Pretty much anywhere else in the Pacific other than the island that the PLAN and PLAAF could easily cordon off with a blockade and land-based anti-air/anti-ship missiles, starving the assets based there from fuel, munitions, and spares.
Stranger
Sure, but the same could be said of US forces stationed in South Korea, that it’s not ideal to put your forces within range of North Korea. At the same time, putting them there helps deterrence.
So the closer you are, the more it deters, but the more vulnerable you are if war does happen.
South Korea cannot be surrounded by the North Korean military, and in fact the reason we have US bases their is because of the strategic advantage of that location specifically with respect to the Peoples Republic of China. Taiwan offers no such advantages, especially with respect to defending that island, which again, can be essentially cut off with a naval blockade and air superiority from land-based resources out of the Chinese mainland.
Stranger
China is going to destroy all the air bases on the island in an opening salvo. NK couldn’t do the same.
Unless you see it as s tripwire, like NATO forces in the Baltics? China can’t convince themselves that the US would sit it out?
The Center for Strategic & International Studies wargamed a Peoples Republic of China invasion of the Taiwan main island. You can find the main report linked here but for those not inclined to read a 160 page report here is the quick summary:
CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defense came at high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of servicemembers. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is therefore not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.
I think the critical underlying assumption is that the United States will directly engage China and will accept the loss of “dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of servicemembers”, especially under the incoming administration. However, I think it is pretty clear that even if the PRC were to be successful in establishing a beachhead and occupying parts of the island, it would be a Pyrrhic victory where they would gain no useful resources and would experience enough loss and expense to hurt PLA military readiness and general standing.
Stranger
Why would they do this, though, now that the US has elected an isolationist chickenhawk who probabaly won’t aid Taiwan? The PLAN could just impose a sea/air blockade and simply wait. That’s more China’s style. How long could Taiwan last under those conditions until they beg for terms? Or maybe more to the point, until Taiwan’s allies are so starved for Taiwan’s exports that they beg for terms?
A blockade isn’t something you can do instead of a shooting war. A blockade is the start of a shooting war. And it’d be a war with a lot of countries, not just Taiwan.
It isn’t President Xi’s style, who has made ever increasingly strident pledges to ‘reunify’ Taiwan in 2027. Xi Jinping is on a clock and unlike some autocrats knows that he has a window of time to secure his legacy as the leader who brought China out of a century and a half of repression and dominance back into being the regional hegemon over East Asia.
Stranger
Actually, Trump was quite open to Chinese visitors at Mar-a-Lago and signed many an exception to his tariffs.
So, yes on bogeyman. No on hate.
That article has a few people saying 2027. But does not have a quote of that date from Xi. Is there a more direct quote out there?
If there is a window to invade Taiwan it is in the next two years (maybe four) for China.
Now’s the time to take their shot. Trump will not protect Taiwan.
It’s not a matter of Trump protecting Taiwan. It’s a matter of China protecting China. The loss of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry will cause a global economic crisis which is going to severely hurt China’s trading partners and thus their ability to purchase Chinese goods, assuming the rest of the world doesn’t just put embargos on them.
The status quo re: Taiwan is in the best interests of all parties involved.
There are plenty of times when nations let their emotions/passions trump their economic/practical considerations.
It made zero economic sense for Russia to invade Ukraine, for instance. Putin had to know that doing so would inflict serious harm on his own nation and economy, whether the invasion was successful or not. Yet he did so anyway. If economics actually worked as a deterrent to warfare, there’d never have been any wars in history.
China wants Taiwan for reasons that have nothing to do with chips, too. When or if the day comes that they decide to invade, the economic blowback will be something they’ve already taken into account and decide is an acceptable side effect.
I tend to disagree. IF, and it’s a big if, but if Ukraine had folded early days as seemed to have been a real possibility, then it would have absolutely been worth it economically. Ukraine’s industrial sector was already partially trashed by the civil war, but the ports and agricultural production would have made up for it in the long run. Even if Ukraine technically survived as a compliant puppet regime (as it had been in earlier decades, deeply integrated with Russian industrial output), it would have at least been a captive market. That’s not to mention Russia’s strategic interests in the Crimea, which arguably trumped economics anyway.
From Putin’s ill-informed seat it must have looked like a gamble well worth taking. It wasn’t quite the reckless assault it appears in hindsight. But one of the inherent weaknesses of an autocracy is the failure to properly analyze intelligence data because of the risk of being a naysayer.
OK, you have a point. But I suspect if we go any further that direction it’ll be a thread hijack.
I do think that China’s desire to take Taiwan is strong enough for non-economic reasons that economics ultimately won’t be a deterrent. They will launch the attack with the economic cost already figured in as an acceptable price to pay.
It should also directly hurt China. Are they not just as dependent on Taiwan’s semiconductors as everyone else?
Xi is not on any kind of reliable clock. China abolished his statutory term limts in 2018 and has handed him 2x 5-year terms since then. The term expiring in 2028 is just the largely ceremonial role of President, he’ll still be head of the party and of the military after that, which is where the real power lies.
Now I’m sure he’d like to hold onto the Presidency as well, because holding all the power is the best way to ensure your hold on any amount of power, and “reunifying” Taiwan would help support his legitimacy in that respect. For that purpose, it’s true that sooner would be better than later, but the most likely 2028 outcome is that the NPC will just rubber-stamp him another 5-year term no matter what.
Something which hasn’t been mentioned is the Japan factor. Japan sees a fall of Taiwan as a direct threat to its survival as it would put China in control of the shipping lanes to the all-important oil.
Japan has been increasing its military capacity and is bringing more resources closer to a potential conflict. They have put radar on Yonaguni, only 110 km away from Taiwan. US troops have been dispatched to this island, and the US ambassador to Japan pointedly visited it this year.
Japan has been moving away from its previous policy of strictly defensive military force. This has the possibility to make the situation quite a bit more complicated.
The PLA carried their troops in 300+ Chinese junks in the invasion. Do you think that the invasion would have been successful had the ROC army been prepared, properly equipped and fought at a level equivalent to the IJA at Tawara?
Victories over demoralized, poorly supplied and poorly lead troops ain’t the same thing as fighting contested landings against a determined defense.
What’s more, that type of invasion would be impossible in 2024 with modern technology.
China could round up a bunch of unarmed fishing boats and send them to their death against artillery, small teams with Hellfire and other missiles and of course drones and drones and drones.
It’s far more complicated than this. The voters swing between KMT and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and KMT is friendlier to China.
When I lived in Taiwan for 10 years, I knew many people who felt that China wasn’t really that bad. My wife is a stanch supporter of Taiwanese independence, but that’s not universal. Very few call for actively joining China, but the KMT regularly introduces policies which help China.
There are a lot of people who believe that if China takes over, they can personally benefit. Uncovering high level spies in the ROC military and intelligence is a regular occurrence.
[quote=“Stranger_On_A_Train, post:59, topic:1009959”]
The Republic of China Armed Forces (ROCAF) has an active duty strength of 180k with another 1.6M in reserves (which have been actively drilling for the last several years).
[quote]
From wiki:
The change to four months of training and no active service for the last decade has really hurt its readiness. Even those who went through training prior to 2013 said that the training wasn’t particularly effective.
I’ve talked to people who are quite critical of ROC army plans for defense and the out dated thinking in the leadership.
I agree that an amphibious invasion is quite difficult and if Taiwan’s defenses are done correctly, it’s possible they could prevent it. However, there are so many unknowns now.
I also don’t know how much of a scorched earth policy would actually be implemented.
It’s in the best interests of all the rational parties involved. Which, a la Putin, may not include Xi.
Or may not continue to include Xi as he gets older and closer to his personal sell- by date. He’s 71 now, so 10-15 years left in effective power then at best 5 more in doddering power.
The combo of trump and his wacko-cabinet badly mis-leading the USA and Xi’s own interests suggest the next 4 years are the opportunity for the invasion. Of course if the USA really starts falling apart about year 3 of trump AND the Chinese have not made their move yet, they might then choose to sit and watch our self-imolation awhile before deciding to act.