No, I categorically do not call you a liar. I think that you are mistaken, not mendacious, and that a little more perseverance on your part in asking yourself what you really mean by this curious phrase will make you realise your mistake.
Do dead brains have a POV? If not, why not? They’re the same atoms as when the brain lived (if death is recent).
Cognitive science says that it is in your memories, ie. those arrangements of cells/atoms in your brain just as the memory of a computer lies in the arrangement of magnetic domains in the hard drive.
So presumably it still had the POV when it wasn’t in your brain for those billions of years before your birth? That sounds like pansychism to me, which I and cognitive scientists in general consider utterly ludicrous.
Only that it is a completely unnecessary entity. Why bother keeping it at all, if setting it aside will bring you into full agreement with us both?
Sorry, but my eyes start to glaze over halfway through these rambling analogies; there is no difference between a system performing a process and an absolutely exactl
duplicate of that system performing an identical process; by definition there is no difference, because the duplicate is exact.
If consciousness is the totality of that system and process, then there is nothing to lose in the process of stopping it in one place and resuming it in another. Nothing at all.
But you still seem to be arguing that there is some entity that is responsible for consciousness that resides outside of the set of things described as ‘the system and the process it is performing’ - your ‘fundamental particle’ - yes, I have a problem with it; the problem is that its existence is pure imaginative speculation on your part.
Let’s be more precise: I built a strawman in order to avoid being suckered into a huge diversion (aberration, alteration, deflection, departure, detour, deviation, digression, divergence, red herring, stutter step) that would undoubtedly lead to another 2 pages of minutia that has no bearing on the argument at hand. Simplifying issues as best you can to substantiate your positions is the better way to go, trust me.
I want to see you recite all the plays of Shakespeare backwards, while chewing gum and skipping rope…
Unnecessary in whose eyes?
Obviously, I was being facetious when I said “one fundamental particle”. It would be more than one atom, and it would most likely be in the nuclear DNA. Why bother keeping it at all? Dunno. Sure, it doesn’t seem like something that I would bother keeping, and it probably doesn’t seem like something that you would bother keeping, either? So, in our eyes, it may seem like an “unnecessary” entity. But, we’re not the force that got the ball rolling in the first place, are we? I may not see any reason to keep a dollop of manure in my pocket; you may not see any reason to keep it in your pocket either. But, maybe someone…a gardner, perhaps…may find it important.
It doesn’t really matter if you or I think that it is necessary, or even stupid. For whatever reason, the driving force of evolution decided that it was important to propagate DNA (and in my opinion, it carries an identification card). So, there may very well be a few or many particles that remain unique that the “eye” of evolution “bothers keeping it at all”. Why? Who knows why? Why does it bother propagating DNA in the first place? Why is it important to push DNA into the future? What is the end game? If I knew why it is important to carry DNA into the future, then maybe I would know why a few particles are important. But, no one really knows, do they?
The reason that I did not want to spend so much time down this particular side street of the topic at large is because in the end, it comes down to faith in ones philosophy:
I believe that your identity is unique and cannot be shared. I believe that this identity is attached to or is something that is unable to be divided.
You believe otherwise.
We should all have guessed that the end of this argument would result in our holding on to our own beliefs. It is un-testable. And logic will only go so far so long as there are so many variables. I have my reasons for believing that everyone has a unique identity. There is no argument you can make that will alter my belief that there are certain constants in the universe, and a unique identity is one of them. If you could have convinced me that “nothing” remains constant in the human brain, you had a shot at making me reconsider my position. You should have anticipated that you would not be able to do so. I did anticipate that I would be unable to convince you that 1) a constant does exist in the brain AND 2) that that constant contains a unique identity. There is simply no way for me to logically convince you of those two things. That argument was not worth having.
Since I did anticipate this outcome, I, as you should recall, originally (and many times after) tried to attack this problem of multiple identities from a different angle: the angle of a perceived paradox. That is an argument that has a better chance of not ending in a stalemate. I would argue the position of why a paradox exists; you would argue the position of why a paradox does not exist. I’m still game for that.
So you appear to be absolutely convinced that thing entity exists, just completely unsure as to what it is. How are we supposed to take this seriously?
Above, you are responding to a post already a couple of days old. I have no idea why you didn’t simply reply back then. So, calm down. Allow yourself a good half hour, and read this whole thread again. Every post, and every point, and even as many of the links as ou can. Don’t skip over things in your haste to respond to the previous point. Just read it all, completely and carefully.
If you do this, I think you’ll see we’re all largely saying the same thing. We are all scientists here (or, at least, consider science to be a useful epistemology), and all seek some scientific explanation for our consciousness and sense of identity.
Now, this might ultimately require you to admit (even if only to yourself, not explicitly on this message board) that your intuition regarding this scenario was mistaken. This is no easy thing to do, and requires great courage. I have on many occasions on this board been forced to re-evaluate my position and change my mind (heck, when I arrived here I thought Oliver Stone’s “JFK” was a serious film!).
In fact, I changed my mind on precisely this issue here. I started off thinking as you do, and by carefully examining the assumptions that position was based on, came to realise that I was mistaken. Hope this helps.
Anyway, to address your other points…
All of your cells contain your DNA. We’re back to considering whether your teeth or hair have a Point Of View, which I consider ludicrous.
Actually, I believe your identity is unique because there is no way to replicate human memories in reality.
You build another strawman here. As I have said in excess of 10 times now, memories or arrangements are not nothing.
A paradox does not exist, because “your” identity is contingent on a unique string of memories encoded in the arrangement of your neuron-atoms.
I see it one of two ways: 1) Consciousness cannot be transferred to a duplicate 2) Consciousness can be transferred to a duplicate.
You have a Dell Computer. You have a CD-Rom titled “Consciousness” in your CD drive. The drive’s tray is stuck in the “in” position.
You have a Dell Computer and a Gateway computer. The drive tray is in working order and you put the CD-Rom in the Gateway. The Dell computer’s “sense of self” resides in the processor (or the hardrive, or the Windows OS, if your prefer). The Dell is conscious and feels like a Dell; the Gateway is conscious and feels like a Gateway.
But computers aren’t biological. They are things and they don’t exchange atoms over time. So, let’s make the computers more “biological”. 90% of the atoms in the computer will be exchanged with other like-atoms. A lower percentage of atoms exchange in the processor: perhaps only 80%. The atoms will be exchanged at different rates, but in 1 month, 90% of all original atoms will have been replaced.
Result: I believe that the Dell will still be in working order, and it will still feel like the same Dell.
Can I confess it to my Priest (if I were Catholic, that is)?
You seem quite definitive and unwavering about that. But I would still like to address the paradox thingy at some point in the near future.
I’m keeping an open mind in saying that even though I believe strongly that illogicality exists with the concept of 2 exact identities co-existing simultaneously, I’d like to explore it a little more and get from all of you who believe it not to be a paradox, your perspective on why you believe it not to be. One of the best ways to accomplish this will be for me to pose some perceived paradox questions and have them discussed. I’ll pose one soon (as soon as we can put the “identity thing” issue to bed for awhile)
Yes, yes…and, ah…yes. They all have a POV. They just don’t all have a “conscious” POV. As I have admitted before, I’m no physicist, but I believe “frame of reference: FOR” may be a more appropriate term to use for a non-conscious POV. And the same particles can be involved in more than one POV depending on the context. Example: 100 particles in a particular array may have a certain group POV (i.e. consciousness); the 100 particles also have separate ungrouped POV’s (unconscious). The loci of the ungrouped POV’s would be within each particle; the loci of the group POV would be within the spatial arrangement of the group.
Well, I’m not claiming that it exists only because it “could” exist (this would not be unlike my asking you to disprove my claim that there is a magical Easter Bunny that exists in an alternate universe…{although, there really is, you know}), and I’m not even saying that it exists because I necessarily “want” it to exist (having it not exist opens up many more interesting possibilities, not the least of which is immortality). I believe that it exists because it “has” to exist. I don’t believe that you can have 2 unlinked beings with the same identity in our universe. I believe that it breaks physical law. If you want to shake my belief the “thing entity”, the best way to do it will to argue against what I believe to be the paradox.
Like I said in a recent post, I don’t think it is productive to continue down this avenue of arguing about identity in terms of: a) does a physical constant exist, and b) whether it contains our unique identity. Or, at least it is putting the cart before the horse (disprove paradox first, then describe the mechanics). Discussing only the mechanics of the existence of a unique identity, in the end, may simply come down to faith…
…But, SM did (indirectly) pose an intriguing question with regard to DNA. So, I couldn’t resist having a go with that one:
The problem:
If we use DNA as the unchanging bonded physical continuum, it must be realized that the DNA in each cell/nuclei contains unique atoms – different in each cell, and from each cell. Therefore, you could take any similar atoms and arrange them in similar fashion. The result would be the same, and you could justifiably conclude that no unique identity could exist.
The solution:
Again, let me simplify and analogize (i.e. I know it doesn’t really happen this way).
*We are only concerned with the n-DNA within those cells (the bare minimum) that are necessary to sustain consciousness. We may disregard all other DNA in the body.
*We will disregard the cells and all biological processes and speak only about the nuclei. We need, let’s say, 1000 nuclei to initiate and maintain consciousness.
*Our DNA model will be viewed as a branching array of atoms. Each double helix contains 1000 unique atoms.
*The “process” of consciousness is an electrical current.
*The atoms are little metal balls.
Timeline:
Cheap prophylactic.
*You are conceived.
You develop.
The necessary 1000 nuclei are finally present and in proper array.
The “electrical current” of consciousness is turned on.
The current courses between all the nuclei and “imprints” on all 1,000,000 atoms.
“You” are born.
Result:
You have the “process” of consciousness bonding with the “thing” of consciousness forming a unique conscious being with its own identity. At this point, the thing and the process are singular and inseparable. Perhaps you can garner that same current and electrify another array of 1,000,000 similar atoms, but it will be a different set of 1,000,000 atoms. They will have a separate identity.
(On second thought, maybe I should be glad that you guy’s kept me on this track as long as you have…I’m starting to like the scenario I just described…maybe it has possibilities. It certainly seems to give me wiggle room out the reductio ad absurdum fundamental particle panpsychistic dilemma.)
But, I digress…
Anyway, here is my question: Could the “array of unique atoms” described in the above scenario (obviously with more meat and realism) be the vessel that contains our unique conscious identity? Not “is it”, or “should it”, but simply “could it”.
If you answer “no”, please provide me with your reason why. If you answer “yes”, then we can continue with the “is it” and “should it” questions.
‘Could’? Monkeys ‘could’ fly out of my arse, they just won’t, because there’s no reason for that to happen, but on some hypothetical other planet, it could be quite a common occurrence.
So yes, there’s probably some absurd way in which an array of unique atoms could constitute consciousness, on an imaginary planet where things just happen to work that way, but I would argue that there’s simply no reason to suspect that this could be how things work for mortal humans here on planet Earth.
If you precisely duplicate an apparatus and the process it performs, then you’ve got the same thing somewhere else; if you precisely duplicate me and my pattern of thoughts and memories, you’ve got another me. The paradox you’re grasping for simply doesn’t exist outside of your own imagination. I’m not even sure if it even exists there - certainly what you’ve been describing so far doesn’t actually sound like what could honestly be defined as a paradox at all, just a complex puzzle.
*<Me thinking> You mean I’m the only one who has monkeys flying out of his arse? I thought it was common knowledge that flying monkeys make good colonics…
*
Actually, there is a point to be made here: just because you don’t know the reason, doesn’t mean that it doesn’t happen. Someone recently brought that to my attention. I don’t remember who it was… :smack: oh, yes…I remember, now…
…it was you!
You have to understand the mind of that which puts something in motion (i.e. evolution) before you can understand all the reasons.
I have a good reason to believe that something like this must occur (to resolve a paradox). What is your good reason for believing that something like this does not occur?
I have not even explained the paradox yet (we’ve been arguing unique identity mechanics all this time), so how can you be so sure that it does not exist? We’re putting the cart before the horse again.I’ll keep an open mind, if you will too – it’s the scientific way.
Recap:
*I believe that a “unique identity” must exist in order to not violate physical law. You can get me to reconsider my position by explaining why it is not in violation. (I’ll elaborate on the paradox tomorrow, promise)
*You have just alluded to the fact that a “unique identity” could exist, but doesn’t. You should discuss the reasons that you believe that it does not exist (is it simply because it sounds bizarre, or is it for a deeper reason?). Then I will be able to discuss that point as well. <in the voice of Schwarzenneger> I’ll be back…
the Tibbinator
Not even sure what you mean by all this. Honestly, I think this entire argument would dissolve were you to read, learn and inwardly digest the principle of Occam’s Razor; i.e. don’t invent an unnecessarily complex explanation when a simple one is entirely sufficient.
You don’t need a good reason to not believe something. You keep trying to shift the burden of proof, but I’m afraid it rests squarely upon your shoulders; you’re the one arguing for all kinds of special phenomena and circumstances. When come back, bring evidence.
This all feels very familiar. I predict you will just come back with another rambling and tangentially relevant analogy. Forget it.
Unique identity exists in the real world right now because there is no real-world process capable of accurately duplicating it; it may be that no such process will ever exist, but that doesn’t change the fact of what’s happening.
We are beginning to repeat ourselves yet again. Once more unto the breech, and then I’m afraid I will have had quite enough. Please, listen.
OK, now ask yourself: What, really, makes a Dell a Dell, and could a Gateway become a Dell? It is not just the name on the box - that is rather like a human’s tattoo or clothing tag, and as easily transferable. One could point to the amount of RAM or the chip speed, or some other difference in hardware. But those items are just as easily transferable also. In fact, any computer can be made to simulate any other computer: this is not speculation as in our human case, but a scientific thesis as demonstrably true as any other.
So, since a Gateway could become a Dell via appropriate upgrades, let us ask: What identifies your Dell as being distinct from my Dell? They both came off the same conveyor belt, and any faulty part could be replaced by an identical part (ie. an instant 100% atom exchange rather than a 90% exchange over whatever time period).
The answer is not the hardware, nor any silicon atom in the chip. What distinguishes your computer from mine is the memories stored in your computer: the arrangement of magnetic domains or microswitches in the chips and drives. If I copied your entire computer memory onto a different computer straight off the conveyor belt, you would not be able to tell (save for the odd ‘scar’ or ‘tattoo’ perhaps - the equivalent of the inky thumb identifier). Whatever program you were running, from a game of chess to a full 3-D Doom lifetime, could continue, unaffected, on the other hardware.
You see, this makes me doubt whether you bother to read any of the links I provide. Just to set my mind at rest, could you tell me what the number of the post was on which I had clearly fundamentally changed my mind in the “Schwarzenegger Continuation of Consciousness” thread?
Again, listen to what I am saying and what I’m not. I have stated several times that two exactly identical consciousnesses cannot exist, since the moment they become conscious again they will be forming new, distinct memories from different locations in space. The only time they could be said to be identical was when their memories were identical and no new sensory input was causing new memory formation, ie. immediately after unconscious duplication.
I am a physicst, and you are using Frame of Reference completely inappropriately. You seem to be just talking about their location. Yes, every particle has a location in spacetime (let’s not introduce QM complications here) - that’s what we’re telling you.
I’m sorry, but this is just gibberish unless you are suddenly agreeing with us that the temporal arrangement is what distinguishes a “conscious” brain from a “dead” one.
We have, several times. I will ask again: if I start a game of chess on some pieces, then cross the Atlantic and continue the game on a different set of pieces with you, has something crossed the Atlantic? If so, could you describe what it was which crossed the Atlantic, and why human consciousness is different? (Remember that, as in the case of the laser spot on the moon, arrangements might seem to violate physical laws but actually don’t).
But even in DNA, atoms are exchanged: that is essentially the mechanism for aging in the first place! So yet another analogy of yours falls to basic life science.
But your simplifications and analogies are just plain wrong and misleading. I might as well say “let us analogise the Earth as a flat disc”.
Let me put the question back to you: Could the array of exchangeable atoms be the arrangement which yields our conscious identity? Why do you think that impossible?
I have told you time and again why there is no such thing as “unique” atoms: since they are identical, then two atoms can swap places and the temporal process continue unaffected. Now, please provide me with your reason why “your” identity could not be a unique string of memories encoded in the arrangement of your neuron-atoms. Note that I have also explained numerous times why temporal arrangements like this don’t violate physical laws, even though they might appear to.
Imagine a googolplex of Tibbycats spread throughout the universe. No matter where you went or where you turned, there I would be. Resistance from Tibby is futile. All of “me’s” would hound you with inane SD-type questions and poke you until you answered, forever. Can you imagine such a world? <me thinking>
All right, granted, it would be a very good world – an ideal world, actually. But, let’s continue…
The “only time they could be said to be identical was when their memories were identical and no new sensory input was causing new memory formation”. In other words, they have the same past. For all intent and purpose, they were identical people…in the past. I never argued that point. It’s a given. In the “mitosis” and “black socks” experiment, however, we are not talking about their past, we are talking about their future. And we are talking about the future only from the perspective of the original.
You will most likely point out that ones future is an abstract illusion, or that it could go in any number of directions, or that it is unbound to a physical body because there is no physical permanence or whatever other spin you want to put on it. But, let’s look at it in practical terms:
When I go to bed, I have a high degree of confidence that “I” will wake up in the same bed that I went to sleep in (I would say same body, but then we will go down that “it’s not the same body” road again). I have a very low degree of confidence that I will wake up somewhere else. If someone were to make the following offer to “me” before going to sleep: “I will give you 1-$ million when you wake up”, I would be very happy. I would be happy because I feel that “I” have a future in that person who will wake up in my bed and that money will be mine. If the person who wakes up in my bed bumped his head during the night and lost his past memories, I would still feel confident that “I”(granted, an altered “I”) would be receiving the money in the morning, not someone else. If they were to offer the money to my duplicate, I would be somewhat happy that someone who looked like me and remembers things as I do would be getting money, but I would not think that it would be me.
If I were to answer the “mitosis” and “black socks” questions the way that you did, I would have to believe that I had a future in the duplicate (s). I have no interest in the past (what’s done is done). My only goal is that “I” want to survive into the future.
Question: Do you agree that you must believe that you will have a future in the duplicate for you to have answered the way that you did?
In order to have a future with the duplicate(s), I believe that one of the following must apply:
Your future will be in one duplicate.
Your future will be in “original you + duplicate(s)”, or in “multiple duplicates”. In other words: you will have more than one future.
If you chose #1 above, then how could you feel you have no future in your original body if you remain alive after duplication?
If you chose #2 above, then I believe one of the following must apply (if even for an instant):
a) Some form of consciousness sharing (a neural network).
b) Alternating consciousness. (?)
Question: If you believe a) or b) above, please describe the mechanics.
Let’s take a more extreme example for better clarification. We agree that in both the “mitosis”, and “black socks” experiments, the duplicate(s) will have completely unique particles from each other and from the original. There really is nothing special about the mode of duplication. There should be no reason why the duplication process could not take place at a distance. The result will be the same. (Agree or disagree?)
Example:
The Distance Duplicator (DD): This will assemble you by recipe – Take 10 quintillion “up” quarks, 15 septillion “strange” quarks, 5 quadrillion bosons…point them and spin them in the same direction as the original…put it in the oven for 35 minutes…, and out pops your duplicate.
Let’s put the DD on a habitable planet around a star 100 light-years away. (Adjust clocks for jet lag time dilation ).
10:00 am: You are walking down the street in London.
10:01am: Your duplicate is assembled on planet Penis (brother planet to Venus).
10:11am: An alien monster kills and eats your duplicate.
Questions:
Were you (on Earth) aware of anything unusual, or different occurring in between 10:01 and 10:11?
Besides the disconcerting feeling of finding himself at one moment walking down a London street and the next being chased by a hungry space alien, would your duplicate feel any effect from you on Earth?
Let’s analyze the Duplicate: He is created at 10:01am on an alien planet. His future begins with a monster chasing him. The last thing that he remembers is walking down the street in London. Was he physically in London 1 minute ago? No, he was not assembled yet. The person whom he remembers as himself before 10:01 was in a different physical body. He has an illusionary past and a real, but unique future.
Let’s analyze you on Earth.
You are walking down the street at 10:00. At 10:01 you feel or experience nothing out of the ordinary. At 10:11 you feel or experience nothing out of the ordinary. Your duplicate was born and died with absolutely no effect on you; while your duplicate was alive, you had no effect on him. If you died at 10:02, would you feel instantly transported onto the alien planet, the same way that your duplicate felt transported 1 minute earlier?
You are walking down the street at 10:00. At 10:01 you feel or experience something. What is it? Are you sharing consciousness with your duplicate? Is this some form of neural network? If so, where is the locus of the network, in between the two planets? A big part of consciousness is perception of ones environment. Do you see, hear, smell, taste or feel anything from the alien planet?
If the choice is #2: While you are both alive, you each have two simultaneous futures and/or a shared consciousness in real time (at least for, in your words immediately after unconscious duplication). What is the mode of information exchange/transmission? What is the physical link that will allow you to exchange information instantaneously 100 light-years apart? Hyper-lightspeed tachyons?
If the choice is #1: You have two beings with absolutely no effect on each other. You have no future in the duplicate. You would not say “yes” to the mitosis or “black socks” experiment. As far as you on Earth are concerned, your duplicate may as well be the Easter Bunny.
There were 6 direct questions in my last post, TibbyCat. I will answer all the questions in your post, but I’ll expect answers to mine which are as full as mine to yours.
[quote=TibbyCat]
Do you agree that you must believe that you will have a future in the duplicate for you to have answered the way that you did?
[/quote}Yes. I believe I equally have a future in both of the individuals who wake up with the same memories, ie. option #2.
You believe incorrectly: (a) or (b) is a false dilemma. The third option is that the number of separate consciousnesses has been increased, both of which are equally “you”.
Agree.
No. The consciousnesses are separate (but both equally “you”, and let’s ignore whether the actual minute comprising the duplication process “feels weird” for either version).
Yes, because “he” is his memories, ie. the arrangement of atoms, not the atoms themselves.
Irrelevant, IMO.
Then both versions have an illusionary past.
I disagree that the duplicate “felt transported”. His consciousness continued from his memories - that’s all there is to it.
No - my choice is #1, but with the clarification above.
Yet again, consider the chess game and the laser spot on the moon, and the falling dominoes. No object is “travelling”. An arrangement is initiated elsewhere.
Agree.
Disagree. “My” future is in both arrangements, just as different endgames of the chess game can continue from the same halfway point.
Yes I would, because the duplicate is equally “me” despite being different atoms, just as my arrangement 3 years ago was equally “me” despite being different atoms.
Now, my 6 answers in full, if you please.
Don’t have time to answer all at once, one at a time will have to do. I’m not sure if you consider this one of the “big 6”, but it seems important to you…
This is simply the same tired scenario with new clothes.
My Point: It is fully dependant on: through whose eyes you are speaking?.
Through your eyes (POV)? : You are playing chess in Cardiff. At different points in time, the chess pieces have different arrangements. We will equate the temporal arrangement of pieces to the process of consciousness. Now you leave those chess pieces behind, travel to Florida, open my chess set, arrange the pieces exactly as they were in Cardiff, and continue to play. Is there any difference in the game (process of consciousness) through your eyes? No. No difference whatsoever.
Through the eyes of Mange and all other observers?: Ditto. No difference whatsoever.
Through the eyes of the king’s rook on the set you left in Cardiff?: It makes all the difference in the world. He is no longer playing the game. He is no longer conscious(not that he ever was, but you get the point).
Through the eyes of the queens bishop in Florida?: Yes, he found himself suddenly in the middle of a game in process.
If I were any chess piece in Cardiff, I would feel that I have no future in Florida. The game goes on, but without me. This is simply another example of confusing what I call the “generic process of consciousness” with “identity”. The “game” is consciousness. The “game pieces” are separate identities. In reality, do I believe that there is a “generic process of consciousness” and that it is separate from “identity”? No, I believe that there is only “consciousness” (identity is included). They can not be separated, and it can’t be duplicated.
The proper question is: an arrangement of what? To you it is an arrangement of non-permanent elements. To me it is an arrangement of a set of at least partially permanent elements (and only for the life of the conscious organism, not necessarily for all of eternity…big distinction there). I have illustrated a model in post #211 (the imprinted array of 1,000,000 atoms). I can’t say it any better than that. Well, I could, but I don’t want to.
