I’m pretty sure China would have failed if they had tried to invade Scotland in 1950. But that’s not where they invaded.
A basic part of military planning is assessing what forces your opponent can bring to the battlefield. The Chinese military planners correctly assessed that they could defeat the forces that would be present in Hainan with the forces they could land on Hainan. So an invasion carried out be three hundred junks succeeded.
But I was not suggesting China would use that same plan. And they wouldn’t need to. China has a lot of military assets in 2024 that it didn’t have in 1950. My point was that there are many different ways to conduct a successful amphibious invasion.
I’m not going to argue with your direct experience on the ground and knowing the culture of Taiwan, but what I’ve seen the DPP is far more popular than KMT (possibly for historical reasons when the Kuomintang ruled as a one-party autocracy), and the Taiwanese I’ve met (an admittedly self-selected people critical of the PRC) are insistent that the Taiwanese will not voluntarily lay down and accept mainland control even though many have a cultural affection for China and have relatives on the mainland. A key issue is what they’ve seen happen to Hong Kong post-1997 transfer; the Taiwanese struggled for democratic reforms and they have to know (despite PRC propaganda efforts) that being subsumed by the mainland government would be an end to that.
I agree that Taiwan let military readiness fall into a poor state in the late-‘Nineties and beginning of the 2000s because the rhetoric about PRC ‘reunification’ became just kind of a background noise but what I’ve seen of readiness estimates in the last ten years shows substantial improvement. They’re not prepared to take on the whole of the PLA, for sure, but then, there isn’t any way that the PLA can actually bring their collective might to Taiwan in one massive, sudden attack, either.
For that matter, the PLA hasn’t actually been tested in a real war since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and subsequent minor conflicts; ever since then they’ve had a few border skirmishes and naval conflicts against Vietnamese and Filipino fishing fleets and coastal defense, but nothing like a serious conflict between a near-peer adversary. They haven’t engaged in any kind of contested amphibious landing since taking Hainan in 1950, and if history has taught us anything it is that even the best trained military can seriously fuck up an amphibious assault through the lack of understanding the hazards and difficulties. This just seems like an effort so costly and prone to failure as to be absurd…but as I said, I’m not longer evaluating the likelihood of Xi doing this based upon rational estimates.
Chairman Xi is a 71 year old man, to be sure, but even more crucial is the ability to sustain whatever state of readiness that the PRC has managed to build PLAN and PLAAF up to in the past decade. China is facing severe demographic collapse, and while they are not as dependent upon the domestic consumer market as most developed nations are, they are already experiencing dramatic contraction which will only worsen with deglobalization (and this invasion would accelerate that trend). A lot of analysts are really focused on China’s energy needs and how that limits growth but without workers, consumers, and investors, the country basically has no economy to sustain a military capable of engaging in this kind of adventure.
I’m not as pessimistic on China’s future as some doomsayers who are arguing that it won’t exist in ten or twenty years but it just isn’t going to have the means to project power (insofar as it can now), and the economic ‘soft power’ of the Belt & Road initiative is dependent upon globalized trade, so even if they reclaim facilities that they’ve bankrolled other nations to build for them like the shittiest international payday lender it won’t do them much good if nobody is actually buying the Chinese products that they aren’t making because their labor base as shrunk to a fraction of what they need while the elderly population inexorably mushrooms outward. For all that Xi has essentially shut down people feeding him any bad news he cannot be so obtuse as to not realize this (even if he is reading the ‘official’ figures that show the PRC at only about half of population replacement rate instead of the more realistic estimate of a quarter or less of replacement). This decade is China’s moment, and for Xi to establish his legacy he has to act as soon as he can gain the advantage, not wait for economics and the aging population to cut through China’s ability to engage in such an extravagant adventure.
That’s just my take; I may be all wet (and nodding to @TokyoBayer, may well be wrong on my estimation of Taiwanese resistance) but I’ve been looking at China for about the last twenty years, first because of their space ambitions and increasing awareness of their extensive global espionage system, but then at their more aggressive military posturing and use of Belt & Road to gain strategic advantage in a manner fairly parallel to how the United States created a global trade hegemony post-WWII, and I see China ramping up almost exponentially but without the means to sustain this posture economically in the longer term. Notwithstanding, of course, what climate change (which China is well aware of but almost completely unprepared to deal with) will do to impact their economy and military capabilities.
Well yeah, but a naval shooting war is within China’s capabilities. I’m specifically contrasting that as an alternative to actually landing on the island in force, which seems like a costly and uncertain course of action.
If China decides to blockade Taiwain before 2028, it now seems reasonably certain the US will say “not our problem”. Will others move against China in that case? Doubtful. It’s reasonable to think Taiwan will be begging for terms by 2028, brokered by Donald Trump, who will become “the man who brought peace to Taiwan after 75 years.”
Oh yeah and he’ll also “end the Ukraine war”. Quite a brave peacemaker he’s going to be.
One tell I use for who is worth paying attention to in the China-Taiwan conversation is who has a realistic assessment of Taiwan’s military. It’s not the “sexy” part of the China-US great powers battle so amateurs don’t bother learning anything about it.
The main issue, alongside of low morale, low pay, and poor focus on the basics, is also that Taiwan still has only half-heartedly embraced the concept of asymmetric warfare. Its military is still stuck in the KMT mindset of traditional warfare; i.e. tanks, big warships, etc.; as if Taiwan were a medium sized nation facing off against another medium sized nation. It is not.
Taiwan needs to ditch that whole concept and go with asymmetric - i…e, many small weapons instead of a few big weapons. Focus on snipers, ATGMs, mines, etc. instead of Aegis, Abrams, etc. But old ideas die hard.
They don’t need to be able to defeat the PRC. They just need to be like a porcupine or sea urchin: unpalatably difficult to kill & eat. And recognizably so before that fateful first bite is taken.
Ref @Stranger_On_A_Train’s many cogent comments, they are not there yet. But they’d better be moving that way quickly.
A blockade means that China isn’t allowing cargo ships to reach the island. If they allow in American cargo ships, then American cargo ships can supply Taiwan (and will, because it’d be hugely profitable). If they sink American cargo ships, then that’s a direct act of war against the US.
America doesn’t have any cargo ships to speak of. Except for coastal freighters plying US waters (and a smidgen of US mainland - Puerto Rico ops) there is no US-flagged merchant fleet.
There are 30 combined container/RORO/combination ships going between the west coast and Hawaii (see Matson and Pasha). They are part of the roughly 200 Maritime Administration (MARAD) categorized vessels in the US fleet. Pathetic in the world view but for us Hawaiians, important in view of the Jones Act restrictions.
Back on topic. Part of the Chinese calculation must include blockade of their incoming fuel tankers by the US and/or other nations. Their navy is not equipped to provide convoy protection from oil sources in the Middle East. This seemed to trouble Japan greatly in past history.
In many previous threads you have argued the same thing. For example, this is your post from 2012.
ISTM that this is a pet point that you have argued for forever, but haven’t won any converts.
You say that your point is that there are “there are many different ways to conduct a successful amphibious invasion”, which of course is true as long as the enemy cooperates with you, or is in complete shambles, ill-equipped, poorly lead and unmotivated, as were the units of the ROC army in Hainan in 1950.
What are these “many different ways”? Your suggestion of loading a huge number of troops and throw them across the water is suicide, especially for an island 100 km away. If what’s written isn’t your suggestion, then what is? Specifically?
One cannot take a possible military takeover of Taiwan in isolation. If a full scale military action starts up and includes U.S. and likely NATO members all or some, then forces must be moved from other places. This leaves other places more vulnerable to localized issues that those forces may have kept in check. Opportunities may be taken advantage of. Allies may be at risk.
Other folks that may be allies in fair weather may make decisions that hamper the operations. Overtly or by opting out of support. Going neutral till things settle out.
Supply issues will mostly hamper the defenders of Taiwan. Shipping in the whole region will be at risk, maybe shut down. The oil and gas supplies may be shut down. Some maybe voluntarily, some by attack in various forms. Even on the U.S. and allies home turf by sabotage. The Middle East will become at the least a major sabotage area if not full on war as well. Maybe this is why things are fired up there now. Settle that out, before a China war? Taking out Iran is a major goal. It would be a major player on the side issues during a China Taiwan war. Take it out before then?
This won’t be a proxy war. It is superpower players in direct conflict. So much will have to be deployed by both sides and in all realms. I really feel the Taiwan defenders do not have the supplies for a long war. Nor the manufacture base to replace. Even if the Taiwan defenders somehow prevail. They will be seriously wounded. Others will take advantage of that.
The economics? That is just a maze of deep dark terrible rabbit holes. During and after. Even the winner may succumb to an economic and supply chain nightmare that will change the world.
You mostly answered your own question here, but cargo carriers are certain to leave the area and not return once Trump makes it clear that the US military won’t be providing safety of passage to, from, and around Taiwan. No carrier wants to lose a ship and all its cargo, I’d imagine their insurance carrier would have something to say about this as well.
Dramatic contraction? Growth has slowed but the only time China’s been in recession in the last 40 years was during the height of lockdowns, like most of the world.
Point me to those doomsayers so I can laugh in their faces. I would consider it far more likely that my native UK economy “won’t exist” in 10 or 20 years.
So just rejecting this scenario doesn’t make anything below it a reasonable take.
Just like anywhere else a recession is possible, maybe even a depression. It will still be a massive, massive economy.
Very obviously improved infrastructure benefits regional and domestic trade as well as trade with China. Not to imply China is doing it out of the goodness of their hearts, or that all deals advantaged the parties equally.
Exactly. I hope they are learning from the war in Ukraine.
There are some important questions. How common is viewpoint you have heard from the Taiwanese you know, and would the country actually implement a scorched earth policy.
It appears to me that you have been exposed much more to people who occupy one side, and have a rather strong belief, while the opinions of the whole country are more complex, mixed and often contradictory.
While the DPP is popular, the DPP candidate for president this year received 40% of the popular vote, the KMT candidate received 33% and a third party candidate received 26.5%. It’s not as simple as you are suggesting.
The first time a DPP candidate was elected as president was in 2000, and Chen served until 2008 (two four-year-terms), followed by Ma, KMT, until 2016, then Tsai, DPP, until 2024. This year is the first time after that either party has managed to retain the presidency for more than eight years.
This is pretty typical of a good share of KMT supporters.
Politics are really divided in Taiwan and many people just don’t discuss it.
It’s also overwhelming for many Taiwanese, just like I don’t want to think about Trump and America now.
Even if people were really against China, there is a question if they would go scorched earth. Scorched earth strategies have worked well in invasions of Russia, where the defending forces can retreat into the interior, and then as the enemy’s logistics got longer and longer, it becomes much more difficult for the attackers.
The problem with a scorched earth strategy for the invasion of Taiwan is that it doesn’t really do much to deter China. It wouldn’t affect their logistics or give the pause to reconsider the invasion. Taiwan could destroy anything of value but the Chinese wouldn’t care. They wouldn’t be invading for looting purposes.
I wonder that if faced with an actual invasion, how many Taiwanese would actually attempt to destroy things? Would the government try to destroy chip plants and such? It’s one thing to destroy bridges and such to delay an advance, and another to blow up chip factories which wouldn’t directly affect the war.