Since China has veto power in the UNSC, that’s kind of a moot point, isn’t it?
Vague, yes, but it does seem as though there is an unspoken (at least until recently) understanding that the US would defend Taiwan against an attack from China as long as Taiwan does not declare independence.
Very good point. I studied for a while at XiaDa and when I first got there, I was amazed that these crappy little islands (specificially Xiao Jinmen) which I could see GMD troops doing exercises (with binoculars) from my dorm window could be the cause of a worldwide nuclear holocast as some seem to think.
That being said, I think that China is not likely to try and find out what would happen if they moved in on them. They will, in my opinion, go all or nothing.
Nothing will happen.
Taiwan’s referendum nonsense is Chien’s move to seal the Taiwanese vote in a new election year. He’d have to be insane to call for a serious independence referendum. There’s a difference between passing a law that allows referendums and actually calling for a independence referendum. The whole referendum issue is just another bone Chien is tossing to a few portions of the Taiwanese demographic. The smart thing for the Taiwanese to do would be to maintain the status quo until China’s authoritarian government ceases to exist.
China’s reaction is just another eyebrow raising move by the PRC to warn Chien not to push his luck. It’s saber rattling, a few comments by PRC lackey generals is nothing to cause a stir about unless you’re a big fan of doomsday scenarios.
Which reminds me of another matter…Taiwan and China is always controversial but why doesn’t anyone ever mention the equally divisive Chechen/Russian conflict? Many of the attitudes on both sides are similar except those two sides have already gone to war numerous times.
Welcome to the boards TheQuagmire. The Chechen/Russian issue has been dealt with a fair bit on this board actually. The difference I see is that Russia immediately tried to recover/deal with Chechen independence. Taiwan has been de facto independent and under a separate government since 1949. Which is one reason why I have to reject YiBaiYuan’s analogies. California is deeply linked to the workings of the US, as is Hawaii. Given that there is no monolithic “American” culture the differences between various regions is an expected state, not an indication of separate national aspirations.
Perhaps a better questions is “How long must a sovereign entity be independent of its parent state to qualify for nationhood, should it desire it?”
I don’t really feel its important. The Chinese could not take Taiwan by force, and they to tell you the truth, they probably don’t want to. This is just saber rattling, but the Taiwanese don’t neccessarily want to separate either.
Sigh Not again.
You may want to note that quality of life in China did not really improve until after the economic liberalization strating in the 70’s. And the nationalists were bastards, but were no worse about modernizing.
Actually footbinding pretty much died out by the 1920’s – long before liberation. Also footbinding was restricted to a pretty small proportion of the population and generally didn’t include the peasants nor the prolitariat.
The furious rhetoric which regularly tumbles out of mainland China used to be a topic which absolutely made my blood boil.
However, thanks to China Guy and many others, both here and in real life, I finally came to realize that like North Korea, most of that trash-talking is just that: mere rhetoric.
I suppose that if there wasn’t significant leverage being placed upon mainland China both externally and internally, they might someday try to put their money where their mouth is. But the fact of the matter is that right now China borders on four nuclear powers, is across the straight from a theoretical fifth in Taiwan, and there’s a sixth one with one to three nuclear carrier groups always lurking somewhere nearby.
That trash talk may be defensive posturing, for all I know. From China’s perspective, they might see themselves as surrounded, not expansionist.
FOREIGN PRESS CENTER BRIEFING WITH MR. RANDY SCHRIVER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TOPIC: U.S.-TAIWAN-CHINA ISSUES
THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.
3:00 P.M. EST, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2003
MR. SCHRIVER: So I first wanted to address the ongoing campaign in Taiwan, the election, and to express, of course, U.S. support for Taiwan’s democracy and the electoral process, but I also want to reiterate what the Department and what the U.S. Government has said repeatedly, and that is, we are neutral in this campaign. We support the democratic process, but no particular candidate. Our interest is in the process, but not in the outcome and not resting with the fortunes of one candidate or another. So I want to stress our position of neutrality, and any attempt to read into U.S. statements or actions any other position is just flat wrong.
So in the interest of clarity, again, the United States will be neutral in this and will look forward to working with whoever wins the election in Taiwan.
The other topic, since, in the last, I think, 48 hours, there’s been a great deal of attention to statements coming out Beijing, I wanted to make clear our position on use of force. Of course, this is addressed in our law: The Taiwan Relations Act – I obviously don’t have it in front of me here – but essentially says that any threat to use force against Taiwan is of grave concern to the United States, and that we will only support a peaceful approach to resolving the differences. And this is not only our law, it is embedded in our policy, that we are firmly opposed to the use of force in settling the differences between the two sides.
QUESTION: Jay Chen, Central News Agency. Different people have interpreted differently what Secretary Armitage said the other day, and I am wondering whether it is correct to infer that just because there isn’t a defense treaty between the two sides, the U.S. is under no obligation to defend Taiwan, or help defend Taiwan.
And another point in his remarks is that, Secretary Armitage said that the U.S. one-China policy is premised on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. Did he mean to say that if indeed the Chinese decided to resort to the use of force, then they should not expect the U.S. to adhere to the one-China policy? Thank you.
MR. SCHRIVER: On the first question, Secretary Armitage was referring to the language in our law, the Taiwan Relations Act. We do not have a defense treaty, but the Taiwan Relations Act is very explicit in terms of what our obligations are and they include providing weapons of a defensive character for Taiwan’s sufficient self-defense. It also includes that we’ll maintain the capacity to resist force, and I think that’s the element he was addressing in his statement.
The second question you asked, U.S. policy has always been based on a premise of peaceful approaches. That language is, in fact, in the three communiqués that the Chinese – we acknowledge the Chinese position, that they have a fundamental peaceful approach to the differences.
So that is an expectation that we have, and we hold our Chinese colleagues to that, and that relates to my opening statement, why we’re opposed to the use of force to settle this question.
MR. SCHRIVER:
We have been clear on our position on independence. We do not support independence. So if any of these efforts touch on Taiwan’s status in a way that leads us in that direction towards independence, we’re not going to be supportive of that.
However, whether to pursue a referendum, whether to alter the constitution, is really a matter of Taiwan domestic politics, and we don’t meddle in that, we don’t want to overly influence that. But again, on the question of independence and Taiwan’s status, we have been clear, and we do have equities and we do have views. So it’s really a matter of, are these efforts going to spill over into those areas or lead us in that direction? And if that’s the case, the U.S. will not support it.
QUESTION: Norman Fu with The China Times. Mr. Schriver, I’d like to pursue the previous first question a little bit. I think the question is quite clear. We want to know whether top U.S. officials, including the President himself, in private meetings and conversations, ever told the Chinese in such language as, “We oppose Taiwan independence,” because publicly, the U.S. position, as you are doing now, is always, “We do not support Taiwan independence,” or non-support of Taiwan independence.
I think it would be helpful to clarify this, you know, as we see it, pretty important issue. It’s not just semantics, because when you say you don’t support, or when you say you oppose, there is some difference. I’m aware the fact that Secretary Armitage explained this a year or so ago in Tokyo, but still, that doesn’t seem to have put the whole issue to rest. So, as I said, it would be helpful for you – I’m mindful of what you said, you are not always present at those meetings, but still, you have access to the transcripts and briefings, whatever. So, simply put, I still want to know precisely what is the operative language insofar as Taiwan independence is concerned? Is it, we do not support, or we oppose?
MR. SCHRIVER: Well, let me speak with as much clarity as I’m capable of: Tthe policy as determined by the President, and the policy of this Administration, the United States does not support Taiwan independence.
QUESTION: Charlie Snyder of the Taipei Times. I’d like to know what the Administration makes of this ratcheting up of the verbiage across the straits with the daily comments, increasingly bellicose comments from Beijing. Does the – is there a feeling that, you know, the stability is fraying a little, that perhaps we’re entering a more dangerous time, and if so, have we talked about this to them? Has Kelly said anything in Beijing or have we said anything to the embassy here?
MR. SCHRIVER: Well, I can’t tell you what’s in the minds of the Chinese and what their rationale, what their intent is. I can tell you what we observe, what we hear, and I think it’s clear that the volume is up a little bit, the rhetoric is up, and a little bit stiffer, and we take that to mean that there are serious concerns in Beijing and we listen to those and we acknowledge those.
And Taiwan is almost always a part of our discussions with the Chinese. It’s something that they will almost always raise, and this was the case recently when Mr. Kelly was in Beijing, and he had an opportunity to reiterate our policy with respect to our one-China policy based on the three communiqués, and the Taiwan Relations Act, our non-support for Taiwan independence, our opposition to the use of force.
And he, of course, addressed some of the views about the ongoing election campaign, very similar along the lines which I just described, that we’re supportive of Taiwan’s democracy, supportive of the electoral process, but neutral, don’t favor or lean to one candidate or another, nor are we in any way involved in shaping campaign policy or positions. We’re, in fact, rarely consulted.
These are the domestic politics of Taiwan and the campaigns are unfolding their strategies as they see fit. When our equities are touched upon in a way that might be seen as unhelpful, we let the Taiwan authorities know privately about that. But I think what Mr. Kelly had an opportunity to say was that we are neutral in this campaign.
QUESTION: Just to follow-up on something you said. You said that you told the Chinese that you’re not involved in shaping the campaign policy. Have there been any suggestions that the United States is somehow involved in shaping the campaign policy there?
MR. SCHRIVER: Well, I think, from some of the questions that we get from the Chinese, I think sometimes they overstate our ability to influence either one campaign or another, and so I think it’s important for people to understand that this is Taiwan’s domestic politics, their campaigns.
QUESTION: Vincent Chang, United Daily News, Taiwan. Well, Randy, yesterday Mr. Ereli said in a State Department –
MR. SCHRIVER: Sorry, Mr. who?
QUESTION: Ereli. Yeah, Ereli. Okay. Well, he said in the briefing yesterday that the United States opposed, you know, any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo of the strait, by either side of the strait. Well, I don’t know – can you elaborate here more on how, why he choose to use a word, opposed, instead of…instead of saying that you don’t want or you don’t expect the kind of things to happen as usual?
And my second question is that, what is your definition for status quo?
MR. SCHRIVER: I think the spokesman’s words speak for themselves, and in fact, Dr. Rice made a very similar statement, and I think this notion of being opposed to unilateral attempts to change the status quo is, in effect, a very consistent kind of statement, in terms of what we’ve always said about our One-China policy, our opposition to the use of force, the fact that we don’t support Taiwan independence. So I don’t regard this as a new formulation. It’s, perhaps to add some clarity, but Dr. Rice, in fact, most recently said it before the spokesman.
The definition of status quo, I mean, this could be a very lengthy description of economics and politics and a very elaborate description. I think what’s important in this case is that there are differences between the two sides, and to date, these differences have been managed in a peaceful way.
MR. SCHRIVER: Hi, Betty Lin of the World Journal. What is considered provocative, from the U.S. point of view, on the part of China and on the part of Taiwan?
And also, when former Vice Premier Qian Qichen was here, did he express any wish that China hope U.S. would do on the issue of Taiwan?
MR. SCHRIVER: I am not going to go through a set of hypotheticals, „this is provocative and this isn’t.“ I mean, I think that, for the sake of clarity, we’re firmly opposed to the use of force, and we don’t support Taiwan independence, and that is fairly broad.
We had an earlier question about referenda and the new constitution. If those efforts go in the direction or lean in the direction of independence, we would not support that. But to go beyond that and start talking about hypotheticals – is this provocative, or is that provocative – I don’t particularly think that’s a useful thing to do.
QUESTION: Yeah. I forgot to introduce myself the first time. John Zang with CTI TV. Randy, in 1996, the rising rhetoric on the part of Beijing finally led to massive military exercises.
MR. SCHRIVER: Yes.
QUESTION: Do you see any – any parallel development in the Taiwan Strait? Is the United States planning any military contingency, because in 1996, the Pentagon had to dispatch two aircraft battle groups? Are you contemplating similar actions, although it’s still, you know, the initial stage?
Second question: Do you have – do you still have full confidence in Therese Shaheen?
Thank you.
MR. SCHRIVER: Well, the second question is the easiest – yes, absolutely.
The first question, this is different than 1996, perhaps that’s a longer discussion we could have, but this is a different situation. To my knowledge, there is no planning or arrangements being made for any special deployments or anything along the lines of that by the U.S. military.
QUESTION: Can I follow-up briefly? You have said twice on the TRA commits the United States Government to make sure that Taiwan has the capacity to resist aggression or military attacks. Does that capacity include U.S. direct military intervention?
MR. SCHRIVER: Actually, I’m sorry if I wasn’t clear. It says two things: We’ll provide Taiwan with weapons of a defensive character for their sufficient self-defense; and then it says the U.S. will maintain the capacity to resist force. And that’s – everyone has their TRA [Taiwan Relations Act], and you can read that for yourself, but that’s the position of the law, that the U.S. will maintain the capacity, and that falls on the shoulders of our commander of the Pacific Command.
QUESTION: Thanks. This is actually a prequel to John Zang’s question. What is your understanding or assessment of why did the PRC – why PRC officials have recently ratcheted up their rhetoric? What triggered this change? And I know that the Bush Administration has prided itself in being able to maintain good – …two good sets of relationships, both with PRC and with Taiwan. Do you expect that to change at all because of what’s happened in recent weeks and months?
MR. SCHRIVER: I can’t speak for the PRC. I can only make an observation in terms of what we’re hearing and what we’re seeing, and I think there is obvious concern about what’s happening in Taiwan and the election, but it’s for them to explain why they’ve raised the volume on the rhetoric.
http://fpc.state.gov/26534.htm
[Edited for length]
The 2 Chinas question is the fault of Chang kai-Shek, who chose to ignore the possibility for his own reasons of propaganda and hope for mainland monetary supporters.
Brilliant parody Sardino. I love the way communist talk. Its cool how they use all the same phrases like they pasted it out of some pamplet. Let me try.
If only South Korea was more like North Korea. Those South Koreans surely need to be liberated… from nourishment, education, and being generally happy and become more like the North.
I am sure finding enough workers in South Korea and in Taiwan to over throw the government will be very easy. I’m sure they all are willing to die for a lower standard of living and resticted political freedom. I can’t beleive those stupid bureaucrats just wont do it!
Also the great leap foward was a huge success, it wasnt for those pesky realities of agricultural production and common sense it would have lasted forever. And what was wrong with the red guard? Who doesn’t need a rowdy gang of young people terrorizing their elders for having differing opinions on the interpretations of classic literature. Once I really wanted to beat and march my teacher off to a labor camp because of may she read a line in Hamlet, Its a shame in this country I can’t. Racists. How else are we going to seek out and destroy all the capitalist running dogs before they start trying to run the show?
Lastly, since 1949 the people of China have never been oppressed and China has never been backwards or outside the modern world. Also China had not changed at for hundreds of years before 1949.
Oh, wait your serious.
Just a tip but China isn’t really Communist and the stuff you mentioned only applied to Maoist China not the new reformist era China.
Yes, but even there he stops short of saying “The United States promises to militarily defend Taiwan in any conflict.” To say any less than he does there runs the risk of China seeing it as a softening; but to issue a guarantee is to open the way for the Taiwanese to do something provacative like issue a formal declaration. The US would be fools to enter into even an informal agreement that would obligate them to military action vs. China. The US would almost certainly defend Taiwan. But they will not guarantee it. The “vagueness” I meant was simply the level of uncertainty entailed in keeping a policy “unspoken.”
I just raced through the posts. It’s good to see a viewpoint different from CNN or the local news here.
I’d just like to add that not “all” Taiwanese want independence. My wife, for one, wishes that Chen Shui-bian would STFU with all of this independence talk. When she goes overseas, she tells the customs folks that she is from the Republic of China (ROC).
Most Taiwanese are apathetic about current events. The stock market, they care about. Shopping at the new malls which seem to open every weekend is important to them. NBA basketball. School. These would make up the Holy Trinity of Taiwanese life (nevermind my math.) I rarely hear anyone express an opinion about the Mainland beyond “Yes, I would like to travel there next year.”
If you think about it, and I wish the locals would, Taiwan is already independent. The economy over here isn’t in great shape, but they’re doing ok. There’s a freely elected president. A couple international airlines (You’ve seen them drive, now watch 'em fly!). They have their own beer. They’ve met Frank Zappa’s requirements.
The current saber rattling by China is just an attempt to influence the outcome of next year’s election. They did it four years ago. And, if I recall, they did it four years before that.
The thing that worries me is – What if Dubya decides he wants to come over here and straighten things out like he did in Baghdad.
Fool me … fool me… can’t get fooled again.
xtisme, regarding the swap, I acknowledge that it isn’t a highly likely scenario; but given the right set of events and the right person in the White House, it’s a possibility, albeit small. GWB has called NK part of an Axis of Evil; so I believe he’d like to be rid of that thorn in the side by almost any means. The Taiwan portion of the equation is harder to deal with. Our relations there are not so easily put aside. Others have expressed very nicely why that is so. Things would be so much easier if they would just willingly go back to China (simplistic lament). But since they don’t appear to be headed in that direction, we’re back to our dilemma.
N Korea is also making things difficult. As you said, it would be nice if they would just wither away. But since they have such serious economic problems, their government is willing to do anything to prop itself up. It has already engaged in the illegal drug trade, so there is no reason to believe they wouldn’t sell a couple of nuclear bombs to make a few bucks. “Buy all you want, we’ll make more!” They say they would be willing to sign an agreement to stop making nuclear bombs in exchange for lifting the sanctions; but when has the current leadership ever honored a treaty or agreement? If only they would self-destruct before selling nuclear arms to the terrorists (another naive lament). But they aren’t cooperating.
Many have stated that China would not win in a war against Taiwan, and that may be the case. But I don’t think Beijing holds that view. I feel they believe they truly could win. But it would be costly in many ways: casualties, economics, domestic opinion, world opinion, etc. So they are hoping for some other way. Nevertheless, force is not off the table.
As you say, the waiting game is proving frustrating because it doesn’t seem to be working; at least not in the way they would like. But furt has identified the most promising solution: the attitudes of the upcoming generation. If only conflict can be averted until the hawks and hardliners have passed from power, then a resolution can be found – whether it be reunification or independence. But this period in the interim is fraught with hazard.
I like Grey’s question, “How long must an entity wait until it qualifies for nationhood?” I think the answer is, “Until the passing of the generation that remembers otherwise.”
Dubya is going to take the traditional republican role in the Taiwan/China affair. Most Repubs are notably hands off in NE asia and are all about maintaining the status quo. Even during the spy plane incident Bush was VERY quiet about the entire event and made sure to settle things quickly and peacefully with China. The ones I see calling for some kind of real military action are usually the far right types who probably have concrete bunkers in their backyard too.
**Funny you mention that; it was a hobby of mine when I lived there (1998 & 99) to check and see. Most of the maps you’d see in stores had China and Taiwan in two different colors, although some had them the same color. I did see a handful of wall maps with Mongolia as part of China in schools, but they had been hanging there awhile. You also see it on monuments and government buildings built under the KMT. A lot of DPP ads and the like prominently featured an outline of the island; don’t know if it’s changed on gov’t stuff with Chen in power.
There’s a dissertation in this: Shifting national identity as measured by third-grade geography textbooks.
**
Well, yes. But the question isn’t whether they care, but how much; do they care about it more than they care about Taiwan?
**
Yep. The other one is a blockade. China’s Navy can’t beat Taiwan, but they can dare Taiwan to fire the first shot. If Taiwan does, they lose a lot of world support. If they don’t, even a relatively brief blockade would threaten the global economy and bring pressure on Taiwan to make some concessions.
Well, yes and no. This isn’t anything new or different; we hear it every month. But the OP was asking if China is serious about going to war over Taiwan, and they are: if Taiwan declares independance, there will almost certainly be military action; which is why Taiwan won’t.
We hope.
Hmmm, true. One can never too easily assume your adversary is rational.
Alas, you misunderstand me; the attitudes of the young are precisely the danger. The remaining old-line KMT hawks on Taiwan are no problem at all: they keep repeating that “Taiwan is part of China,” and their only quarrel is over who has the right to govern it, them or the Communist party.
The young people and the native Taiwanese are more inclined to state the obvious: that there are all sorts of differences between the two and that Taiwan already is, for all practical purposes, an independant nation. The only way most younger Taiwanese would accept reunification is if China became a liberal democracy; that is the attitude that is growing.
**
And that is what China finds threatening.
To answer the OP: No one knows if the present Chinese leadership would go to war if Taiwan declares independance. These are all WAGs, and most WAGs are by people that don’t follow China very closely or newspapers making headlines.
Quagmire, when Bush first took office, he made comments on GoodMorning America or someother show about Taiwan. What he said implied a sea change in US-Taiwan relations about defending an independant Taiwan. His spin doctors were out in force about 30 seconds after the show aired to explain what Bush really meant, and what he really meant was that there was no change in the US-Taiwan approach.
Sofa King, those were kind words. Happy that some people are noticing that when headlines like these are viewed in the context of the past few years, then it adds some perspective. “Crisis, what crisis, call me when China starts lobbing missles in the shipping lanes again.” And don’t forget what happened that time. Taiwan voted overwhelmingly for that candidate not favored by China.
If you mean against just Taiwan, then China has a fair chance (leaving out the wild card of nukes).
But China would lose decisively in a full war against the US, and it knows it. It would lose in a nuclear war, and it would lose in a conventional war. There is no question about this whatsoever, and they would have to be divorced from reality (which they are not) to believe it. The U.S. certainly could never be able to invade and occupy mainland China without widespread support from the Chinese people (which they would almost certainly never get), but if it came to war over Taiwan, the most the Chinese could do would be to obliterate Taiwan itself: they would never be able to take the island if the US was willing to defend it.
China’s advantages are that it has a LOT of troops, and it’s close by. But how are those troops going to get to Taiwan in the first place? The only theater the Chinese could hope to face the US on is on their own homeland (and only then because of sheer numbers): precisely where this sort of battle will not take place.
I would say that if the U.S. did say that it would be willing to defend Taiwan, and it could go ahead an declare what it obviously already the case anyway (its independance), that China wouldn’t do much about it except lose a LOT of face. That the US hasn’t done this is, I think, more a factor of not wanting to make China hate us so bitterly over something like that than it is worrying that they’d start a nuclear war over it.
**
I’ve thought this, too. There are a lot of factors that line up. In addition to hosting the Olympics, which is a Very Big Deal for the Chinese that they will do almost anything not to spoil, Summer 2008 will be coming up on the end of George Bush’s final term, assuming he gets re-elected. No matter who replaces, GB, they will be less instictively supportive of Tiawan and less likely to back Tiawan with military force in the event of a conflict.
At the same time, China is working hard to modernize its military force. Right now, any invasion would likely be a failure. Ten years from now, though, the balance of power will have strongly shifted in favour of the Chinese.
The point of all this may be that, if you’re Taiwan and you decide that a conflict over a formally independent Taiwan is eventually going to occur one way or the other, you might very well choose to provoke a crisis and get it over with. The summer of 2008 may be your last and best chance to stage the crisis on your terms.