[QUOTE=msmith537]
Bruce Scheier is an expert in cryptography, not explosives or chemistry…His purpose is to make the government appear foolish and reactionary.
[/quote]
Not that they need much help with that. Duck & Cover!
[QUOTE=msmith537]
It’s like people who say that current airport security is a joke or provides an illusion of security. Airline security has to balance between providing an impenetrable barrier and not having you wait 2 hours to board your plane.
[/QUOTE]
The thing is, many of the current methods are demonstrably almost wholly ineffective.
[QUOTE=msmith537]
Nitroglycerine by itself is generally too unstable as the terrorists would probably need to be concerned with not blowing themselves up during the manufacturing or on their way to the airport (ie don’t hit any pot holes).
[/QUOTE]
Not true. Correctly purified nitroglycerin takes a significant shock–comperable to the impact of a hammer on a hard surface–to detonate by shock impulse. Its spontaneous thermal detonation point is more than 400 degrees F, and while you don’t want to be playing with flint and steel around it, it is substantially less sensitive to static discharge than many solid aluminized propellants. In short, you could walk around with a vial of the stuff in your pocket without a major risk of detonation; the biggest risk is that you’ll get a small amount captured between the threads of the cap and that will result in a friction-initated cascading detonation.
Nitroglycerin has other problems for terrorists, though; the corrrect grade of nitric acid (white fuming nitric acid) used in manufacture is pretty carefully tracked (albeit more for drug manufacture than explosives), the purification and thermal control processes are key in getting a usable, stable product, and the end result is readily identifiable both visually and by smell. It’s not an ideal product for terrorist application, although I daresay it could be pressed into service to blow a fairly large hole in a sensitive part of an airframe by someone sufficiently desperate.
[QUOTE=LSLGuy]
The central folly of the current security mess is that until we focus on the intent of the passengers we’re largely chasing windmills. Any object is a threat in the hands of a threatening person.
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Essentially true. Aircraft are not that robust and it would be easy for someone to do significant damage with objects readily smuggled or openly carried onto an aircraft. (I’m not going to go into specifics, but anyone familiar with the construction and operation of commerical airliners can easily come up with a varity of vulnerabilities.) The stupid thing about the September 11, 2001 attacks, however, is how utterly preventable they were. A closed, locked, secure flight deck isn’t just an obvious vulnerability, it’s one that is remediated in a straightforward fashion at a very modest price. Locks on the doors would have rendered terrorists wielding boxcutters unable to control the plane and limited to harming individual passengers. And yet, because the airline industry and the FAA was so utterly blind to this idiotic security lapse we now have to endure extensive and mostly useless restrictions that are all about closing the barn door after the horse has escaped.
To the o.p.'s question, liquid explosives are a threat, but probably not the most major one. Limiting the liquids that can be taken onto the plane is actually a fairly reasonable precaution in the scheme of things, but there are so many other vulnerabilities this is like rowing a life raft with a teaspoon.
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