How can a Jew argue with God...and win?

The problem with understand the story as one about God allowing the rabbis to decide Torah law, is that such an interpretation ignores several basic factors:

  1. the story takes place in the context of a sugiya about “ona’ah bedevarim”, fraud through words, especially, those who cause another public embarrasment.

  2. the story is a example of that happening – the rabbis humiliate R. Eliezer

  3. the proof text given that majority rules, actually says the opposite.

  4. R. Gamliel dies at the end of the story, proving the point: don’t humiliate someone in public, especially when all he is doing to trying to have the people follow God’s will in a given case.

The story is about rabbinic hubris, what happens when the rabbis do stop listening to God and think they can operate independently of God. Remember Baba Batra 12b: the holy spirit was taken from the prophets and given to the Sages. When the Sages stop listening to the ru’ach ha-kodesh (in the case the bat kol), their legitimacy is threatened.

I know how Eliezer Berkovitz and nearly every other rabbi interprets this passage (I have spoken to many of them about it), I show them that they start the story in the wrong place – you have to start at the beginning of the sugiya, not when the oven of Achnai is brought up. And, they it too early, with “nitzchuni banai”, instead going all the way to the end, and watching the rabbis wreak havoc, excommunicate R. Eliezer for no reason, and finally watch R. Eliezer call out to God, and then R. Gamliel dies.

God agrees with R. Eliezer; is not God the standard of right and wrong? Jewish law is not a system of conventional law, that whatever the court decides is the right law simply because court decides it. The rabbis have to attempt to accord their law with God’s will. Here, God made His will clearly known, and the rabbis disregarded it. R. Gamliel, the rabbi in charge, died for this.

The story is certainly not a simple story of rabbinic independence from God, but more likely, a story of the great perils and complexities of a legal system that is supposed to align itself with the Divine will.

Lynwood

The carob trees may lean your way but the majority of scholars seem to to disagree, and Torah is not in heaven after all. :slight_smile:

Agreed. The Rabbis should not have humiliated R’ Eliezer in this way, causing him embarassment when his intentions were good. R’ Gamliel, leader of the camp at fault, is punished for exactly that. But as I said before, that does not make them wrong in what they said. It makes them wrong in the way that they said it.

I believe (though I’m not positive) it was also R’ Gamliel and R’ Eliezer who clashed over the declaration of a New Moon, arguing over whether it was in fact a new month. But R’ Gamliel was the Nasi, the leader of the court, and the authority was given exclusively to him to declare a New Moon. To ensure that his authority remained intact, R’ Gamliel declared the argument over and ordered R’ Eliezer to come to the court on the day that would be Yom Kippur by R’ Eliezer’s calculations, carrying his walking stick in his hand. If R’ Eliezer were right and this were Yom Kippur, carrying the walking stick to court would have been very forbidden. But, recognizing that R’ Gamliel had the authority to declare a New Moon and he did not, R’ Eliezer acquiesced and came to the court on the day and in the manner R’ Gamliel had commanded.

  R' Gamliel was often harsh in this way, making sure his authority was clear and that the court system would remain intact.  According to the passage referenced in the OP, that was a time when he overstepped his bounds.  His *methods* were not all right.  But the principle (that your opinion of the truth takes a backseat to the opinion of those vested with the authority to decide it, be it the majority of the court, or the leader in the case of the New Moon) remains undisputed.  Even R' Eliezer respects that in the story I just mentioned, even though he disagrees with the decision.

Nuu Atticus? Has this helped flesh out the Jewish tradition and perspective of God and of a Jew’s realtionship to Him?

Because even if this story wasn’t originally intended to mean what most scholars think it means, even if Lynwood is exactly right, Torah is in the interpretation by Man. Tradition has it that God did His job and gave it to us; the rest is our assignment. And tradition has interpreted this story (and made it somewhat famous) to mean exactly that. Even if this story didn’t mean that at first, the fact is that that principle is still now mainstream Jewish thought.

It is a bit different than a traditional Christian or Islamic one I think, despite sharing some texts. There isn’t much fear of the lightening bolt and the reason for the doing is not the prospect of reward or punishment in a life everafter. It isn’t about submission either. It is, according to tradition (and others will, I am sure, be quick to disagree if they feel otherwise), that the process of the doing is the relationship with God. We can argue with those we love, be they parents children spouse or God. We may win, we may lose, but we love each other anyway and we are not afraid that the relationship will vanish just because of an honest disagreement or two.

Render that beit din, and it is not a civil trial, but a court composed of religious scholars.

Zehava: your points are good. That was Rabbi Joshua, not R. Eliezer, and if you’ll in Berakhot 28b or thereabouts, R. Gamliel was deposed for exactly the reason you mentioned.

btw: here I think is the nub of the argument: when you and the accepted take on this story says, that the rabbis were “right” you have to define what that means. They clearly went against God’s answer. If you means by “right,” they had conventional law legal procedure on their side, then you are saying that whatever the court decides is “right”. I think this sugiya comes precisely to make us doubt that notion. This sugiya is to introduce humility into the idea that the court majority always comes with the right answer. Just look at the proof text for majority rule!! It is a brilliant, subtle critique of majority rule.

And remember, R. Gamliel is killed for letting the court run amok against R. Eliezer, who is always right.

Perhaps they were motivated by jealousy?

Mt. Moriah?! Coulda sworn it was out on Highway 61!

Lynwood- You’re right. Mea Culpa, it was R’ Joshua who argued with R’ Gamliel about the New Moon issue. And as to what is meant by “right,” I sympathize with your problem. This particular issue has long been a personal sticking point for me, but I try not to air my own religious qualms on the boards; my goal in this thread was to report the generally accepted wisdom on behalf of the religion, and I very carefully used the phrase “functional truth” to articulate the weight of the sages’ decision.

This is hoe I use the words “functional truth”: Ashkenazic Jews are not allowed to eat rice on Passover, observing that rabbinic decision as the functional truth of the laws of Passover, while Sephardic Jews are allowed do do so, observing that rabbinic decision as the functional truth of the laws of Passover. We do our best with the knowledge we have. That’s what R’ Gamliel and his camp were trying to do, and once it was decided, the decision was binding.

That's my understanding.  However, I respect your obviously very knowledgable opinion, and I look forward to checking in to many of the same threads as you in the future.

By the way, Atticus, I hope we haven’t chased you out of your own thread. I know we’ve strayed a bit from your intended debate. Sorry about that!

Zehava,

I am glad that we share the same philosophic concern here. You can see how profound the implications are. If halakha is understood as a “conventional law” system, and God’s will is taken out, then we are left with the legal theory of Conservative Judaism. I am not saying this is bad or good, but what does bother is C.J. legal theory is that God’s will is rarely discussed.

And oddly, here is where Reform Judaism has over C.J.: their license for abrogating halakha was that halakha was not longer coterminous with God’s will.

When traditionalists celebrate R. Joshua saying “lo ba-shamayim hi” “it is not in Heaven” I think they don’t fully grasp the legal-philosophic implications here (and that’s why they never learn well the rest of the sugiya).

Digression: R. Joshua confuses me here. He has personally experienced the bullying of Rabban Gamliel, but does not show any sympathy for R. Eliezer. Did they have to excommunicate him and humiliate him like that?

back to the OP’s question: there is another sugiya where a party argues with God, , but not Jews – non-Jews. Look at Avodah Zarah 2b-3a, God seems to be losing that argument, and is not a very good loser at that.

They didn’t have a choice, though. Like R. Gamaliel said, he was excommunicated “so that strife may not multiply in Israel”. (which was what kept R. Gamaliel from drowning.)

Whether the rabbis were “right” or “wrong”, that doesn’t matter. Once the decision was made, R. Eliezer had an obligation to go along with it

Well, this is what you get when you ask a bunch of Jews a Talmud question ;j

Lynwood, do you know the chronology of that? Had R’ Joshua already had his run-in with R’ Gamliel before the incident with R’ Eliezer?

As a side point, I believe Zahava spells her name with an a, not an e.

Captain A: I see your point, but I have doubts. Look at R. Joshua over the in Berahot sugiya (27b-28a)-- R. Gamliel had stated the halakha, and found that R. Joshua continued to disagree. Rabban Gamliel tried to humiliate him, but was eventually deposed by the assembled Rabbis (reinstated later, true, but under changed conditions)

I believe the entire scene recounted there shows that “strife” “machlokot” is exactly what was needed. Someone here cited “The Dynamics of Dispute” good book. Machlokes is “dispute” not “strife” and I think that the epistemological implications of machlokes are far reaching. For those that know some of the thought of Jurgen Habermas – much in common.

Gila B: Great question; I am not sure of the chronology. I will try to check it out.

Zahava – selichah!

Right…but look at it. The disciple goes to R. Joshua, and gets an answer (that the evening Tefillah is optional), then he goes to R. Gamaliel, and is told that it’s compulsory. The disciple then says, “But R. Joshua said it was optional”. R. Gamaliel then makes him wait until the sages have all entered and repeat his question, and then R. Gamaliel says it’s compulsory and asks, “Is there anyone here who disagrees?”, and R. Joshua says, “No”. He’s willing to submit to R. Gamaliel’s authority because R. Gamaliel heads the assembly. It’s not until R. Gamaliel makes him stand up and admit that he disagrees and then is made to stand there while R. Gamaliel lectures him like an inattentive schoolboy, that the sages have enough and depose R. Gamaliel. And look at the reasons the sages give…because of this incident, where R. Joshua submitted to R. Gamaliel only to be humiliated by him, because of the Yom Kippur incident, where R. Joshua submitted to R. Gamaliel only to be humiliated by him, and by the R. Zadok incident, where R. Joshua submitted to R. Gamaliel only to be humiliated by him. But in all those cases, R. Joshua is willing to submit, and R. Gamaliel’s fault is in being a “bad winner”…in using the perogatives of his office to abuse his opponents.

Captain A: excellent answer, thank you. You are right. In the Achnai’s Oven case, R. Eliezer continued to resist, even though he knew he was right, and that he knew that God knew that he was right. The two cases are not analogous. I submit to your reading!

But . . . that is tough position for Rabbi Eliezer: to know you are right, that your colleagues are wrong, and they outvote you out of jealousy and spite . . . and you have to submit.

I would be interested in your opinion regarding the A.Z. sugiya I mentioned above. Don’t you feel that HKBH gets a bit shrill at the end, feeling just a little guilty that He didn’t hold a chavit over their heads as well?

Oh, I’m sorry, just one moment. Is this a five minute argument or the full half hour?

Where, at the end of time, the nations try to claim credit for their actions, you mean?

Not that part. The part where the nations say (I’m paraphrasing), “you didn’t coerce us as you coerced Israel”, and the response is: “You wouldn’t have followed the mitsvot anyway”, and then the evidence adduced that Israel followed the commandments!

Analogy: you have two kids, one you force to play piano, one you don’t. You lavish praise upon the musician, the non-musician says, “why didn’t you (love me enough to) force me!!??”

Parent’s answer: “You wouldn’t have obeyed me. Your brother always does as he is told” when both sibs know that the musician is always getting in trouble for not doing as he is told (witness just about all the Nevi’im, and not to mention last week’s parasha . . .)

Whom does the parent think s/he is kidding?

The rabbinic responses put into HKBH’s voice seem so weak that I think their own discomfort is showing.

An extremely learned discussion, indeed. Somewhat off the point, but learned.

Lynwood, I take slight exception with your classification of Conservative Judaism as asserting “the law is not in Heaven” to imply that rabbinic decision can abrogate the law. Conservative Judaism certainly believes that rabbinic decision can interpret the law; so does Orthodox Judaism, for that matter. Otherwise, we could not evolve new halakha to deal with new circumstances. The Talmud itself has little to say about electricity, for instance, or time zones or antibiotics; rabbinic decisions have thus had to figure out how to deal with such changes. If they adhered to the notion that only God can interpret, they’d be stuck, and there would be no consensus on whether electricity is “fire.”

The problem that Conservative Judaism faces is that it tries to re-interpret the law while remaining faithful to traditional interpretation. But that’s a debate for another thread. However, I disagree with your implication that Orthodox Judaism doesn’t accept that there is human responsibility for interpreting the law.

Back to the OP, and regardless of this particular bit of Talmud, Judaism has always taught that a Jew should wrestle with God. We’ve had the citation of Abraham, arguing with God to save Sodom., and Jonah (who loses his argument) and Job (who loses his argument.) But the tradition is to argue, especially in the face of perceived injustice. I would add that the Israelites in Egypt “cry out” to God, and I like to think that their crying out was partly a complaint: what happened to God’s promises?

Moses, also, several times argues with God. After the golden calf, God says he will destroy the Israelites and start over again, building up a people from Moses’ descendents. Moses argues with God, and seems to turn back God’s (anthropomorphic) anger. And there are many tales, both rabbinic and folkloric, about Jews arguing with God. The most famous, perhaps, in popular culture are those stories by Sholom Aleichem about Tevye the milkman. So, the tradition of arguing with God is deep-rooted, and usually concerned with the perception of injustice.

The moral is: when we see injustice, we should not simply shrug our shoulders, Pangloss-like, and say, “It’s God’s will.” We have the right – indeed, the obligation – to challenge God about injustice on earth.

Judaism does perceive God as all-knowing and all-seeing. But human beings are not. Human justice and human mercy are notoriously lacking in omniscience. Judaism beleives that sometimes God tests us: sometimes He tests even the very righteous, like Abraham and Moses. Sometimes He tests us by setting up a situation where we must argue with Him. God knows how the test will work out, but we don’t. Judaism very firmly and absolutely believes in human free will, and that God not only created/granted us free will, but He encourages it.

This is also the Jewish answer (or one of them) to why there is evil in the world, when God could stop it. To stop all evil would be to abrogate human free will, and this would go against God’s plan.