No, they would both claim to be Bob and if they might well both claim that the other one was an impostor. Or they might well both understand that the other one was another bifurcation of the same original personality; it depends on whether they understood the situation.
This is called “building a strawman”, ie. misquoting or misrepresenting an opponent in order to find a position you can argue with because your having trouble with the genuine one you can’t.
I want to see you describe the atom exchange takes place at the lung surface, and the difference between life and death which depend not on the atoms themselves but their arrangement. I answered your question. Please answer mine.
The debate is fun and I’d like to continue, but, I’ve got to go for awhile. Since you are “kinda” saying that your position is more counterintuitive than mine, more of the burden of proof should lie on your shoulders. I will backtrack, and try to answer more of your questions from prior posts. I sense that there is a major contradiction that can be demonstated from some of your prior posts as well. I’m going to try to locate those…but it may take some time. It would be really good to get some outside scientific perspective on this as well.
Let’s at least hear from some other people in the meantime. We three are hogging the show.
Only in the sense that the roundness of the world was initially counterintuitive. That you are different atoms from years ago is as true as the roundness of the world. Any scientist would say so.
<crickets chirping>
According to Tom Stoppard’s “Jumpers”, Wittgenstein once asked a colleague why people used to believe that sun went round the earth. His colleague replied, “Because that’s what it looks like.” Said Wittgenstein, “But what would it look like if it looked like the earth were going round the sun?” In other words, just because something is counterintuitive doesn’t mean it isn’t true.
If you want my take on it, Mangetout and SentientMeat are being more than patient in the face of a)your inability/unwillingness to understand their argument; b) your disregarding of the gulf between your theories and basic physics and biology; and c) your belief that “that’s weird” is equivalent to “that’s wrong”.
In the light of c), I must admit that I find your assertion that there are fundamental particles that lurk within me, unaffected by the constant flow of new particles that pass through me daily, which never change in any circumstances at all ever, to be frankly weirder than a sockful of puppets at a “Van Gogh for President of New Atlantis” rally. Does that, by itself, make your argument wrong?
…Wow, that’s profound. Let me put down my New Age Weekly and write that down. It doesn’t mean that it’s necessarily true either, dingleberry. (There are some people that you actually want on the opposing side). In sum total I would bet heavily that most counterintuitive propositions throughout history have turned out to indeed be false. If you hear hoof beats, think horses, not zebras (unless your in Africa). The ones that end up being true simply make CNN. Reviewing past posts on this thread, I’ve noticed a lot of insults lobbed my way. Apparently, I’m a pretty dense fellow. But, as a general rule, I’ve found that the people who call me dense are denser than me. I, on the other hand, being the thick skinned, good natured American that I am, don’t make disparaging remarks about anyone…unless I follow it with an emoticon.
Example: “You are a gaggle of wacky limeys with loony ideas and funny teeth”. 
**
Note that the judicious use of the smile emoticon turned what normally could be considered an insult into a good-natured ribbing that we can all appreciate. So, I don’t mind all your insults, but do try to use the smiley-faces more.
Tell you what, call my secretary and leave it as a memo. She’ll file it in the appropriate place
<flush>
Ok, back to business. During the cell/atom/particle sidestep of this debate, let me try to recapitulate what I (the dense American) feel is the crux of the matter. I don’t want to be accused of not comprehending your side of the argument.
Your Position: Consciousness and POV (frame of reference/feeling of self/whatever you want to refer to is as) are one in the same and cannot be separated. It can simply be referred to as “consciousness”. Consciousnesses may be transferred to duplicates. Consciousness is not “hardwired” to matter. Rational for this position: Since most or all of the atoms are replaced in the brain, consciousness cannot be hardwired, and therefore may be transferred to non-original cells/brains.
My position: I believe that there is a cohesive physical bond of cells that exists and continues to exist in the aging brain. The POV is “hardwired” to this mass and cannot exist without it. If “consciousness” is transferable (which I very much doubt), then POV must be able to be separated from what we refer to as consciousness, because POV is not transferable. If (a big if) a duplicate can acquire consciousness, he must develop his own separate POV. Rational for position: I believe that the physical link must be broken during the process of duplication. I don’t believe that it is necessary to have all the original “parts” (Particles/atoms/cells) in order to maintain a hardwired POV, so long as the original cohesive bond of cells continues. I also believe that you may not have two entities with the same POV without breaking laws of physics (but I’m not sure about that, I’m not a physicist).
Again, if I have misstated your position, please enlighten me.
**As I’ve stated earlier I’m 50% English so don’t accuse me of anglophobia. (We do try to keep mum away from the public as much as possible, though).
I thought being able to separate mind/“self awareness” from the body was more of a dualistic position. Though I still haven’t had a chance to research physicalism, my assumption was that it is or is similar to materialism. If so, wouldn’t the physicalism/materialism view run contrary to dualism? Wouldn’t the concept of making multiple duplicates with the same “sense of I” be a dualistic and anti-physicalism position? I’m not up on such matters, but it just seemed ironic to me.
I don’t really know what percentage of original atoms remain in the brain after those exchanged during everyday metabolism/food/waste…I never claimed to know (how atoms got tied up with “biology”, I don’t know), and I don’t really care. It’s not particularly essential to my argument, so it’s not worth my time to look up. My bet?: somewhere between none and most). I am not making the claim that the only valid physical bond must be with the atoms, you are. The cells work just fine with me. If you know the exact percentage and it would make you happy, tell me…maybe the question will come up in Trivial Pursuit someday (I’ll even give you credit). If you tell me that no original atoms remain, then I would appreciate to see the cite.
This entire discussion offshoot was bandied about far too long, in my opinion. If you recall, I took responsibility for getting too “fundamental” with the particles and recommended that we go back up to the cellular level- a more agreeable level. At that level it is common knowledge that most of the cells remain for the life of the brain. That is all that is important for this part of the argument. Most of the cells of the brain stay in a cohesive physical bond. It doesn’t matter that they respire, metabolize, change shape or engage in any other type of activity: most remain and those that do, stay in constant contact with each other.
The whole tiny purpose of this argument step was to make one point: a cohesive physical bond exists large enough to contain a persons “awareness of self”, the process of consciousness, memories, motor/sensory neurons, cognition etc.
The duplicate would have the same cohesive physical bond in his brain too. But the point is: the physical bond would be broken between the original and the duplicate during the process of duplication.
Lets look at the brain issue from another angle. Instead of concentrating on what is different about it over time, what does it have in common over time? Physical cohesiveness. All of the processes of the brain are kept within and between the cells of the brain. Over time some of the cells change and some die. The ones that die no longer participate in the processes of the brain. The ones that remain stay in physical contact with the other living brain cells. Certainly, being composed of living cells, some matter comes and some goes. But, that does not break the physical bond that exists through time with the living and functioning cells.
How is this fundamentally different than any other closed system in your body? You name it, there are independent biological processes going on all over your body and so long as the integrity of the tissue is maintained, they remain continuous and independent processes (nit-pick alert: Of course they are not totally independent since they serve the greater good of the body). And nearly all of these other systems are contained in and amongst tissues that regenerate cells at a much greater rate than that of the brain. HCL is kept within the GI track unless the integrity of the stomach or duodenum is compromised. Vitreous humor is kept in the confines of the eye unless it is compromised. Bone marrow is kept within the confines of the bone unless it is compromised. The tissues change, but the processes that take place within the tissue continues. Do we have to discuss the haversion canal and osteocytes and osteoclasts and osteoblasts, etc. in order to comprehend that the living breathing bone contains marrow? Is it too hard to grasp that the process of blood circulation continues its job of supplying nourishment to tissues pretty well unless something like an aneurysm blows out the integrity of the vessel wall? I think that there is an obvious reason that the majority of cells of the brain remain relatively unchanged compared to the fast turnover of cells in say, the alimentary canal: because the processes of the mind are admittedly much more complicated than the processes of digestion. Try to duplicate your digestive system and your going to find it nearly impossible; try to duplicate your digestive system so that they you have two originals and you will find it impossible.
I don’t think anyone was actually claiming that it does make it true, only that the counterintuitive nature of something cannot be used as a definitive criterion in deciding to dismiss it as untrue, and yet that’s what you have been doing.
I think we should simplify things a bit. Do you agree that consciousness is entirely a product of the configuration of the physical brain, including its electrochemical state etc, down to to as much detail as is necessary? Or are you arguing that consciousness requires something else in addition?
I believe that consciousness is fully contained within the brain matter
Sorry, the wife is calling for dinner…
I’ll respond to any posts later on.
Cheers for now.
OK, now do you accept that any given brain state could be described as being a pure product of:
-The immediately preceding brain state (including all electrochemical and configurational properties)
-Plus the sum of any external stimuli to which the brain is subjected.
That is to say, do you accept that for any state that the brain is in, it got there as a purely natural result of what happened on the way.
?
But this is demonstrably false.
Here is the crucial question: What are cells made of?
And what are cells made of?
I have repeatedly said that some residual atoms might well remain. My point was that they could be exchanged just like all the rest without affecting your consciousness, just as you could keep the same hairstyle over time even though it’s different hair.
OK, let’s stop for a moment.
I think we have found the key phrase here: “cohesive physical bond”. Now, indulge me for a moment. Just try replacing this phrase with arrangement: Most of the cells of the brain stay in an arrangement. This is actually the position of both myself, Mange and most of the cognitive scientific community. If you could just divest yourself of this “cohesive physical bond” gobbledegook, which you simply made up from nowhere somewhere late on in page 3, and realise that by reaching for such ill-chosen words you are really trying to describe precisely what we’ve been telling you for four pages, you might be surprised to learn that you actually agree with us. Let’s continue, using the same substitution:
The duplicate would have the same arrangement in his brain too.
Instead of concentrating on what is different about it over time, what does it have in common over time? Its arrangement.
But, that does not change the arrangement that exists through time of the living and functioning cells (which are continuously regenerated).
EXACTLY!
TibbyCat, examine the phrase “cohesive physical link” and ask yourself preceisely what you mean by it. Clearly, it cannot refer to the electromagnetic forces between cells, since they are made of atoms and the atoms change. In fact, the crucial nub of our discussion just as much relates to a single cell as an entire human multicellular organism. The “cell” is an arrangement of atoms. The cell looks like it remains over the years, but it may be completely different atoms within a short time. The only constant over time is the arrangement.
Do, please, think about it. You might hopefully come to realise that we were all actually in agreement on page 1 several days ago, but you didn’t quite know the words with which to describe your position accurately.
Incidentally, TibbyCat, would you step into the Star Trek transporter?
Lets say we have a single human brain that exists in a series of states, called:
A>B>C>D>E>F
Each of these states is derived from the previous state, plus or minus external stimuli
Lets also suppose we have the technology to freeze time at State ‘C’ and create a precise duplicate of the entire human; lets also suppose that we are able to subject the duplicate to precisely the same external stimuli as the original would have experienced.
The duplicate will start in state ‘C’ and progress through states D>E>F
How is it that the consciousness experiencing state ‘F’ is different in either case? In both cases, each state was derived from the previous one, plus or minus external stimuli; in both cases, the consciouness is that state.
I think TibbyCat is trying to argue that, for the duplicate, state D is not derived from any previous state, but this is false - because it is derived from state C, by virtue of the precise duplication process.
-In either case, state of consciousness ‘C’ dies - in the sense that, before the time we reach state ‘F’, it no longer exists, except as represented by memory.
The entire argument appears to hinge on the ‘only a copy’ notion, but if the process of duplication is absolutely and scrupulously precise, then the notion of ‘only a copy’ becomes a totally meaningless one.
Your stay, here, will be more enjoyable if you keep in mind that name-calling (even cutesy names) is not permitted in this Forum and that adding emoticons does not mitigate any transgression of the rules.
[ /Moderator Mode ]
Mangtout you’re preaching to the choir, my friend. Remember, I wrote the OP in the first place. I’m the one who proposed that the “splones” or duplicates could theoretically be conscious. I’m not an old poop who believes that the universe is purely mechanical and concrete. The universe is a weird place and we don’t know a whole lot about it. The brain is a weird place and we don’t know a whole lot about that either. I’ve contemplated the abstractness of human thought and consciousness and I agree that it is, for the most part, merely and illusion. Your mind takes a hodge-podge of disjointed sensory input and like separate frames in a movie, makes sense of it all and makes it seem to flow in forward time. If your brain was not such a good illusionist, I’m sure we would all go mad in a matter of minutes. I’m aware of the stop and go nature of consciousness. Did you know that sitting frogs are only conscious when their eyes perceive motion (why waste energy when no flies are around). You can probably continue on the track that you are on for a long time and in the end, I’ll probably say that I agree with 95% of what you say. But, I can say that right now and save you the trouble. Now, that does not mean that I don’t want to hear what you have to say, because I do. I would like to learn new perspectives on what I already agree with. As a matter of fact, it would be great if we had some people in here who did view the mind less abstractly…I would most likely be on your side arguing against them. I guess what I am saying is that I recommend you present your position to the audience at large (I’m sure there are hordes lurching about) rather than as an argument against me, because I agree with most of it…but not all of it.
Now, as for that other 5%: that you can argue with me about. Really, the only thing that I think you and SM (from now on you guys are M and SM) differ with me on, relative to this scenario, is the POV. It makes sense to me to think of consciousness as a generic process and POV as an object. POV and consciousness may be inseparable (in which case duplicates would not gain consciousness), or they may be separable (in which case duplicates could gain consciousness). I have already stated that I believe a cohesive physical bond of cells is all that is needed to contain all the processes and functions of the mind. SM keeps calling me a liar for calling cells in contact a “physical bond”. His contention being that because the cells “repair” themselves with new atoms over time, no physical bond can exist with the cells. But that is simply his/your interpretation of physical bond-dependant on what level you want to consider. In my opinion the processes of the mind can be contained within the physical bond of the brain. In your opinion, the processes of the mind can only be contained at the atomic level. Fine…difference of opinion. But, let’s separate the processes from the identity. Processes of the mind: there is a lot going on in that respect: thought, emotions, motor/sensory input etc. A lot of real estate is needed for all that commotion. But what about that which is needed solely for the feeling of self (POV)? Like I said, I believe that POV can be thought of as a thing, as opposed to a process, therefore not very much real estate is needed for it. Maybe it would be better for you to think of POV as being your identification card. Where exactly does it reside? As far as I know, no one knows yet. Maybe it is spread out throughout the entire volume of brain cells, but I doubt it…it doesn’t need to be. In theory, it could simply be one single atom. One “identification card” atom that no one else can have or share. If I were to venture a guess, this POV “thing” is within the DNA of certain or all cells of the conscious brain.
Like I said, your POV can be thought of as a thing. An identity. Think of the generic process of consciousness as being the protector of that identity. The process is big, the identity can be very tiny (like a mouse in a factory).
Think of a little mouse inside of a big factory. The factory functions to produce everything that the mouse needs. The factory is the mind; the mouse is the POV. You can move a new mouse into the factory but you can’t have more than one mouse in the factory at any one time.
It doesn’t even have to be “active”, it could be a dead mouse.
Why is DNA a good contender for identity?
In my opinion, if biological evolution can be thought of as having any sort of driving purpose, it is for the continuation of an individual’s DNA. It goes through an awful lot of trouble to protect and propagate it. It has developed many morphological variations with which to carry and protect it. In the case of an elephant, evolution came up with a large vessel with which to carry the nuclear DNA. But what is more important, the vessel or the cargo?
Your identity (your P.O.V, F.O.R, etc.) does not have to be active, it just has to be. It is what makes “you” you. The processes of the mind, admittedly, need more room.
So, if you want me to take my position to the extreme, I’ll say this:
There is one fundamental particle in your brain that is your identity. Maybe you can share the processes of your mind, but you can’t share that particle. Any problem with that?
Depends on who’s in the reassembly room when I get there: Julia Roberts: yes; Michael Jackson: no.