We’ve had this debate before. Specific cites from notable sources were provided to disprove your assertion. You were then asked to provide cites to support your assertion. All you did was link to some extremely sketchy Youtube/video channels, which people picked apart to prove to you that they were sketchy. You did not provide any specific cites from these channels, you just linked to them, as though we were going to spend hundreds or thousands of hours trawling through them to find the bits that supported your assertion.
You’re a fucking idiot with a superiority complex.
Have you heard of the Dunning-Kruger effect? Because that’s you.
Read about it and gain some insight into yourself:
Hey dumbass, you’re not being nitpicked for ‘using the shorthand most understand’ whatever that means. What’s being pointed out is your shifting opinion of Wagner, if it is integrated into the Russian military (ha!), what the Russian government and society think about Prigozhin, how many of the higher command in Wagner were actually backing the Wagner ‘march for justice’, if Prigozhin was a patsy, if Wagner was the urban warfare specialists of the Russians, or if they are dumb asses who might become a more respectable force now that Prigozhin is gone (here’s a clue for you: they were the most competent force Russia had) or if the rot is too deep, etc. etc… Your statements regarding these issues are so all over the place, it’s almost like you’re just repeating the Kremlin line of the day about them and acting as if prior statements by the Kremlin and you never existed.
It’s almost like - dare I say it - you’re a Kremlin shill. Great, now I’ve got to get it through your thick skull that that doesn’t mean I’m literally saying your being paid by a Russian bot farm. If you are they definitely aren’t getting their money’s worth regardless of how much they are paying you, even if you’re doing it for free.
Here’s some more evidence I bring to the debate, which I made a few days ago for the other thread. It shows the previous month’s Russian and Ukrainian equipment losses as counted by Oryx’s main assessor. Every entry can be viewed on the Oryx website. It has Russian equipment losses numbering 604, with Ukrainian at 309.
You still have not provided one single piece of evidence to support your argument.
That reminds me, the counts on Oryx of artillery losses over the past months have been heavily favoring Ukraine, and the cause is almost certainly superior counter-battery equipment, training and doctrine by the Ukrainians. Ukraine being superior at counter-battery was one of the complaints that got the commanders of both the 58th Combined Arms Army and the 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division dismissed from their commands. The additional effectiveness of DPICM has no doubt added to this, and modern counter-battery radars were amongst the first items the West sent to Ukraine, the modern Western artillery that has been supplied to Ukraine outranges their Russian and Soviet-era counterparts, and the sloppiness of Russian OPSEC and laziness in relocating artillery after firing have all also likely contributed to this. So much for Kamrad’s endlessly repeated Russian artillery superiority. Things are probably even worse than counts on Oryx would indicate, as 1) artillery is the most likely to be not have photographic evidence of losses as they are far behind the front lines most of the time and 2) all of these millions of shells the Russians have fired off has worn out a hell of a lot of barrels. Covert Cabal did yet another count of satellite imagery of Russian military storage depots, this time of artillery parks and counted over 5,000 missing from storage depots since the beginning of the war. This doesn’t mean Russia has lost 5,000 artillery systems in the fighting; what it likely indicates is they’ve had to pull close to 5,000 barrels off of stored artillery pieces to replace ones worn out in the fighting.
Also notable in the Oryx loss counts is that Russia has consistently been losing equipment at a rate of two to three times that of Ukraine during the Ukrainian counteroffensive into positions that Russia had a year to prepare. All other things being equal, this should not be happening. The side attacking into a prepared fortified line should be suffering substantially more losses than the defender, if all other things are equal. They clearly are not between the Russian and Ukrainian militaries, but of course glorious Komrad would have us believe in the face of all evidence to the contrary that Ukraine is “being bled dry in personnel and material.”
I do wonder, at this point, how the slightest shred of morale remains in Russian troops. Like, what incentive could there possibly be to keep fighting rather than go home?
Just an interesting nugget of information from CNN, which I of course lack the sources to fully evaluate, but may have bearing on this thread and certain posters:
But the official stressed that the Western voices that eventually became mouthpieces for Russian propaganda were almost certainly unaware of the role they were playing.
“At the end of the day, this unwitting target is disseminating Russian influence operation, Russian propaganda to their target public,” the US official said. “Ultimately, a lot of these are unwitting people — they remain unaware who is essentially seeding these narratives.”
I’m not saying that anyone here has been directly influenced by the FSB, and the article again stresses they aren’t spies or propagandists in the traditional sense. Instead, like a lot of Qanon folks, they’ve been fed data to support a point of view, then a bit more that’s more ‘out there’, and then further on until it’s reached an endpoint that is self-isolating and self supporting.
And those who follow such persons down spiral end up the same.
Also, here is more evidence that (unlike you) we are aware of potential source bias even in those that support the notion of a Ukrainian victory.
In this post a cited a piece from “The express” claiming that Russian morale was on the verge of collapse. The source was viewed with significant skepticism by the other members of the thread who wondered about the veracity of the source, to the point that a separate thread was started specifically on that point (concluding that it was tabloid trash)
Man, this just not the week for Russian neo-Nazis. Komrad! Remind me again what some of the justifications for the war 72-hour special military operation in Ukraine are? Denazification? Preventing the expansion of NATO?
The co-leader of Russian neo-Nazi paramilitary group Task Force Rusich has been arrested in Finland, authorities said on Friday.
Yan Igorevich Petrovskiy (referred to in Finnish media as Jan Igorovits Petrovsky) was detained “at the request of Kyiv,” Russia’s state-run news agency RIA Novosti reported on Friday, citing an unnamed Russian embassy source.
Earlier, Finland’s MTV3 channel reported that Petrovskiy, who is subject to European Union and United States sanctions, was in custody, saying that Ukraine has requested his extradition.
Finland joined NATO on April 4, 2025 following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Here’s some data on the counter-offensive in Zaporizhzhia oblast, which is one part of the counter-offensive, which in turn is one part of the fighting. It’s compiled by an Oryx helper and retweeted by the Oryx guy whose data was discussed a few posts ago. This area is akin to the point of the spear, where Ukrainian forces are arguably pushing hardest, and it has a closer ratio of equipment losses, of around 1:1. Where Ukrainian losses have been particularly high is in Infantry Mobility Vehicles, but they’ve inflicted greater damage on the enemy in the categories of artillery, MLRS, radars/jammers and anti-aircraft systems. It’s a tough fight, but actually a pretty good ratio for attacking an enemy in a well-prepared defense.
Good post, and it is a good ratio for attackers assaulting prepared defenses. The reason Russian losses in Infantry Mobility Vehicles is so low is that they pretty much don’t use them; the Tigr is the only infantry mobility vehicle they have, and it is mostly used by Ministry of Internal Affairs troops rather than the Army. NATO and particularly the US have a large excess of these types of vehicles in many varieties, they’re the MRAPs (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicles that were produced for use in Iraq and Afghanistan.
And excesses of them have controversially been given to numerous law enforcement agencies in the US.
Ukraine seems to have always been leading in developing new tactics and utilizing, modifying what they have. That is a great advantage in such a situation. It has been so long since a large scale war of this type has been waged. A lot of old concepts needed to be dropped or modified. Ukraine did this much quicker.
But they need more materiel. I don’t think they will get enough, soon enough.
Ukraine seems to have bowed to pressure from the west to try the U.S. style of maneuver warfare again.
I think it is a mistake. For one thing the U.S. has chided them for being casualty averse. Fuck you U.S. it is not your personnel fighting and dying there. Ukraine can make its own decisions. And you should support them best you can.
Unless there is a so far unknown and very large amount of extra materiel available for such a push, I think Ukraine will not be able to protect their flanks in a deep push. They may indeed get far forward. Russian forces will fall back. But at some point the flanks will be in danger. Supply routes will be under fire.
Of course they may have some detailed intel to back up the plan. But even if they can push through, they now have to hold.
So far there is not a meaningful deep penetration. I hope they calculate carefully the resources they have, versus the defence of flanks they will need.
It seems there is a level of disagreement of tactics/strategy in Ukraine higher levels. Offence seems to hold sway at the moment. If it works, then great. But I hope they have enough left for a good defence if it fails. If the deep push shows signs of flank collapse, I hope they get them out fast, intact.
I did a bit of looking into those creeps. Assholes for sure. Do them to full extent of the law.
Obviously Wagner was not too fussy about allies or direct enlisted. Mercenary forces are usually nasty things. Wagner was/is a tool mainly controlled and financed by Russia. It has command structure that is ultimately connected and controlled by Russian government agencies. But distanced for legal/political reasons. The figurehead had a level of control. Mostly over their more freelance operations. The operations that mattered to Russia were directed to the actual commanders of Wagner. Like Utkin. Now Utkin is not a nice guy. I do believe he was a neo Nazi. But I think he had been turned to more of a Russian super patriot. But still an asshole in actual human terms. But the real command of Wagner was Russian government. Hence the small number of Wagner command that went along with the mutiny/coup. A lot of ex Russian military and intelligence people sat that shit out.
Wagner will continue to exist in some form. Most of it is being folded into regular Russian forces. Again for legal reasons. They cannot legally conduct operations on Russian territory. So induct them.
Whatever freelance portion of Wagner might remain, under whatever name. Will probably also have some nasty cohorts as well as regular nasty members. It will continue the fantasy of being a PMC, while always being under Russian control. There are many countries who wear such a fig leaf while doing military operations.
The assassination.
I do think that Russia offed him. But what a kill. The guy was always being in at least two places at once, even when flying. Two planes. People with his same legal name. And multiple top level guys on the same flight! Just lucky? Did they just want him and got a bunch for free? Did they actually take out one or more of their own as well? The other plane did not “crash” so they knew which one he was on for sure? Seems so. Maybe you just pick one plane to kill. If he is on it, done. If he is not, big message sent!
There is speculation galore as to who ordered it. Others have their reasons too. But I think Putin probably gave the okay. The MOD probably wanted to, FSB might have been on the fence, Putin is more of a mystery as to yes or no. But if the majority wanted it, I think he would have been overall happy to get it over with. The guy was useful. But his mouth was still too out of control even after the mutiny shit.
But you say that there is “not a meaningful” Ukrainian penetration.
Who to believe?
Well, the ISW have consistently assessed that Russia lacks operational reserves, which would surely be needed for such counter-counter-attacking operations:
Does the ISW report that Ukraine has the spare mobile artillery and ammunition for it to defend two flanks? Do they say Ukraine has the personnel and materiel required to punch forward while also defending their flanks. Has Ukraine already put in place a huge force at the old line of contact to protect that front from being collapsed and the deep forces cut off? Are they bringing along lots of air defence systems with ammunition to defend the now very narrow supply route opening at the former front line?
Russia has defence in place. They will fall back as required while taking out Ukraine forces. Three to one or more. Likely more as Ukraine has almost no air support. They do not require extra reserve forces. They are there. Ukraine needs extra. As the Russians fall back while taking out Ukraine forces, there forces concentrate. A defensive line is not taken out entirely. It falls back to a deeper line with forces already in place. Defence can often multiply in force if it has planned fall back. Each step forward requires more flank defence forces. The enemy already had most of those forces in place to attack the flank. They can reroute some of the now concentrated defence line forces up both flanks, without actually decreasing the defence line strength. The ones who fell back assume some of the new line, the new line can send more forces up the flanks. But the worst thing for the Ukraine forces, is the further they penetrate, the closer they are to less restricted Russian air power.
