You are apparently omiting the word specific in your parsing of the statement, "I do not consider specific material composition, spatial location, or morphology to be relevant. How you can be confused on my position here I am truly at a mystery to explain. Would a list help?[ul]
[li]Changing my subatomic particles, singly or as a group, for different subatomic particles of the same type does not change my identity.[/li][li]Moving through space does not change my identity.[/li][li]Proceding through time does not change my identity.[/li][li]Changing one or more specific elements of physical being does not change my identity.[/li][/ul]
Yes, the material components have to exist for there to be a relationship between them. Which specific material components share that relationship is irrelevant. (Note: We have been discussing material composition at the level of subatomic particles. Organizational principles hold both here and at larger scales. Recreating my body with silicon substituted for carbon, for instance, wouild not recreate me.)
No. It seems to me that you are considering specific material composition. Whether you emphasize it over other qualities is as irrelevant to this discussion as the quality itself is irrelevant to identity.
So you do not consider particle composition, spatial position, etc. are relevant to the specification of a material object? Did you not say, “I take the word “entity” to mean a material object which has objectively verifiable existence, while “identity” is the assertion that said object has [had] continuous existence over time”? If an entity in the past is not distinct from an entity in the present (or in a different location, or with different particle composition) then how are entities differentiated?
It seems to me that you are really talking about identity, here, and I am not. Tell me, is there any manner in which the “you” of now differs from the “you” of five minutes ago? If so, what word do you use to describe those two cases. I was assuming that that was exactly how you meant “entity” to be defined. If not, please tell me what word you would like to use to label the: object with specific material composition
Maybe we need to also agree upon some usage for terms describing relationships between objects. How about: different: not sharing identity. distinct: not corresponding to the same entity (or whatever label you decide to use for this concept.) separate: Not continuous in space and/or time.
Under those distinctions, yes I am a separate and distinct person than the person I was 5 minutes ago. But I am not a different person.
This makes no sense to me. Temporal distinctions are nothing more than a label which we apply to the occurrence of material change. Time ==> change.
[/sub]
Sure, why not. (What was that pithy definition of insanity again? The one about expectation of different results?)
My answers to several will be much shorter than your own, though, primarily because they don’t seem pertinent to the questions at hand.
What is identity?
A relationship which defines an ontological correspondence between distinct entities.
Why is identity important:[list=a][li]when considering material entities in general?[]when considering biological entities?[]when considering sentient entities?[/list=a][/li]Important? It is the subject of this discussion.
Are there different kinds of material identity (disregarding classifications and typologies) for biological entities as opposed to non-biological?
The identity relationship is context-dependent. It is possible that the same relationship will hold for some bilogical and some non-biological contexts, but it is certainly not guaranteed. When discussing particles, for instance, particle composition is very relevant to identity.
For sentient as opposed to non-sentient?
See above. I think any identity relationship for sentient beings which fails to account for consciousness, however, would be insufficient on its face.
Can a non-material entity (i.e. a concept, theory or specific idea) be positively identified?
I would say yes, though this places the discussion squarely in an explicitely realist realm.
What are the ways in which identity is currently established?
Through phenomenological observation and comparison to the identity relationship appropriate to a given context.
Is the scanning process in erislover’s thought experiment analogous to cloning/twinning (biology), to cloning/copying (electronic data and operating systems) or to recording (information)?
It is most analogous ot copying.
Are any of these analogies informative as to a methodology which can establish the identity of the doppelgangers in relation to their originals?
No.
If no methodology can adequately establish a separate identity for the doppelganger, does this lack necessarily invalidate those methodologies as applied to a non-duplicated material entity over time?
Of course not. Even asking this question presumes that establishing a separate identity is the “correct” answer.
Does this lack validate the inseparability of the identity?
If we have a methodology which does establish identity, and if that methodology does not differentiate between separate entities, then identity is not inseperable. QED.
In your answer you said: post-scan, they are separate identities with a common prescan identity. I agree. In the instant of duplication, however, they are separate entities with a single identity.
Nope, I saw it, but I don’t see why the fact that identity is not dependent on those features makes them irrelevant. Just because compositional/spatial changes don’t necessitate identity change does not make them irrelevant to the identity relationship! Your list, as it happens, illustrates the relevance, as you were forced to qualify the changes in those physical elements which would not change identity (carbon for carbon; no substitutions allowed). So at the very least, the specific morphology is relevant to identity.
Continuity != Unchangeability
Continuity is a time-dependent feature. The fact that I exist in a continuous line from my beginning to my end means that incremental material changes cause incremental (not absolute) separations and distinctions between I[sup]o[/sup] and I[sup]next[/sup]. That’s what I meant by “in any absolute sense.” (Perhaps you’ve committed your own parsing omission here.)
Of course there is, as I’ve clearly stated. Again, I refer you to my use of the phrase “in any absolute sense.”
You are not a different person because those distinctions are minor, and are connected through virtue of your continuous existence. They are not absolute distinctions.
So, if temporal distinctions are nothing more than shorthand for material changes, then… they are relevant to the relationship “I” in a different way than material distinctions. They are notations regarding change, rather than change itself.
On Preview:
Hey, c’mon now. Was that really called for? Who was it who spent five pages arguing the meaning of semantic meanings with erislover?
It doesn’t.
[ul][li]The fact that specific particle composition can change without altering identity makes specific particle composition irrelevant to identity. The fact that the set of particles in two entities can be completely disjoint (as in “you” and “you - 10 years”) without altering identity makes particle composition irrelevant to identity.[/li][li]The fact that you can move part of your body without altering identity makes specific location irrelevant to identity. The fact that you two entities whose domains of existence can be non-intersecting (as in you and you in another room) without altering identity makes location irrelevant to identity.[/li][li]The fact that you can change your hairstyle without altering identity makes specific morphology irrelevant to identity.[/li][/ul]
My list, as it happens, does no such thing. I explicitely stated that the context of discussion for composition was at the level of subatomic particles. Here, let me quote the passage, since it seems to have escaped either your attention of your comprehension: Note: We have been discussing material composition at the level of subatomic particles. Organizational principles hold both here and at larger scales.
A carbon atom differs from the substituted silicon atom both in subatomic conmposition (irrelevant) and organizational elements (relevant).
This would really be much easier if you would stick to the terminology which you yourself requested. (Or supply an alternate terminology, as I requested.) An illustration:[ul]
[li]I take the word “entity” to mean a material object which has objectively verifiable existence[/li][li]“identity” is the assertion that said object has [had] continuous existence over time"[/li][li]I disagree with your feeling that the you reading this post is a separate and distinct entity from the you of five minutes (or five years) ago in any absolute sense.[/li][li]Continuity != Unchangeability[/li][/ul]
Continuity, you have said, is an assertion of identity. Yet I have said more than once that identity is not altered by the simple passing of time. So, if you are talking about identity how do you disagree?
I tried to suggest a non-ambiguous usage for separate, different, and distinct with regard to entity/identity. You have ignored that suggestion and responded with a formula (Continuity != Unchangeability) which is a completerly irrelevant to a statement which was explicitely not about identity.
Why?
Apparently. Why you would expect me to parse “separate and distinct . . . in any absolute sense” as “discontinuous” I do not know.
In any case, the you of now is discontinuous from the you of five minutes ago. Whether any number of “intermediate yous” bridge that gap is a question of identity, not distinction between entities. I have already said, more than once, that the two are identical. They are not, however, indistinct.
Of course: that phrase clearly means “discontinuous”. :rolleyes:
Well, if you define “absolute distinctions” to be “differences in identity” then I agree. I have even said so many times. We simply disagree about the reason why. I ask plainly: what position of mine are you disagreeing with in the bolded statement?
Wow–catch any straws in that grasp? You were clearly advocating the position that changes in time were less impactive than material changes to the concept “identity”. My disagreement . . .is predicated on the assumption that continuity of existence is the determinant; IOW, temporal distinctions are relevant to the relationship “I” in a different way than material distinctions.
I point out that change in time has no meaning without a corresponding material change. You grasp at “notation”.
No matter what label I apply to that, the relevance to your argument is unchanged.
Apparently so. It was also apparently useless, since you refuse to engage clarify your use of terminology and continue to ignore my direct questions (no matter how many times I repeat them).
I find that my patience for this one-sided exchange is exhausted. I enjoy a courteous exchange of ideas. I even enjoy a spirited and discourteous exchange of ideas. I do not enjoy an interrogation. I shall not participate in this one any longer.
You object to my accusing you of having a static concept of concepts, yet in your reply you illustrate the very same when discussing how once an observer has had experience with “an ontological class” it remains fixed and unchanged by additional experiences with objects that become its members.
My position is that once an exemplar is classified as part of concept A, it becomes another point in the cloud of its conceptual space’s probability wavefunction, and thus reconfirms or subtly alters the mean of the cloud, which is the prototype for that concept. Moreso, most recent points tend to be held as more salient, so its importance is weighted.
This definition by example is all the more true for abstract concepts as it is for mere objects. Afterall, didn’t you quote Wittgenstein as saying “meaning is defined by use”? Multiplicative inverse? Don’t know enough about it. Your Godelesques self-referential concept of fluid concepts certainly is subject to definition by exeplars and to formation by geometric transformation of conceptual spaces. How about other abstract concepts? Red? An abstract concept to label the perception experienced as a result of particular wavelength. Which exact wavelengths? Hmm. We learn by using it in social interactions. Where you cut off red and start orange varies with context, though. In fact some wavelengths that are normally called tan may be called red when applied to a particular set, the same set that calls brown (in comparison) black, and peach, white (skin colors). This is just a geometric transformation of the color spindle, reduced and translated, onto a subportion of itself.
You accuse me of confusing a colloquial shorthand of language with a confusion of conception. Do not confuse the shifting of conceptual space by context modulation with colloquial use of language.
Erislover,
Word have meaning only because the conceptual spaces of different users overlap more often then they do not. But they are rarely perfect fits even for many apparently rigid concepts.
Briefly, I am making the case that the conceptualizations arising from medieval philosophy using the logic of its time, can gain some benefit from application of concepts from twentieth century mathematics, such as chaos theory and neural networks. In this mindset a system is constantly resonating and readjusting to new steady states (call them attractor basins or prototypes, whatever is your fancy), constantly readjusting itself ever so slightly to new inputs.
Yes, and I asked you to show me where I had done so.
I said no such thing.
I said that the relationship identity is primary and the acceptance of a phenomenological experience as represented the “identical” entity is a posteriori. Here is the sentence: The “shifting prototype” that you speak of is a posteriori synthesis of the identity relationship and the particular instance, “you”. You, in fact, make the same claim implicitely when you state: “once an exemplar is classified as part of concept A, it becomes another point in the [psuedo-quantum babble-speak]”
Another way of saying “classified as part of concept A” would be “identified as A”. Notice how it comes first and your “shifting of the conceptual cloud” comes after?
I ask again, Perhaps you might present some quotes and/or lines of reasoning to support [the statement that I am stuck in a static conception of concept]? Specific quotations are always appreciated.
I did. How you find that quote supports your assertion that it is more true to define abstract concepts through the “experience of perceptions” than it is to define objects which are directly perceived mystifies me. Meaning is use, in fact, was Wittgenstein’s explicit refutation of his earlier perception-driven model. The fact that you now use it in support of your own perception-driven model puzzles me.
Perhaps you could explain, in small steps rather than sweeping pronouncements, just where you find such support.
A number multiplied by its multipliocative inverse generates the multiplicative identity element (1). the multiplicative inverse of 5 is [sup]1[/sup]/[sub]5[/sub].
You should now be able to explain how this concept is fluid.
Oh goody. Please demonstrate such a “geometric transformation of conceptual spaces” using the two concepts I offered.
Meanwhile, since irony does not seem to be your strong point, perhaps you could tell me what the “fluid alternative” to the static conception: All X are Y would be? How does that apply to the statement: All concepts are fluid?
Yes, color is a classic example of a universal. Since it is a label for some group of direct phenomenological experiences it lends itself well to definition through perception. Have you read Wittgenstein’s discussion about pain? Can you perceive infinity? Death? Silence? Absence?
Exactly. Meaning through use, not meaning through identification with personal perception. More precisely, my view (not Wittgenstein’s) is that neither model accounts entirely for the develpment of language. I suspect that concrete nouns and at least some simple abstractions did develop through perceptual refernce. Mor ecomplex/abstract concepts become known through a societal feedback cycle.
It seems as if we are nto too far apart, here, you just onflat ethe social feedback loop with the direct perception, which I feel is unwarranted.
I caution you against it in your example of the pathologist. If you feel the caution was misguided, then by all means explain how the pathologists supposed identification of your physical remains as “you” should be viewed as a conceptual shift rather than a colloquial use of the same phoneme for distinct sememes.
Perhaps you would be so kind as to point out where I have done so.
Undoubtedly. I find this approach particularly powerful when the rigor of mathematics and the precision of mathematics are also applied. I become suspicious that such rigor and precision are lacking, though, when the terminology of mathematics is appropriated to make a statement like, “the cloud of its conceptual space’s probability wavefunction, and thus reconfirms or subtly alters the mean of the cloud,” especially, I must confess, from someone who has expressed unfamiliarity with the concept multiplicative inverse.
Not that I wouldn’t love a full-blown discussion of meaning, but I’m not sure this applies here. Once we have accepted an external world subject to causality we have some very “static” frames of reference. Hence we may learn the word “oak tree” by pointing to oak trees. Not all words have objective referents, so not all words are easy to precisely define, and abstract words like “tree” or “red” are definitely fuzzier.
The idea of a perfect fit isn’t necessary for identity. A perfect definition of identity might require a perfect fit, but an understandable definition of identity might be the intersection (dang it, I had said “union” before but I meant intersection) of the frame of reference for interested parties. The societal feedback loop that spiritus mentions would serve well to make a semi-rigid definition where an objective referent was nowhere to be found. Specifically, the word “identity” has no objective referent. Is this a problem you see?
Identity was understood before strange attractors were. I don’t feel Plato had any problems calling himself “Plato.” That he didn’t understand what he meant by that because of the mathematics of the time is not a very appealing or enlightening notion. The idea of identity plagues abstract mathematics as much as it plagues conscious beings. If mathematics could completely express or encompass identity it would become tautological or paradoxical in nature.
I’ll take these one at a time and then hand the thread over to you, erislover and DSeid. I’ll be as careful as I can to state any assumptions and to use words the same as I’ve been using them. I’ll also flag points where I believe that I’m agreeing with you.
Truthfully, I don’t understand why you accuse me of changing the meaning of the terms I’ve been using; I have not. You’ve quite definitely changed my understanding of identity during the course of this discussion, and consequently I’ve reflected that alteration by adjusting my assertions regarding those terms. Except for the term “identity” itself, however, I have not substantially altered my usage of terms, and any contradictions of earlier statements were done in order to fairly represent my thinking. -If that became obfuscatory, I abjectly apologize.
But this has neither been an interrogation of you on my part, nor an evasion of your points, most of which I’ve responded to at least obliquely, and all of which I’ve tried to take into account to the best of my poor ability to do so.
[quote]
[ul][li]The fact that specific particle composition can change without altering identity makes specific particle composition irrelevant to identity. The fact that the set of particles in two entities can be completely disjoint (as in “you” and “you - 10 years”) without altering identity makes particle composition irrelevant to identity.[/ul][/li][/quote]
The fact that specific particle composition can change without altering identity does not make specific particle composition irrelevant to identity, as that fact does not imply that discontinuous reproduction (nondestructive scanning) of all particles reproduces identity beyond the instant of the scan.
***What it does imply is that instant exchange of all particles of an entity does not disrupt identity. BIG RED FLAG: This is a direct concession on my part that you’ve convinced me one of your original assertions regarding identity.
[quote]
[ul][li]The fact that you can move part of your body without altering identity makes specific location irrelevant to identity. The fact that you two entities whose domains of existence can be non-intersecting (as in you and you in another room) without altering identity makes location irrelevant to identity.[/ul][/li][/quote]
Physical location is relevant to physics, and thus to those phenomenological characteristics by which we define identity in at least some contexts. For example, if erl’s Deus ex Machina instantly reproduces the planet Mars in a circular orbit around Antares, there is no phenomenological uncertainty as to the identity of the planet around which Deimos and Phobos continue to orbit, which will be separate/distinct/different/not the same as the newly created Antarean planet. For another example, the me in this office has a separate/distinct/different/not the same frame of reference from all other possible me’s in other offices. Again, there is no phenomenological uncertainty as to the identity of the xeno typing this post.
***BIG RED FLAG: This is where I agree with you that the relevance of any quality to existence is dependent on context.
[quote]
[ul][li]The fact that you can change your hairstyle without altering identity makes specific morphology irrelevant to identity.[/ul][/li][/quote]
“Specific morphology” must mean something else than what I understand it to mean… For instance:
“Morphology” includes those organization elements, does it not? If morphology is the form and structure of a type/classification/species, then specific morphology must be the specific form and structure of a particular entity of that type. The fact that a hairstyle change alters my specific morphology in such a way that my identity is maintained does not imply that my identity is maintained through all possible changes to my specific morphology. “Recreating my body with silicon substituted for carbon, for instance, wouild not recreate me.”
***BIG RED FLAG: I agree with the quoted sentence. I think it is an example of two different specific morphologies.
***BIG RED FLAG: I don’t disagree with that statement. I’ve presented that viewpoint consistently during this discussion. None of those statements of mine which you listed contradict that viewpoint.
Of course, if you object to the equivalence of “absolute distinction” to “discontinuous materially and temporally”, I can see why you might think there’s a contradiction there. Too bad I wasn’t quite clear in my subsequent explanation of the term. Or was I?
Really? You asked: “If an entity in the past is not distinct from an entity in the present (or in a different location, or with different particle composition) then how are entities differentiated?” In addition to the listed inequality, I said the following: “Continuity is a time-dependent feature. The fact that I exist in a continuous line from my beginning to my end means that incremental material changes cause incremental (not absolute) separations and distinctions between I[sup]o[/sup] and I[sup]next[/sup]. That’s what I meant by ‘in any absolute sense.’”
Your question was explicitly about identity, in that it pondered the differentiation between entities; the forumula I offered was most definitely relevant to your nonambiguous suggestions for terms, as it addressed your misapprehension of my meaning, and the subsequent text laid out my meaning in fairly simple terms.
I disagree with your first sentence. Those incremental me’s that bridge the gap of time establish continuity, by any definition of that word.
***BIG RED FLAG: I agree with your second, third and fourth sentences.
Note that I have taken great pains to impart to you that I do not believe “continuous” to mean “indistinct”, merely that discontinuity creates a distinction. (See explanation of continuity being a time-dependent concept provided above.)
It’s not a disagreement; it’s a qualification. You said “I am a separate and distinct person than the person I was 5 minutes ago. But I am not a different person.” I agree that there are separations and distinctions between you[sup]now[/sup] and you[sup]5 minutes ago[/sup]. My disagreement is with your assertion that there is no continuity between you[sup]now[/sup] and you[sup]5 minutes ago[/sup].
Your description of time was “a label which we apply to the occurrence of material change”.
Temporal distinctions merely denote finite opportunities for change, not discontinuity; material distinctions which occur between you[sup]5 minutes ago[/sup] and you[sup]now[/sup] are less relevant to your identity than material distinctions between you[sup]now[/sup] and any other like entity which exists in the same moment “now”, because they are physical differences between separated entities, rather than material changes which have occured to an entity.
You’ve demonstrated an astuteness over many different debates which led me to believe that you could deal with indirect responses given in an earnest attempt at understanding. I don’t think that evaluation of your abilities was wrong, so I ask you to accept that my posts were indeed earnest attempts to refine my own understanding.
Like xenophone I apologize if I have offended you. I do not mean to interogate you. We are just coming at a problem from very different perspectives. If I stated my case in too personal a way, then I am sorry. If I have misrepresented your point of view, then I regret that as well. Let us start a fresh sheet here.
My perspective is not that of one trained in classical philosophy. I am a pediatrician, a parent, and fairly well read in issues of developmental cognitive neuroscience. My strongest interest is in autism and how forming concepts becomes distorted within that system. I have some bystander interest in issues of artificial intelligience stemming out of my interest in neuroscience. And an amatuer’s interest in trying to understand things like string theory and such.
When I hear (or read) dicussions about ontogeny or epistemology I cannot help but to bring those perspectives into the mix. I am continually struck by how uninfluenced by nonlinear dynamics these discussions are. To me, they seem very contrived. I see how children learn concepts and how they shift and become more specific and in other ways how more abstract concepts emerge and develop, and cannot help but apply those dynamics, and models of them, to the philosophical constructs being discussed. Ideas do not come out of nowhere. And neither do names come first. Concepts are formed and reformed as fluid reactions to perceptions that seem to predictably travel together and by transformations of concepts already held. Social interaction gives words that often mean much the same thing to each user, but often not exanctly the same thing (sometimes in subtle but important ways).
The thoughts expressed are not my quantum-babble alone. They are influenced by a huge body of work in neural networks and models of learning (such as the work of Steven Grossberg and Adaptive Resonance Theory), Peter Gardenfors’ “Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought”, and even Jacob Bronowski’s “The Origins of Knowledge and Imagination”.
Certainly there may have been some misunderstanding on my part of what you have been trying to say. (After all, words and concepts are not always well matched between different users.)And I may have overstated my case if I implied that the only means to establish a concept is by exemplars. That is not really what I mean. But for most circumstances it is indeed the case, and if I now understand you correctly, we agree that new exemplars affect how we categorize future inputs. But I do acknowledge that fluidity is broader than that. The application of a conceptual space onto a novel data set, and the discovery of an unexpected good fit, is fluidity of concept space.
In terms of the fluidity of multiplicative inverse. This is the result of and a means of conceptual fluidity. It allows for the application of a concept across dimensions. Still, the point is made that some concepts do have strict rules based definitions with rigid boundaries. My belief remains that they are less common then more fluid ones, and that even in areas that terms are strictly defined our top-down prototypes get called into play. For example think of a straight line. You have an image in mind? You have a defintion (look up Euclid’s)? Yet under some geometries a line is a circle. NonEuclidian geometries took a long time to evolve partly because mathemeticians couldn’t rid themselves of their prototypes of straight lines.
But this becomes a huge digression.
My original small point was simple. Identity is not per se a strictly defined concept. That it is fluid is illustrated by how hard it is to get a consensus here on what constitutes having an identity. You can choose to establish a rules based meaning to it. But all involved then have to understand that it means that only and not all the rest that we each bring to the concept. I maintain for most us the expression of consciousness is the most salient feature of identity.
And now erislover, you see why I wanted to avoid the whole identity discussion.
I agree. All abstract concepts are (probably) not able to be rigidly defined.
Difference: it is hard to create a concise definition. It is not hard to continue to call you DSeid.
Then to understand your side more clearly, is it your contention that:
There are no objective referents
There are only objective referents
or
There are objective referents and things which are not objective referents
Furthermore, the question of epistemology comes to me asking if you believe that
We can explicitly know what we refer to through explicit concepts
1a) We can explicitly know what we refer to through implicit concepts
We can implicitly know what we refer to through explicit concepts
2a) We can implicitly know what we refer to through implicit concepts
We cannot know anything, so everything is moot
or
We cannot know what we can or cannot know, so everything is moot.
It seems to me that you would choose (3) from the first set and (2a) from the second. Meaning, in effect, that identity is not definable and that we can only resort to semantics instead of a real discussion. hey, not much argument here if that’s the case, except that I deliverately use strange definitions of words. Perhaps I should stick to quoting Jabberwocky
I would probably agree (if anyone ever pins down a good definition of consciousness :p). But I think that a piece of paper on my desk has just as much identity as I do.
DSeid
Nothing you wrote offended me. I find it fairly common on these boards for people to respond to positions which I have never taken. I am not certain why this seems to be my lot, perhaps it is influenced by the type of debates I join and the style of presentation I am most comfortable with . shrug It happens. When it does, I try to get the other poster to show me exactly what they words of mine inspired the response. Otherwise, I am stuck either ignoring them (which I consider rude) or defending positions which I do not hold (which is sometimes an entertaining exercise, but not always what I wish to do.)
I also did not feel you were interrogating me. We disagreed, but I never felt that you were refusing to address any points that I specifically raised for your attention. In fact, much of our “disagreement” appears now to have been a by-product of misunderstanding. I was not holding the positions you attacked, and you are not nearly as absolutist in your relativism (don’t you just love oxymorons?) as I believed.
details:
Nor is mine. My readings in philosophy have all been matters of individual interest. My academic training, such as it is, was in creative writing, mathematics, and computer science: none of it above the undergraduate level.
Well, mathematics has a much fuller and firmer grasp of linear dynamics than non-linear. And, of course, the language of these investigations is heavily influenced by the structures of formal logic. You are correct, of course, that some examples/thought-experiments are contrived. It is the nature of the beast. I imagine that non-linear examples would seem no less contrived, since their function in a philosophical discussion is to illuminate the dark corners of reason/knowledge/experience. Some of those corners take strange shapes.
As I said before, I think that the models of new mathematics, when applied with rigor and precision to philosophical issues, can be very powerful. Unfortunately, the models can also be misapplied, in which case they obfuscate rather than illuminate. QM, chaos theory, and Godel seem particularly popular with folks, for reasons that I am convinced have more to do with human nature than mathematical pertinence. I mean, when was the last time you saw someone bring Laplace Transformations into discussions of continuity of identity?
I understand. My point was never dependent upon authorship. My point was that the sentence represented an abuse of terminology. The cloud of conceptual space works as a metaphor, but that’s about as far as it goes. A dispersal of data points does not imply a probability wavefunction. A perceptual element does not require quantum instability. The mean of the cloud is meaningless until the type of mean is established. Since you later argued that recent events are given additional weight, the use of mean is also misleading in this context.
I admit that I can be a stickler for terminology. I do so because I think these concepts are difficult enough to grasp without allowing language to obscure them further. “Probability wavefunctions” do not seem justified as a mathematical form for representing concepts/perceptions. They also strike me as a poor choice for a metaphor, since quantum dynamics is hardly a firmly and intuitively understood basis from which to draw comparisons.
I believe so. It is difficult for any of us to approach these concepts without projecting our assumptions upon another’s words. Sometimes we get it right, and we can point out an implication that the author never anticipated. Sometimes we get it wrong and we end up contending points that were never offered for challenge.
That is how I read your words. I am happy ot see that it is not your position.
I don’t understand what you mean by this. It is true that we are able to perceive novel data. It is also seems to be true that novel data is “tested” against established concepts. “Unexpected good fit” seems to imply a conscious control of the mapping process (complete with expectation of result) which strikes me as unjustified.
Perhaps you can tell me precisely what you mean by “fluid”.
I certainly agree that conceptual identity is not a rigidly-defined relationship. As erl and I have discussed, the relationship holds over many variations of data set. I also agree that the understanding of a particular concept can be influenced over time by both individual perceptions (a generally dynamic force) and social interactions (a generally conservative force). Finally, I understand that broad abstracts such as “identity” are dependent upon context for evaluation. It seems to me that you use the word to imply a good deal more, though, and I am curious as to what.
This is why I think I do not understand what you mean by “fluidity”. Multiplicative inverse is a strictly defined operation within an well-established context. How is this concept “the result of and a means of conceptual fluidity”?
Well, I would quibble that the issue had little to do with an inability to adjust the concept of “line” and much to do with mathematicians’ (and philosophers. Kant in particular.) unquestioning acceptance of Euclidean geometry as “right”. Mathematicians as early as Ptolemy struggled with Euclid’s 5th postulate, but the intent was always to derive it from the first 4, not to develop a new geometry by altering the assumptions. Many of the results of non-linear geometries were actually discovered, even published, long before Reimann’s famous lecture.
Guilty. What can I say, maths are fun. Ideas are fun. Just be glad you didn’t bring up transinfinite numbers.
Perhaps. Certainly it is not a relationship with a single solutions. In either case, however, there are still many things we can determine about “identity”.
Is consensus the test for fluidity/rigidity?
I think you see me as forming a definition and then trying to make others use the word as I define. The opposite is the case. I observe how the word is used and attempt to formulate a working definition from the relevant principles of usage. “Meaning is usage” does not mean “everyone defines a word for themselves”. It is still possible to use a word incorrectly. We could get into a discussion of semiotics and hermeneutics here, but that really would be a long digression.
When speaking of human identity, I agree. That does not imply that it is the only salient feature. It also does not speak to the importance of phenomenological input in shaping the expression of concsiousness.
xeno thanks for the response. I will answer as soon as time permits.
First things first. Xeno, I like you. I think you’re a smart cookie and an all around good egg. Nothing I have said or will say in this thread reflects a change to that opinion.
I accept your apology. I was, and am, certainly obfuscated. I cannot figure out what words you would use to describe the concept that two separate experiences of a thing may not be the same in all respects. I offered distinct, but you seem unwilling to consider that word apart from “continuity” which you assert is a necessity of “identity”.
Color me obfused.
Fair enough. Unfortunately I have been unable to find a response, however oblique, to such direct questions as:
[li]the distinction between substitution and alteration in this context[/li][li]what word do you use to describe [the things which are not the same between the you of now and the you of five minutes ago][/li][li]How do you wish difference and distinct to be understood in this context. (separate was later added to this group)[/li][li]Why you disagree with my analysis of sameness w/respect to duplication and time.[/li]
If your responses contained answers to those questions, I was not able to discern them. I asked some of them more than once. I even teased you about not responding to them. I thought that would suffice to communicate that I really wanted some direct answers. In particular, it annoys me very much when I express a desire to solidify the understanding of our terminology and that desire is ignored. It strikes me as antithetical to a desire for communication.
You say that it was not intended as such, and I accept your word. Please answer those questions directly. I think the answers are necessary for us to understand each other’s positions.
Yes, it does. If the union of the particle sets of two entities sharing one identity is empty, then particle composition is irrelevant to identity. A quality which can be changed to the utmost degree without affecting a result is irrelevant to that result.
What other definition for irrelevance would you prefer?
Yes. Thanks for the flag.
This is just a restatement of your position regarding duplication of a person. Since we are talking about location, why not restrict the free variables (as much as possible) to location.
Does Mars at perihelion have the same identity as Mars at apihelion? If so, then location is irrelevant to identity.
Thanks for the flag.
It means a single specified morphology, just as a specific gumball would be one particular gumball.
No. It implies that your specific morphology is not necessary to your identity. If I had meant to argue that all morphological changes were irrelevant to identity, I would have included the generalized statement morphology is irrelevant to identity as I did with composition and location.
Of course not. The statement that you disagreed with was: the you reading this post is a separate and distinct entity from the you of five minutes (or five years) ago in any absolute sense. I, of course, never made such a statement. I made the statement: Two separate and distinct (in both time and material composition) entities. One identity.
Since that time you have established that your inclusion “in any absolute sense” was meant to convey lack of continuity which you see as a defining characteristic of identity. Whether you disagree with the statement I actually made remains to be seen.
I offered a specific definition for distinction in this context.
You did not comment upon it.
It did not require discontinuity.
From my perspaective, you have refused to accept my usage and then disagreed with my sentence based upon your new definition. I maintain my position that these discussions would be simpler if questions of terminology were dealt with promptly and explicitely.
Yes, and that is not an answer to my question.
Continuity != Unchangeability? I did not ask you about continuity.
“Incremental separations”? Is that your anser? The entities are not distinct they are “incrementally separated”? But wait–you said they were “incrementally distinct” too. Is it that you are unable to read distinct without internally supplying “absolute” and “discontinuous”?
No. My question was specifically about differentiations (or distinctions or whatever term you found most pleasing) which did not alter identity. We have both said many times that we felt identity held in this specific example (me::me 5 minutes ago). Having reached that agreement, you disagreed with me that the two entities were distinct. Why would further examinations of that disagreement concerned identity?
Really? The only place either term of your formula appeared in my definition was in separate: Not continuous in space and/or time. Since that definition certainly does not imply that continuity required no movement in space or time, I still fail to see the relevance of your formula.
Certainly it has no relation to the defintion for distinct, which is where you seem to most strongly disagree with my usage.
I confess that I am still unable to parse the your meanings for distinct, separate, and different from that text. I suppose we also disagree on the meaning of “fairly simple”.
No. On the real number line 1 & 2 are not continuous. 1-2 is a continuous segment.
A continuum may connect you with you[sup]-5 minutes[/sup]. That does not mean that the two entities, examined pairwise, are continuous.
Thanks for the flag. You are wrong about the first.
Fair enough. How else is distinction created? Please answer this simple question directly.
Then you disagree with an assertion that I have never made. I have said the two entities are not continuous. Whether a continuity exists between them (are there unbroken interconnecting forms) is a separate question.
I have said nothing at all about time and discontinuity. Are you saying, though, that no material change represents discontinuity?
The rest of your case for “temporal” vs. “material” change confuses me. What reason have you to assert that the meterial changes between me and me[sup]minus 30 years[/sup] are less relevant to identity than the material changes between me and me[sup]dup[/sup]? You point to continuity. Do you agree, then, that if all of your particles were transported instantaneously across 4 feet of space you would cease to exist?
I accept that. I hope you will accept my statement that it would help me refine my own understanding if a direct question were sometimes given a direct answer, particular in matters of definition of terms.
I’ll get over it. I am sorry to have made you sad.
Obviously, the greater part of our disagreement seems to be based on faulty communication (mainly, it seems, on my part). I said that my understanding of “identity” has been refined over the course of this thread, so I’m going to provide the first statement I made, and then expand on my answers to the two cases offered in the OP.
First, though, definitions; the three you’ve asked for, plus a few other terms relevant to our disagreement:[ul][li]different: I agree with your definition of “not sharing the same identity”[]distinct: I agree with your definition of “not corresponding to the same entity”, where “entity” has the meaning listed below[]separate: I agree with your definition of “not continuous in space and/or time”[]entity: any [material or conceptual] thing which has objectively verifiable existence[]identity: the quality held by an entity of having a separate existence from other like entities along with a distinct provenance, causality or meaningcontinuous: marked by uninterrupted extension in space, time, or sequence[/ul][/li]We appear to have different understandings of that last term. You have said:
And you have indicated that your characterization of two entities (you and you[sup]-5 minutes[/sup])as “not continuous” doesn’t mean there is “no continuity” between them.
Now, I’ve been struggling with the distinction you’ve made between “continuous” and “having continuity”, and the only answer I’m able to come up with is that you want to consider two temporal instants of an entity outside of the context of “time”. Am I right about this? It’s the only way I can see that you could consider [you and you[sup]-5 minutes[/sup]] as “not continuous”; you are considering them as a set, rather than as two points along a segment.
If so, then I submit that the decontextualization removes such a consideration from the question of identity, as it creates an arbitrary rhetorical separation which doesn’t have a manifest reality. If I’ve misapprehended you yet again, then I apologize and ask you to straighten me out about this.
Regarding “relevance”: I agree that the specific particle composition, location or morphology of entity A need not be indistinct from those of entity A[sup]also[/sup] in order for the entities to possess the same identity (as identity is defined above).
Regarding “alteration” as opposed to “substitution”: An alteration is any change to an entity which occurs within a time or space continuum. A substitution is any exchange of component elements of an entity. A meta-substitution of all elements of an entity duplicates the entity while destroying it. (NOTE that I have conceded that such a substitution does not necessarily disrupt identity.)
So anyway, here was my initial sortie into the thread: “I’m gonna buck the crowd here and say that continuity is necessary for identity, but not for consciousness.” I want to amend the statement to say that continuous identity does not imply continuous consciousness.
I think we must consider the thought experiment from two different assumptions. First, if we assume the scanning process to be a physical process involving manipulations of matter and energy; second, if we assume it to be a miraculous occurence which doesn’t involve the material universe.
Physical process
First case: destructive scan - is it still “you”?
You’ve created an exact duplicate that is “me” to everybody except the “me” that existed before the scan. That entity was destroyed and replaced by another entity, with provenance back to the old entity through the scanning process. He is a distinct entity, but he has the same identity and a new but quite similar consciousness. (The prescan “me” is dead.)
Second case: nondestructive scan - is it still “you”?
You’ve created an exact duplicate which mirrors “me” to everybody except himself and “me”. However, he is not “me”, as he is a distinct entity who exhibits a separate existence. He is a different identity with a new but quite similar consciousness. (The prescan “me” is dead.)
Miraculous occurence
First case: destructive scan
If there is a time lag (as posited in the OP), then the duplicate has a distinct provenance and a separate existence and is therefore a different identity from the old “me” with a new but quite similar consciousness. (The prescan “me” is dead.)
If there is no time lag, and creation of the new “me” is accomplished instantaneously with destruction of the old “me”, then in the instant of creation the duplicate is indistinct in provenance and unseparated in time, and is the same as the old “me”. After that instant, spatial separations allow distinctions of provenance and causality to manifest. The new “me” is then and afterwards a different identity from the old “me”, with a new but quite similar consciousness. (The prescan “me” is dead.)
Second case: nondestructive scan
If there is a time lag, then the new “me” has a distinct causality and a separate existence, and is therefore different from the old “me”. (The prescan “me” is dead.)
If there is no time lag, and the duplicate is an instantaneous copy of the old “me”, then in the instant of creation, the duplicate is indistinct in provenance and unseparated in time, and for that instant is the same as the old “me”. After that instant, divergence of reference allows our separate existence and distinctions of provenance and causality to manifest. The new “me” is then and afterwards different from the old “me”. (The prescan “me” is dead.)
So there.
Please delete the parenthetical references in each of my answers to “nondestructive scans”. If the original entity is not destroyed, then my reports of the death of the old “me” were greatly exaggerated.
This is getting a bit further afield from the OP, but I do feel the need to try to explain my perspective some, and hopefully, answer Erislover’s questions, even if not explicitly.
I’m going to start of with defining “object” to mean any concept held in the mind, whether very concrete or very abstract.
The mind can define objects according to many domains, dimensions, and subdimensions: shape, location, motion, surface characteristics, color, smell, sound characteristics, drive significance, number relationship, and so on and on. In each of these dimensions a certain ideal spot may be prototypic for that object, and a certain range around it is acceptable, with some rate of drop-off in that acceptabilty. Thus every object has some shape in this n-dimensional space with potentially fuzzy margins of decreasing best fit.
This can range from the very specific - my particular red ball that has that old musty rubber smell and the divot right there that only bounces in particular ways - which have a range of wavelengths that are accepetable and a range of smells, but fairly narrow across many dimensions - to the very abstract in which one dimension is very sharply defined and all others are let to be any shape whatsoever - like the concept of the multiplicitive inverse, which can apply whether considering apples or galaxies.
The exact shape of each of these spaces, and of the prototypes, is influenced by: our experience with exemplars of the object; by context modulation; and by expectations.
So to illustrate: if I hold shape to a square and color to blue, but let other dimensions vary, then the abstract concept of a blue square and any blue square is held in my mind. If I instead let shape vary some, hold texture fairly steady, color a narrow range around pastel blue, then I have (more or less) my prototype for my son’s blue blankie. Note that his prototype would put more emphasis on its smell, texture, and drive significance, than mine would. We hold different features as salient. As blue blankie frays through the years, our space and prototype for it changes … out of constant experience with these changes and expectations of them. For each of us a wide variety of perceptual inputs will be acceptably classified as blue blankie. We both identify the same object under most normal circumstances as blue blankie, but the meaning of blue blankie emerges to each of us differently out of our interaction with our preceptual inputs.
These shapes can be applied against dimensions other than those in which they were formed. So a wheel can inspire the abstract concept of a circle, which can then be applied to other data sets, like the motions of the planets. I liken this to a geometric transformation of the object (in this case a rotation) and wonder if the metrics can be defined (and much work in the neuropsych literature supports that many of these metrics can be defined) then these transformations can be rigorously modelled by those with enough mathematical expertise (which ain’t I). I also acknowledge that these transformations do not create perfect fits and are streched and squeezed in their new locations (for example, the planets are not really in circular orbits, the concept was molded into ellipses to make it fit) These operations I liken to topologic alterations. And I suspect that if the metric was well defined, and someone had the mathematical expertise, it could be modelled for many sorts of concepts and metaphors.
To bring this back to the question of identity. If some major aspect of an entity is changed, then the identity issue depends on whether that aspect was along a critically salient and/or narrowly focused dimension to the particular oberver or not. This is different for different classes of objects and for different observers in different contexts. Erislover, I maintain that to hold the same standard for identity for all cases of objects is ignoring these issues.
Is there an objective reality? Of course. Do any of us percieve it? No, not directly. Our understanding of it is filtered through our perceptual abilities, functional needs, and personal experiences. Each of us forms our own model of it. Since we share similar perceptual faculties, and share common experiences, our internal representations of external reality are often similar enough to allow reasonable communication.
No two entities can ever have the same identity in an objective sense.
Make an exact copy out of particles created out of nothingness at the same time. Are they identical? Well, let’s say that each is a five hundred dollar bill, and you can choose just one of them. Since they are identical, you don’t care which one you choose, right. But one is located on the table in front of you and the other is in Alpha Centuri. I’d choose the one located closer to me. In this case its location in space is a salient dimension of identity.
“Identity” really means stable classification by the observer. (Whether it is a “particular” or a “universal”)
By an objective standard “I” now is different from “I” a year ago - many different molecules, different morphology (I’ve put some weight on and lost more hair), some alterations of my thinking process and behavior - but no one would classify me other than as being still me because I am similar enough across pertinent dimensions and have changed according to expectations (although my wife thought I’d keep more of my hair).
What about my kid’s blue blankie? Imagine that he’s going into Kindergarten. He’s really attached to that smelly thing and I don’t want him dragging the 4 foot thing into school. So one day I cut off a third of it. What remains is still blue blankie. Another third, and another over the next few weeks, until he’s left with a 4 inch square of smelly blue cloth. It still meets his needs; it still feels and smells the same; it is still blue blankie to him. If I pulled the larger mass of the cloth out of the garbage, he would not call it blue blankie. Did it ever stop being blue blankie? When did the tossed pieces stop having that identity?
