Do Immanuel Kant's racist opinions render the rest of his philosophy suspect?

Blah blah blah, ethics is a snoozefest, but I’d like to hear more about this. Do you say the above because (1) you don’t believe aesthetics should be a part of philosophy, or (2) you believe that philosophy addresses aesthetic questions, but that the question “Is work of art A better than work of art B?” is unanswerable, in which case philosophers should talk about why works of art are incomparable with each other.

Well, simple something, anyway. You can’t really get away with baldy asserting the thing you want to conclude in your premises like that.

Some variant of 2 without the snark. *Definitely *philosophy should address aesthetic questions, in fact these are more important than, say, epistemology or teleology. But at the same time, it should remain aware of the subjective nature of the field it is playing in. There are more interesting and meaningful questions in aesthetics than “is A better art than B”, which just strikes me as a category mistake from the get-go.

And the average german person no doubt had the good sense not to write books about the relative level of development of the races, then. Kant didn’t.

That’s what i’m saying - that Kant doesn’t see this is his failing. That it is also the same failing for his whole society doesn’t excuse him in the slightest.

You jump from forgiveable to understandable too quickly. Yes, it is understandable why Kant says as he does. That does *not *make it forgiveable.

No, but it means we must be more critical of his work than if he wasn’t co-incidently nuttier than a fruitbar. Just like we would for a modern idiot savant. For Newton, this is easy - repeat the experiments, get the same results, etc (or get Leibnitz to do it for you).
For philosophy, it’s the same thing. Notice, at no point here have I said we have to reject the categorical imperative or anything (we should, but not because Kant was racist), just that he should be held to a higher standard of examination because he clearly didn’t have a more scientific frame of mind. The philosophy of someone who didn’t question their own biases is always going to have less weight than that of someone who does.

“Better to stay silent, and be thought a fool, than to speak and remove all doubt”

Not really. When did he live? I mean if he lived today and saw all that blacks had accomplished, he would recant.

It is kind of interesting though. Was he privy to the best information of his time and essentially making a true statement? Or was he ignant on the subject for his time?

He might recant. One never knows. That’s not meant as a slur against Kant; it’s a comment on human nature.

I’d say he was ignorant, and it is that he was propounding so confidently in the face of that ignorance that is troublesome.

How could it be his failing - when the science which would have proved him wrong hadn’t been invented yet?

He was going by what information was available. That the information was wrong, in some cases deliberately so, is obvious in hindsight (well, except to those “Bell Curve” people, but we’ll pass over them in silence, right? :wink: )

It is sort of like blaming pre-Darwinians for not correctly grasping evolution. They were wrong it is true, but one cannot blame them for it, or coinsider that they need greater “scrutiny” for it.

What’s there to foregive? It isn’t a moral issue, but a question of fact, whether some group of humans happens to be of lesser capabilities than another.

Today’s racists are “blameworthy”, that is worthy of moral judgment, because they are being willfully blind to the scientific and anthropological facts that demonstrate that human populations everywhere have equal capabilities. In short, they are choosing to believe stuff they hnow or ought to know is wrong, in order to support a predetermined notion of superiority.

You can’t extend this sort of judgment into the past. People from the mid-18th centuries simply did not have a rational basis to believe that human populations were of equal capacity. In fact, at that time the greatest impetus to believing in the innate equality of humans came from non-rational sources, such as religion (“all are made in God’s image”); and even then, it was a minority view.

At the time, it wasn’t a question of “his own biases”, but one of biases in the information he received - which was slanted in the direction that Africans were lesser. What was he supposed to question that data against?

Could you elaborate on this?

Eh - I don’t know. You don’t actually need to do a thing to offer sensible advice about it, especially if you are either well-read or have a decent amount of common sense. For example, I’ve never gone mountain-climbing, but I could probably intuit some not-bad safety rules from general principles. For example: Don’t drink and climb, tell people when/where you’re climbing so they know where to look if you run into trouble, make sure your safety gear is in good condition and you know how to use it, etc. It would still be foolish for a friend to rely on me for mountain-climbing advice - far better to ask someone with experience - but I could produce advice that a mountain climber would probably agree with so far as it went.

There’s an issue of frame of reference here, though – being wrong and being right can only be distinguished through confrontation with contradictory data, so what if that data isn’t (reasonably) available? Should I remain silent on anything that I don’t know I’ve heard the last word on – and how could I possibly come to know that I’ve heard the last word on anything?

Sure you can. Simple proof by contradiction. He’s not trying to prove slavery is moral…he knows slavery is moral. That’s a given. He’s trying to prove blacks are inferior. Here’s another one, stripped of the racial connotation. If ice cream is poisonous, I will die if I eat it. I ate ice cream and didn’t die. Therefore, ice cream isn’t poisonous. Or, in Hume’s case:

If blacks are fully human, enslaving them is wrong. Enslaving them is not wrong. Therefore, blacks are not fully human. Note that the fact that the minor premise is wrong and wouldn’t find many advocates today doesn’t mean that the argument isn’t logically sound.

Please bear in mind, also, that Immanuel Kant was a real pissant, who was very rarely stable. You have to make allowances.

:confused:

In whose twisted mind is that a valid argument?

Modus tollens is an entirely valid form of argument.

Note that the validity of the argument has nothing to do with the correctness of the premises.

I think Skald is pointing out that the entire premise rests on the bolded assertion:

This reduces the whole exercise to merely a “cuz I said so.” In the end Kant’s moral failings prevent him from being correct; he’s not the first asshole to bend logic to justify his assholeness. Racists/sexists/bigots do this everyday.

Pretty much. And I’m dubious of the utility of inductive logic to reach moral conclusions anyway; it’s too easily manipulated.

In my last post, I wrote inductive logic when I meant deductive logic; sorry for the error.

Here’s the problem with Captain Amazing’s argument (which I realize is only a mock argument) as I see it. The statement Enslaving blacks is not immoral is not a falsifiable fact in any sense (unless God exists and is willing to do interviews); it is a judgment. Using judgments as your minor premise is fatally flawed, it seems to be, because it’s a stealthy way of begging the question. Minor premises ideally should be limited to statements that can be proven or disproven, because otherwise any argument one chooses can be proven valid through deductive logic.

I don’t think so, but I’d love to hear a logician or philosopher weigh in.

I thought the whole point of deductive logic is to show what follows logically from your premises, whether those premises be falsifiable statements of fact, judgments, opinions, assumptions, mathematical axioms, or whatever. The valid argument is meant to show what someone who agrees with your premises is bound to accept as true, but is irrelevant to anyone who doesn’t agree with your premises.

I’d argue, but my logic classes were twenty years ago. Brother Ted discoursed long and passionately on the issue of what sorts of statements were and were not suitable for premises, but he’s dead now and thus not available for a consult.

Let me just say that even if CA’s argument is valid (which I doubt), it sure isn’t sound.