Does consciousness/identity need to be continuous?

[erislover]

My point, dear Podkayne, isn’t that physicists aren’t noble souls who do try very hard to understand things, but that elements in the scientific community have, over the years, strenuously rejected predictions and formulations which didn’t make sense. Like time travel, quantum probability, corpuscular light, black holes, black hole surface area as a measure of entropy, etc. ad nauseum. They rejected these predictions and formulations because they didn’t make sense, not because there wasn’t evidence for them. They are just human, for Eris’s sake.

Now, hopefully putting that dog to rest (unless citations are requested, which I can supply without even bringing up Galileo once), some more comments.

Maybe it’s better to consider the identity of an inatimate object that has been exactly duplicated, and leave consciousness out of it?

By all means. I am not particularly concerned, here, about what you feel consciousness is or is not. Just the identity problem. Consciousness is involved because it also has an identity which some would say is seperate from our physical identity. For those of us who feel that consciousness is somehow a direct effect of our physical forms then the difference between an inanimate object and a conscious person in this thought experiment is nil.

I have no problem with acknowledging that the experiment has created two of me, equal in me-ness.

Nor do I, really. Just wondering which one is you. I have no problem with multiple pieces of white paper existing simultaneously on my desk. They are identical in appearance; they each have a seperate identity. Duplicate Podkayne ::[duplication noise]:: OK. I have two Podkynes which are identical in appearance. They have seperate identities. Which one is you?

andros

If it walks like an andros and quacks like an andros, and thinks it’s an andros, and remembers being an andros, I think it’s a safe bet it’ll be able to cash my paychecks.

I concur wholeheartedly. If my mystical machine works like it should I couldn’t tell the difference between the two of you. It’d cause no end of trouble for those bumbling upper-management types, eh? But which one is you? Understand there are two entirely similar entities. Each has an independent identity (hence the word “two”). I am asking: does one of them have the same identity as the one which stepped into the duplicator? I know they will both claim to be you—very convincingly, as well. I have no doubt about it, actually, unless we actually manage to resolve the issue here and one (or both) will have to say, “Well, yep, I ain’t andros.” But I am wondering if one of the andros’s identity is the same as the one before the cloning.

xen

I take the word “entity” to mean a material object which has objectively verifiable existence, while “identity” is the assertion that said object has [had] continuous existence over time. (Hence, my assertion regarding identity being tied to continuity.)

OK. So if I chop off your arm you have a different identity? (also reiterate Spiritus’s example of a broken object seamlessly repaired)

[dierson]

Mangetout
Member

<p>ha ha! You thought about that too!..you know it COULD be that we aren’t even here yet…oohhhh!

I agree…last thursday was a better day than five minutes ago!

[jab1]

*Originally posted by ModernRonin2 *
**This reminds me vaguely of the whole “Thesus’s Ship” debate:

http://members.aol.com/kiekeben/theseus.html

Incidentally, my answer to this is: “The ship becomes different when the first plank is replaced.”

That’s my story, and I’m sticking to it!**

Once every plank in the ship has been replaced, the original ship is gone, true. But the design is still the same. The design is the “soul” or “identity” of the ship.

[dierson]

*Originally posted by jab1 *
**

*Originally posted by ModernRonin2 *
**This reminds me vaguely of the whole “Thesus’s Ship” debate:

http://members.aol.com/kiekeben/theseus.html

Incidentally, my answer to this is: “The ship becomes different when the first plank is replaced.”

That’s my story, and I’m sticking to it!**

Once every plank in the ship has been replaced, the original ship is gone, true. But the design is still the same. The design is the “soul” or “identity” of the ship. **

Is one machine the same as another machine with identical design? Is one HAL9000 the same as another HAL9000???

[Spiritus_Mundi]

I take the word “entity” to mean a material object which has objectively verifiable existence, while “identity” is the assertion that said object has [had] continuous existence over time. (Hence, my assertion regarding identity being tied to continuity.)

**earlier:**I’ve posited that identity is inherent in the entity, not in its component particles. I’ve further posited that the continuity of existence of a specific entity alters but maintains its identity.

[ul][li]What part of a material object is not component particles?[/li][li]What exactly is “same and same” after the particles have all been changed?[/li][li]Do those questions have different answers, or are they identical?[/ul][/li]

I am tying [identity] to separation from all other similar or exact objects, so spatial position does have something to do with it.

How so? If all of your particles are moved to a different location, does your identity change?

Identity itself isn’t dependent on maintaining a location, but rather a distinction.

This seems to answer, “no”, to my question above. If so, I repeat the initial question: please tell me exactly what the difference between substitution and alteration is when discussing particle makeup of an entitiy.
Also, what distinctions are relevant in specifying identity, since you don’t seem to mean material composition or location?

However, I definitely think consciousness is tied to frame of reference, so as soon as you create an exactly similar consciousness and give it a separate frame of reference, it necessarily gains a separate identity.

Of course, but both identities have the same relationship to the pre-duplication identity.

Whether that’s a distinction without a difference is for better minds than mine to determine…

It isn’t. [sub]Hey, if you’re going to throw out a line that straight . . .[/sub]

erl

Understand there are two entirely similar entities. Each has an independent identity (hence the word “two”). I am asking: does one of them have the same identity as the one which stepped into the duplicator?

They both do.

[DSeid]

Are identical twins the same person with one shared and/or divided consciousness? No. From conception on they have different experiences and diverge. Is one more of the original zygote than the other? No. And discontinous or continous multiple copy, the pattern is the consciousness is a twin.

As long as it is an exact copy set off running in the same patterns of activity. But that is key. Not only must every atom be an exact copy, but all of their vectors must be exact copies as well! Every extant swirl and eddy of activity. Every little nested resonant arc and it competitor. Then they have the same claim to the past identity and seperate future ones.

[Genseric]

I guess I am not expressing my thoughts as clearly I thought.

*Originally posted by erislover *

Genseric, I tend to agree with you except for the sticking point that everyone else would think that the copy is you if the real you were destroyed. Think what an ontological mess Star Trek is! **

Then we are in 100% agreement. To any outside observer, the original “me” and the copy “me”, are indistinguishable. Even my own mother would be unable to tell which is which. If the original were destroyed, no one would ever know the difference. The copy of me wouldn’t even know! But I have this sneaking suspicion that the original me (in the sense of my own personal conciousness, such as I am experiencing at this very second) would be extinct.

Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi

**Genseric
I don’t see any need (or even potential) for consciousness to be divided between the two “mes”, certainly not if we accept the materialist framework of the OP.

If we imagine that such a duplication does result in a single consciousness split between two bodies then it would seem to be a strong argument in favor of a non-material agent of consciousness.**

I agree completely. The “divided conciousness” is an illustration I put forth as the only way I can concieve of my “me-ness” surviving in a destructiove scan and reconstruction, with the added complication of the original not being destroyed. I in no way think is possible, therefore the copy cannot be “me” it must be someone else, who to all outside (and even inside!) appearances is “me” it has all my memories, it thinks like me, it acts like me, it can do everything I can do, but “I” am not in there. “I” am still in the original, or in the case of the destructive scan, “I” am dead.

[Genseric]

Just reading back through this, and I think most of us are agreeing with each other in the most roundabout fashion imaginable.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

I don’t think so, at least not until someone can specify for me the difference between the I[sup]original[/sup] and I[sup]duplicate[/sup] which does not also hold for I[sup]past[/sup] and I[sup]present[/sup].

[Genseric]

Honestly, I don’t think I’m smart enough to continue. I’m not following a good portion of what’s being discussed anymore. The way I see it is, I am “me”, I am not anyone else, as far as I know everyone else who has ever existed has experienced this exact thing. For whatever reason, my brain creates a conciousness, that I percieve as myself. I experience a continual input of information through my senses that I sort and selectively store for later retrieval. I have been in this state since I was about three or so. I am unable to retrieve any memories from before then. As far as I know I will continue in this state until my brain ceases to function, whereupon, “I” will cease to exist. For some reason, the “me” is related to my specific brain in a way I do not understand. An exact copy of my brain could not possibly be “me”. The difficult issue is that the exact copy of my brain will be “me” but it will have it’s own conciousness separate from the one I am currently experiencing. Therefore it is not really “me-me” it is “me-you” in the same sense that to me I am “me” and you are “you” but to you you are “me” and I am “you”. That doesn’t help at all does it?

My problem is, I don’t understand how conciousness works, so I can’t come up with a satisfactory answer to this discussion.

[erislover]

Ah, Genseric, we could really talk about a piece of paper or something. The same idea of identity should hold.

Spiritus, I admit your (most recent) post is exactly the problem that bothers me with respect to discontinuity over time. Discounting the single object for a moment, are you saying that indistinguishables have the same identity?
Me: Understand there are two entirely similar entities. Each has an independent identity (hence the word “two”). I am asking: does one of them have the same identity as the one which stepped into the duplicator?
You: They both do.

heh, color me So you are saying, I[sub]1[/sub][sup]past[/sup] == I[sub]2[/sub][sup]present[/sup] == I[sub]3[/sub][sup]present[/sup]? Wouldn’t this mean the two pieces of paper on my desk have the same identity? That is: identity = able to be identified as = the sum of its descriptors? That is: are you disagreeing with me saying they have seperate identities? If you aren’t saying that, then I am really

[xenophon41]

Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi:
I don’t think so, at least not until someone can specify for me the difference between the I[sup]original[/sup] and I[sup]duplicate[/sup] which does not also hold for I[sup]past[/sup] and I[sup]present[/sup].

Spiritus, if you don’t mind, I’d like to answer your direct questions to me by wrestling with this more pithy restatement of the conundrum, which goes hand in hand with your request that I “please tell [you] exactly what the difference between substitution and alteration is when discussing particle makeup of an entity.” Perhaps in the process, I can also address erl’s rather odd query regarding the loss of a limb.

(–I do wish to clarify my remark about spatial position, though. It was offered merely as a nod to the basic physical axiom that multiple material entities cannot occupy the same space/time position, and therefore the distinctions which define identity necessarily include positional distinctions.)

I think we’d best do this in baby steps, so that exact points of contention can be identified (heh heh), and also so that we can carry on this discussion between distractions (like continued employment, a critical factor in determining the quality of my own continuous existence).

[/quote]

Okie doke, then. Let’s start with nondestructive scanning/replication, and then later apply whatever agreements we have to the destructive case. In keeping with the spirit of the OP, let’s limit the discussion to living, conscious human entities.

I think the only difference between I[sup]original[/sup] and I[sup]duplicate[/sup] in the instant of duplication is that they are distinct material beings. There are two of them, exactly alike in all details including consciousness, and it is merely their separate realities which profer separate identities at this instant. Both entities have the same temporal relationship to I[sup]prescan[/sup], but I[sup]duplicate[/sup] has an abrupt incremental material separation from I[sup]prescan[/sup], which I[sup]original[/sup] does not.

Question: Do the material relationships (where ===> indicates continuity)

I[sup]prescan[/sup] + time increment ===> I[sup]original[/sup] and

scanning process ===> I[sup]duplicate[/sup]

imply an ontological difference between I[sup]original[/sup] and I[sup]duplicate[/sup], even though they share the temporal relationship (I[sup]past[/sup] + time increment ===> I[sup]present[/sup])?

[Podkayne]

*Originally posted by erislover *
My point, dear Podkayne, isn’t that physicists aren’t noble souls who do try very hard to understand things, but that elements in the scientific community have, over the years, strenuously rejected predictions and formulations which didn’t make sense. Like time travel, quantum probability, corpuscular light, black holes, black hole surface area as a measure of entropy, etc. ad nauseum. They rejected these predictions and formulations because they didn’t make sense, not because there wasn’t evidence for them. They are just human, for Eris’s sake.

And, as humans, sometimes prone to overreaction. Apologies.

OK. I have two Podkynes which are identical in appearance. They have seperate identities. Which one is you?

Both of them. Since neither one can be shown not to be me, they are both me. The are not the same, but they both have equal claim to be identified as “Podkayne.”

Do you consider it part of the definition of “identity” that each identity is unique?

I think in this case, maybe the Podkayne identity has simply expanded, in a sense, from the identity of an individual to the identity of a group, whose members may vary.

For example, consider Adam and Eve. They are THE man and THE woman. Adam and Eve have two boys, Cain and Abel. The boys grow up. Now, Adam is no longer be THE man, he is one of the MEN. He is still A man, of course, but so are Cain and Abel.

Similarly, neither of the copies is THE Podkayne. They are each A Podkayne. Podkayne-ness is still part of their identity, though that identity is no longer unique to one person.

I just noticed something I missed before. Previously, you said:

In both cases, upon the instant that the copy is made, the copy is you, but of course it diverges thereafter–since the person I am right now is not the person I was a millisecond ago or a millisecond later. [emphasis added]

The sentence almost doesn’t make any sense… if you weren’t “you” a millisecond ago, nevermind ten minutes ago, then what does that say about identity?
[/quote]

That sentence says that something can change over time, and retain the same identity. I have a block of wood. I call it Bob. Bob is originally red, but I sand off the red paint and paint Bob blue. Is it still the same block of wood? Not quite. Is it still Bob? Certainly. If I previously introduced Bob to another person, who left the room before I painted Bob, and then returned, that person might say, “No, I recall that Bob is red. Either you have altered Bob, or this is not Bob.” I can then provide this person with the continuity required for identity by explaining that I painted Bob.

Same thing with personality. I know I’m not the person I was when I walked into my office and sat down at the computer, because that person was still mulling over what a jerk erl was for poking unfair fun at physicists. However, my memory provides a continuity. I know the process that I went through to get over my little snit, so that I can be confident that I am the same person.

Now, say that I introduce someone to Bob, then they leave the room, and I hide Bob and pull out a new block of wood that is larger than Bob. The person returns, and I say, “Here’s Bob.” Now, that person can say, “No, Bob was smaller. That’s not Bob.” Now, since I can provide no plausible explanation for how I could have increased Bob’s size, the person is unlikely to accept that the larger block is really Bob. The important step of continuity is missing.

I contend that the duplication experiment provides the required continuity for any and all copies. If I hijack the duplication machine and waste a good deal of time and money making hundreds of copies of Bob, they are all Bob, whether or not I subsequently paint them all different colors.

(I’m a bit unsatisfied with this, because it requires human observation, but maybe I can untangle that.)

{Fixed code. Is this post still the same post that it was before it was unbolded? Does it retain a memory of its prior boldness? Discuss. --Gaudere}

[Edited by Gaudere on 11-29-2001 at 11:49 AM]

[DSeid]

Genseric concisely expresses the essence of this debate: how do you define the term “consciousness” (and “identity” for that matter)?

One camp clearly accepts the concept that consciousness is the complex network of patterns extant in the material being of the organism. It therefore follows that if that pattern is moved in spacetime it maintains the same identity, whether or not the move was discontinous in any way along any of those dimensions and whether or not a duplication is involved, and whether or not the exact same individual atoms are part of the network of patterns.

How the other camp is defining consciousness is unclear to me.

[erislover]

DS: I thought I was clear that it really wouldn’t matter to me how you defined consciousness. In my opinion the result should be the same if it were a person or a piece of paper. Some people may feel consciousness has some special considerations in this, but I don’t. It is really the identity question that is getting me.

I would lean to the following, after some thought on the subject. Identity is a property which is not required to be continuous over time. It is not a property which is required to be discontinuous over time. It is a property that an object has regardless of how long that object exists.

Identity is a pattern, like jab said. Two existents which are otherwise indistinguishable share the same identity. There is no meaningful distinction between Podkayne and the Podkayne duplicate. I cannot tell which shares the identity with the pre-duplicate (past) Podkayne and which does not; therefore, IMO, they share the same identity. Identity = ability to be distinguished without regards to spatial/temporal placement. (excessive bolding is also a trait they share :p)

This puts me in a tough spot, though. I am starting to describe identity as a set of universals that satisfy a relationship of my choosing (identity = the relation, not the set of universals). This forces me to take a realist stance where I often find myself agreeing with nominalism (no universals, so no relationships between universals). Not only that, but I’ve basically said only physical objects have identity, which doesn’t just put me in a spot where I am a realist, but universals must have physical identities themselves! Oh sheesh… that’s platonism, pure and simple.

Fuck. I’ll think on this more.

[Podkayne]

*Originally posted by erislover *
(excessive bolding is also a trait they share :p)

Dagnubit, that’s the second time today. I swear it’s not a plea for attention.

“And ye shall know her by her formatting errors.”

[DSeid]

erislover,

So, if I have a totally homogenous slurry of wood pulp, and a machine that can precisely process that slurry into pieces of paper of exactly the same pattern, then those pieces of paper share the same identity?

I would agree that they are equivilant. That no observation could tell them apart. But they are not one another.

Your position would seem to imply that every up-quark is all up-quarks (or pick your favorite elemental particle) because there is no way in which their patterns are measurably different.

[objection]But different quarks can be described by their different vectors in spacetime, thus we know that they are different[/objection]

So much more so am “I” as an individual entity different from the “I” of two hours ago … different spatial and time coordinates, in fact a set of different patterns extant in my brain and some different material in my cells, yet I maintain my identity.

This is why I think that the identity issue is less pertinent than is consciousness to the issues at hand. Unless you want to define identity as how an “object” is classified by sentient entities which may include itself. And then you’ll get into all that Godelkeit.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

erl
Well, “they both do” was an oversimplification. They both have the same relationship to “I”[sup]pre-duplication[/sup]. An important consequence of this is that identity is non-transitive across time and space.
“I”[sup]before[/sup] == “I”[sup]after[/sup]
“I”[sup]before[/sup] == “I”[sup]duplicate[/sup]
but
“I”[sup]after[/sup] (!=) “I”[sup]duplicated[/sup]

xeno

I think the only difference between I[sup]original[/sup] and I[sup]duplicate[/sup] in the instant of duplication is that they are distinct material beings.

I agree. I also not that this is a less significant difference than exists between I[sup]past[/sup] and I[sup]present[/sup].

Do the material relationships . . . imply an ontological difference between I[sup]original[/sup] and I[sup]duplicate[/sup]

I don’t see how you can justify one (based simply upon disjunction of component particles) unless you also apply it to I[sup]past[/sup] and I[sup]present[/sup].

.
.
{break for actual paying work}
.
.
erl again

Identity is a pattern, like jab said. Two existents which are otherwise indistinguishable share the same identity.

I don’t think that covers it, really. You are distinguishabe from erl[sup]past[/sup] in many ways, yet I suggest that you share identity.

This puts me in a tough spot, though. I am starting to describe identity as a set of universals that satisfy a relationship of my choosing

I’m not sure why you conclude that the relationship be between universals. Neither erl[sup]present[/sup] nor erl[sup]past[/sup] seem universal to me.

This forces me to take a realist stance where I often find myself agreeing with nominalism

Well, there’s always positivism or post-modernism or hegelian idealism.

But I’m not sure you really have to take such drastic steps. (side note: you really need to get around to reading Wittgenstein.)

Not only that, but I’ve basically said only physical objects have identity, which doesn’t just put me in a spot where I am a realist, but universals must have physical identities themselves! Oh sheesh… that’s platonism, pure and simple.

Woah! I think you are talking yourself into an illusory corner (phenomenology anyone? ;)). Show me that the relationship “identity” must apply to universals, first. (How might be an intersting question, too.)

Fuck. I’ll think on this more.

Me too. When you start leaning toward Plato I know something strange is going on.

[xenophon41]

Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi:

xeno

I think the only difference between I[sup]original[/sup] and I[sup]duplicate[/sup] in the instant of duplication is that they are distinct material beings.

I agree. I also not[e] that this is a less significant difference than exists between I[sup]past[/sup] and I[sup]present[/sup].

Yes, the instantaneous material difference between original and duplicate is far less than the material difference between any individual at t[sup]0[/sup] and that same individual at t[sup]+5 minutes[/sup].

Do the material relationships . . . imply an ontological difference between I[sup]original[/sup] and I[sup]duplicate[/sup]?

I don’t see how you can justify one (based simply upon disjunction of component particles) unless you also apply it to I[sup]past[/sup] and I[sup]present[/sup].

Good. That wasn’t exactly a direct answer, but I’m going to assume it means that you do see an ontological difference between I[sup]original[/sup] and I[sup]duplicate[/sup]. Now let’s compare the relevance this difference has to the question of identity with the relevance the ontological difference between I[sup]past[/sup] and I[sup]present[/sup] has to that question.

To illustrate both differences, I’d like to place the duplication process onto a timeline, with the assumption that the scanning/replication is instantaneous, and that replication takes place within one increment of time. It looks something like this:

I  ===> I[sup]next increment[/sup]
        +
        +
      scan
        +
        +
        I[sup]duplicate[/sup]

Now, we see that both I[sup]next increment[/sup] and I[sup]duplicate[/sup] are temporally distinct from I, but that I[sup]duplicate[/sup] is materially distinct from I to a much greater degree than is I[sup]next increment[/sup]; in fact I[sup]duplicate[/sup] is entirely distinct materially from I.

Question:
Which represents same-sameness with I to the greatest degree, at the instant of duplication?

[Spiritus_Mundi]

That wasn’t exactly a direct answer, but I’m going to assume it means that you do see an ontological difference between I[sup]original[/sup] and I[sup]duplicate[/sup].

Sorry if the answer seemed evasive. I was trying to point out that more than one system of ontological evaluation is possible. For myself, I see an ontological difference between the respective sets of physical particles. Whether this corresponds to a difference between I[sup]original[/sup] and I[sup]duplicate[/sup] is pretty much inseperable from the definition of “I”. Do you mean “set of particles”, “entity”, of “object with identity ‘I’”?

Which represents same-sameness with I to the greatest degree, at the instant of duplication?

In decreasing order of “same-sameness” (over all qualities)
I[sup]original[/sup] :: I[sup]next[/sup]
I[sup]original[/sup] :: I[sup]dupe[/sup]
I[sup]original[/sup] :: I[sup]past/future[/sup]