Ok, so we know that it’s physically possible for a White man to rape a Black woman, and we know that it has happened before (even as an extremely rare event). So, why is the Black woman more likely to be lying than the White woman? Because that’s the real question we’re getting at. That’s what has to happen for one to have more truth value than the other-- it has to be more likely that one is lying.
You don’t remember any posts in that thread that alluded to his name and based on his name suggested that he harbored a bias? Really?
If you really don’t, I’ll go find a couple. But I suspect I’m misunderstanding what you’re asking, and I don’t want to slog through that thread looking for something that’s going to be dismissed immediately. So – just to clarify – a post or two that refers to the ‘88’ in Hurerta’s name and suggests that this is evidence of an agenda or belief system that includes racial bias.
Right?
Please answer my extended roulette scenario. At what point does it become more likely that Jack is lying?
Dumbass, it doesn’t matter.
Do you think your average juror is going to be to be able to wash away all his preconcieved biases and prejudices because “such evidence is inadmissible at trial”? I mean, seriously. Would you trust a juror to weigh your case fairly when he/she already has it in their mind that your accusation is less than fully credible? Of course not. The system is supposed to be impartial. A juror who already thinks your story is, on its face, unbelievable is not someone you want judging your case.
Yeah, all true, in theory. However, the prosecution’s burden of proof is raised the more people there are in the jury box who think that crime stats are indicators of credibility. How does the saying go? “Beyond the shadow of a doubt”? Well, with a biased juror that shadow gets bigger.
And you are an idiot if you can’t see why that is a meaningless disclaimer. If you don’t have evidence, then you need to suspend judgement until you get some damn evidence. Once you get evidence, then you make your assessment.
Well what does it mean to you, Bricker? To me, the bare bone facts of a case is evidence, because its the minimum information you need in order to assess the plausibility of the allegation.
In the LW thread, the stats were introduced into the discussion after several pieces of evidence (in addition to the bare bone facts) had come to light. But they were being used anyway, despite the bullshit disclaimers.
So you tell me. What is “evidence” as you define it?
Now wait. How can you inveigh against the use of the stats WITH THE DISCLAIMERS by saying the disclaimers were bullshit? The disclaimers are key to the whole thing. If the disclaimers are removed from the picture, then of course the use of the stats collapses. That’s why the disclaimers were repeatedly made.
So under what method of analysis do you now simply dismiss the disclaimers as bullshit?
Evidence is any fact or inference that tends to show the truth or falsity of any factual question in dispute.
And why isn’t ANYONE here answering the extended roulette question?
When the statistical odds of the events that he are talking about seem to defy what we understand about nature.
Random events and not comparable to events that occur through non-random human behavior.
Huerta’s “probablistic model” bullshit should only apply to random events. Such as action on the roulette table. Not to free-willed individuals.
Not to human beings who are more than capable of defying whatever predictions you can glean from a prevalence stat.
Human beings are not subject to “statistical odds”. This is the type of language you reserve for random events.
I can’t believe you call me stupid, and yet this stuff has to be carefully and slowly explained to you.
You call that an answer?
I asked a very simple question. Jack says I bet on a roulette number and won, Jill says I bet on a roulette color and won. Which is more credible? If the answer is that they are equally credible, then the new scenario is that Jack says he bets on two roulette numbers in a row and won both, Jill’s story remains the same. Which is more credible? If the answer is that they are equall credible, Jack’s story is three wins in a row. And so forth.
Answer the damn question. At what point, if ever, does Jack’s story become less credible than Jill’s? Simple question. Answer it.
A credible story would have Jill admitting that after winning the $2 she lost $120 over the rest of the evening’s gambling, while Jack dumped 14K and is now frantically ducking Vinny The Collector.
Cite?
Who made that rule? You?
I appreciate the humor, but you know that’s not a real answer either.
Several people above have suggested that in the first scenario, Jack and Jill’s stories were equally credible. I want to know about the second, or the third, or whatever point we get to when Jack’s story becomes somewhat, marginally, slightly less credible.
When is that?
I honestly don’t know. I don’t know how to calculate the mathematical probability that Jack is lying based on no data points about Jack. Because, remember, that’s the key issue. We’re not talking about “what is the probablity of X happening”, we’re talking about “what is the probablity that Jack is lying about X.”
But why is the original scenario only less cridible by a “razor thin” margin? Can you put some mathematical bounds on the thinness? If not, how do you know it’s not non-existent rather than “razor thin”?
Yet not followed.
And the disclaimers are bullshit anyway because they don’t make it okay to use those stats in the manner that they were. A false rape report of 50% at one or two colleges is not enough information to justify any a priori assumptions about future reports of all college rapes. Racial crime data that purports a 0.0% rate can not be used to the gauge the plausibility of a future rape allegation.
The stats are simply not predictive at all. Why is this concept so difficult for you to understand? It’s really not that hard.
See above.
So answer me this question.
Mary is a white woman invited to a frat house with a bunch of college guys and is paid $400 to strip for them.
She says that she was raped after an argument broke out when she decided to stop dancing before the agreed upon time.
Question: does the plausibility of this case change if Mary is black? How do stats factor into this assessment?
…in your posted scenerio, Jack is more credible.
A black lady goes to the police department and complains she was raped by a white man. A white lady goes to the police department and complains she was raped by a white man. In the absence of any other evidence, who’s story is more credible?
Because it’s the only thing that’s different between the two stories.
Picture each story on a balance scale. We know nothing about Jack or Jill - if one were a known liar, the balance scale would tip strongly in one direction, for instance. But the chances of that are equal for them both. Everything is exactly even on both sides… EXCEPT for the likelihood of the event they are describing. Jakc describes an event that’s perfectly plausible, but less likely to occur than Jill’s story. So the balance scale is tipped, ever so slightly, ever so razor-thinly, towards Jill telling the truth. The more unlikely the event Jack describes, the more the scale tips. At some point, if his story becomes implausible, it tips far over. But even the first scenario tips the scale slightly towards Jill.
Now, I can’t tell exactly what has people up in arms here. In the case of ywtf, it seems to be the idea that that scale tip would someho translate into any sort of action as far as the handling of the case.
Let’s think a bit about standards of proof. We might run the scale from “Utter certainty,” through “beyond a reasonable doubt,” to “preponderance of the evidence,” to “probable cause,” through “reasonable suspicion.”
The slight, razor-thin nudge I’m talking about here wouldn’t satisfy any standard of proof, even “reasonable suspicion.” It’s not something that alone would sway any fact-finder. No one could reasonably accuse Jack of being a liar if he told his story.
But that wasn’t ever the question. The question was, IN THE ABSENCE OF ALL OTHER INFORMATION, what do the stats tell us?
Now, you may rightly protest that we’re not in a IN THE ABSENCE OF ALL OTHER INFORMATION scenario. That’s certainly a valid observation. But the thing to do then is not simply declare that stats irrelevant. It’s to point out that their tiny, near-zero, epsilon value is massively overshadowed by other, specific evidence.
Zero does not mean “almost zero.”
How so? he’s claiming in event has a 1 in 38 chance of happening. Jill’s claim has a 18/38, almost 50%, chance of happening.
In the absence of any other evidence, the stories are equally credible. Read the damn thread. Asked and answered above.
My beef is its equally important to know why the stats exist, why and of course we know now that the disappeared Huerta88 was wrong; would it be less likely for a black woman to be ganged raped by white men.
If in this case, the reasons why it’s less likely are overshadowed by reasons why it is likely that are independent of race, i.e booze, sexual tension, power struggles, etc, then it seems to me, ridiculous to keep harping on absence of all other information, when this other information was already known before Huerta88 decided he needed another data point to prove this woman was lying.
Bricker this didn’t just appear in a vaccum, there’s a timeline to it.
The roulette wheel is (presumably) random. Accurate odds can be calculated and each of us would have a breaking point for when the odds would make us flip a mental switch from “I believe you” to “I disbelieve you.” (If it were my husband telling the story, I would believe him long past the time I would believe you, since I think you’re dishonest. I would believe my husband if he came home and said he won the lottery despite the odds being so incredibly against it and despite the fact that he never plays.)
In fact, I’d say that the odds of something happening, even when it’s a perfectly computable random event, are much less likely to influence our ideas of its credibility than our opinion of the speaker and the manner in which the information is conveyed.
Since rape isn’t random, odds cannot be calculated the same way. Each woman has a different likelihood of being raped, and each woman has a different likelihood of being raped by a specific race. We can predict certain things about groups, such as what percentage of women will probably be raped, and we might be able to point toward specific locations or activities that increase or decrease those chances.
I still don’t get the “razor thin” characterization. Why is it only razor thin, and not as large as the difference between the probability of the two events happening (guessing the right color vs guessing the right number)?
But I have to agree with what **ywtf **had to say about this type of analysis anyway. You can’t predict individual human behavior in the way you can predict random events. You can only come close to that level of prediction when you’re talking about large numbers of individuals. If we know that murders in a certain city hoover at about 1 per 10,000 per year, then we can expect that city to have 50 murders if it’s population 500,000. But we can’t say whether any one individual is going commit a murder or be the victim of a murder. What are the odds of a guy named John Mace being murdered in that city? Pretty low. In fact, VERY low. But if someone reports that John Mace was murdered, why would we not believe it, since we expect murders to happen (about 50 per year).
It means there is not enough evidence for a judgement. The prudent course would be to abstain from making any sort of judgement at this juncture. Probabilities are not predictors of individual cases. Using them as such is unwise, at best. About the only place it is useful is in the case of extraordinary claims. We’re talking Aliens and Anal Probes territory.
This has been a highly charged case and to make a judgement with no actual evidence is foolish. Take your hypothetical Jack and Jill case. Statistically the event Jack is relating is less probable than the one Jill is relating, neither is impossible, nor is either so improbable as to require extraordinary proof. Would it be prudent to call Jack a “lying asshole”? Would it even be defensible?
Enjoy,
Steven