One of the few exceptions to free speech is causing immediate danger. Yelling fire in a crowded theatre. Shark! at a crowded beach. etc.
Couldn’t that be applied to depictions of Muhammad in print or film?
I think a case can be made for imminent danger. There’s been violent world wide reaction very quickly in the past few years. Salman Rushdie was the first that I’m aware of. People die after something gets published.
I’m reluctant to suggest this. The 1st Amendment isn’t something to restrict lightly. But, the immediate danger exception has always been applied.
IANAL. This is my best guess as a journalism student.
In the USA, free speech can be curtailed only through certain exceptions. The most relevant among them would probably be “incitement to imminent lawless action”, which in Brandenburg v. Ohio clarified the older “clear and present danger” test that you reference. There’s a difference between asking someone to commit a lawless act and offending someone to the point where they decide, of their own volition, to perform a lawless act – it’s the difference between “You should kill someone” and “You suck”. If you prohibit speech on the basis that somebody, somewhere, might get offended enough to kill because it, well, you’ve effectively silenced all criticism of violent groups. Free speech would be useless.
There’s also the “fighting words” exception which prohibits direct personal insults likely to incite violence, but that exception has gotten weaker over time and is typically used to protect private individuals and not groups, and there’ve been further issues with trying to apply it to specific protected groups (religion, sex, etc.).
And lastly the courts don’t function in a political vacuum. Even if the rhetoric is valid, I don’t think the US political climate would allow a ban like that to survive very long. How would it even get to the Supreme Court anyway? Which sane prosecutor would go after somebody speaking out against Muslims after a decade of fighting them?
people have time to choose to behave rationally. If they react violently, that is also a choice they made. But either way, they have time that they don’t have if there is possibly a fire in a crowded theatre.
The incentive it would create is the following: When someone expresses an idea you find offensive, use enough violence as a form of protest and the gov’t will make it illegal to express that idea because the yelling “fire” in a theater exception will be used.
Don’t like when someone says homosexuality is a sin? Whenever someone says it, kill a lot of people. Soon enough, saying homosexuality is a sin will be prohibited in the same way that yelling “fire” in a theater is.
Don’t like when someone says homosexuality is ok? Whenever someone says it, kill a lot of people. Soon enough, saying homosexuality is ok will be prohibited in the same way that yelling “fire” in a theater is.
Creating such incentives is unlikely to have the overall effect of reducing violence.
I’m not exactly sure why, though, since in her analysis the film meets the time and likelihood criteria, but not necessarily the criterion of intent. Wikipedia talks about those three tests; they are not, as far as I can tell, laid out as such in the court decision, but there is a paragraph that says (bolding mine):
So you’d have to prove that the violence is not only imminent and likely but also directed. It’s kind of a grey area whether intentional provocation of violent groups would trump other free speech concerns, and again, it’s hard to imagine either a prosecutor or a court taking this up unless a lot of people die.
If the theatre is on fire, a “reasonable person” will try to leave in a hurry. Deceiving a “reasonable person” about the theatre being on fire will similarly result in them trying to leave in a hurry. The threat of a crush exists because no one person can both act and see the end result of that action, and the perfectly reasonable fear of being burned alive means it is understandable for someone to succumb to a sort of “temporary insanity” in which they forget that trying to get out a tiny bit faster is going to have a knock-on effect twenty metres further down.
By comparison, arson and murder are not how a “reasonable person” responds to having their feelings hurt. And unlike the crush in a crowded theatre, the individual is personally committing a moral wrong by attacking someone or setting fire to property, and not simply succumbing to short-sightedness about the knock-on effects of their actions out of fear.
I’m not aware of any controlling precedent, and I flatly reject the idea that speech should be restricted for fear of criminal actions by third parties.
This has actually been addressed, although I can’t remember the relevant case.
During the Civil Rights era, southern states, claiming that they feared violence, required civil rights groups to pay for police protection. THe groups themselves were peaceful, the ones opposing them were responsible for the violence. Yet the states used the threat of violence to say the march shouldn’t happen.
Speech cannot be restricted by law due to a heckler’s veto.
Also, how would such a law be written? You obviously can’t pass a law restricting only denigration of Islam. It would have to be a general anti-blasphemy law. Lots of books and movies would have to be burned to comply with such a law.
No; there’s not much point. This is a matter of manufactured outrage by religious demagogues; for example the cartoons of Muhammad that a while back supposedly inflamed Muslims were heavily modified from the originals to make them more insulting. Even if we clamped down completely and forbade any insulting or critical portrayals of anything Islamic, the demagogues would just make up their own “insults to Islam” out of whole cloth.
That doesn’t mean we can’t criticize non-Islamic people who deliberately, publicly throw baseless insults at Islam/Muslims in their own attempt to offend and whip people up, however. Free speech doesn’t mean freedom from criticism, and not all demagogues are Islamic.
No, and I find the suggestion almost comically ill-considered. To use the current example, the rioters have not seen the allegedly anti-Islamic film. They will never see it. Its content is utterly irrelevant. Rather, they are reacting to the encouragement of their so-called leaders who are telling them the film is anti-Islamic and that they should get outraged and smash stuff and can do so without penalty. If anything, restrict their speech.
What’re you talking about? I still see the lamish drawing in the post you quoted.
I’m wondering if anyone’s considered publishing photos of certain drawings of Muhammed and then only after the ensuing outrage, the publisher will inform all and sundry that those drawings are from a mosque.
Brandenburg v. Ohio is a case about speech that is intended to incite imminent lawless action, not speech that is likely to provoke a violent response. In a few limited circumstances the government can prevent speech that encourages violence if there is a real chance the violence will take place immediately. So the government could, for example, stop an imam in California who is whipping his flock into a frenzy and saying they should all go down the street and murder one of the actors who was involved in The Innocence of Muslims. It does not mean the government can stop someone from bashing Islam because Muslims might react violently. That’s flagrantly unconstitutional and it’s a really terrible idea on every level.
As has been noted in many other threads, the real-life facts of these cases also establish that there is no need for a law like this. In almost every single case of a major Islamic backlash, there has been a gap of weeks or months between the offending act and the response. The Satanic Verses was published in the fall of 1988; protests began a few months later and the Iranian fatwa was issued in February 1989. The Muhammad cartoons were published months before they were circulated in the Islamic world (along with fake images) and the uproar began. South Park did some Muhammad jokes, then they repeated the gag four years later (and went a little further) and people started protesting. The movie trailer was on YouTube for about two months before Egyptian media reported on it and the violence started. So it’s pretty clear that the images and criticism of Islam themselves don’t constitute an incitement to violence. It’s only when this stuff gets in the hands of a religious leader who decides he wants to flex his muscles and provoke a crisis that something bad happens. On a U.S. basis, that’s what needs to be regulated.