Materialism, the way it’s usually understood, is a particular kind of monism (i.e. the doctrine that there is only one ‘fundamental’ substance, as opposed to, e.g., Cartesian dualism, Popper’s three worlds, and other kinds of pluralism). As such, it holds that matter is fundamental, and things like mind, abstracts, concepts, and so on, are ultimately derived. Materialism is opposed to other kinds of monism, like idealism, the view that all that there is, is ultimately mental in nature, or neutral monism, which posits a fundamental substance that is neither material nor mental in nature (and hence, ‘neutral’), and which gives rise to both mental and material properties.
Quantum mechanics is a physical theory. The most popular view is that physical theories are substantially theories of matter, of real stuff out there, and that they’re true because their claims about the stuff out there obtain, at least in an approximate way (scientific realism). Consequently, quantum mechanics may elucidate the nature of matter, but can’t possibly argue against materialism.
This view may be challenged. One may for instance hold that physical theories are not substantially true about the world (scientific antirealism); but then, QM can’t really tell us anything about materialism either, as its truth conditions don’t lie with what the world is ultimately like.
One may also hold that while quantum mechanics is a correct theory of matter, that’s not all there is—although issues like the causal closure of the physical and the question of how different substances could interact make this a difficult to defend position, in my opinion.
So in the end, quantum mechanics is perfectly consistent with materialism; and on the opposite end, one can hold non-materialist views and still be convinced of the truth of quantum mechanics.
So the question really just betrays a mistaken view of the purview of scientific theory: while it is undoubtedly possible to take our best current theories as guiding principles in the creation of metaphysical worldviews, and while they may even impose constraints on such constructions, ultimately, metaphysical questions are not answered by physical theory.