Iraqi constitution in a bit of bother

[tomndebb]

@Debaser

Why does this need to be moved to the pit? You made a factual claim in GD. I asked you for a cite. You cannot provide one because your claim has no truth to it, yet refuse to retract. It sounds a lot like “lying” to me.

You are being deliberately belligerent, here. The initial statement by ElvisL1ves was couched as a hypthetical with a clear implication of opinion. The accusation of “lying,” while technically defensible in the way that you choose to shape your side of the discussion, does not promote discussion.

On the other hand, Elvis, you need to refrain from rising to the bait so quickly. Kimstu has done a pretty good job of making the case that you could have rather than having the two of you square off in GD.

Stop it, both of you.

[ /Moderator Mode ]

[Kimstu]

Here’s a recent discussion on the subject of Iranian influence on Iraq:

Suddenly, Iran’s growing influence in Iraq is top of the national security agenda again in Britain and America. The influence is real, massive and growing. More than that, following the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the empowerment of Iraq’s Shiite majority, it became inevitable. The question is, what to do about it? […]

And there is no doubt that the Shiite militias are a rising and probably irresistible force in southern Iraq, where most of Iraq’s 60 percent Shiite majority lives. Indeed British occupation authorities in the area have turned a blind eye while Shiite militias – including one loyal to Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafaari – have infiltrated the police. Two weeks ago, Basra’s police chief admitted last week that he could count on the loyalty of only a quarter of his men.

The largest Shiite paramilitary group in Iraq with strong ties to Iran is the Badr Organization, believed to be 20,000 strong. It is the armed wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) that is now the largest and most powerful political party in iraq.

Iran also backs Moqtada Sadr and his Mahdi Army. […]

Prime Minister al-Jaafari and the United Iraqi Alliance he leads represents the Shiite majority and dominates the government. Al-Jaafari’s own al-Dawaa party has very strong ties to Iran. For that matter, so does Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi who runs energy policy. U.S. intelligence concluded last year that he may have given crucial U.S. intelligence secrets to Tehran. […]

Jaafari’s appointment as prime minister was welcomed in Washington as a giant stride toward the goal of establishing a peaceful, stable, constitutional state in Iraq friendly to the United States. But his emergence as the first Shiite national leader of Iraq in its history may also be seen part of a very different process – the rise of a new, militant, politicized and revolutionary Shiism articulated and shaped by the late Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran.

This was the process that also led to the rise of Hezbollah, the Party of God, among the Shiites of Lebanon, a process that transformed the most passive and unthreatening group in Lebanon to the most militarily formidable and dangerous guerrilla force the Israeli army has ever faced – and one that it has never conclusively defeated.

And with popular pressure rising fast in the United States to reduce the number of American troops, currently numbering around 150,000 stationed in Iraq in the face of the continuing Sunni insurgency, Iran’s influence in the neighboring country looks certain to grow.

[Kimstu]

Oops, I think I’m repeating myself (I think I’m repeating myself). Sorry.

[XT]

Is it just me or is the board crawling today? 10 min. to load for this reply. Hope it goes out…
Anyway.

@Kimstu

No, I think Elvis is talking about the provisions in the Iraqi constitution that disadvantage the Sunnis, such as the provisions for federalism (where the mostly-Kurdish north and the mostly-Shi’a south could have more or less autonomous control over their oil resources without sharing with the oil-less, mostly-Sunni center). And in particular the provisions for “de-Baathification”, which according to many Sunnis will punish Sunnis in general for the actions of the previous Baathist government.

So the minority-rights issue is not that the Sunnis didn’t get to reject the constitution (they had a fair shot at it, as far as we can tell, and lost fair and square), but that the constitution may be intrinsically skewed against them.

Ah…I see. I didn’t get that. Ok, as for the provisions in the constitution being a disadvantage for the Sunni’s, I’d say that its a debatable point. Certainly SOME of them could be seen that way…especially by the Sunni’s. However, even if we acknowledge that this is the case, beyond doubt, there are provisions put in that allow for changes to the constitution at a later date…thus at least in theory again protecting the rights of the minority group.

@Kimstu

And yes, I sure as hell can see an Iranian-style and Iran-allied Shi’ite theocracy taking over in Iraq, at least in the Shi’ite-controlled regions.

Well, I disagree as to the ‘Iranian’style’ theocracy obviously (oh, btw I have read the cite you posted in the past…in fact I used it myself in another thread). Iran-allied I think is pretty much a foregone conclusion, though what that will mean in real world terms is still up in the air. Iran will have a large influence on Iraq though…I freely acknowledge that. Unless the democratic process completely collapses though I just don’t see a full fledged ‘Iran-style’ theocracy in Iraq. This isn’t to say though that theocracy won’t have an impact on their government…you can already see that it is weaved throughout their constitution. Iraq’s democracy (if it happens) isn’t going to be just like the US’s…or like any in the West either. It will be something that the Iraqi’s can handle and understand…and that means religious elements. However, if it holds to the constitutional framework it won’t be just like Iran…and thats all I was trying to say.

@Kimstu

Really? Who do you think is running those Shi’a political parties? What about the role of notorious radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr?

Granted. Also, I acknowledge the growing power of the various militia formations and am unsure what effect they will have on Iraq, though I admit that they actually have me more worried than the insurgency does some days. Again though, the difference between the Iranian clerics and those in Iraq is (IMO, which I never claimed to be expert on this stuff) the framework they work within. The Iranian clerics pretty much are autonomous and work outside of government…they are practically a law unto themselves. Iraq, if it holds to the constitution, will provide some checks and balances on the clerics, forcing them to work within a constitutional framework and somewhat limiting what they can and can’t do. Assuming they stay within their constitution, and assuming they continue with their form of democracy (whatever that turns out to be) it will be different from Iran…which again, was all I was saying.

-XT

[ElvisL1ves]

@Kimstu

No, I think Elvis is talking about the provisions in the Iraqi constitution that disadvantage the Sunnis, such as the provisions for federalism (where the mostly-Kurdish north and the mostly-Shi’a south could have more or less autonomous control over their oil resources without sharing with the oil-less, mostly-Sunni center). And in particular the provisions for “de-Baathification”, which according to many Sunnis will punish Sunnis in general for the actions of the previous Baathist government.

Yes, thank you; I had made the mistaken assumption that all those engaging in this thread had actually read at least a summary of the thing being discussed.

My most-likely-case scenario is between your worst and best ones - I just don’t see Kurdistan becoming violent (at least after subjugating or expelling the Arabs that Saddam had moved in there recently), or reinforcing the rebellion in Turkey. There just isn’t much for them to gain by violence, not when they’d have control of a lot of oil, and not after they’ve experienced relatively peaceful self-rule in the Iraqi side for over a decade now. Ankara is already making peace overtures in the region, and I’d expect a modus vivendi with both independent Kurdistan and Kurd-inhabited southeast Turkey to emerge.

In the Sunni region, I’d expect a continuation of the current insurrection, not an outright organized revolt that could be crushed by numbers. Call it a guerrilla civil war, lasting decades or longer.
tomndebb, thanks for addressing a problem that’s been present for too long in this forum. I’d be very happy to stop responding to the sort of shit you refer to in the future if a moderator will do so instead.

[Debaser]

Pit thread.