All except this special ‘link’ part, which only exists in your fond of imaginations.
If the organism splits into two identical copies, then both copies have the link, or neither have it, or, more likely, it is a meaningless concept
I think that we’re spending too much time on the “link” problem. We can always come back to it later. Or, perhaps we can solicit some feedback from others. For now, let’s just agree to disagree on the “links”.
On to new business: SentientMeat mentioned the “instant duplicator” in his ink thumb experiment way back when, so lets go with that and retire the mitosis concept for awhile.
**Same machine, new scenario: **
You are wearing nothing but a pair of rayon socks. You are told that when you walk into the Instant Duplicator room you will have three duplicates made. The machine does not copy rayon, so the duplicates will be naked, but numbered 1,2 and 3. Each of the duplicates will be given a million dollars. Three of the four people in the room must be terminated while in the room. You are asked which one you want to come out of the room: “socks”, 1,2 or 3? Which one do you choose, and why?
This is just an appeal to emotion, which we have already admitted does not yield rational answers. This simply isn’t a useful question.
Or to put it another way, you could have asked me whether I’d be comfortable to eat insects, but my immediate answer would not tell you anything at all about their nutritional value.
I agree that when discussing killing, emotions are involved. But, I still think that this is a useful question. So, in order to remove emotion from the equation, let me answer the question and you can simply analyze my response as unemotionally as you can.
Obviously, I would refuse to go into the Duplicating Machine in the first place on moral grounds (to prevent three innocents from being killed), but we will assume that I am forced to do so.
If I were the person in the socks being asked which person (“socks”, 1,2 or 3) I would like to have come out of the room after duplication, my reply would be, “socks”. My reasoning could be summarized by my adding, “why should I die just so that 3 other people can get rich.”
Is my logic faulty?
It’s not that your logic is faulty, it’s that you’re not using logic, you’re using emotional value-based decisions.
Now, would you like some fried silkworm pupae? Why not, exactly?
TibbyCat, you are NOT LISTENING. You are dragging us all over the place with analogy after analogy without addressing the crucial issue: You are just plain wrong about what your body was made of a few years ago. You are as different to that 2003 body as the splone is to you now. The overwhelming majority of the stuff you were made of in 2003 has dispersed in he environment: not 51% (which is likely achieved within weeks), not even 75%, but well over 99%, with that <1% comprising residual atoms in long-lived cells like ova, and in stuff like tooth enamel. Those 2003 atoms were in physical contact, but they’re not anymore. They were circulated and expelled from the body by basic biological processes which you (unconvincingly) say you know something about. If you put a body in space and the atoms cannot be replaced, the body dies precisely because the atoms are not replaced. And I’m glad you finally agree that the atom/quark/lepton/superstring bifurcation is irrelevant: whatever an atom is made of, the entire thing exits your body sooner or later.
The rayon socks scenario is irrelevant. The “cohesive physical bond” is just false. The only constant over time is the configuration of the matter, be it cells, atoms, strings, or whatever. The matter itself changes over the years. If you agree with this, we can move on. If you do not, I’m afraid you are just demonstrably incorrect.
Now, there is debate about whether the atoms of the memory cells in the brain ever leave the body. That tiny percentage might indeed stay put for your entire lifetime. However, even in this case, then if you accept that memories in a silicon computer can be copied perfectly, then memories in a biological computer surely could also given the “magic” technology of the duplicator. And if two brains contain the same memories, the original consciousness could be said to be “transferred” just as the game of chess could be transferred between boards.
If I may ask you a direct question: What is the difference between a living brain and a dead one? After all, at the moment of death they are both the same atoms.
Quite the wiggly worms aren’t you!
For two seemingly intelligent people to think that there is no difference (from the perspective of the original) between the original and a duplicate is preposterous, its inconceivable…well, it’s paradoxical.
Then it hit me. I know that Mangetout is British and I assume that SentientMeat is as well. This is nothing more than absurd British humor. You are yanking my chain and trying to make me look foolish by defending an obviously correct position against an absurd one. I’m only half British, so it took me a little longer to see the humor. Mange and Sentient are lifting a couple of pints in a pub in England laughing about yanking a yanks chain.
If that’s not the case…let me continue…
Appeal to pity now, is it?
I’m not yanking your chain (I’m not convinced that the opposite is not true though); you’re not listening; you’re arguing from emotion and calling it logic, you’re ignoring basic facts of biology and you’re repeatedly misrepresenting and distorting the statements made by Sentient and myself.
I think it’s actually you that is not taking this seriously - this particular topic is one of my favourites and for SentientMeat, it’s practically his hobbyhorse.
Please would you be kind enough to demonstrate that you at least understand the position that we have been arguing; State mine or Sentient’s case as accurately and concisely as you can (say, less than three sentences), just to reassure everyone you are actually listening.
No, it isn’t. Honestly, it isn’t. When I say I’m becoming tired of repeating myself, I’m not joking.
The rayon socks scenario is the most relevant question posted in a long time. It cuts to the chase as to what we are arguing about. If you deny this, then you obviously have realized that your position is patently wrong and you are attempting to backtrack. I can explain why you were duped into believing your position was correct in a post or two down the road. I won’t take the same low road to name calling as you have, though you have given me plenty of ammunition. The reason this is taking 10X longer than it should is because I answer your questions directly and you answer mine indirectly.
You think the rayon sock scenerio is irrelevent, then explain why it is so. Better yet, if you do me any favor at all…just answer the question even if it is, in your mind, irrelevent. If you think that I have misunderstood your position, answering that question will clarify it for me. Answer that question and I’ll answer any that you may have…
Your position is that you believe that “you” will have a future in your duplicate.
I will continue…
OK, perhaps a little less concise than this?
1, with the other three killed, so that I have £1M and no socially inconvenient identical twins running around. Because the configuration is important, not the particular atoms which change over the years anyway.
As I have asked directly, what happens at the lung surface and wha is the difference between living and dead tissue given that the atoms in both remain the same ones?
Let me say it another way for clarification.
You have a sense of self, a feeling of “me”. I’ve been using the term POV (point of view). You could probably use other terms to mean the same thing (frame of reference, a sense of self…whatever). I will use POV because it is easy to type.
You believe that your duplicate will inherit your POV. You think that you will feel “carried on” in your duplicate in some way that you would not feel carried on in, say, your identical twin.
No, I repeat, it isn’t relevant because it is an appeal to emotion and fear; neither of which are particularly good methods of determining fact in this case. As I have said, my reluctance to step into the duplicator (no matter what is supposed to be coming out) is not any kind of reliable indicator of anything at all about consciousness; any more than my visceral reluctance to eat insects is a reliable indicator of their nutritional content.
I can’t believe you’re saying this; we have gone to great lengths to explain ourselves, over and over; you, on the other hand, have been evasive and have speculated wildly and wilfully ignored plain fact.
That is an irrelevent question. It’s nothing more than a red herring. I’ll answer it later if you want when I have a chance to also include the reason why it is irrelevent.
Thank you for answering the question, finally (feels like pulling teeth at times). I do indeed understand your position as I always thought that I did. Can I take it that you understand my position from the way I answered the same question?
May I assume that you believe that (with regard to the topic at hand) there is a difference between:
- You and your duplicate
- You and your identical twin
So far as your POV (sense of self, feeling of being “me”…etc)?
I answered your question even though I thought it irrelevant. Please extend the same courtesy to me. Your answers should make some reference to exchange of atoms and to the arrangement of those atoms if you do indeed understand basic biology.
Yes, and I explained why your position is based on a false premise (ie. that more than half of your atoms remain in your body for your lifespan.)
No, because my identical twin has different memories, starting from the difference in that he was born minutes before or after me and occupied a different point in space throughout childhood. The duplicate has exactly the same memories as me, and therefore I continue as him.
Sorry, to clarify, yes I believe there is a fundamental difference between the duplicate and the natural identical twin in terms of “POV” (whatever that is).