Since India is saying they did that 2 days ago.
It was observed by Pakistan throughout and fortunately the PAF concluded it was a mistake and not an actual launch.
The Indians didn’t bother revealing it until 23 hours after Pakistan had said they had launched a missile.
I will admit I am a a little, strike that very terrified. And angry.
From your cite it wasn’t a nuclear missile:
Babar Ifthikar said in a late evening press conference that an unarmed Indian supersonic missile took off from Sirsa and landed near Mian Channu in Khanewal district, around 124 km inside Pakistani territory.
Bolding mine.
Still really bad, of course.
It’s a BraMoa
A Supersonic missile which is known to be armed with nuclear warheads in its land based variant.
I don’t see that in either of your cites. In fact, the first one says
Neither India nor Pakistan has identified what kind of missile it was.
Modern tactical and strategic rocket motors and engines are initiated by what is called a Safe & Arm Device (S&A or SAD) or Arm/Fire Device (AFD). These are devices that contain an ordnance device (redundant squibs) and that then ignites the igniter. These generally have a mechanical inhibit (“safing key”) that by default rotates the assembly containing the squibs out of line with the igniter and disconnects the firing circuits into the SAFE position although some modern devices are purely electrical in nature, requiring an extremely high voltage pulse with specific frequency modulation to be able to develop a firing charge. These devices can only fire if the safing key is removed and the appropriate FIRE command signal is sent. Of course, there should be other inhibits upsteam to prevent a command signal from unintentionally being sent, including not having the firing system energized, having the actual firing circuit shorted, et cetera.
It is inconceivable that this is purely an ‘accident’ in the sense of being a purely a mechanical or electrical failure of a properly maintained system. Either some part of the Arm/Fire system was damaged or had a defect, or somebody was fucking around with an unsafed system and ‘unintentionally’ initiated it. You should be terrified and angry because this is exactly the sort of incident that has the potential to set off an unintentional and unprovoked nuclear exchange.
Stranger
It’s a very good thing that nothing else is going on in the world (or between these two nuclear powers) that would raise tensions in any other place :-/
[I did a search to see if this topic had been brought up yet. Just … fuck.]
Wikipedia has a handy list of nuclear weapon close calls (inadvertent release of nuclear weapons). There are more than is comfortable.
Also, I think the rules for release of nuclear weapons vary by country and each country has differing levels of competency within their forces and command structure.
If a missile with a nuclear warhead is launched, is the warhead automatically armed, or does that require a separate set of commands?
An American (and I assume other modern) nuclear weapon delivered by ballistic missile is armed only after experiencing a sequence of acceleration conditions consistent with ascent, post-ascent ballistic flight, and reentry so as to prevent any possibility of inadvertent detonation during launch or catastrophic failure during launch. However, no commands are sent after launch. Non-ballistic weapons (gravity bombs and cruise missiles) have different sets of protocols consistent with their operation.
Stranger
Life imitates art.
If it’s capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, it has to be presumed to be a nuclear missile.
If ICBM’s start coming over the pole from Russia, NORAD isn’t going to wait and see if they are armed.
Pakistan has every right to be outtraged by this. How can it happen, especially with everything else going on? India needs to explain it.
Fire-and-forget, eh?
For an operational missile, yes. For a test flight from a launch site into a range like Vandenberg Space Force Base/Western Range, there is a flight termination system on the booster for command destruct should the missile malfunction or fly off course as required by range safety standards. This is obviously not a concern in the case of a deliberate launch of an operational ICBM, since the only reason to command a launch is in response to an imminent threat.
Stranger
If your enemies can somehow hack the missile guidance system of your nuclear missiles in mid -air to defuse them it’s not really a good deterrent.
Also I remember reading how once they start to descent it’s almost impossible to contact them anyway.
Movies/TV have given us a really bad understanding of what it takes to hack something.
Unless someone already has access to such missiles from prior espionage they almost certainly will not figure it out in the 30(ish) minutes it takes an ICBM to reach its target.
I would hope all such missiles have a self-destruct/disarm mechanism that the launching country could use to stop the missile in-flight in case they change their minds.
Remember the “B” in ICBM. These are ballistic. All the aiming is done early. After that the nuke is like a thrown baseball following a ballistic trajectory. I am not sure if they have any course correction ability once they are free from the rocket.
During atmospheric reentry the reentry vehicle (RV) is surrounded by a plasma sheath produced by the superheated air from ram compression that would prevent radio signals from penetrating it.
No, there is no command destruct system on an operational ICBM or SLBM. These vehicles are only in powered flight for a few minutes anyway, and given that for an operational trajectory they are probably flying over the North Pole they would be out of contact for much of the flight. Once boost flight is completed the final tuning of the trajectory is done by the post-boost vehicle (PBV), essentially a kick motor and guidance system and can allow for multiple targets in the case of a multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV). There are maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV) on some advanced weapon systems but the intent of this is to improve survivability against terminal defense or to allow for trajectories that can negotiate deep valleys and strike at embedded targets.
Stranger
There is no “changing their minds”.
That’s one of the arguments in favor of bombers with human crews: they can be recalled (up to a point, at which they are required to disregard commands to recall them).
Maybe it was dry run of launching procedures and the checklist got mixed up? I dunno
You should be terrified and angry because this is exactly the sort of incident that has the potential to set off an unintentional and unprovoked nuclear exchange
Ya think.
I have seen and heard from more than one source that one of the unexpected challenges of modern nuclear states is that staffing the military functions around the nuclear arsenal is very difficult.
On the one hand, these are some of the most important jobs in the country, demanding a high level of commitment and professionalism; for obvious reasons, there must be extremely low tolerance for sloppiness, laziness, or foolishness. But on the other hand, it’s inherently understood that these jobs are staffed with the hope that they never have to carry out their ultimate responsibility. These people sit endlessly, performing repetitive maintenance, checking and re-checking readiness conditions, while the rest of the service is out doing stuff. If the things I’ve read are accurate, this is a real dilemma, because as critical as it is to execute this function properly, it’s also limiting in terms of career advancement; these servicepeople aren’t doing anything that gets them noticed or promoted.
As a result, it’s apparently really, really hard to get the highly qualified people to accept these positions. Sure, on paper, it’s the military, if you’re ordered to do a job, you have to do that job. But that’s on paper, and in reality, other factors — office politics and personal influence and the incentive of offering at least a degree of choice in order to attract good people — could have a counter effect.
I would appreciate some level of either confirmation or refutation of this principle, as I’ve heard it repeatedly but it feels like something I “know” rather than something I know, if that makes sense.
And if it’s true, it could certainly be a contributing factor in incidents like these. If you can’t staff your missile command with the best people possible, then you have to mitigate with layers and layers of procedural failsafes, because single points of failure will inevitably break due to the human factor.
From the first article:
Pakistan claimed the missile was initially headed towards India’s Mahajan field firing ranges but after travelling around 70-80 km, it changed direction while maintaining the same altitude and speed and headed towards Pakistani airspace.
In other words, it wasn’t fired accidently.
It was fired deliberately and was supposed to hit a firing range inside India, but for some reason it deviated from its course while in flight.
Still a problem, but not the same problem.