Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25658-2003Apr14.html
However, …
Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,937105,00.html
It appears that saner minds managed to get to Bush ahead of the hawks. Then again, anything is now possible.
Surely there is a connection with the Palestinian homeland issue. Israel will yield to negotiate only if certain threats are removed, among them being Saddam and Syria. There’s a familiar aroma of backroom deals having been made.
Not to mention the Rummy-Perle shift of American policy to radicalism. Previously the US world view was this: the US was a country that was first among equals. Now, the US is determined simply to be first, and Syria is an obstruction on that path.
Syria is more tractable than Iraq was. Bashar Assad is an Ophthamologist who landed as leader of the country due to the accidental death of the heir followed by the death of his father. He’s not a megalomaniac like Saddam, trying to build a gloriious new Caliphate. My reading of Assad is that he’s a lightweight who fell into a position of power, and likes the perks.
Syria has been trying to liberalize its economy, however ham-fisted and corrupt the attempt may be. And Syria’s move towards chemical weapons and other asymmetrical warfare methods is not so much as a way to attack neighbors (other than Israel, which can look after itself), but as a way to close the capability gap created by its aging military no longer subsidized by the Soviet Union.
In short, Syria is still a good candidate for negotiation. Leaning on Syria right now is smart, as long as it’s done right. That doesn’t mean there has to be a war, and I think a war would be highly unlikely. More likely, I can see economic pressure doing wonders. Syria is not that heavily invested in chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons like Saddam was, both economically and emotionally. Given the right incentives, I think there’s a possibility for change there.
Collounsbury: All of your examples involve disputes between Arabs and Israelis. That’s a whole 'nuther kettle of fish.
However, if you’ll recall, the big dispute between us was that you said an invasion of Iraq would inflame the Middle East. It would radicalize neighboring countries. It would harden the Mullah’s grip in Iran, and make that problem intractable. There would be riots in the ‘Arab Street’.
I, on the other hand, felt that an invasion of Iraq would calm the Arab street. I felt it would put pressure on Iran, which would respond by opening up further. It would lead to a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, because it would give the U.S. the leverage to lean on Syria, and the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq could give Israel security assurances against attacks from Syria and Lebanon. I predicted liberalization. I said that Iraq was one of the key pieces in the puzzle. Then, you being you, your response was a few pages of hurled invective and insults. I was stupid, uneducated, delusional, partisan, and blind.
You predicted disaster in Iraq. My prediction was a two or three week war, very low civilian casualties. You said the Iraqis would rise up against the Americans, as the force of Arab nationalism overpowered their hatred of Saddam. I, on the other hand, predicted cheering in the streets.
Well, it’s still early in the game, but shall we start a scorecard?
First, Iran:
Iranian Calls For a Vote on Relations With U.S.
The Palestinians:
Palestinians Choose Reformist Cabinet
Israel:
Sharon Hints at Dismantling Settlements
Oh, and North Korea - I’ve been saying that a swift war in Iraq, coupled with pressure on China and South Korea, could lead to a re-opening of multilateral talks, which were much more important than bilateral talks.
North Korea Agrees to Multilateral Talks
The point I’m making, Collounsbury, is that you would do well to learn a little humility. You know a lot about Arab society and culture. You seem to think that gives you an automatic vision of the truth. You fail to recognize that there are many other factors than just culture at work here. Other people have better knowledge than you of military tactics, military history, etc. Plus, your own ideological blinders are seldom mentioned, although you are quick to accuse those who disagree with you of being partisan.
Now, it’s still early. Perhaps your predictions will all come true (except the ones that are already demonstrably wrong). But the fact that things are not progressing in anything like the direction you predicted should give you pause. Perhaps there are other people on this board who’s opinion on the matter are worth something, after all.
And once more, I would like to ask you to tone down the hostility and condescension. If you can’t, please go back to your own thread so that those of us who like to actually enjoy our time off work can avoid you and your insults.
Is it?
I don’t think so. I must point out that you put in evidence no understanding of the psychology and culture of the region, Sam, which is why it’s quite dissappointing to see you make valid points (Syria and diplomatic screws, etc.) often dwarfed by questionable assertions (dispelled by Collounsbury in this case).
The main difficulty with your argument is that, in many respects, it is all the same kettle of fish. What you have now is a region where the defeat of Iraq has spread discontent and humiliation among the regional population, as unlikely a result as that may sound to Western ears. The Great Satan has once again inflicted its imperialist rule on the region it has already harmed so much, brave men were killed by the invaders, and so forth and so forth. It may not make demonstrable sense to a Westerner, but it is happening nonetheless.
Disputes between Arabs and Israelis have everything to do with it. Firstly, we are talking about Arabs and Muslims both, who are to some degree united by their ethnicity and religion in ways more dramatic than other religions or ethnicities. Secondly, without Israel Saddam would have been just another despot. Instead, because he is the only leader who truly stood up to “American and Israeli interests”, he became the default de facto hero of the Arab world, and even his old enemy bin Laden expressed support for his struggle (if not for his person). Why else was Saddam considered a hero across most of the ex-Iraqi Arab world? As for Iraq, well, let’s see how it works out, but I would be cautious of singing success too early, particularly if the UN is marginalized in the administrative and rebuilding phase.
Do not confuse the Arab or Muslim streets with the governments of the region. As you well know, most Arab governments are not always representative of their populations and their wishes. Were it otherwise, I’m guessing tolerance for the US in the region would be drastically lower than it actually is, access much more limited, and state-level opposition rather sturdier.
Collounsbury’s predictions have, in my estimate, been largerly correct as far as popular discontent goes, though fortunately most states have managed to keep a lid on things. As for his political predictions, well there were fewer of those, as he issued warnings and possible scenarios rather than flat out predictions. Governments have a lot to lose, and must toe a difficult line. In a sense they don’t have any choice right now because there is an invasion force dangerously close and, even if it seems unlikely, the possibility of an attack does exist. Do not assume that the governments in question are reforming spontaneously owing to the Iraq war, as you seem to be suggesting. That would be short-sighted.
As for your predictions, I don’t mean to answer them or make predictions of my own, but I think a few warnings are in order.
The above is quite meaningless until we see A) whether it happens at all, and B) what the people say if a referendum does happen, and C) whether it will in fact have an impact. Until then this is the rhetoric of an Iranian ex-leader (no recent ex either) who wants his country to open up and engage in dialogue – a worthy goal, but no fait accompli by any means.
This is a sign of progress, but I’m not sure it should be linked directly to the Iraq situation. The above had been coming for a while, after all – Arafat’s steam ran out long ago, the PA was crushed a number of times, and a new radical government would have spelled more (unnecessary) trouble for Palestinians, especially with the media smoke screen provided by the war in Iraq. After years of brutal suppression under Israel and ineffective attempts by the international community to mitigate Israel’s hardline, the Palestinian authorities were up against a wall. It remains to be seen how radical grups like Hamas etc., will influence the situation, and how the average person will perceive future developments.
What value would a radicalized population perceive in a moderate government?
Interesting interview, but what does it say? That the onus of responsibility is on Palestinian Arabs and that if the Palestinian government A) does as Israel says and B) is successful at doing so, then “the possibility of reaching a settlement exists”. Such tidbits make good PR, but little more, especially coming from someone like Sharon. Let’s see how the radicals in Palestine decide to act – a decision that was likely influenced by the attack on Iraq in a non-favourable manner (again, a question of culture).
And, once again, I would caution you against assuming that war in Iraq necessarily changed North Korea’s tactics. The article you quoted also reports a negotiation expert saying that “Pyongyang’s position may have shifted for reasons besides Iraq, including the intervention of the Chinese and Russians”. The one who is claiming that it’s the war who brought about this “success” is Bush himself, and you’ll forgive me if I treat his words as hot air – self-congratulatory hot air, his average output.
I would also like to answer to the following, though I realize it’s not my place:
Sam, I might as well ask you set up your own thread and stay in there rather than make certain claims all over the place. And, rather than evade Collounsbury’s admittedly sharp barb with evasions and complaints the way you have done in this thread – many of Collounsbury’s objections to your assertions are still standing-- you might consider that your ideology and perceptions of these matters often come across as little better informed than those of hawks, rabid patriots, and similar idiots speaking from positions of ignorance. It makes people with better information angry to read some of the claims you post with such confidence and persistence, and it is especially irritating to see you at work with a broad brush when it is obvious you do not have a clear grasp on the culture and psychology at work in the region. You may or may not know a lot about military history and similar matters, but look at what you wrote:
Strictly speaking a cultural phenomenon, wouldn’t you say? Something better examined in the light of grassroots psychology (with an aim to fixing the problem) than military precedents (which would have the aim of exterminating the problem, quite frankly a fantasy, a hardliner wet dream).
Finally, I support Collounsbury’s objections concerning the shifting standards of evidence you employ depending on the subject at hand, something Col has pointed out more than once. Is it surprising that you draw fire with such strategies?
On Hashemi Rafsanjani: “no recent ex-leader” was a phrase that slipped past preview without the elaboration I intended. What I meant to say was that his relevance seemed questionable since 1993 or possibly earlier, making him over a decade past his glory days. He was barred from re-election in 1996 or 97 if I remember correctly, so he is in fact a fairly recent ex.
I am for the war and liberation of Iraq, I could justify invading Syria BUT not until we have a stable, republic, US loving government in Iraq.
If you mean never, kanicbird, just come right out and say it.
And WTF should Syria NOT have WMD’s as deterrence to Israel’s WMD’s?
I have to agree with Sam here, he didn’t suggest that any Middle East generals felt that way, but it was a part of Islamic Extremists propaganda. Its a lot easier to recruit some cannon fodder guerillias if they think US soldiers are soft and cowardly. Now the US has wiped the floor with the Taliban and the Iraqi army, with both of them stating in the weeks before conflict the generic threats of religious victory (hmm…roasted stomachs… sounds like haggis). I don’t think it helps the fanatics that they have been saying the exact same thing for decades. The swift victory in iraq is a huge propaganda success for the US, it may not have made them any friends but you can bet Iran and Syria will play nicer now the US army is next door.
I love these, my favourite is :
In the interests of accuracy it should be noted that there are currently 5 Carrier battle groups on rotation at the moment which are launching sorties into Iraq. 3 are in the Red Sea and 2 are in the Eastern Mediterranean. It’s the Red Sea groups which are preparing to send 2 of ‘em to sail home. But the two battle groups 40 kilometers off Syria’s coast ain’t goin’ anywhere soon I rather think. They were the ones which required overflight rights over Turkey.
Their very presence is ominous enough I suspect. But as Tamerlane so sagely pointed out recently, nobody really wants a piece of the US Military at the moment. Nobody wants that sorta pain.
Abe:
Well, yes and no. The Israeli situation IS different, in that it is rooted in anti-semitism. That Israel is a special case can be seen by the great length the U.S. has gone to to keep Israel out of any conflicts the U.S. is involved in. There is much more tolerance for the U.S. in the Middle East than there is for Israel.
As for the humiliation, that’s true, and it’s an important factor. However, the U.S. could play this smart, still. If this eventually gets portrayed not as a humiliating defeat of an Arab nation, but as the liberation of an Arab nation hijacked by a criminal, then it could work to the U.S.'s benefit. I don’t think Arabs have sorted out their feelings on this yet - the most common description for their state of mind right now is not humiliation, but shock. Many in the Arab world bought into the belief that Saddam would wipe the floor with the Americans. This was a wake-up call. In other words, the Arabs may wind up feeling humiliated, but humilation regarding their own governments. And that’s the way it should be - Iraq has a glorious history, and Saddam stomped all over it and repressed the people. The U.S. saved them from that, and freed them to rebuild their own great culture. If the liberation of Iraq comes to be seen in that light in the Arab world, it’ll be a huge win for the United States.
In my opinion, the stakes have always been in the reconstruction of Iraq, and not the war. Anyone who has studied the military capability of both countries would have known this would be a cakewalk, militarily. I was confident there would be no quagmire. It was also totally predictable that the people would cheer their liberators. Even the looting was predictable (and probably cathartic and a good thing, in a sense - although the U.S. should have done a better job protecting key points like the museum and hospitals). Looting and chaos has always followed a liberation. It always dies down, and then reconstruction can begin.
But that’s the sticky part. Iraq could go badly still, in a number of ways. And the satisfaction of the Iraqi people matters greatly in forming the opinion of the Arab Street on what actually happened in Iraq. If the country remains peaceful and the Americans don’t botch it up and wind up with a civil war, this will turn out fine. The Iraqis aren’t about to portray themselves as a people beaten by the Americans. They’ll portray themselves as the heirs of a great civilization temporarily held hostage by Saddam, who was ultimately weak and flawed. That he was overthrown by U.S. military power is not a commentary on the Iraqi people.
This is a good point. But it cuts both ways. For example, I think we’d both agree that the current Jordanian government is far more supportive of the United States than is the population of that country. Opposition to a war in Iraq is running as high as 90% in Jordan, yet the government has been quietly supporting U.S. efforts.
On the other hand, the anti-Americanism of Saddam’s government was clearly not shared by the people of Iraq, because they were completely under the thumb of a dictator. It’s clear today just who they blamed for their misfortune, and it wasn’t Uncle Sam. And the mullahs in Iran are far more anti-American than are the people.
No, it’s meaningful because it’s a barometer of opinion on the street. If the Iranians had in fact hardened their position against the U.S. and turned Anti-American, we wouldn’t be hearing suggestions like this from the leaders. And a referendum, if held, would surely pass. A huge percentage of Iranians want closer ties with the United States. Over 70%.
The other articles I linked were not offered as proof of direct ties to the Iraq war, or as fait accomplis. But again, that they are all popping up now is a sign of an Arab Street that is becoming receptive to dialogue.
North Korea: Yes, it’s being leaned on by China and South Korea. That was the U.S. strategy. The U.S. has been pressuring China and South Korea into entering talks with North Korea, to avoid the ‘bilateral trap’. That’s why the U.S. refused to enter negotiations directly with North Korea - a strategy many on this board have been deriding as ‘ignoring’ North Korea. It looks like that strategy is bearing fruit. And it looks like Iraq may have been a factor in bringing North Korea to the table, for two reasons - one, the rapid success scared a lot of people who had fooled themselves into believing that their large conventional militaries could put up a fight, and two, because until the Iraq war was over the U.S. military was pretty busy, and that gave tiny Korean Elvis room to manoever. Now that the war is over, the U.S. is free to park a few more carriers in the Sea of Japan if it needs to, or ship a few hundred thousand troops and armor to South Korea. So KJI is out of time, and right now it looks like he’s going to deal.
And let me add that I don’t think I’ve got a monopoly on the ‘truth’ any more than anyone else here. These are just my hopefully informed opinions. I’m perfectly willing to modify my position on many things if given the evidence. And I must say, Collounsbury has done more to modify my position on matters in the Middle East than anyone else, because it’s clear that he knows what he’s talking about. And he may still prove to be right - the real change in Iraq is just beginning, and there’s still plenty of time for everything to go to hell.
so what you’re saying is that the Palestinians should be grateful because Sharon is considering to dismantle illegal settlements on their own land? They should be happy they’re getting a minuscule part of their own country back.
Well ofcourse they should be.
Bad, bad Palestinians! :rolleyes:
No he’s not saying that at all… He’s merely quoted a link to an article. YOU are the one who is deliberately interpreting Sam’s post to mean something which you would dearly choose to argue about.
Sam’s post, that you’ve quoted here, was quite innocuous. More importantly, it was factual.
If you must argue with your fellow Doper’s elfje, at least do us the courtesy of taking them to task over what they ACTUALLY said, as averse to what you you would have liked them to have said.
** elfje:** The point, elfje, is that post-Iraq war, both the Palestinians and Israelis are beginning to move from their original, hardened positions. You may think it’s not much that Sharon is hinting at offering the settlements, but it’s a BIG change from previous Israeli policy. It’s a start.
And I don’t recall saying anything bad about the Palestinians at all. Where did you get that from?
Sam reply
It really doesn’t matter what Bashar al-Assad is, he is not the power, the power is the found in the Generals. Moreover, our dear ‘Opthamologist’ has shown few signs of moderation in recent years, indeed has appeared to be slipping into the same crafty habits of his father. It is not a matter of liking the perks, Sam, it is a matter of there being no exit, no exit at all. Of course, the al-Assad have never been loose canons like Sadaam.
Well, done right is the bloody key, isn’t it? Frightening them away from reform into a lockdown mode where acquisition of theater weapons for self defense is neither necessary nor particularly useful. Syria, until very recently showed ever sign of trying to inch away from its past, including cooperation on al-Qaeda. This is going to melt away now.
First of all Sam, that is bullshit, on both ends of the sentence. Only Lebanon (in part) and the Occupied Territories are examples of Israel and the Arabs, Algeria, Yemen etc. are not, neither is Egypt, as the negative ‘success’.
Nor is the Arab-Israeli conflict another kettle of fish, not in any way is another kettle of fish. It all gets back to pride, prestige and desire for self-respecting and land. It is not, as you later claim, simply a question of ‘anti-Semitism’. Anti-semitism is a lever, but the more important levers are those of colonial versus native – Palestinians, Muslim and Xian alike view the Israeli state as a colonial intervention – and the fact of lost land. Land is a bloody obsession here (which explains many ludicrously stupid real estate developments, insofar as only land is felt to be a ‘real’ investment. That of course goes to a whole range of socio-economic issues and instability).
Indeed, and I see every sign of radicalization, there were indeed riots in the streets – perhaps you missed Midaan Tahrir being taken over in the first week and vehicles burning? Or does Fox not show such discouraging imagery. I saw it live myself. I also saw, for the first time I might say, people fighting with the secret police to prevent individuals from being dragged off to the secret prisons of our dearest Allies in Democracy…. Nice sight that Sam, a wonderful sight. The security response by the local governments has been omnipresent and iron fisted.
We shall have to see on the issue of Iran, however I will freely predict a muscular policy that plays into Iranian nationalist reaction will play into the hands of the Conservatives and Reactionaries in Iran, and weaken reformers hands.
Well, your first prediction was flat out wrong, Sam my man, flat out wrong. Anti-Americanism is seething, people are angry and frustrated, and the boycott of American goods seems to be spreading as far as the data I can find shows.
Now, on let us move on. Pressure on Iran, I see no results yet at all. You quote one sally, I see no results. Jury out.
Now on the Palestine issue: we have no road map published yet, Sharon making hazy statements about “some” settlements having to go, but of course only if “Palestinian violence” completely stops – in other words a pretend position as he has all along. The PA reform is (a) not done yet and (b) still dependent on something happening, else it is as dead as anything prior. Not to mention of course it was pre-war in gestation, so I hardly see how it is magically the result of the war. But let me get back to this in detail.
I predicted and predict the war in Iraq is a medium to long term disaster for US policy, unless the reconstruction period is masterfully handled. I find it deeply annoying that reading comprehension or desire to misread is so deep as to result in this continuous mischaracterization. Now on the civilian casualties, we don’t know quite as yet, nor are there plans to know either. I grant civilian casualties have been minimized, but from the Iraqi and Arab points of view, they have also been non-trivial. As I believe I was categorical about, the problem is political, not raw numbers. I direct the reader who wants something other than Sam’s tendentious resume to my thread for a real overview. On the point of nationalism, I indicated that I saw Arab nationalist response on the rise and noted that as a danger, indeed with busloads of Iraqi exiles returning and volunteerism getting boosted as the Battle for Baghdad approached, the dangers were mounting. As luck would have it, the regime folded, mysteriously and rather suddenly after a month of oddly dogged resistance. I note I indicated, and let me quote, “The war, although going badly() will be won in a purely military sense. However, military victories are themselves utterly meaningless if they do not achieve real political objectives. The frequently cited rubbish about ‘could have won in Vietnam’ is an example of such myopic pseudo-realism.”*. Cheering in the streets, see my thread on that issue once more for something of a less tendentious read of the events to date.
Yes, let’s Sam, let’s. Although given your capacity for spin I should very much like an arbiter with less Fliescher like capacities.
Yes Sam, let’s see what actually comes of this, shall we not? I can point you to recent FT reporting which quote reformist camp people indicating they can never recognize a US installed government in Iraq, and of course let us leave aside the conservatives rhetoric. A one off comment, above all one that comes in the context of continued power struggles that the Conservatives have been winning is not an adequate test.
The remainder on the PA issue and Israel I will address separately.
May be so, Sam, maybe so, however I at least do not go on repeating utter and errant nonsense as in your carping anti-French comments. Whatever I may or may not be, I feel I am a fair reader of the facts – for example never getting into the idiocy of “War for Oil” or other partisan carping. Everyone has a point of view, partisanship is shaping the facts and spinning. For example on that issue, let me illustrate, in addition to the French contracts I have called you on multiple times, may I point to the inanity of blaming the French for the nuclear dossier idiocy, on the slim basis that the French intelligence services may have passed these items on to British and American intelligence, and ludicrously implying somehow the French set up the Americans and Brits. I should say this is only believable if one posits gross incompetence on the part of the CIA analysts – I know enough these folks to reject this – and simultaneously French knowledge of that incompetence, and thinking the CIA et al are utter dupes. Only a shrill partisan desperate to avoid the conclusion that some faction in the two administrations was looking to fabricate a stronger case would be able to concoct such a tortured explanation, when the reality looks rather more like ordinary intelligence sharing (insofar as the French as well as the Americans could have done a better job of cooking the books than that dossier). It could hardly be the French fault that some people in DC and London either (a) went for utter shit hook line and sinker or (b) thought they could pimp utter shit and not get caught.
I claimed, as I noted, no expertise in military tactics or anything of the sort, my commentary has focused on the political, and the social.
Give me a bloody break. My statements were of two different natures, warnings on arising issues, and predictions about problems. Insofar as I correctly identified those issues, I would say I am on target: we do and did see Iraqi nationalist response, we do see a lack of a fulsome flower throwing welcome across a wide spectrum, and we do see a wide spread anti-Americanism in the region. The point I was off on, and this was merely a sidelight to the main focus of my thread, was my later sense that the regime might last out longer than expected. Indeed it did, then mysteriously collapsed.
On those matters I am intending to predict, that is where the problems will occur and the resultant communitarian tensions, I would say I am doing well. Much as Afghanistan looks like my predictions, and not yours, now one year down the road. My commentary has been consistently looking to the medium term, not the next week’s results, ex- the sudden collapse in Baghdad which indeed was a surprise.
Further in response to Abe, Sam writes
Primo: It is a humiliating defeat and I lay odds 100 to one it being portrayed as “liberation” of an Arab nation in the wider Arab world. I do not see any circumstances in which the present Administration allows for an Iraqi government that is going to be responsive to the locals in regards to political desires. Shiites clearly are going for, to use a clear example, a religiously influenced, even based government, and seeking the power long denied them. The Kurds scheming for de facto independence, while politely toeing the public line, the Sunnis in defensive reaction to both Kurd and Shiite, look to a central state in their tradition.
The humiliation in regards to their own governments is already there Sam, that is nothing new at all. However those self-same governments are largely US allies: Egypt, Jordan, even Yemen and of course those bastions of democracy in the Gulf. The issue of humiliation runs to the lack of choice, and the clear impotence of any Arab regime before US power, as well as the startling hypocrisy the US has engaged in so far with its rhetoric of democratization in stark contrast with the support for pseudo-democracies such as Egypt as part of the ‘War on Terror.’ Nor will this change, Sam my boy, for any democratic government in the region, freely elected, is not going to be pro-US and is going to be deeply influenced by Islamism. Why Sam is this so clear? Because the secular elites are all, all, discredited with the populaces, for their narrow self-serving internal politics, their corruption, their support for repression etc. Secularism has died back because it has failed politically and delivered shit. The masses support, in large part, some kind of Islamic government. Now the ideas about that government are often self-contradictory and hazy, but that is what would get elected, Islamists of some stripe. Should you have a glimmer of honest reflection you will admit that this current administration has no intention of letting that run its course.
So, the humiliation is two fold – anger at the US for imposing “democracy” – something everyone knows will be subject to larger US interests rather than popular will, given the track record to date, while feeling quite free to support autocracies – Jumrakiyat in Said Ed-Dine Ibrahim’s brilliant formulation (Republikarchies to quasi-translate, combing the words for Republic and Monarchy).
Now as to the belief that Sadaam would defeat the US – no I do not think many bought into that belief. Some substantial portion of the unlettered masses may have hoped it was possible, but few really thought it, ex-the Palestinians who are so down-trodden they seize on the most ridiculous hopes out of desperation. What many clearly were happy about was some Arab nation finally fighting the US and at least giving for a few weeks, despite long odds and a terrible mismatch, some semblance of really doing something. This sort of commentary I heard even from normally pro-American Arabs, Xian and Muslim. A sense of empowerment, a sense of finally someone doing the ‘honorable’ thing rather than backing down like a beaten cur. Such is the depth of the anger towards the US government and policies, the sense of frustration that popular opinion is not translated into policy – that regardless of popular anger towards Israel – which is very real for all that it contains displaced anger as well – no government dares even break off relations in protest. Even folks who are not particularly anti-Israeli or Jewish would like to see more response from their governments. This is merely illustrative of the sense of humiliation, the events have fed into the reservoir of opinion that says normal politics and normal state action can do nothing to change the US. Maybe things can be pulled off, although I believe that the emerging chaos amply illustrates the deep problems. Perhaps by some extraordinary chain of events things will go right, but the immediate result is deeper frustration and a conviction, as I have heard to date, that normal politics can not result in real change. These are hard holes to climb out of, possible but very hard.
Well more accurately most military defeats result in chaos, and the errors in not protecting key cultural sites are a real setback for the US image (already that of an uncultured heathen) among the middle classes who were proud of their history and past achievements (right up to the 1970s). The “people” cheering were of certain segments of society, the oppressed. One need only have followed some more balanced news channels to have seen a broader array of opinion (e.g. French and German and Arab international channels) with a predominate reaction of bemusement and profoundly mixed feelings. Cheering liberators, some, many cheering the new guys with guns, and others sullenly looking on. However, I have provided a fuller overview in my thread.
If Sam will look to something other than Fox he might find something perhaps a little less self-congratulatory, and far more grey. As I pointed out so many times before: there is in no real sense of the word an Iraqi people with anything like a general POV. As far as can be ascertained via the information at hand, those cheering the soldiers were the poorest of the Shiites – much in the same manner as that profile was the looters. Interviews with middle class and Sunnis showed little cheering, at best ambivalent attitudes. Not support for Sadaam but deep dislike for the presence of American troops – reinforced of course by the opinion that the Americans had deliberately allowed and even fostered the destruction of Iraqi historical and cultural treasures so as to cut the people off from their history. The common prejudice being that Americans have no history and no culture (in the manner an educated Arab usually uses the word) and so disrespect others.
In short, it is not clear today who Iraqis blamed for their misfortune or will blame for their misfortunes in any sense of the word. What is clear is that there are severe ethno-religious fractures in society, and as one can see in the wider body of evidence on reactions to the invasion and now occupation, even among the Shiites the dominant sentiment as captured in the demos and common man on the street interviews I have seen on A2, TV5, DeutcheWelle, Abu Dhabi, al-Jazeerah, al-Arabiyah has been ‘Thanks for getting ride of Sadaam, now bugger off as soon as possible.” No small number of persons explicitly blame, in these interviews, both America and Sadaam.
Of course perhaps this is all less accurate than some shots of people celebrating on Day 22 or so and Sam’s airy assertions of what the people think.
Now this has gone on far too long, I have some quarterly reporting to extract from some lying bastards.
Now, let me illustrate why I find Sharon’s recent declaration “non-news” except insofar as it is part of his larger and regrettably masterful manipulation of the gullible and the willfully blind.
As a point of departure let us look to Sharmila Devi’s reporting from Israel for The Financial Times such as “Rift over ‘road map’ interpretation” Sharmila Devi, et al 19 Mar 2003:
First let us note that before the news Sam cites as a result of the war predates the war, that is the anointing of a new PM Abu Mazen. As noted in the article “The Palestinian parliament yesterday [n.b. 18 March] approved powers for a new prime minister after winning a concession from Yassir Arafat, the Palestinian leader, that is expected to lead to the formal presentation by the US this week of a “road map” for Middle East peace.”
The article in question however notes that “European diplomats accused the Bush administration of in effect destroying the [negotiations] road map, by what they saw as US willingness to allow Israel to propose changes that would make it impossible to implement the plan in any reasonable manner.” – the movement on the road map is hardly due to the war, except in the negative sense that suddenly the Bush administration feels it has to pay attention. As noted in the article “The road map, drafted after long negotiations with both sides and already widely circulated, sets out incremental measures leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state by 2005. The Palestinians have fully accepted it, but Israel objects to many details, including the call for a freeze in settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.”
As we can see from this article, before the war, the situation is already where is is now, except Sharon has a new little game to play, “accepting” theoretically, as he has in the past, a Palestinian state and “some” settlement plays, but imposing standards that will never be met. But let us return to that.
Now on the magical world of benchmarks, it is notable Blair aimed for ‘publication’ of the road map “once Mahmoud Abbas was confirmed in office as Palestinian prime minister.” This of course rather slipped, as new little benchmarks emerged, the ever slipping goal posts. (see also “Abbas begins forming cabinet” Sharmila Devi Financial Times 20 Mar 2003) It should of course be noted the Palestinians are about 2 weeks behind in the Cabinet selection, which in this area is just about on time. The same article notes “Saeb Erekat, chief Palestinian negotiator, said in an opinion piece in the Financial Times this week that for the US to be credible it must implement the road map and “not simply issue another draft and allow it to be delayed by endless Israeli demands and conditions”.” Funny that, for new conditions to the road map is precisely what emerged.
Once more let me rely on an article by Sharmila Devi from FT to illustrate: “Israeli stance casts doubts on peace plan” Sharmila Devi 7 Apr 2003, which illustrates the game to which I refer above, and why I find it laughable you think there is some real movement because of Sharon’s announcement, tied to the war. Agitprop. “Israel on Sunday reiterated its refusal to resume peace negotiations while under Palestinian terrorist fire, casting doubt on the future of a plan being pushed by London, the European Union, the United Nations and some US officials.” Sounds nice, but as has been said many times before on this board, this is really an excuse, given the PA has no means to control all the factions, and any wildcat action blows it all up. See the entire Northern Ireland issue for a counter example. In addition, the article notes “Israeli officials have also outlined their objections to the “road map” - which calls for a Palestinian state by 2005 after a number of parallel measures are achieved, including an end to Palestinian violence and easing of conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. …… While the US has said the road map will be formally unveiled within the next couple of weeks - after the inauguration of the new Palestinian government headed by Mahmoud Abbas, known as Abu Mazen – *Israel is resisting any implementation of the plan in its present form. Numerous changes that Israel is demanding include diluting the call for a total freeze on Jewish settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. *” No surprise there, for in fact these have been the standard positions for the song and dance Sharon has played. Nota bene the article also draws attention to this “Israeli analysts say the White House is unlikely to risk antagonising the Jewish and Christian fundamentalist lobbies by forcing Israel to implement the road map Colin Powell, US secretary of state, said last week that the road map was not open to change but acknowledged it could not be “imposed” on both sides.”
In short, the PA moderate faction is about to get fucked again. They get out in front of an angry pop, begin concessions, and then things drag along
One can hardly be encouraged by a government (Sharon’s) that characterizes Blair’s efforts as unbalanced as the Gov spokesman indicated ““A country that adopts such unbalanced positions cannot expect to have its voice attended to seriously,” Mr Weisglass said.” As the PA spokeswoman said ““Israel’s approach has always been to accept proposals in theory but to reject them in practice,” said Diana Buttu, a Palestinian spokeswoman. “While Israel claims that it accepts the road map, we already see that Israel intends to delay the implementation of its obligations.”” The generalization is too strong but fits the Sharon modus operendi to a T.
We can get yet another fullish look at recent developments through “Palestinians attempt new peace drive” Sharmila Devi FT 14 Apr 2003: On the essentials we find Abu Mazen stuck in a struggle with Arafat’s old guard over a few appointments, and note the goal posts: “Washington has promised to present the “road map”, which outlines security and reform measures leading to a Palestinian state by 2005, as soon as Mr Abbas, known as Abu Mazen, presents his new government.” The article notes “Israel, backed by the US, has said any progress towards peace is dependent on the Palestinians sidelining Mr Arafat and making efforts to contain militant groups. Mr Arafat’s opposition to the new cabinet is focused on the appointment of Mohammad Dahlan, who has clashed with Mr Arafat but is backed by Israel and the US, as security chief.” Dahlan, will he have the cred?
Further to the issue of the meaning of Sharon’s remarks, “his seemingly conciliatory stance in a newspaper interview towards the eventual dismantling of illegal Jewish settlements in the occupied territories,” as FT noted “Sharon was careful to state in the interview in Ha’aretz newspaper that any discussion of a settlement freeze was a final-status issue.” Final status, far away, and only after many hurdles, nice and theoretical, and easily derailed. As noted, the “road map calls for a settlement freeze in the first stage and Dov Weisglass, Mr Sharon’s aide, is in Washington outlining Israel’s proposed amendments to the plan. These include making the Palestinians give up the right of return for those made refugees in the 1948 Israeli war of independence before any new negotiations can start. “In the eyes of the Palestinian moderates, the right of return is their main bargaining chip in the negotiations for a comprehensive agreement,” said an editorial in the Israeli Yediot Ahronoth daily.”
Nice game that, make the other side give up any and all bargaining chips before you even agree to potentially speak to them. In other words, unless magically your little neo-Con clique sees the light on balance, there is not going to be any progress, only more of the same.
We can see similar notes from “Israel would yield settlements for peace” Reuters 13 April 2003 “Israeli reservations about the road map focus on its prescription for parallel steps by each side rather than an initial, total end to violence by Palestinians, and on its timetable for a state without guarantees of “performance” by Palestinians on their end of the deal. Palestinians want a formula of reciprocal steps that would require Israel to freeze settlement-building and withdraw forces from Palestinian towns from the start of the process. Another objection, Sharon said, was Israel’s position that Palestinians must give up the right of refugee return to what is now the Jewish state, a demand Palestinians call a non-starter.”
I further profer the 7 April, 2003 “Analysis: Gearing up for the ‘road map’” by Barbara Plett BBC
On the road map and ‘progress’ “From an Israeli point of view this involves efforts to change the terms of the much vaunted “road map” to peace, from a Palestinian point of view it involves making the most of a bad deal.” Brilliant. Resume: “The road map is a three phase diplomatic plan drawn up by the Americans, Europeans, Russians, and United Nations (the so called quartet) meant to lead to a full Israeli Palestinian peace treaty in three years.”
Of particular note on the reality of progress, she notes: “The reservations as published in Israeli newspapers involve some conditions no Palestinians would accept - such as relinquishing the right of return for Palestinian refugees. For this reason some observers have suggested what the Israelis are really trying to do is sink the road map.”
Also note: “They are also annoyed that its publication was not as imminent as Mr Bush indicated: first it was tied to the appointment of a new Palestinian prime minister, now to the moment when he announces his cabinet.” And after?
I also point Sam to this analysis, from 31 March, 2003, “Analysis: Israel’s ‘road map’ manoeuvres” by James Reynolds (BBC)
More of the same dance that we have seen for the past ten years, pretend negotiations?
Sam posted the link to this article, in a series of factual posts to argue that US intervention in the Middle East was going to calm the region down. The article states how Ariel Sharon thinks about dismantling the illegal settlements (he’s against it), that Israel set up in the last few years in the West Bank. And seeing that the US isn’t really “leaning hard” on Israel, and stil is targetting Israel’s main enemy’s (Syria, Lebanon), I think that US intervention in that region is going to have the opposite effect, as far as the Israel-Palestine conflict is concerned. (you will notice it was the only thing I quoted out of his first post)
And no, Sam Stone, you did not say anywhere that the Palestinians were bad, I’m deeply sorry for being ironic there, but if you have followed the conflict from the beginning, you should have realised what a slap in the face Ariel Sharon’s stance on “peace” was for the Palestinians. According to him, they need to give up everything before he will even think about doing something in return (and he’s always very vague as to what it actually is he’ll do for them).
I find that a bit rich, actually, I find it disgusting that a man with morals like that, is allowed to rule a country. And the open support Israel gets from the US, is not going to endear them to the Arabs.
Anti-Jewish feelings do run high in the Arab world, generally speaking, in part because of perceived injustices suffered by Arabs and Muslims at the hands of Israel and its sponsors. Not because of some indigenous and inexplicable fundamental streak of anti-Jewish sentiment, but rather for historical and cultural reasons.
It is true that the USA is probably more tolerated than Israel, but consider what the USA does for the Arab world, and what Israel does. There is a great and significant disparity because at the end of the day the US does provide aid to a number of Arab countries, it does support significant regional trade and development, it does have a history of occasionally doing the right thing (e.g. 1991, when Arab countries were convinced to join ranks with the US to free Kuwait). Israel is simply a thorn in the side of the Arab world, presenting no direct benefits whatsoever (quite the opposite, it can be argued) and therefore eliciting a more dramatic, visceral even, response than the US.
It’s a mistake to write off the Arab world’s reaction to Israel as simply “anti-Semitic” and leave it at that. As always, there are clear reasons for cultural patterns, and self-justifying labels like anti-semitic make the waters murkier even though the way they are bandied around suggests they are somehow intended to explain everything.
Yes, definitely. Although almost everything aside from the rapid execution of the war has been bungled so far, there is certainly the possibility to get on the right course again, and on this particular topic Collounsbury will no doubt be able to provide more valuable insight. However I disagree with the following paragraph, which I am breaking up:
Humiliation, anger, and, yes, shock. In my opinion a doubly dangerous mix, and it may be difficult to appreciate the depth of the humiliation and anger of some groups at present without direct experience of such, but I for one have witnessed it, and the anti-Americanism streaking through the Arab world would seem to support my conclusion. That is not to say the entire Arab world feels that way, but one must be extremely wary of strong popular currents of anti-Americanism now more than ever.
As an aside, this was partly attributable to the surprisingly effective propaganda campaign put up by Iraq, and in no small part thanks to the Iraqi information minister’s remarkable performance during the war. From a communications point of view, I was very impressed with al-Sahaf’s performance (he is rumoured to have committed suicide btw).
Well, it would be nice, but this is very, very optimistic thinking, especially if you think that injuries to pride, nationalism, etc., can be deflected so easily. Iraqis may come around to such a point of view – that may well be possible and to some extent is happening, since the weight of Saddam has been lifted from Iraqi necks. Reconstruction will be crucial, as you mention later. But it is quite another thing to convince the entire Arab world that humiliation and anger (the severity of which you may perhaps not understand fully) should be swallowed or forgot, and such is not the visible trend at the moment. In addition, how the post-war administration goes will be a fulcrum too, for Iraqis and Arabs in general. Serious UN involvement will be necessary to help placate anger.
Note that the above difficulties would have been much mitigated had the Bushites managed to score a couple points in the diplomatic process, rather than barging forward in hare-brained, unilateral, might-makes-right, we are America neo-con fashion.
And imagine if Bush had taken significant leadership and responsibility for the Palestinian problem before embarking on his Iraqi quest – he would have appeared to have at least the semblance of equity, of sincerity and consistence, in Arab eyes.
I imagine we will be seeing a very strong propaganda effort from the US communicating much of what you state in your message, but US propaganda hasn’t proven terribly effective so far, and convincing the Arab street – well, let’s wait and see, but I am not terribly optimistic on this point, especially if governments start tottering. According to Eddin Ibrahim, a sociologist at Cairo’s American university, Egyptian religious fundamentalists (until recently vigorously kept away from matters of state) have a chance at winning as much as 40% of parliamentary seats in a fair election. These guys would definitely be anti-American, and I see the numbers getting worse before they get better.
That’s terrifying, and Egypt is not alone by any means. So even if Arabs do come to believe that this was a benevolent liberation without ulterior motives (HIGHLY unlikely), and even if they do direct their humiliation and anger at their governments as you suggest, that isn’t a move for the better, because the governments are more US-friendly than anything the people are likely to erect in the present climate.
Well, we can hope, but the above really depends on a number of “ifs”, and we must remember the highly fractional nature of Iraq’s population: Kurds, Turkomans, Sunni elite, Shia majority, etc. Saddam might well have been a more ruthless version of Tito, holding together a nation in spite of itself, and his abrupt removal could have an accelerated effect of what happened in Yugoslavia. I’m not predicting that will happen, but there are serious diffculties on the path ahead.
The same may be said of many Arab nations, not just Jordan; in spite of vocal opposition, the governments of Arab countries usually exhibited some form of cooperation with the USA in recent months. The governments that are usually considered so incompetent and evil are the friends of the USA. The problem is that generally the people of those nations are not. Yet we expect these same people to realize that their governments are the evil they ought to feel humiliated about, the same governments that supported US efforts against fellow Arabs and Muslims? Confusing messages.
Not likely, certainly not in the short term.
Yes, the Iraqis had more than enough to worry about domestically without getting excessively emotionally involved with the plight of the Palestinians or the evilness of the US – perhaps Saddam did do some good after all (!). I would further suggest that it is not yet clear what is happening; Iraqis may be euphoric that Saddam is gone and will allow anti-Americanism to creep ahead once things settle down, in spite of a certain gratitude for the removal of the tyrant.
As for Iran, a slightly different question, not the least aspect of which is that Iranians aren’t Arabs and therefore identify with the plight of the Palestinians rather less than Arabs do, which may account for the relatively (note emphasis) moderate philosophy that is widespread (but by no means the rule) among the population as far as America is concerned. Still, the string of “Axis of Evil” idiocies served to distance many Iranians, first and foremost the youth, and played right into the hands of the fanatics and totalitarians.
Let’s look again at why some people object to this Iraqi exercise. Context as always is important, and the context of the Iraq war is not a very good-looking one. I could understand your expectations if what had happened was a simple case of America going in and liberating Iraqis from an oppressive regime. That is not what the context was, such was merely one of the results and the latest ad hoc justification provided by the US, who had failed to make a convincing case based on other grounds. The real context involves a number of unpleasantries, such as alternately trying to strong-arm the UN into legitimizing the war, or trying to win an argument using twisted logic and false evidence.
These unpleasantries won very few friends in the Middle East, to put it mildly, and just as few around the world. Let’s not look at this through rose-tintend glasses and pretend it is simply about liberating a people, as admirable an outcome as that is. This is about the USA being perceived as a tyrannical loose cannon more prepared to put down Arabs and Muslims rather than rein in Israeli hardliners, even though the latter are led by a “war criminal” who went out of his way to disenfranchise the Palestinian people, who supports apartheid and similar lovely practices, and who has demonstrated his intent of snatching even more Arab land from its owners. Such (and more along those lines) is the context you have to consider when gauging the mood of the Middle East, and when attempting to understand the powerless rage of many Arabs (and even Muslims).
Iran, as mentioned, is somewhat of an exception – before the Revolution it was (like some other places in the Middle East used to be) a surprisingly “Western” nation. Throw in the traditional rivalry between Persians and Arabs and you have a curious situation indeed. I won’t make predictions, as I said, but I must note that Hashemi Rafsanjani, although still an advisor, is an ex-leader, and not even a top-tier leader at that. The president in Iran has to defer to the Ayatollah, who is the supreme leader as far as anything is concerned. The current president, Khatami, supports reformists and has for years – but that hasn’t ushered in any significant reforms, because he simply does not have the power. That’s not very promising.
So what does it mean that the Iranian people appear to be in support of dialogue with the US? I am not sure to tell the truth. It may be an indication of a softening up, but it could just as well be a popular expression of fear and concern that what happened to Iraq does not happen to Iran. My vote is on the latter.
As far as Sharon goes, I would be very wary of trusting that repulsive carrion-bird. I confess I have to look into the situation a bit deeper and have not the time right now, but don’t take anything that man “hints at” at face value, as I urged in my previous post. History as well as common sense suggest caution.
As for North Korea, I see no evidence of any cunning strategy whatsoever, and I must point out that the US hardly needed to pressure South Korea into entering talks with its neighbour! They’d been trying for years, experiencing setbacks often brought about by US foreign policy.
Loosely speaking, first Bush alarmed North Korea with the Axis of Evil foolishness. North Korea was clearly stung. As soon as Bush began the last stages of his push for war, Dear Leader saw his opportunity and began engaging in (effectively) nuclear blackmail, demanding immunity for his country, special consideration, etc. Bush backed off, refused all talks, and concentrated on Iraq, itself not a demonsrable problem, not a clear and present danger, while Dear Leader openly admitted the nuclear program was being revamped, marched his million-strong army up and down the nation, and polished off the batteries of missiles aimed at Seoul. The region starts sweating.
Reckless. Simply reckless. And I ought to know, having experienced the jitters and uncertainty around these parts.
Japan starts to discuss military protection, missile tests, and a program of missile defence, something that clearly infuriated and worried Dear Leader and a few others. Prompted by this military escalation, China is finally successful at convincing North Korea to discuss the situation and stop making demands. End result: North Korea gets their talks with the USA, and South Korea and Japan – two key players-- are not invited.
I am not sure that the above is any kind of strategy – it is simply ignoring the issue, and dumping into Asia’s lap an unnecessary problem.
No more time today, I must rush, but I think I hit most of the points I wanted to make.
ON PREVIEW: I started this post then had to sit through hours of the most boring of meetings, came back to finish the last paragraphs, and it looks like Collounsbury has written a few responses to Sam. I apologize if we addressed the same points, but his posts weren’t there when I was typing, I swear!
By the way to my last knowledge (2 yrs now) Saad Eddine Ibrahim is at American University in Cairo
Good guy, we shamefully let him rot in jail unitl after 11 Sep