Astros game 5
9th inning
2 outs
Runners on 1st and 2nd.
Astros are winning by 2 runs.
We are the Astros and would like to win this game.
The pitcher is now faced with the best batter on the opposing team.
Should we walk him or pitch to him?
On total instinct I would walk this batter loading up the bases rather than pitch him a potential lead taking home run but what is the real answer?
Somebody would have to know the stats on the guy at bat as well as the next batter against that pitcher (the next batter as well as the potential odds for going “x” batters before getting the 3rd out). The overall odds of striking out a guy in those conditions with those stats, and the potential %s of winning even if one run is scored but the next batter up caused the 3rd out. So it’s a lot of math that we may not be able to access the info to, or I may have the wrong methods in mind to measure the potential results but I 've got a gut feeling that statically it would be advantageous to walk the guy with .400 (or whatever it is) average giving up no runs in the process and taking on the next guy with a much lower batting average considering the only goal is to get one out before the opposing team can score 2+ times.
I feel pretty sure walking him is the odds on correct answer but baseball wisdom seems to favor pitching to him.
Any baseball statistical fanatic / odds %'s enthusiasts or baseball managers care to comment?
Unless the next guy they can put up is dramatically weaker(like me), I would say
pitch to the guy.
The only way the guy can beat you right off is a home run and about the only way he can tie the score is with an extra base hit. If you walk him for someone else, a single ties the score, a more likely event than either a double or homer by the first.
If anybody can answer this question with any sort of statistical accuracy, it’s the guys at www.baseballprospectus.com. Might want to shoot them an email and report back here when you get an answer.
If they email me back I’ll post the answer but I’m not paying $39.00 to subscribe for the results. I did allow posting my question with my initials “JF” if anybody happens to be a subscriber and views the question/answer.
I don’t think you can walk him, because you really don’t have any place to put him.
As aahala said, walking him advances the baserunners and puts two in scoring position instead of just one. Then a base hit ties the game and you have runners at first and second again (or maybe first and third if the opposing manager sends his runners). So you’ve lost your lead and you’re right back where you started.
On the other hand, if the base runners were on 2nd and 3rd and already in position, and first is open, I’d say go ahead and put him on.
My money–if you go strictly by the regular season performance numbers–is that pitching to Puljols is clearly correct odds-wise.
The way I think of it, Sanders batted .270 during the regular season. So, 27% of the time, Sanders ties you or beats you with a hit (remember, that .270 includes triples and homers). Puljols only beats you with a homer and ties you with a triple–which only happens 7% of the time going by the numbers (41 HR and 2 trips in 591 ABs). I don’t feel like going through all the numbers and break down the likelihood of each outcome (and we would have to extrapolate further down the batting order to complete our analysis), but I think pitching to Puljols is oddswise favorably–if and only if you work with the basic numbers and disregard all the possible variables involved in this situation. I mean, you can compare clutch statistics, you can analyze hitter v. batter stats, hitter in ballpark stats, etc., etc., etc. You can analyze this to death, but I’m pretty certain the odds favor pitching to him.
Oh, you can call it hindsight, but I definitely would’ve pitched around Puhols. The next batter is Reggie Sanders. I’ve watched Sanders played for years with the Giants before he left for the Pirates and now the Cardinals. The guy has a lot of holes in his swing. Pitch him away, get to two strikes, then throw him a high hard one and he’s gone. In other words, he’s an easier out than Puhols. Forget about averages and the numbers. Also, Sanders has cooled off significantly after his injury in Game 2. If you read the news accounts, the Astros manager Gardner actually told the pitcher Lidge that it was OK to walk Puhols because there was an empty base. That tells you how much Puhols is feared. You never let the big guy beat you. Same goes for any batter of Puhols’ caliber like Bonds and Guerrero.
He can also tie you with a double, since most times a runner will score from first on a double with two out. Even so, this only raises his game-tying percentage to 13.7% versus 27.1% for Sanders. Unless the manager has compelling reasons to think that Sanders will be far less effective than average against this particular pitcher in this particular situation (but that Pujols won’t be!), he should pitch to Pujols.
The win expectancy for the Cardinals when Pujols came up is .053, meaning the Cards had about a 5% chance of winning.
If you walk Pujols, the win expectancy changes to .102, which means walking Pujols doubles the Cards’ chance of winning the game.
As has been stated, pitching to Pujols would be much more likely to result in an out than a three-run home run.
Interestingly, after the home run, the Cards’ win expectancy increased to .829, which means Albert’s blast was worth 77 percentage points of win expectancy all by itself.
The difference between the batting average of Pujols and of Sanders is relatively small. Pujols is still much more likely to be out than to manage to reach base without the third out being recorded. Sanders is only slightly less likely to accomplish same (somewhere around 5 out of 100 times at most). But putting Pujols on puts runners closer to home, and puts an extra runner on the bases, meaning you now have 6-4 in the mix as well.
If pitching to Sanders was so easy, he wouldn’t have a BA of .270, which, while not world beating, isn’t exactly the Mendoza line.
Thinking about it this way can lead to incorrect results.
We have three possible outcomes. First, the Cardinals can score no runs or one run, in which case the Astors win. Second, the Cardinals can score three or more runs, in which case the Cardinals win. Third, the Cardinals can score exactly two runs, in which case we go to extra innings. In that case, there’s a fifty-fifty chance of either team winning.
Of these three outcomes, the Astors obviously prefer an immediate win to an immediate loss or extra innings. But they also prefer extra innings to an immediate loss.
Pujols, on the season, hits a home run roughly 8% percent of the time when he is not walked. That means you risk an 8% chance of immediately losing if you don’t pitch around him. That 8% probability of immediate loss is worse than looking at an 8% probability of tying the game, or of Pujols bring in just one run. So when you contemplate the potential cost of not walking Pujols, you need to consider that as a power hitter he has a considerable chance of bringing in three runs and ending the game immediately. Sanders may have a higher probability of tying the game, but with half as many home runs he’s less of a danger to win it outright.
Whether that changes the final answer or not, I don’t know.
Half as many homeruns…in 295 at bats! Sanders’s slugging %age is .546 vs. Pujols’s .609–a pretty academic difference.
As a homerun or triple would put the Cards ahead, according to the season stats, Sanders would be statistically expected to get one of these two results 7.8% of the time. Pretty much the same percentage as Pujols putting the Cards ahead outright. The only problem is, now with runners at first and second, you are far more likely to get a tie result.
You also should factor in the park effect for Houston. Minute Maid Park gives up more hits (and home runs) than the average park. Because of this, it’s not good to put runners on base there without the hitter earning it.
If you go talk to any baseball manager, you’ll find that they don’t make decisions strictly based on averages. Averages reflect outcomes over many past situations. What you have to decide is what to do RIGHT NOW for the current situation. Yes, you consider the averages, but ultimately it’s a gut call by the manager. Anyone who would rather pitch to Puhols instead of Sanders because of the numbers does not follow baseball enough to understand which one is more dangerous in the particular situation that confronted the Astros. Bear in mind that Gardner told Lidge that it was OK to walk Puhols. That tells you right there that he felt better pitching to Sanders if he had to. Gardner’s strategy was solid, but Lidge did not execute. He threw a slider right over the middle of the plate instead of off the plate. And that’s what makes baseball so great. Ultimately, it’s not the averages. It’s not the strategy. It’s humans competing and mistakes can happen. One man becomes a hero and another a goat. Looking at this another way … if baseball decisions can be reduced to following the stats, why do you need a manager? Why not just let a computer manage a team? In my opinion, that would be disastrous. But we are venturing into IMHO Land.
<Nitpick> I believe the game was in Houston, so if the Cardinals tied in it the 9th, the Astros still have a chance to win in the bottom of the 9th. Therefore, in the case of the Cards scoring two runs, the Astros still have a slightly better than 50-50 chance of winning. I’m sure the saber-heads could give you more precise odds.
I think you may have accurately described the behavior of major league baseball managers–going with their gut-- but that doesn’t mean the decision is optimal.
Baseball managers can get away with this because they are not adequately rewarded for going with the percentages or adequately penalized for bad decisions either. Over the long run, the win-loss percentage of the club is about the size of the bank account to hire better players.
In NFL football, because the quality of players are fairly uniform from one club to another due to the same player salary cap, coaches who regularly go against the percentages are losers, those that regularly play the percentages are winners and winners can be head coach for decades, while the others usually aren’t.
The fact that the Cardinals were on the road is very important. That would mean walking Pujols is an even worse idea because it could lead to a four or five run inning and made it even harder for the Astros to come back.