About three decades ago, I was the Assistant Weapons Officer, supervising the Missile Technicians (MTs) and Ballistic Fire Control Technicians (FTBs), on a ballistic missile submarine. The people working for me were extremely good, as were the other people serving nuclear command and control functions on the boat.
I have heard similar descriptions as you about demotivating factors for those who serve in ICBM facilities, but have no direct experience to know whether it’s true.
There are cultural differences between the Navy and the Air Force. Further, a ballistic missile submarine is out there “doing stuff” in addition to “endlessly, performing repetitive maintenance, checking and re-checking readiness conditions”. Maybe that’s the difference between my experience and what we’ve both heard?
Thanks for this. It makes a lot of sense that the experience of getting to be on a submarine, which is in motion and actively stealthy in its operations, would be fundamentally different from sitting in a silo or in a control room supervising the silo remotely, and would have different staffing challenges.
If this is a real concern couldn’t the military either limit the time any one person is doing this task and/or guarantee a career advancement path?
I get training a constant stream of new people is expensive and troublesome but so what? These are nukes…they can deal with it. Or, make sure that if you want one person sitting in a silo doing drudge work for years that they are promoted on a regular basis so they don’t come to loathe their jobs. That is not what you want from a person with their finger on the nuclear button.
Or some other means to make things ok for the people in the silos. I do not know “the answer” to this but I would think the military has been doing this long enough to know how to attract the right people for this job and keep them motivated. If the military does not see to this then they are derelict in their duty to see to the protection of this country.
It’s my understanding that one of the safeguards, with the US arsenal at least, is “detargeting,” i.e. they are “aimed” at the middle of the ocean, and not “aimed” at say, Moscow or Beijing by default. They must be intentionally targeted at someplace before launching.
I mean, certainly the warhead should get proper commands while still in the silo. That’s the only way to be certain it gets the info it needs to target and do its thing.
But, also, you do not want it exploding prematurely in the silo or on launch so, it also needs to have mechanisms that let it know it is flying and no longer in the silo before it arms itself.
Just a WAG on my part…I am not a nuclear missile tech.
Fortunately, it just caused a mild international incident easily dealt with via diplomatic channels, but it also upped the game for range safety from the US Eastern and Western Ranges in terms of assuring that a vehicle that is going off course can be destructed with a minimal increase in Expectation of Casualty (EC).
“Missileer” duty used to be a fairly high prestige job that required a lot of specialized training and discipline. Unfortunately, it is also a pretty dull duty in mostly undesirable duty stations (anyone who has been to Minot will know what I mean) and few people made missileer a career path even at the height of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, maintenance and discipline has often been lax and there was even a scandal of missile officers cheating on knowledge and readiness exams. There are systems in place to prevent unintended, negligent, or malignant operation or interference (e.g. the PAL listed above) and modern LGM -30G ‘Minuteman III’ ICBMs can only be retargeted at the Wing level so their is no possibility of a single rogue officer retargeting a missile to an unauthorized target but how thoroughly such safeguards are applied to the Indian strategic forces is unknown (to me, at least). The US ‘Nuclear’ Navy has a very different culture of extreme discipline owing largely to the legacy of Admiral Hyman Rickover, but also a high burnout rate as ‘deterrence’ patrols by ballistic missile submarines are an intense duty under highly confined circumstances and tend to be hard on family life.
That is exactly correct; interlocks are in place to prevent the nuclear warhead within the RV from being armed before it completes flight and is on a terminal vector. Of course, the entire weapon system is initialized (e.g. thermal batteries are squibbed, firing circuits are verified, et cetera) prior to launch but the actual ‘physics package’ is only armed in the terminal phase of flight.
Came closer to an exchange than previously believed.
Apparently what stopped it was since it “didn’t look right”.
Wonder what the SOP are for a surprise attack. Is it, retaliate immediately? Or retaliate once sure…
Either way they have literal minutes to decide.
This is insane.
Don’t forget - the US had a Titan missile explode in a closed silo with such force that the umpty-thousand ton blast door was blown clean off the silo, and yet the warhead was found sitting on the ground nearby, If that didn’t cause it to explode accidentally, probably not much will.
Movies are wrong: you launch an armed ICBM and millions of people will die. There’s no calling them back.
That’s American thinking. (Or perhaps more generally, Western thinking.) Russia has to deal with the same kind of staffing issues. If we are to believe the propaganda we’ve heard, they have different philosophies about how to keep their people “motivated”. That could be something we need to worry about.
”Destructed” is the nomenclature used in range safety standards and documentation to refer to a command destruct as distinct from being destroyed by some design flaw, malfunction, or external hazard.
We have seen Russian military performance in Ukraine and it has not been great.
Russians are certainly smart enough and capable enough to do anything a westerner can. But their military culture is not the same.
I recently watched a YouTube video about a serial killer in Moscow. At least 50 people were killed in a local park and the local police were threatening people who were pointing this out rather than working to solve the crime.
It is that kind of “staffing issues” that differ between countries.
The topic reminded me of the film, The Bedford Incident. A destroyer is hunting a Russian nuclear sub that is discovered in territorial waters. Tensions are high. The captain is asked what he would do if the submarine attacks. The C.O. says, matter-of-factly, “If he fires one, I’ll fire one”. Thinking the C.O. has given an order, the guy with his finger on the button says, “FIRE ONE” and pushes the button. We see the sub explode. Unfortunately, the sub had detected the incoming missile. The film ends when the C.O. sees the nuclear torpedoes heading straight for the USS Bedford.