Here’s a batch of factors not adding up to a coherent essay.
Even setting aside any he-said-she-said falsification or posturing, there’s a lot of ambiguities and complexities here. Somebody screwed up along the way somewhere, but we in the public sure don’t know who or how yet.
Procedure back in my day would have the fighter maneuver so as to try to avoid triggering the airliner’s TCAS. As well we’d typically adjust our switchology to preclude triggering their TCAS at all. Then again, that was peacetime training 30 years ago, not guys working in an active war zone in very different airplanes w (probably) fancier equipment.
If the fighter is in a big enough hurry about a worrisome enough target, just getting close enough fast enough to confirm the target’s lack of hostile capability is the only thing that really matters. If that results in a high rate of closure in close, so be it.
We also don’t know what the weather was; the Mideast can be real hazy where you have to get pretty close to see anything.
Or maybe the F-15 drivers, like the Vincennes 32(!) years ago, were a little bunch too cowboy for their britches.
The articles I’ve seen are a little ambiguous about which collision avoidance system is involved and which aircraft experienced the alarm. The OP’s article says the fighter’s “automated collision avoidance system” triggered and they presume the airliner’s did too.
TCAS is the civil standard all airliners worldwide have. But does the F-15 have that? We sure didn’t back in my day.
Does the F-15 have a totally different system based on its own air to air radar that would warn for excessive closure rates in close but leave the airliner unaware? Does the Iran Air airliner have a RWR receiver that would warn them that a fighter (or SAM) radar has them targeted? Certainly US airliners don’t have that, but Iran Air, El Al, etc., operate in more dangerous neighborhoods & might well.
In response to a TCAS alert for any reason, the appropriate maneuver by an airliner is prompt but smooth. Bouncing people off the ceiling, throwing them to the floor, etc., is gross over-controlling by the airline pilots.
Response to gross cowboying by an interceptor OTOH could hurt folks in the back pretty easily. See wiki for a similar incident with the shoe on the other foot.
Older F-15s were not equipped with radios that can connect to airliner radios. So any commo from those sorts of F-15s to airliners would have to be relayed through ATC. Later F-15s did have airliner-appropriate radios. Did these particular F-15s have airliner-appropriate radios? The public doesn’t know yet.
The fact the airliner was not where the US military expected it to be implies (not guarantees) they were off course. Which in turn implies they weren’t talking to a radar -equipped ATC authority of any country or that ATC authority would probably have noticed them off course & done something about it.
Even with fighters with airliner-compatible radios there’s the question of which frequencies to communicate on. For any given blob of airspace there is exactly one ATC authority that’s managing it. But which frequency is in use in that blob of air varies from time to time & only by contacting the controlling agency and asking can one know for sure. Knowing that frequency wouldn’t help in the event the airliner had goofed and was on the wrong frequency or had turned down the volume for some reason. It happens every day.
There is also the concept of the “Guard” or emergency frequency that everybody is supposed to monitor all the time everywhere and is a “universal hailing frequency” in extremis. As above, something less than 100% of airliners actually monitor it 100% of the time. Due to sloth or an honest switch error. The radio commonly used for monitoring Guard is also used for other things at various points in the flight and may have been legitimately in another use at the moment that mattered, or may have been simply misset.
The article says the Iranian pilot said that the fighters had identified themselves as American, not Israeli. That implies they were talking to each other at some point, although whether that was before or after the passengers were injured isn’t stated in the article.
I find it a little surprising that the interior pix show all the window shades up. That’s sure not how US airliners look inside. Then again, after a scary close encounter you might expect to find all the pax anxiously scanning the skies looking for the next wave of interceptors.
If the fighters were scary close alongside I’d expect there to be at least one passenger photo of that. If such a photo existed the various Iranian press releases would certainly have included it and legitimately so. That implies (not guarantees) that the fighters were where the passengers couldn’t see them.
We certainly used various avenues of approach to the target that were intended to keep us invisible to passengers, the pilots, dedicated side / top / bottom observers carried aboard many military aircraft, and for targets suspected of having tail guns, outside the field of view of the gunner’s windows & gun aiming radars. Time permitting.
Lots of factors to consider.
Absent any hard data I’m going to speculate it was both over-eager F-15s and over-reactive Iran Air pilots. Bad luck they came together on the same day.
These are the kinds of bad local luck meets a bad global situation events that have triggered instant crises every few years all over the world since WWII ended. And will continue to do so. It becomes a question of when & where, not if or whether. That’s a dumb way to run a planet.