Still sitting on this one, so I will just toss this out for now.
Ah, no, they don’t to me either. There isn’t a “erl-ness” just an “erl.” However, properties of “erl” change over time. If the real components change and I am still “erl” then my identity is not related to those physical components directly, but either their relationships (which are, IMO, universals) or relationships of their properties (which are also universals). That’s what I’m thinking, anyway.
Well, I own and read through (I think “trudged” is more accurate :p) his Tractutus logico-philosophicus. Looking forward to reading Philosophical Investigations.
If you are still erl, then the properties which determine that identity have not changed.
Assuming a material basis for identity, I don’t see why. I still see no reason to tak ethe leap into absolutes. I think you were on the right track in positing “identity” as a relationship. The question now is definitely “a relationship of what?”
If identity has a material basis, then there should be no need to appeal to the second level of abstraction: some relationship between the material particles is what we mean when we say erl. (Or “the cup my grandmother always drank her tea from”)
Now, if you want to rescue your strict nominalist leaning you are going to have to account for how we declare one such relationship equal to another without making “identity” an absolute. Now you would seem to require a relationship between relationships. That’s your cross to bear, though. I’m not a strict nominalist. I’ve never found a satisfactory (strict) nominalist explanation for relationships betweeen abstracts. Hmmm–has this been enough of a digression, yet? Don’t ask me why I care whether you resort to absolutes one stage too early, I wuz just wonderin’.
You should. He rethinks his entire theory of language in-between, rejecting the “picture world” basis of Tractutus. Now, there are lots of great things in the earlier work, too, but so much of his work is concerned with the nature of language and meaning that You have to read Philosophical Investigations to get the full picture.
Now, to put these entities into order of same-sameness (with 1 being the highest degree):[list=1][li]I[sup]-2[/sup] :: I[sup]-1[/sup] and I[sup]-1[/sup] :: I[sup]orig[/sup] and I[sup]orig[/sup] :: I[sup]o1[/sup] and I[sup]o1[/sup] :: I[sup]o2[/sup] and I[sup]dupe[/sup] :: I[sup]d1[/sup] and I[sup]d1[/sup] :: I[sup]d2[/sup][]I[sup]orig[/sup] :: I[sup]dupe[/sup][]I[sup]orig[/sup] :: I[sup]o-future[/sup] and I[sup]dupe[/sup] :: I[sup]d-future[/sup][]I[sup]d-future[/sup] :: I[sup]orig[/sup][]I[sup]o-future[/sup] :: I[sup]dupe[/sup][/list=1][/li]
Before we discuss implications, tell me if you disagree with the above ranking; particularly with the last degree (which I think is questionable)?
So which is more me, me at age three, me now (42 yo), me duplicated now, me at 80? As judged by … an absolute scale of similarity, self-referential judgement, or by someone who knows me at some specified point in time?
By self-referential judgement the me in question is always the perfect me. By external observation it depends on what factors are currently salient to the prototype of me held in the mind of the observer.
That is a good question. My thoughts are that “erl” is a unique permutation of relationships between material entities. Specifically between weakly-organized sets of material entities (if we go down to the particle level). My biggest personal issue is that “erl” can lose an arm and still be referred to as “erl.” Because of that, I feel, “being erl” cannot be viewed without some manner of abstraction-of-an-abstraction—a relationship between elements of a set chosen by a function. “erl” is not the filtered set; “erl” is a specific case of a filtered set, one that satisies a certain relationship. Hmm, I see, though, that I could just be a very specific set (or rather, the choice function which creates a subset from “the set of available particles”). True, the second level of abstraction may not be necessary. What I like about the relationship-between-relationships is that it provides an interesting structure for thinking about “being human” which “erl” is also, you see what I mean?
Hmm, not sure I see that. I am not a strict nominalist in that I think it is very “obvious” that universals exist. But I am very, shall we say, sympathetic to nominalism anyway. the “Problem of Universals” finds a reasonably priced home in my mind.
Apart from that, though, the fact that I am changing all the time without losing “being erl” means that it cannot be simply a relationship between material particles… at least, if it is, I am very unsure about how I would formulate it. I would certainly appreciate being able to form identity without resorting to relationships-of-relationships.
This is definitely my biggest problem with nominalism. It is sort of self-defeating in that regard. For, after all, can we not put a group of people together who all feel universals don’t exist and abstract-out the property of nominalism from them? Not that realism doesn’t have its own cross to bear in saying just how universals exist. When that discussion comes up I do start falling back toward nominalism.
However, the first thing I would like to note, flat out, is that identity is an abstracted property of existence which, IMO, makes it a universal. Not that I cannot appreciate that the nominalist might say that there is no common property “identity,” it only seems like there is because of our weakly-defined descriptions (or however one would seek to undermine identity as a universal). I am simply always leary about realism because I don’t want to find myself falling into platonic realism.
For someone who so often mangles the language I should appreciate it! (danger, will robinson, danger!) That’s all I need is a tough philosophical background in semantics :rolleyes:
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::rereading after preview::
You know, I said this above: “[Identity is] a relationship between elements of a set chosen by a function.” This does actually, after reflection, serve to remove some of the abstraction-of-abstraction. I am not the sum of my parts, but rather I am a set of parts that satisfy some condition. Identity, then, is not as unique as it sounds! That is, the choice function which would “make” an “erl” is unique, but in fact, there are a number of different solutions to it.
Well… Maybe… that was a little off-the-hip, so let me think some more. It also doesn’t resolve my OP either, at least, I don’t see how it does yet.
Sorry to interject, but I am quite enjoying the content of this thread. If you are interested in Wittgenstein, might I suggest Nagarjuna’s “Mulamadhyamakakarika” - a philosophical/soteriological treatise on the Buddhist Middle Way ontology.
Here’s a link that might prove useful in the ongoing debate.
That is one way to phrase it. Another is to say that many of the factors which are often considered relevant to identity (component particles, specific morphology, temporal/spatial continuity) are not, in fact, relevant to the identity relationship.
I think probably it is a litle of both. Sepcific particles, etc. are irrelevant, but the identity relationship is also fuzzy.
xeno
In that case I see no ontological difference between original and duplicate.
Well, your original question asked for “onological difference”. Perhaps you could define how you wish difference and distinction to be used in this context. (I’m still waiting for the substitution::alteration answer, too. Is it dependent upon the completion of your ontological chain?)
Okay, but if you try to equate this “same-sameness” with your ontological difference above I will cry foul. I have explicitely stated that my evaluations are based upon sameness over “all qualities”, and I will not accede to the assertion that “all qualities” are relevant to identity.
I cannot evaluate these based upon the information given. The duration of time between measurement states and the rate of change for various factors (particle replacement, movement through space, decay/growth, etc.) What does seem inescapable is that for some finite increment t the order will become:
[list=1]
[li]I[sup]orig[/sup] :: I[sup]dupe[/sup][/li][li]I[sup]orig±t[/sup] :: I[sup]orig[/sup] (or dupe :: dupe±t)[/li][li]I[sup]orig±t[/sup] :: I[sup]dupe[/sup] (or dupe±t :: orig – I’m not sure how you ordered these as 4 & 5. They appear perfectly symmetrical in the general case.)[/li][/list=1]
It also seems inescapable that for some T > t options 2 & 3 will converge.
DSeid
My answer is that all 3 cases are you and that any formulation of the relationship “identity” which fails to account for this is flawed or incomplete.
eponymous
[quote]
Thanks for the recommendation (and link). I’ll check it out once I get a good chance for uninterrupted thought. A quick glance was enough to convince me that “just skim through it” was not a good option.
So… are you saying that any material or spatial distinctions between them do not make an ontological difference? Perhaps I’m being a bit thick, here, but I’m not sure how you can support the assertion that two separate and distinct material entities are ontologically the same entity merely because they are alike in every aspect of construction.
How so? If something is “less same” to a predecessor than something else, how is this not tied to identity?
What is the basis for your objection to the relevance of any quality of existence to identity?
Which qualities do you consider relevant, and which do you not, and why?
I really need to know as the relevance of material, spatial and temporal distinctions is key to my several disagreements with your analysis:
[quote]
What does seem inescapable is that for some finite increment t the order will become:[list=1][li]I[sup]orig[/sup] :: I[sup]dupe[/sup][]I[sup]orig+t[/sup] :: I[sup]orig[/sup] (or dupe :: dupe+t)[]I[sup]orig+t[/sup] :: I[sup]dupe[/sup] (or dupe+t :: orig – I’m not sure how you ordered these as 4 & 5. They appear perfectly symmetrical in the general case.)[/list=1]It also seems inescapable that for some T > t options 2 & 3 will converge.[/li][/quote]
No. That’s why I said the following:[ul]
[li]I was trying to point out that more than one system of ontological evaluation is possible.[/li][li]I see an ontological difference between the respective sets of physical particles.[/li][li]In that case I see no ontological difference between original and duplicate. (Where you define the ontological object as “entity with identity ‘I’”.)[/li][/ul]
I am saying that material and spatial distinctions are not sufficient to create an ontological difference in identity. I am the same person I was this morning, though I have some different material components and am in a different place.
The same way that I assert that the entity which typed these words is the same entity that read your post. Two separate and distinct (in both time and material composition) entities. One identity. Do you disagree?
(One quibble, though, I do not belive “alike in every aspect of construction” is necessary for 2 entities to share one identity.)
Because identity does not require absolute sameness. The me who finishes typing this sentence is not absolutely the same as the me who began it, yet we share a single identity.
One can certainly construct other meaning for “identity”, but to fall back on Wittgenstein: meaning is defined by use. We use “I” to mean the person we were, the person we are, and the person we shall be. We do not assign each microinstant of our lifes a separate identity. We say, “I have changed” and “I grew up” and “I lost a tooth” and “I went to work”. Identity survives such transformations.
I have never made such an objection. I have disagreed that a number of specific qualities of existence were determinative of identity.
As erl and I have been discussing, I feel identity is a relationaship of material components. As I said earlier I feel it is possible this relationship has both organizational and compositional elements.
As I have said repeatedly I do not consider specific material composition, spatial location, or morphology to be relevant.
Why? Because that is what we mean when we use “identity”.
I don’t see why. I have explicetely stated, more than once, that my rankings of those entities was evaluated over “all qualities”. The fact that I consider some of those qualities irrelevant to identity should make no difference.
But which is more me? Because none are the exact same me as the present me. Wait, now I’m a different me again!
My small point is that “sameness” is not defined equally over all qualities. Each feature has a different salience to each observer.
The quality of salience could be the amount of the same physical paricles. (Is the blood on Turin’s cloth the blood of Christ?) Or the pattern of physical features. (Theuseus’ ship) The relevant features of identity depend on the context, just like all object perception.
For evaluation of sentient beings by sentient beings it is likely to be related to the individual’s expression of his or her consciousness … hence we accept fairytales in which a prince is turned into a frog, or Princess Fiona into an ogre, as having the same identity despite two forms. My 6 yo would likely react to me at 80 as more me than me at 3 (I’m already an old fart to him), my Mom may percieve the reverse. They have different prototypes of the concept of me. We percieve a continuous identity in individuals because the changes from me at present and me at a small increment of the future are small and are the prototype is modified accordingly.
Identity is not defined over all qualities at all.
I agree. But that is a far different thing from saying that sameness over all qualities is relevant to identity.
I disagree. In defining “DSeid” I have no perception of your consciousness and only indirect evidence for your expression of your consciousness. Identity for humans is defined by those qualities which we believe to be essential not only to the expression of human consciousness but also to the development of human consciousness. You mind, if it could be seamlessly translated into a computer’s memory, would not be you. The phenomenological gap between a human body and a digital circuit is simply too large.
Nonsense. We are quite able to accept abrupt changes in morphology, behavior, and even composition without struggling with questions of identity. Gradual or sudden is irrelevant. What matters is that the changes do not fall outside of the identity relationship for human beings. If I lose an arm, I am still “me”. If my conscious mind becomes an intangible disembodied cloud, it is not I.
You are stuck in a concept of static concepts. In truth concepts are fluid entities with ill-defined margins subject to our individual experience with exemplars and to context and to needs.
Let us stick with this concept of “me.” How is this concept defined, my identity?
By experience with some combination of perceptions that have been identified as “me” in the past. These exemplars form a constantly shifting prototype of “me” in an individual observer’s mind, with some space of increasing misfit around it.
By the needs of the observer. To illustrate, if I suddenly collapsed dead, the pathologist would identify that collection of matter as me, yet my wife would say that I had gone and no longer existed in this mortal plane. Is one right and one wrong?
To the pathologist “I” am the bit physical bits of matter that he can identifiy as sharing the DNA and cell markers that have been part of my pattern. To my wife I am the ability of my consciousness to express itself and to interact in ways consistent enough with her past experience of me. They are both right, for while their “conceptual spaces” of me overlap, they differ significantly in this salient regard.
An outside observer doesn’t have experience with expression of my consciousness??? What are you experiencing now, if not some small interaction with my consciousness expressing itself. In fact, you have formed some small concept space of “me” in your mind, based on a small experience with that interaction.
If we continued to have many interactions that conceptual space would extend along more dimensions and become better defined.
That interaction transplanted into another physical form, if possible, would still fit your concept of me. The pattern of interactions (expressions of my consciousness) is “me” to most people, even if I lose an arm or my hair (what’s left). There is space around that prototype … behavioral variation is acceptable … but the farther away from prototypic behavior the less comfortable would most people be saying that that is me. (Again, self referentially I am always the perfect me.)
I agree with whoever said that they are no longer the person they were a single millisecond ago. That is similar to the way I feel. I know I exist but the person I had in mind as I type this sentence has changed. I have always felt this way. I have never known “who” I am, because I am me.
If we rule out all possibility of a soul and assume that we are entirely organic then there is no doubt in my mind that I would remain the same person. However, not knowing for sure what identity is throws a wrench into my thinking and I would have to say that the rebuilt person is both me and both not me… in the same way that the person I was a millisecond ago is both me and not me
My immediate answer to the second scenerio is that the duplicated person is obviously not me. He can’t be me if I still exist. This conclusion is not really logical, nor is it consistent to what I just said in the previous paragraph. So, I will just say “I don’t know” because that is the only correct answer to the question.
It’s hard to grasp the idea of identity. My thought processes have been screwed up enough that I have not recognized myself in the mirror… so my belief is that identity is nothing but an accumulation of memories. An unconscious idea that doesn’t require the destruction of the physical body to be drastically changed. I have seen the computer monitor I am staring at now a million times but it’s never the exact same each time I notice it. My perception of it is never the same because my perception is the sum of all of all the information being processed in my brain. Sight, sound, touch, etc… they all influence how I percieve and obviously there is very rarely the same combination each time I stare at the computer screen.
Really? I am? Perhaps you might present some quotes and/or lines of reasoning to support that statement.
I don’t mind when people disgree with me in these threads, but I much prefer it when they disagree with things that I have actually said.
While we’re on the subject, though . . .
Perhaps you could illustrate that truth with regard to the following concepts:[ul]
[li]multiplicative inverse[/li][li]the concept that all concepts are fluid (don’t you just love irony?)[/li][/ul]
As trees are defined by things people point at when they say, “tree”. This primitive model of definition is certainly a standard beginning point when seeking the meaning of a word, but most people understand that it is usually insufficient as the “final answer”. In particular, few people have had much luck in applying it to abstractions, as you are attempting to do.
You do seem to be leaning towards the siren’s song of unmitigated relativitiy, though. I am curious to see where your definition through personal phenomenology leads.
Only if the observer in question has never before had any experience with an ontological class to which you belong. Actually, even if you are completely beyond the bound of experience, I suggest that your “shifting prototype” model fails. The relationship “identity” is primary and is, in fact, what determines whether my experience in the present os viewed as a “change in something old” or “something new”.
I experience you now. I experienced somethin in the past. If my identity relationship is satisfied by both of those occurences, I view them as 2 viewing of “you”. The “shifting prototype” that you speak of is a posteriori synthesis of the identity relationship and the particular instance, “you”.
I doubt that a competnet pathologist would make such a statement. He would be more likely to identify the collection of matter as your body. Certainly he would have to be a very strange man to accord your collection of mater all of the potential roles and relations which he accords “you”.
Don’t confuse a colloquial shorthand of language with a confusion of conception. When someone points to an empty chair with your coat hanging over it and asks if DSeid is sitting there, it doesn’t mean that he thinks you are a coat. Or invisible.
I say again, please express your disagreement (or amazement) to what I actually post. The sentence that I typed was, "I have no perception of your consciousness and only indirect evidence for your expression of your consciousness."
What I experience when reading your posts (insert obvious joke here) is indirect evidence for your expression of your consciousness.
Not necessarily. It depends upon the characteristics of the new form.
Since I have explicitely stated that a transplantation into a digital computer would violate identity I cannot imagine why you would make this assertion. Or did you mean to phrase that sentence in the first or third person? The first would be justifiable. The seconad is obviously false. The third fails as an expression of consensus and is arguably invalid as a reflection of current and historical concepts of human identity.
nickc
You are certainly welcome to, but identity without continuity is a pretty useless concept. If you go back to xenophon41’s definitions, in fact, it would seem inseperable from entity.
Do you, perhaps, have some other concept in mind which allows you to be paid for work which was performed by billions of other people over the last 40 hours? Do you mind if we call that concept identity, since so many other people do?
Spiritus, sorry for the delay in getting back to you (fun and work schedules prohibited my ‘Doping in any major way until now). It strikes me that I have become quite confused regarding the meaning of your posts, and that I’ve failed to adequately communicate my own meaning. For instance, I perceive a contradiction in these two sequential statements from you:
The second paragraph seems to contradict the preceding statement. If identity is a relationship of material components and various organizational elements, wouldn’t material composition and other characterizing elements have to be relevant to identity, if only as the platform for the identified relationship?
Additionally, while I’ve tried to consider identity (or same-sameness) within the context of all available ontologies, it apparently seems to you as if I’m emphasizing construction over all other qualities. This is not my aim. I certainly agree with your assessment that identity does not require absolute sameness. And although I also agree that identity is shared between past present and future manifestations of a temporally continuous entity, I disagree with your feeling that the you reading this post is a separate and distinct entity from the you of five minutes (or five years) ago in any absolute sense. My disagreement, however, is more intuitive than fully thought out, and is predicated on the assumption that continuity of existence is the determinant; IOW, temporal distinctions are relevant to the relationship “I” in a different way than material distinctions.
In order to clarify my own thoughts on the question of identity, and to try and express those thoughts in a less confused manner, I’ve asked myself a list of questions which I’ll include in the next post. I’d like to pose the same questions of you. I’ll provide my answers immediately subsequent to the list, and then see if I’ve muddied the waters sufficiently to slink away in shame, or if I’ve contributed in some minor way.
[ul][]What is identity?[]Why is identity important:[list=a][]when considering material entities in general?[]when considering biological entities?[]when considering sentient entities?[/list=a][]Are there different kinds of material identity (disregarding classifications and typologies) for biological entities as opposed to non-biological?[]For sentient as opposed to non-sentient?[]Can a non-material entity (i.e. a concept, theory or specific idea) be positively identified?[]What are the ways in which identity is currently established?[]Is the scanning process in erislover’s thought experiment analogous to cloning/twinning (biology), to cloning/copying (electronic data and operating systems) or to recording (information)?[]Are any of these analogies informative as to a methodology which can establish the identity of the doppelgangers in relation to their originals?[]If no methodology can adequately establish a separate identity for the doppelganger, does this lack necessarily invalidate those methodologies as applied to a non-duplicated material entity over time?Does this lack validate the inseparability of the identity?[/ul]
[ul][li]What is identity?[/li]Identity is the quality held by an entity of having a separate existence from other like entities along with a verifiable provenance, causality or meaning.[li]Why is identity important:[list=a]when considering material entities in general?[/li]All of theoretical physics is dependent on the concept of identifiable material entities which affect the material universe in predictable manners based on measurable physical characteristics. Entities must be considered as separate in space and time for measurements to have any meaning.[li]when considering biological entities?[/li]The identity of progenitors is crucial to the study of genetics and heredity. The theory of evolution hinges on the assertion that individual attributes of biological entities will either aid, hinder or have no effect on that entity’s survival, and that this in turn determines which attributes are more likely to be passed on to descendants.[li]when considering sentient entities?[/li]Morality, ethics, punishment & reward, responsibility, guilt, etc.; all standards of personal behavior are predicated on individual actions and responses and on the identification of moral agents and entities.[/list=a][li]Are there different kinds of material identity (disregarding classifications and typologies) for biological entities as opposed to non-biological?[/li]I don’t see why this would be necessary.[li]For sentient as opposed to non-sentient?[/li]Aside from material identity, there is the problem of consciousness. Theories abound which postulate an incorporeal soul; this would be a different kind of identity from the material. Disregarding that postulate, there is also the most salient aspect of sentience; self-awareness, another type of identity. Can there be a single “self” which is claimed by more than one consciousness? My belief is that the self is individually defined by each consciousness. As long as the consciousnesses are distinct, identity must also be distinct.[li]Can a non-material entity (i.e. a concept, specific idea or mental construct) be positively identified?[/li]I think so; theorems, quotations, literary constructions, tales, dogmas etc. can all be separated and distinguished from other like entities.[li]What are the ways in which identity is currently established?[/li]Through material ideosyncracies such as defects in physical structure or distinguishing marks and coloration. Through informational tests. Through direct observation of the entity over a period of time. Through deduction based on physical necessities. Through induction based on elimination of probabilities. Through assertion of the entity itself.[li]Is the scanning process in erislover’s thought experiment analogous to cloning/twinning (biology), to cloning/copying (electronic data and operating systems) or to recording (information)?[/li]I think it’s most akin to cloning/copying of an electronic data system, combined with a direct physical “transcription” of the computer itself at a specific point in time.[li]Are any of these analogies informative as to a methodology which can establish the identity of the doppelgangers in relation to their originals?[/li]Searching for material or informational ideosyncracies would prove useless. Direct observation, or deductive/inductive logic must be employed.[li]If no methodology can adequately establish a separate identity for the doppelganger, does this lack necessarily invalidate those methodologies as applied to a non-duplicated material entity over time?[/li]No. Where an identity relationship can be positively shown, no theoretical duplicate negates the identity.[li]Does this lack validate the inseparability of the identity?[/li]No, I think although it makes past associations indeterminant, all future associations are as if by separate identities. All actions prior to the scanning apply to both entities and all actions subsequent to the scanning apply individually. Ergo, post-scan, they are separate identities with a common prescan identity.[/ul]
But there is a fair amount of flexibility there; just as a fifth-degree polinomial will have five complex roots, an identity defined by a relationship may (and should, IMO) have several different “solutions” to it in order for it to make sense over time.
I’m not certain how discontinuity factors into things. At first thought the best conclusion I can come up with is that identity is meant to apply to a singular relationship. Thus, the creation of a duplicate violates identity. One must be considered to have a seperate identity. The claim to the previous identity is then, IMO, a matter of continutity. That is, none-destructive-scan > perfect clone, the non-destructively scanned agent maintains identity through its continuity of the process.
I would also be of the opinion that continuity isn’t mandatory, however. Should I cease to exist for a moment and then return then I am still me as I am the only creature which fits that relationship.
With respect to the issue of morphing throughout my existence, then, the relationship itself might be unstable over time just as I am. Need to think on that though, such modification might be unnecessary.
DSeid, my first comment to you is that extreme subjectivity of identity is very counter-intuitive, namely because Spiritus, xenophon, Gaudere, your mother, and yourself all perceive “DSeid” and all have some concept of your identity. Are you suggesting that this is mere happenstance that they overlap? What if we named the union of our perceptions “DSeid’s identity.” Or are you thinking they don’t necessarily overlap? If so, how would you account for the rather convenient way they seem to?
Furthermore, the problem of the ship’s planks seems to be one of continuity over space and time but not material composition. Should I put new siding on my house (if I had a house) I wouldn’t feel it was somehow not my house, and what I refer to when I say, “My house” has not really changed. Should I slowly over time replace every bit of it it would never stop being my house. Others wouldn’t seem particularly perplexed by the notion either.
So am I saying that there is a definite point where ship(original) and ship (modified) diverge with respect to identity? No, I don’t think so. Even if we built a new ship from the removed planks it would exactly that: a new ship. Since one was continuous it has the priority with respect to identity. Yes, the new ship would be “more like” the old one in all regards, but it came into being during such a time where the identity relationship which should hold was already in use.
(danger, will robinson, danger!) That’s all I need is a tough philosophical background in semantics :rolleyes: