[QUOTE=BrainGlutton]
Story and discussion here.
The official story is that on August 30, six nuclear-armed cruise missiles were loaded onto a B-52 in Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota and flown to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana by mistake. But theories are floating around the Internets that the nukes were actually bound for the Persian Gulf, perhaps to be used on Iran – or that they’re meant to be detonated in the U.S., a “nuclear 9/11” to justify a wider war. All seems very silly, but the idea of the U.S. military losing track of any of its nukes by mistake, however briefly, seems even sillier, and now this happens . . . hmmmm . . .
(Do tinfoil hats actually block radiation?)
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Any US Department of Energy nuclear weapon[sup]*[/sup] that was detonated could be readily be identified by the unique characteristic isotope ratios from fallout residue. Not only could you identify it as being fabricated by a U.S. facility, but you could actually determine the reactor, and with the appropriate information the time and section of the reactor in which the material was produced. In addition, you’ll see characteristics of the enrichment or seperation process; the U.S. has historically used the laborious gaseous diffusion process, whereas any modern weapons will used some type of centerfuge seperation. So, forget any nonsense about using weapons from the U.S. stockpile to “fake” an attack, here or abroad. Unless you are going to assert that thousands of scientists and engineers who will have access to residue data are all in on the conspiracy, it just doesn’t float.
Stolen nuclear weapons would also be next to useless for any immediate purpose. Modern safety interlocks like those found on the W80-3 “physics package” carried by the AGM-129 follow the “strong-link/weak-link” principle, requiring a matching set of codes to activate, and automatically deactivating should environment conditions indicate that it is not in operation mode, i.e. you can’t detonate it sitting on the ground with just an activation code. It’s also one of the most modern designs, incorporating all modern safety features (single-point safe, fire resistant pit, highly insensitive explosive, advanced static discharge resistance) which would make it virtually impossible for someone bypass the safe and arm systems and easily rig it to detonate; you’d effectively have to rebuild the entire weapon to detonate it. There are designs–some still in the reserve stockpile–which could potentially be caused to fizzle by a partial detonation or by accident (hence, why the W-78 can’t be air transported) but almost all of these are in the Inactive Stockpile and/or are scheduled for disassembly and reprocessing.
This isn’t to excuse the egregeous lapse of security in unknowingly transporting nuclear weapons. This serves to highlight the need for tighter controls, idiot-safe handling procedures and security systems, and reducing the Active Stockpile to minimum necessary levels, particularly portable weapons. Unfortunately, the Air Force and Strategic Command is being cut to minimial levels, and lacking a clear strategic threat and all that comes with that the first impulse in cost cutting is to reduce budgets for maintenance and training. But it does not follow that this is some kind of conspiracy, and it’s highly doubtful that this is the fault, either deliberately or unintentionally of one individual; more likely a systemic failure in security culture.
Still, this isn’t nearly as scary as the fact that the PAL locks on the Minuteman force were all set to exactly the same, easily remembered combination through the 'Seventies, unbeknownst to Presidents and DefSecs until Carter. :eek: And even a quick survey of Titan II accidents and near-accidents is enough to make one’s hair curl.
Stranger
[sup]*[/sup]While nuclear weapons are controlled by Strategic Command and deployed via the labor of various Armed Forces services, nuclear weapons are owned and maintained by the Department of Energy through the aegis of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
