Why must a game stay put? (An alternative is an image: if I initiate a photo, say that iconic one of Che Guevara, on my computer, and then a split second later you display the same image on your computer, has anything “travelled”? This is the key to explaining why there is no paradox.)
Particles in spacetime. For the nth time: why must some be permanent?
All of your analogies make the same point - over and over again. The point that you make quite convincingly is that to an outside observer there is absolutely no difference between splones, duplicates, guy’s with inky thumbs, guy’s with black socks, laser beans shining off the moon, people playing chess or doom, pictures of Che Guevara or any of the other scenarios that you have presented. But, you don’t have to make that point, you never did. I have always agreed with the fact that to an outside observer, there is no difference. This discussion doesn’t hinge on an outside observer, however, it hinges on one very specific observer: the original (be it the pre-mitosis guy, the pre-duplication guy, the pre-ink guy, the black socks guy, the Dell computer, the laser photon, the chess piece…etc.). No other point of view matters, for the sake of this discussion, except the original.
Che Guevara: Nothing has traveled. The pictures appear the same to all observers…except to the original picture of Che on the first computer. If the picture had a mind, it would die when the hardrive was reformated.
All of the scenarios convincingly make the point that there is no difference to an outside observer, but they do not convincingly make the point that there is no difference to the original. You keep saying that it does, but saying it many, many times does not necessarily make it true. You make a valid point, then try to sweep a similar, but different case in there as well. Then it basically comes down to: you believe this, don’t you? Well, if you believe this then you must believe that. Well, no, I don’t, because they are not the same situation. Then when it comes time to discuss paradox’s, your argument basically distills down to: it’s not a paradox, because I say it isn’t.
Let’s bring it back to the counterintuitive notion. Back when people believed that the earth was flat. It was believed to be flat because it seemed to be flat. Then, people began to notice things and hypothesized that the earth may, indeed, be round. Well, the burden of proof at that time fell to the “round earthers”. They are the ones who had to show proof that earth was round and not flat, and they did just that (ships falling into the horizon…etc.). It was a counterintuitive and unpopular notion that was successfully argued by proof.
I maintain that the notion of one being having two futures is counterintuitive and unpopular. It is counterintuitive because I can not think of anything else that even approximates one-being having two futures (excluding optical illusions, like laser beams shining on the moon). Your argument will be: that’s because no one has yet been duplicated. That’s true, but what phenomenon in nature even comes close to one being having two futures? And, a bit more esoteric, why should one being have two futures (I plan to give some reasons why it shouldn’t later on). An unpopular notion: I get the impression that certain tenets of physicalism may lead to the conclusion that one being may have two futures. And, I’m sure that there are quite a few lay people and scientists who hold the physicalist point of view. But, I believe that the majority of lay people and scientists do not believe that one being can have two futures. I conclude that the notion of 1 being having 2 futures is both counterintuitive and unpopular, therefore the burden of proof is on you to substantiate your position. I don’t even expect proof (unlike the "round earthers, you really can’t give testable proof), but at least some better explaination of things like: If you have no effect on a mind 100 light years away, and visa versa - if no information is exchanged - how can you on earth have a future with that mind. You have glossed over how that can be, I would like a little more of an explaination.
(a side question, just for my curiosity: I assume that physicalism and materialism are similar. I recall reading a while back something written by a materialist that went something like: “Although it is possible for a fellow to have a back-up of his mind in a safety deposit box somewhere, when he finds himself in a burning plane, he will be most disappointed.” The implication being that “he” will not have a future in the back-up. Questions: is physicalism and materialism similar? Is mind having two futures a physicalist point of view?)
I am saying that POV is from “my perspective”, from my “location in space”. I am conscious so I perceive my location through my own eyes, I can discuss my POV in the first person singular. If I am the chess piece, I can perceive that the game is going on without me, although no one else can tell the difference. Remember, I am the one who is saying that the original consciousness-identity can only exist in one location at a time, so “location” works just fine with me. In the case of non-sentient entities, since they have no self-awareness, they can not “see” themselves in the first person singular, they have no point of view, so as outside observers, we must simply think of them in terms of their location.
I keep getting hammered about my “inappropriate” use of the terms POV (and FOR). So I posed that question (and a couple others) in a physics forum. To my chagrin, it was brought to my attention that I, a mere layperson, was not really welcome to pose questions in their highbrow forum. One fellow was down right belligerent about it, calling me an idiot more than once.
A sampling of his comments:
What about it? Idiot…
You mean “splones”? Good grief you are an idiot!
Idiot…
Now I am going to have to call you an idiot again…
What crawled up your ass and raised a family? You were the one that provoked
me into calling you an idiot.
Yeah? And your splone wears army boots…
I kinda got the impression that he didn’t like my term, “splone” very much. 
But, I did get some helpful information from some of the nicer forum members. The three members who were kind enough to answer my questions about POV are higher credentialed than the guy who kept calling me an idiot, so that gave me some solace. Here is a sampling of their answers:
Tibbycat: I thought that “point of view” POV was a term that physicists used, or at least could work with.
Answers:
It is. ‘Point of view’ in physics is roughly synonymous with ‘frame of
reference’. It is almost strictly used when contrasting observations of a
given phenomenon in discussions of relativity.
The identity of the observer is irrelevant as physical phenomena are presumed to be independent of this ‘variable.’ Two different points of view always have two different locations and may have different velocities relative to the objects/events/interactions under discussion.
The POV (presumably “point of view”?) diverges the instant the duplicate is formed. It is in a different physical place (Pauli’s exclusion principle applies), so it will have different perceptions, which will lead it to different information, different interpretations,
and different conclusions.
Tibbycat: Can we separate POV from consciousness?
Answer: Yes. It is another word for “frame”, and any inertial object has a frame. Muons have no consciousness (Are you sure, have you met all the muons?), yet they experience things from the perspective of their speed. Pauli exclusion does not apply to this. A duplicate must be made, or must share, new matter brought in…
Tibbycat: I maintain that the human brain over time may lose some of the original fundamental particles that it originated with (through some cells dying, metabolism etc), but certainly not most or all of the particles.
This doesn’t occur with the central nervous system. This is why dementia, and a host of other diseases are an issue. But for survivability, you cannot have less than a perfect recall, and regenerating neurons will change the “hologram”.
Atoms/molecules don’t exchange out of the brain, except food/waste.
Other answers they gave:
No matter how identical the original and the duplicates are at first, their experiences after their creation/activation will be different, leading to gradually diverging points of view. Their knowledge bases will diverge, their acquired skills will diverge, their attitudes and preferences will diverge. They will be different people, and as time goes on, they differences will become apparent even to others.
There is a lot of ethical hand-wringing going on lately about cloning.’ Genetically identical twins have been around as long as life has reproduced. A clone of me would not be me, but would be a separate person. Clones have the same human rights as anyone else. The ethical problem is not in the clone or the process of cloning, but in the purpose of cloning. As always the key difference between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is the motive.
The battle-cry for the civil rights movement of the 21st century may be
“Clones are human, too!”
Tibbycat: Would you choose to be terminated if your duplicate was assured of getting a million dollars.
Answer: In other words, would I volunteer to die to make someone else rich? Is
that what you are asking?
We can discuss their answers later if you wish. I won’t list their names or the forum that I posed the questions on. They made it clear that I was an interloper on their turf and I don’t think it would be appropriate for me to possibly encourage people from this forum to pester them in their forum. So, you can say that this is not an official cite, but it is what it is.
More answers to the “big 6” questions:
Once again, this is the same analogy with different players. For the sake of simplicity, let’s use the exact same model of Dell with the same configuration and identical software. To all outside observers, there is no difference between them. If I were in the store and I had to chose between 10 boxes of those Dells, I could chose any one of them and I would be confident that it would be the same as all the rest. It is not from my perspective that I am concerned. In this case it is the computer’s perspective. Assuming that they have self-awareness, the Dell that I bought will perceive a future in my office, the other nine have futures elsewhere. None of them have any effect on each other. And the 80 or 90% vs. 100% atom exchange in the processor does matter. The human brain does not have 100% atom exchange, I don’t think that it is anywhere near 100%.
This was nothing more than a joke. I suppose that I should have included a smily-face . Your tone in the paragraph that prompted it appeared to me to be a tad condescending, so it was a gentle poke at smuggness. I will read the Schwarzenegger thread more and comment later.
No, it is not gibberish, you are obviously just not understanding it yet. You seem to be having trouble conceptualizing what I term POV, and it’s really very simple. Let me try to reduce it to one very small aspect of consciousness – the sense of sight. Let’s say you have one naked lady and two men, one in front of the lady and one behind the lady (both guys looking at the lady. From the POV-guy #1, naked breasts are in his field of view; POV-guy#2, naked lady’s arse; POV-lady: horny guy #1; POV-Outside observer, 2 men, one naked lady. Example: Your chess game in Cardiff: The K-rook sees that his game is stopped and is unaware that it starts up in Florida again. His game is over. The chess piece’s POV is different from the player’s POV who sees the game continued on, but in 2 locations. To the player, the game never ended. Extrapolate that out to consciousness as a whole, and you should get the point.
So, in the case of my 100-particle scenario above (using only the sense of sight): Each particle can see each of the other 99 particles. Each “eyeball” will be within each particle – the locus of sight is from within each particle. The array of 100 particles could have a networked sense of sight with a much larger field of view – the locus of that groups sense of sight will be somewhere inside the array.
You must still elaborate on exactly how one can have a vested interest in one or more beings who do not exchange information of some sort with each other at any point in time. Otherwise, I can’t see how it can be anything other than one “you” and many “thems”.
Maybe so, but they are still separate identities with no vested interest in eachother.
But, if the original you on earth dies, and you remain conscious, where exactly are you hearing, tasting, smelling, tasting or feeling? On earth, from your corpse?
I disagree. I don’t know how many atoms are exchanged in DNA in the course of a human lifespan, but I certainly do not think that it is a majority. Having some exchange during the aging process is most likely inevitable, but should be considered a fault. Most types of senility could certainly be viewed in part as being a progressive loss of ones identity. If you lose too many, you could lose your identity in it’s entirety. That is supportive of my position.
Challenge: I am not in a location where I can easily research the percentage or rate of DNA atomic exchange (I could find no mention of it even with a cursory Google search). However, if you can post a reliable cite that corroborates your claim that a high percentage of DNA atoms are exchanged in a human lifetime, I will hold less tightly to my position that one’s identity is hardwired to the brain.
I thought that I made that point quite clear on numerous occasions. Because, I believe that everyone has an identity that is hardwired into his or her brains, somewhere – most likely in the DNA. Because, if there is no unique identity, it leaves the door open for multiple futures for one entity, and I still don’t believe that is possible.
Consider this (I will elaborate on this theme in a later post): I believe, as I think you do, that there is quite a bit of impermanence in the universe. Given enough time (on a galactic scale), many particles will transform. At some point in the distant future, perhaps even the last proton will decay. But remember, individual consciousness is on a very miniscule time scale compared to the big events in the universe. It only has to hang around for a few decades. Particles that may be completely transformed in billions of years, can still be considered original and permanent for a few decades - enough time to hardwire an identity onto consciousness.
This property of originality for which you’re arguing, is exactly the same thing as SentientMeat’s 'temporal arrangement of particles. Or it would be if you would only let go of the parts that are entirely imaginary.
If I have a picture of Che Guevara stored as a pattern of bits in my computer memory and the computer is switched off, then I contrive to replace the image in the memory in exactly the same location (so that every memory location that previously held a 1 now holds a 1 and every location that held a 0 now holds a 0), In what sense have I not restored every aspect of the original? What non-imaginary property did the first instance have that the second one lacks?
Let’s place Sentientmeat and Mangetout face to face and strap them together. Then we will pop SM’s eyeballs out of their sockets and focus them in a superior direction between the two heads. MT’s optic nerves will be transected and anastomosed into SM’s optic nerves. We will hardwire the auditory pathways of all four ears in tandem but ablate the inner ear vestibular apparati. We will also destroy all somatosensory, upper motor neuron and central taste pathways, as well as the olfactory bulbs. We are left with SentientMeat and Mangetout having only two of the five senses (sight and hearing) and no motor function. They no longer even have a sense of balance, proprioception, temperature, pain…nothing). The two remaining senses are shared equally between them. They perceive the outside world exactly the same.
This is sort of the opposite situation from the duplication experiments: Instead of having two beings with identical past memories and diverging futures, we have two beings with different past memories and converging futures. Will SM and MT become one consciousness? Will they be the same person? If so, and they are again physically separated (Mangetout gets his eyes reattached), will the one consciousness become two again?
I have a better idea: how about we get TibbyCat to give a straight, concise answer to a direct question.
Evolution. A being replicates itself, and from that moment the two entities diverge, each being just as much the original as the other.
Again, I can only say you’re wrong here. I am espousing the standard view of cognitive science.
Because the mind is not the atoms or cells themselves, but the arrangement of those atoms or cells.
Well, “he” won’t remember the plane journey nor anything else which happened after the moment of being stored in the box, but just as my 2004 version was still “me”, so the deposit box version is still “him”.
Yes to both, as far as I understand them.
I largely agree with everything said there. But note that they are physicists, not cognitive scientists. They might well fall at exactly the same final hurdle as you, calling the duplicate “someone else”, when he is just as much “you” as the “original”.
I’m not talking about the hardware, I’m talking about the software running on it.
Well, it is most definitely much greater than 50% in respiration waste alone. My point was that the software is unaffected by suddenly being run on different hardware.
It would save a lot of time if you just did it now - I just want the post number of the clear change of mind (no pun intended). Even a 5 minute read-through should tell you that.
I suggest that this is a category error.
Because “you” are not an object (a spatial arrangement) but a process (a temporal arrangement), which can be replicated on other hardware/matter (just like your 2003 or 2008 duplicates).
No, on the other planet, because the arrangement called “me” was initiated there.
Well, we’re now getting ever more specific in seeking out these permanent entities which you for some reason consider essential. We started with your body, then moved to your brain, and now we’re rooting around in the nucleus of the cells themselves. I admitted back on page 2 that there might well be residual atoms somewhere, and the problem with gauging atom exchange in DNA is that when the exchanged atom is identical (as atoms of the same elemt and isotope are), we cannot tell which have been exchanged and which haven’t. But the fundamental point is that each atom could be exchanged with an identical one without affecting its function: problems occur only when the atom exchanges with one of a different element or isotope.
Yes, but for the love of Kenneth: why not? What is so unscientific or illogical about the idea? Do you just not like it, in a similar manner to your least favourite food?
Remember that under my (and cognitive science’s) position, Different past memories (ie. arrangements of matter) = Different people. SM just gains new memories via different apparatus. No new memories are laid down in MT’s hard drive.
I think we’re almost as far as we can go here, TibbyCat. Try as I might, I cannot think of a better way to explain why your scenario holds no paradox than my first post 5 pages ago:
You continually ask me to consider the POV or consciousness or reference frame “of the original”, meaning those atoms there. I am continually telling you that the POV/consciousness/reference frame which we all have is not contingent on the atoms themselves, but the arrangement of those atoms whcih could be initiated using other atoms. I assure you that I understand your argument, but my position is that there is no difference between me waking up tomorrow and someone else who thinks they’re me waking up tomorrow, since the thinking is all that counts.
I have no problem whatsoever with answering direct questions (I don’t feel that the same favor is always afforded to me, however). But, the redundancy of answering the same question over and over again does get a tad exasperating. Che Guevara is the same question as all the other models that have been hypothesized. To an outside observer, there is no difference. If the original Che Guevara picture were conscious, then it would matter to him, but no one else.
I think part of the problem may lie in an inability to conceptualize the difference between a hypothetical conscious picture of Che (or other inanimate objects) and a real conscious brain. Perhaps you are oversimplifying all of what consciousness entails, then you are tempted to attach that model of consciousness onto the picture (or chess piece et al). If the original Che Guevara picture were conscious in the broad sense, it would have to be more than simply 1’s and 0’s. The totality of consciousness is more than simply thinking or processing information. Sure, as we have agreed on all along this thread, if it were possible to transfer the “process” of consciousness to another being they would have identical past memories to the original. They would have the capacity to think and reflect on their past as the original. In order to process new information and create a present (“I’m here now”) and a unique future, however, it needs to interact with the outside world – it needs biological hardware that can perceive the environment. If we are going to anthropomorphize, let’s make sure that we make it complete. So, I will even go so far as to say: it is valid to hypothesize that your duplicate used to be you, but he is not you in the present or in the future. If your duplicate was only you in the past tense, there is no time or place for you to “cross over”, or continue in, or perceive as, or have any real interest in, or however else you want to think of it - your duplicate. Your past does not need hardware, but you present and future do need it.
Now, if we use the simplified model of consciousness in, say, the Che Guevara picture, then yes, there is no difference at all? Why? Because, in that scenario, the conscious picture of Che has no awareness of self, therefore no difference can exist. But we humans do have an awareness of self, an identity, so we have to use a slightly more complex model to ascribe to the Che Guevara picture in order to be accurate. Namely, a model that includes the ability to perceive oneself in relation to his environment. That ability cannot be expressed in simply 1’s and 0’s - it requires hardware. The necessary hardware hangs around for at least 80 years, long enough to give the consciousness a permanent identity.
And these things are all that we have - the capacity to think and reflect on the stored memories of the past. There is no property of identity that exists outside of that.
You’re talking about the past and the future as if they exist concurrently with the present; they don’t - the past is gone and all you have left of it is the memories stored in your brain; the future is not here yet and all you will take with you into it (all that is of any consequence) is your memories of the present and the past, stored in your brain. The brain itself does not have any property of identity beside the arrangement of these memories,
So it’s pure and entire function as an image of Che Guevara is unaffected; it is as ‘original’ as the original.
And that awareness of self and identity is a pure and entire function of the arrangement of your brain; arrange something else the same way and it will perform the same function; no less ‘originally’ than the original.
But this property of identity that you keep asserting is distinct from the actual pure and entire function of the system is just something you invented because you like the idea. If not, where is the property?
If you recall, we spent quite a few days discussing those atoms and it was I who kept saying that we were putting the cart before the horse. I wanted to discuss paradoxes while you two kept telling me that a significant number of original atoms get replaced in the brain. I was told many times that my knowledge of “biology” must be faulty for not realizing that so many atoms leave the brain. I went along the atom road, however, and went down to the level of DNA because, if forced to pick a location for “identity”, DNA seemed to me to be the logical choice. It still does. Remember, I wanted to keep the discussion only on the brain, while you guys kept diverting the discussion to other parts of the body (i.e. the lungs). Yes, many parts of the body do regenerate cells, often quickly, but it is the brain that contains consciousness.
Today, I was able to pose a couple of questions to a colleague of mine who does know significantly more than I do about the brain (Harvard med school educated board certified neurologist). I asked him the following three questions:
In the course of a human lifetime, are many of the atoms in the brain replaced/exchanged besides those from metabolic waste/food?
Answer: There is no significant brain regeneration known.
Do most of the atoms remain in their original form (unexchanged) in the nuclei/DNA of neurons?
Answer: Yes.
Do you believe that a person’s identity is hardwired into the DNA of neurons?
Answer: Probably.
So, if my “biology” was wrong about all this, at least I am well-credentialed company. For you to say, “there might well be residual atoms somewhere” is to greatly trivialize and underestimate the real situation: that the atoms most likely to be the source of identity, neuronal cell DNA atoms, are essentially unchanged in the course of a lifetime. For you to claim: “the fundamental point is that each atom could be exchanged with an identical one without affecting its function” is at best misleading. If you are trying to include “identity” in under the guise of function, that is purely conjecture on your behalf, and one that I strongly disagree with. In my opinion, if you exchange more than a critical number (and no, I don’t know what that number is) of atoms in what I believe to be the source of identity, DNA in neurons, then you will lose your sense of self awareness – if you function at all, it will be as an automaton.
I think this goes to show how shockingly desperate you’re getting in your attempt to find something to bolster your claims; The molecular composition of nuclear DNA doesn’t change much when it is all packed away in the nucleus, inactive, but when it is inactive, it can’t very well be doing anything with regard to consciousness; when it is active (chiefly at cell division), it is subject to change, including exchange of its component molecules.
You can’t have it both ways; the only things that don’t experience chemical change are the inert things; inert things are not taking part in consciousness, because they are inert.
What?? We get to, say, 60% and stay conscious, then one more brain atom exchanges and POW!, we’re an automaton? That is just silly.
Look, the point throughout all of this is that atoms do exchange without affecting the function of the molecule or cell: that’s how DNA works in the first place - it splits in half and replicates itself from the atoms around it. I have been perfectly candid about the level of debate concerning brain atom exchange. Respirational waste accounts for an enormous percentage of atoms in the brain cells, and the nuclear DNA only a tiny fraction. To seek these out as being the source of “identity” (whatever that is) is just Ockhamly unnecessary. We already know that the temporal arrangement of cells and atoms is what causes complex properties to emerge: As I ask yet again, given the same atoms, what is the difference between a live brain and a dead one, or a conscious brain and an unconscious one, if not the temporal arrangement?
It is not surprising that he was utterly unaware of the context of this question. Heck, I would answer in the affirmative if you asked me it out of the blue. You should have asked him if consciousness and identity were distinct entites, with one residing in the operation of the neurons and one residing in the DNA which sits lazily in each nucleus. DNA is the builder of the hardware on which the software runs, and thus determines the differences between software. That is not to say that the software cannot be run on different hardware given a magical machine like your duplicator.
Please, just try your best to answer what you’ve repeatedly been asked. Why don’t you believe it possible for “me” to be a thinking being with unique memories and only that? Why do you seek to introduce extra entities which cognitive science considers unnecessary? (And the Schwarzenegger thread answer would also set my mind at rest that you were at least giving a cursory glance at the links I provide here.)
If personality were hardwired into the DNA of neurons (whyever that is important, since the nuclear DNA in the teeth, toenails and testicles is identical to it), then identical twins would have identical personalities. They don’t, so it clearly isn’t.
Actually Mange, I think TC is suggesting that the different ‘identities’ of identical twins derive from those specific DNA molecules in each exclusive spatial location, even though the molecules are indeed identical arrangements of atoms. Of course, your point about teeth and toenails still stands, as does the sheer unnecessaryness of such an odd choice.
Agreed; it’s fairly clear here, I think, that TC is actually just grasping at straws in the hope one of them will support his pre-existing (possibly religious) notions of unique personal identity and POV.
Here’s a random, pointless thought: If identity/consciousness/personality is a pure and entire function of the physical arrangement of the brain, all God needs to do to grant the individual eternal existence is to precisely reinstantiate that function somewhere else. Of course this notion is unsupportable/unfalsifiable, but I mention it only out of interest; materialist explanations of the mind do not automatically exclude spiritual notions of eternal souls.
Quite so: some alien device somewhere in our bodies could even be recording our memories as we form them from childhood, or transmitting them elsewhere, allowing a new individual which thinks it’s me (just like I’m an individual which thinks I’m me) to exist elsewhere, elsewhen.
Of course, I ascribe to this proposal a probability so tiny that I might as well live in the Matrix now, but I can’t call it zero.
Can’t get any more a lucid summary of the point than this.
It is (logically)possible for a new individual to come into existence, which thinks its me, exactly as I am and individual that thinks it’s me). The new individual need be no more or less deluded than me; no more or less right than me.
Evolution? Identical twins? Two unique sets of atoms, two unique identities: that’s my position. Mother/offspring? Same deal.
Let’s think of a more likely scenario…oh, yes…how about a gradual loss of ones identity?
Do we have any analogous situation in real life that would prompt me to propose such a preposterous idea? How about senile dementia? One prominent aspect of end stage dementia is fulminating disorientation toward person, place and time. They become progressively more vacant. They do not know who, where or when they are. They become automatons. They lose their identity. Or, is that “just silly”.
How does senile dementia (and there are a host of other examples – all real life, not hypothetical) fit in to your “consciousness is merely an arrangement of particles” theory? According to you, what we perceive as being an awareness of identity is simply part of the process of consciousness. This implies that even if ones neurons progressively degenerate, so long as consciousness endures, one should not lose his orientation to person, place and time. But they do. Why?
I think that it is a good time to take stock of where we are at this time, and think of what direction we should go in to continue this discussion productively. I think that it is a discussion worth continuing and I don’t think that you would have participated as long as you have unless you find it interesting as well.
· We spent a lot of time discussing whether there was any likely candidate in which identity could reside (not “does”, just “could”. I said that I would have to reconsider my position if a likely candidate could not be found. The candidate for this identity had to fit certain criteria: it had to be considerably more complex than a single atom; it had to remain permanent/unexchanged/”in it’s original” form, for the lifetime of the individual; and it had to reside in the human brain. I think that we can all agree that on the cellular level, the vast majority of brain cells – neurons- remain active and in contact for a lifetime. At the atomic level, I am satisfied that my original assumption about the permanence of neuronal n-DNA was correct. Two physicists and a neurologist have validated my assumption in that regard and I found no one outside of this forum that claims otherwise. This is good enough for me, but I can understand if it is not good enough for you. I did not make those cites official and I choose not to trounce on their anonymity. If you want to find information to the contrary, that is your prerogative, and I would be happy to review your findings.
I have my reasons for believing that if there is a vessel for identity, neuronal DNA makes a good candidate and I have shared some of those reasons with you. To recap: the propagation of DNA into the future appears to be the raison d’état of evolution. A prime directive of evolution is to protect the DNA of the individual. It does this in a number of morphological and physiological ways. There is no reason to believe that the evolution of consciousness should be any different. It has no cosmological significance, it is simply one more “thing” that evolution has developed in order to protect the DNA of a rather minor (quantitatively speaking) branch of life on earth. Consciousness is something that protects DNA in the individuals of some species. The effect is local and individual. If your opposable thumbs are hardwired on you, then so should be your consciousness.
If evolution believes that DNA is important then I think that evolution would choose DNA to be where identity resides. You have mentioned that the DNA in neurons is inactive and therefore could not be “the process” of consciousness, a very active enterprise. Think of the process of consciousness as being the protector of its identity. Your identity doesn’t have to be active, it simply has to be – not unlike me protecting my ID card.
I have even described a model of conscious identity (the 1,000,000 unique atom bonding model). While I don’t believe that model is reality incarnate, I would not be surprised if I am pretty close to the mark.
I have given good reasons why a hardwired identity should exist and how it could exist. I have just given you a real life pathological state that demonstrates that identity fades with the loss of matter. I have illustrated a working model. Have you provided me with as much substantiation for your position?
Precisely because dementia is associated with gradual loss or breakdown of function in the brain.