The full testimony of Kaye can be viewed here:
The purpose of this thread is to examine the Kaye report in as nonpartison and unbiased fashion as possible and see what conclusions can be drawn from it with regard to the status of WMDs in Iraq as well as the US administration’s stance before the war:
I’m going to try to cover it in sections and take a representative quote from them as each point is made.
Section 1 Tentative
As has been pointed out by Mr. Svinlesha in a previous thread, the tentativeness of this report and its presentation as a work in progress is at odds to earlier statements about presenting a clear and definitive picture which this report was billed as.
Clearly, had they found large quantities of WMDs the report would by now be definitive. The failure to present a definitive report is itself a telling fact, despite the validity of mitigating circumstances described.
Kaye lists six reasons why the effort is being hindered. While some have validity others are representing a transition in the nature of what is being searched for as well as it’s scope.
Section 2 Positive Findings
A strong case is presented for concealment in violation of the UN resolution and their inspectors. The nature of what is concealed is not as clear and is induced rather than deduced from a pattern of destroyed evidence.
Because something was purposefully destroyed does not mean that it relates to a WMD, and a connection is at best circumstantial.
is a strong statement. Concealed research into bioweapons is not an actual bioweapon though.
Kaye continues on with the subject of bioweapons and makes a very strong argument that their was on ongoing program to create them, despite Iraqi claims to the contrary.
(to be continued)