I’m sure that some people will find themselves with…ahem…more time on their hands come the new year.
However, “no deal is better than a bad deal” was and remains exactly the right standpoint to take. The UK and the EU both went into these negotiations with that clearly in mind and rightly so.
If you start a deal negotiation and the other parties don’t think you are willing to to walk away then you are screwed. It is likely only the credible threat of a hard Brexit that has allowed the progress to be made on a softer Brexit (i.e. the one that most of the UK parliament and voters could live with and certainly the one the Theresa May would personally have chosen given her basic desire to remain)
When we get to the end of this process we will see clearly what currently remains under wraps. i.e. that for all the bluster on both sides about red lines and non-negotiables, and all the public nonsense and scare stories we’ll realise that both parties started out at their most extreme positions and negotiated towards a compromise and we’ll see some inventive post-hoc rationalisation from all sides as to why what was previously declared impossible or intractable turned out not to be so much after all.
This is viable where “no deal” literally means no deal. In this case it didn’t. It meant cliff-edge, WTO rules only, no guarantees for UK citizens in the EU, chaos at borders etc. etc. It was not a credible threat and the EU didn’t treat it like one.
The EU wasn’t the barrier to progress on a softer Brexit. The EU wanted a softer Brexit: there was no need to threaten them with hard Brexit to achieve that. The only people pursuing hard Brexit were the Tory Ultras and the reason progress has been made is because
a) the contradictions over the Irish border caught up with them and
b) the DUP is, thanks to the 2017 election, in a position to call the shots.
The EU has compromised very little. E.g.
[ul]
[li]They wanted the negotiations to be sequenced. The UK did not (It would be “the row of the summer”.) Negotiations are sequenced.[/li][li]They wanted the UK to pay for existing commitments up to 2020, existing liabilities, and contingent liabilities. The UK is.[/li][li]The UK wanted the cut-off date for EU citizens to be resident in the UK to be before the date of withdrawal. The cut-off date is the date of withdrawal.[/li][li]The UK wanted to set a 5 year residency requirement for EU citizens in the UK seeking right of residence. The length of residency requirement is not 5 years, or 3, or 1. There is no length of residency requirement.[/li][li]The UK wanted to charge a fee to EU citizens seeking right of residence. There will be no fee.[/li][li]The UK wanted to change the eligibility requirements for residence for EU citizens from those in the Freedom of Movement directive. The conditions for obtaining eligibility are those laid out in the Freedom of Movement directive.[/li][/ul]
The EU most certainly took seriously the possibility of getting no money, the loss of EU citizens rights in the UK and lack of access to a large market 20 miles off their coastline. The UK took seriously those reciprocal risks as well.
The E.U. wants the UK to feel the pain of Brexit just enough to discourage others whilst maintaining a relationship with a lucrative market, a major military force and intelligence service while trying to negotiate a multi-billion penalty clause.
That is not a balance that can be realistically maintained without compromise and the same goes for the requirements of the UK.
The degree of compromise is not known yet and won’t be until all aspects of the negotiations are complete. Nothing is signed, nothing is agreed except in principle because nothing is agreed until it all is agreed.
They are certainly already looking at a lower payment than they wanted (but more than the UK wanted to pay) and less involvement of the CJEU (but more than the UK wanted to accede to) The talks have moved on to trade with a lower bar set on the certainty of those three initial big items than the EU initially wanted.
I think it is naive to assume that all the movement and compromise will be on the part of the UK. It won’t be and can’t be. Plus the EU have to tread slightly carefully regarding painting the current government into a corner. Imagine throwing another election or referendum into the mix now, imagine a UK having to remain with a deeply divided population. Labour have no more coherent or fully formed plans than the Tories do and there’d be no guarantee of a majority for them, believe me, they are so glad to not have to take this troublesome child to term.
And remember, as tempting as it may be to see the EU as some kind of noble and steadfast beacon of righteousness and competency, they are the ones that fudged figures and bent accession rules as it suited them and failed to see the implications, that have open borders except where they don’t. Their record is not one of inflexibility and ultimately, as I mentioned before, after Brexit (of whatever shape or hardness) there will still be a massive economy with a politically population of 60+ million sitting 20 miles off the coast. That is something that will always grab the attention and makes one willing to compromise.
In recent centuries, the prime minister has been an MP. Though it would be quite stylish to elevate Ms Davidson to the Lords and let her sit there as PM!
Novelty Bobble, I admire your positive attitude. Hopefully the majority of leavers will also be pleased at this sort of outcome. Like you, I’m sure the Europeans can be forced to concede similar compromises in Phases II and III.
While the EU has good reasons for wanting a close relationship with the UK, the UK has much more compelling reasons for wanting a close relationship with the EU, and both sides are aware of this. Inevitably, as in any negotiations, both sides will shift their positions somewhat so that agreement can be reached - there’s not much point in entering into negotiations in the first place if you’re not prepared to shift at all - but, given their relative situations and strategic positions, it’s inevitable that the UK is going to have to shift rather more than the EU. Thus it has certainly proved so far, and I do not expect that to change.
One reason why the UK government seemed to keen to box itself in with inconsistent “red lines” may have been precisely because it recognized it was going to have to move significantly from its opening position in order to achieve its objective of a good brexit deal, and a good ongoing trade deal. Therefore it staked out some high ground from which it could later move. It didn’t greatly worry them that the high ground was not somewhere they wanted to be or, realistically, could be in the long term; they never really intended to stay there.
This does leave them with the problem that, when they do move off any of their red lines, domestic constituencies who were pleased by these red lines are likely to become upset, so this requires care, and probably a degree of fudge, and even doublespeak. The slightly surprising result is that the famous British negotiating/diplomatic skills are been deployed not mainly in external negotiations with the EU, but in internal negotiations, trying to reconcile competing visions of Brexit with the constraints of political and economic reality.
Not without precedent, especially in the Irish context: “Sunningdale for slow learners” took about 25 years to come to fruition. I suppose we should expect “Brexit for slow learners” to take about as long.