The reason the Iraqi army doesn’t fight for shit is because the concept of “Iraq” is a more theoretical one to them than say… the United States (or Canada, or the UK or wherever) is for us. Their personal loyalty isn’t to Iraq, it’s to their local tribe and sheikh, while for most Western soldiers, their loyalty is to their nation-state.
On top of that, their training is sub-standard, meaning that there hasn’t been any real unit loyalty, or discipline instilled into them, so that when the going gets rough, they think “Iraq? Fuck that shit! 1st Battalion 3rd Iraqi Rifles? You guys have fun- I’m going home.”
And finally, the fact that the officers are usually rich or well-connected appointees means that there’s no personal loyalty going on, and is also the reason that no discipline is being instilled.
Kind of a perfect storm of what you don’t want to be in place for a disciplined, loyal fighting unit.
And… the US Army wasn’t really a merit-based organization until sometime well after the Spanish American War; just look at the number of rich guy colonels who raised Civil War regiments of volunteers, or who commanded state militia units (both of which comprised the vast, vast majority of Civil War regiments).
Even in the so called “professional armies” of the XVIth and XVIIth century, upper echelon officers were still picked from within the nobility almost exclusively, and promotions had a lot more to do with who you knew, whom you could call upon for a little nudge, a word in someone’s ear etc… as opposed to straight merit.
As well, many officers simply bought their charge as part of a sort of loan system on the part of the monarchy : whenever the State needed a quick cash injection, it sold public offices in bulk, typically for life, which was a good investment for the buyer because those came with a fixed stipend. In the long term, the State lost a lot of cash that way - but continous wars often meant needing money right now, so…
That’s not to say that distinction and valor weren’t considered at all - but they were only a small part of the story, and a non-noble would have to break a number of glass ceilings on his way up. Valor itself only got you so far. In France that only started to change around the time of Louis XIV (so, 1650-1700, thereabouts), and very slowly at that. Napoleon, for example, was only able to catapult through the ranks thanks to the chaos of the Revolution. While he was studying at the Ecole Militaire, he was still consistently laughed at and bullied by his peers due to his petit bourgeois origins.
I’m not as knowledgeable about the British system, but I feel fairly confident assuming it was more or less the same thing, especially considering the uproar caused by Cromwell’s New Model Army. Which does predate the US Continental Army, and did promote on merit. Sort of - as I understand it there were still political/religious bona fides required. But no issues wrt social class.
True, but that was an anomalous situation. The latter stages of the Iran-Iraq War ( after Iran had ejected the Iraqi invasion force ) tended to settle into a pseudo-WW I scenario with Iraq sitting on the defensive in prepared entrenchments and repelling assault after assault.
The Iranian regular army had serious supply issues during the war due to arms boycotts and found their material situation deteriorating literally from day one. Meanwhile the ruling clerical class saw the partial ( and overstated ) success of cadres of revolutionary light infantry in defending in built-up areas of Iran against the really rather inept Iraqi offensive and took the wrong cue. They decided superior elan could make-up for material inferiority and too often embraced variants on the “human wave” offensive. In fact it appears on average the Iranian infantry was just a little better than their Iraqi counter-parts at the most basic level of military skills. But they were thrown away in how they were used.
Meanwhile Iraq was lavishly and regularly re-supplied by the anti-Iranian alliance and I recollect the one area they really excelled ( at least subjectively ) was military engineering. No cite handy at the moment, but I seem to recall that up and coming, talented young Iraqi officers not of 100% provable loyalty to the regime ( i.e. most of them ) tended to get transferred to the engineer corps where they were not a serious threat to stage a coup. As a result Iraqi overall leadership sucked eggs, but their static defenses were pretty soundly constructed. Which played perfectly into the Iran-Iraq War.
The western-trained Iranian military despite its severe weaknesses post-revolution quite frankly out-fought the invading Iraqis more or less handily. But the professionals were thereafter side-lined and the ideologues proceeded to bang their heads ( or rather their fiercely committed light infantry ) against the rock of superior Iraqi firepower for the next several years.
The system of Purchase, buying one’s rank — although it had a few merits since one couldn’t buy senior rank — which ossified the social status in the army [ didn’t happen in the navy ], was mainly there to give the officer a stake in the established order and came about partly as a reaction to the Commonwealth tyranny. The people who ran Britain in the 18th century were the creatures of revolution, the 1688 revolution — a political revolution, but they were anxious not to have the Rule of the Colonels back, and any attending social revolution.
Actually, although there were quite a number of British officers by the early 19th century who were quite sympathetic to liberal ideas and ‘Liberty’ enough to lead an overthrow and self-sacrificingly accept the positions of dictators, as much as any inspiring Bonaparte, virtually no-one wanted to go back the the Colonels, any more than any Greek revolutionary today wants to go back to the rule of their Colonels. Military Governance, although it appeals to the immature, is kind of annoying.
Frederick the Great had non-noble officers to fight his wars, but in his retirement from battle, he increased the aristocratic aspect of the Prussian Army, mostly to bind the aristocrats ( who were always the most dangerous kickers-off of revolution ) to the royal service.
However appealing it is to any sensibilities that technocratic virtue should be the basis of merit, all successful revolutionary movements regenerate aristocracies to take the future positions; from the communist tradition of the soviets and Chinese etc. to the bonapartist line from Cromwell, Napoleon to Hitler. Again it is pre-emptively rewarding future loyalty.
This may have happened partially in America, [ although I don’t know much about these ] in West Point and Annapolis, in that certain not unwealthy families were certain of a welcome for their scions, and that these institutions deliberated moulded their cadets not only into officers, but into a petty aristocracy as well. West Point did seem to do that in an old novel by John P. Marquand I can’t recall
As for the English Revolution of the mid-17th century, it was entirely a Gentry affair, some colonels came from poor backgrounds, ( such as Colonel Pride ), but frankly you can find isolated examples of that in every regime that has ever existed, no matter how aristocratic or reactionary: more typical was when the Grandees ( the noble and gentry core of the army leadership ) had the Levellers ( proto-communist loons ) hung for preaching equality.
Both sides had a point.