I might have gone with “Dialing for Dullards” except that, you know, there’s no actual telephone involved. Dial-up modems, maybe, but a stretch…
Goes Hawaiian.
Lessee: here’s Bill O’Reilly calling the folks at Air America “traitors” for undermining the war effort. Here’s Pat Robertson saying Democratic attempts to undermine the C-in-C on Iraq “amounts to treason.”
Ann Coulter had a book entitled “Treason.” One guess who it was about.
According tothis article in the Los Angeles Times the neocons are behind the new approach.
Whether or not the article is correct remains to be seen. Presumeably the neocons have long contented that the way to deal with the insurgency is to have lots of troops broken down into small units scattered throughout neighborhoods so they can interact directly with the populace. This, supposedly, would make the people more willing to not cooperate with insurgents and in fact inform on them. Sort of a military “neighborhood policing” approach.
We’ll see. GW is supposed to reveal his plan for the additional troops and their use next week.
It must be conceded that such a scheme would be a radical departure from past methods. Would it work? Who knows?
Here’s the real trouble, supposing I’m to put myself in GW’s loafers: I have to come up with a plan that’s a) different from the previous plan; b) different from the Democrats’ plan; c) different from the Iraq Study Group’s plan; and e) has some tiny shred of plausibility as to actually being able to work. And frankly, what are you left with, beyond a troop increase?
The only consolation is that when the surge fails, there’s nothing left to try, except retreat.
Except of course, for the scores more of additional fallen soldiers. What a cluster fuck. small clusters of soldiers in the neighborhoods will draw fire.
Or another surge.
20,000 is not a substantial increase. If he got them it would not matter. More to sit in the Green Zone. His generals who he lied about listening to are getting broomed for not agreeing that 20 k will win. Casey, Riggs and Abazaid are all in trouble for daring to question.
On the plus side (for Bush), it makes for a handy excuse to bludgeon his opponents with. “We’d have won the Iraq war if it wasn’t for you cowards who didn’t back my surge!”
“Broomed out”? As in, “being forced to leave the military?” What about stop-loss?
Maybe this is the way for all those poor stop-lossed guys stranded in the military past their contract dates to get themselves released.
I don’t see how it can work either. Small unit operation isn’t an uncommon tactic but they are organized so as to be mutally supporting. In a city this would mean a squad at every street corner. The logistic support for units scattered all over Sadr City is also a little hard to picture.
Well, nobody consults a hippy when it comes to the deployment of an armored division, stiil, seems to me…
Such a neighborhood deployment can work under one set of circumstances, that is, that the neighborhood is largely sympathetic and cooperative. By largely, I mean right next to universally and unanimously. If only 10% of the neighborhood is comprised of violent insurgents, they will dominate, especially if the neighborhood is not, as above, overwhelmingly opposed to them.
Just like in Viet Nam,* we don’t know these people*! We don’t know what they think, how they feel. We don’t know when they are telling us the truth, and when they are lying. And sure as you’re born, some of them are lying.
When they rat out Achmed Sixpack as a Sunni terrorist leader (#3 in Al Queda organization!), how will we know he’s not siccing the dogs on his brother-in-law? How do we know he is not, in fact, a moderate secularist that the religious fanatics would like to have dead without bloodying thier own hands? “See! See! The Amercians even kill the moderates, that’s how much they hate us!” Problem liquidated, solution exploited to advantage.
And the only way any ethnic neighborhood is going to look upon our troops benignly is if they are convinced that we are on their side, entirely. The notion of acting as heavily armed umpires is so entirely ridiculous, I will not insult you by explaining. The barrier to such trust amonst the Sunni is, needless to say, daunting, even were we to declare on their behalf. And how we might go about that without encouraging Sunni insurgency escapes me.
The Shia haven’t trusted us since we encouraged their rebellion against Saddam and left them twisting in the wind. They are perfectly willing to let us spend our blood and treasure on their behalf, but that doesn’t mean they like us.
If every time I crossed paths with an American soldier he’d slip me a C-note, I might become pretty amiable with him. Not to mention I’d be crossing paths with him at least ten times a day…
Well, my vast military experience (I’ve played Risk,) leaves me with many misgivings concerning this strategy. Our soldiers really aren’t supposed to be policeman or security people in my understanding. That’s not what they are trained for.
I don’t like the idea of them out there functioning mostly as targets waiting for somebody to engage them. I don’t think there presence in overwhelming force will be well received. I think there is a potential for a lot of bad incidents and misunderstandings which can create further misgivings.
Wherein Scylla displays a previously hidden talent for understatement.
There was a time when a rifle team on every intersection might have been made a difference. That time, however, was at the outset, as a measure to keep the lid on everything until some sort of order could be established in the wake of the collapse of the Baathist government and to suppress the outbreak of a nationalist insurrection. The decision was made to go into Baghdad light and cheap. It was a terrible decision which, when taken with a number of measures adopted by the initial occupation authority (like disbanding the Iraqi army), allowed the current situation of turmoil, civil warfare and disorder to arise. The 20,000 pairs of boots that has been bandied around - a mere three of four brigades - would not have been enough to do the job in the spring of 2003. It certainly isn’t enough to do the job of enforcing and coercing civil order now.
It is my recollection that when the invasion went in the Fourth Infantry Division was sitting on the sidelines waiting for Turkish permission to enter Northern Iraq. Turkey refused permission and the invasion went in using an armored division, a mech infantry division and a big USMC force that raced to Baghdad with no real attempt to consolidate positions on the ground. Having that extra infantry division available at the beginning of the occupation could have made a significant difference.
To augment the force now is just a dollar short and a day late. I’m not at all sure that the United States even has the 400,000 soldiers and Marines that, in my judgement, it would probably take to put the cat back in the bag.
If nothing else the experience of the British in Northern Ireland should have taught our leaders something. So should have the Philippine Insurrection and the French Adventure in Mexico. Good Lord, Vietnam should have served as an instructive example of what happens once irregular warfare breaks out. The Sec of State knew that, he was there. The senior officers of the Army and USMC knew that, they were there.
The worst thing is not that this foreign adventure in Big Dawg international politics was poorly executed. It is not that our leaders allowed the situation to deteriorate to the point that it is probably beyond our power to redeem it. The worst thing is that it was not necessary in the first place.
According to the estimates I’ve seen, out of that 20K forces, only about 4K will actually be combat soldiers, the rest will be support personnel. The phrase, pissing in the wind, comes to mind for some reason.
I heard an interview with a former senator who’d worked with the Clinton Administration on developing a plan to invade Iraq if they deemed it necessary. He said that their estimate of necessary forces was 500,000.
I didn’t think this needed a new thread, so I’ll throw it here. Who here thinks an admiral would make a good leader for a land war?
Based on his credentials, I wouldn’t automatically say that he’s a bad choice, but certainly an admiral wouldn’t be my first choice to head up a land war. He should, however, have an understanding of land forces, since he has had Marines under his command.
Commanders in the stratospheric levels decide what is to be done and insure that the necessary resouces are at hand. How it is to be done is decided at the operational level. An Admiral is prefectly competent to be the theater commander over land operations. After all, I believe that all activities, including those of the navy, in Central Command are under the Commander of Central Command.