Iraqi strategy, the Limbaugh hypothesis

Great Debates
41

X~Slayer(ALE) and Riboflavin, the thread title that I linked previously, “Saddam wants US to invade” wasn’t the question of the OP, it was an assumption one had to make to address the OP (at that time). The OP went on to describe the strategy described in this one, and then asked, Is this plausible (that Saddam thinks he can win)?

The question wasn’t whether he could win (as described in the thread Sofa King linked), but whether he thinks he can.

X~Slayer(ALE) is correct, his post was a bit of the exception. Most everyone doubted that Saddam thought he could win that way. But that doesn’t seem to be the sentiment here.

december, while I wasn’t aware of that particular quote, I’m not sure of your point. Particularly within the first few days of this war, many administration made comments that suggested they thought the Iraqi army would mostly surrender, and the US wouldn’t need to do much more than mop up. I’ll be glad to provide quotes to support it, if you really question it (probably in another thread, as it would be bit off-topic here).

I stand by my point - that I don’t think the administration properly prepared the American public for the difficulty we face, perhaps even despite their words. Nonetheless I agree it is my subjective assessment.

42

Just FTR, since I may have been the first to use the word “obvious” (no time to check), what seems to me “obvious” is the advantage of using guerilla tactics. Beyond that non-earth-shattering insight, I’m no expert on military matters, and took almost no part in threads that involved speculating on what a war might be like. As I said above, it really makes no difference whether Saddam simply wants to make this war as hard as possible for Bush, or whether he truly believes he’s got a shot at forcing in an American withdrawal: in either case the usefulness of guerilla tactics seem to me to be obvious.

That said, I certainly didn’t anticipate their use, nor notice anyone in the press doing so either. The reported fears seemed more to do with oil-burning, infrastructure-destroying–which SH seems to have decided not to do–and with geopolitical backlash a la the Kurdish situation. So in that sense, yes, hindsight is foresight and my hat is off to those who saw it coming.

Since there is some simplistic thinking about Somalia circulating here, let me post this excerpt from the link provided above:

" But why would the citizens of Baghdad rally around such a tyrannical regime? …

The problem is that each war develops an interior logic. …[E]very death and wounding of a child, a sister, a father, a neighbor no matter how unintentional, creates passionate new enemies whose anger eclipses politics.

And even Iraqis who despise Saddam Hussein can be expected to recoil from a foreign invasion, which wounds national pride…

Much of this happened in Somalia. When American forces landed in 1992 to enforce the United Nations humanitarian effort, many were greeted with smiles and gifts from the Somali people. Mohammed Farah Aidid, the most powerful of Mogadishu’s warlords, was not a popular figure, even within his own clan.

But then the United Nations decided to pursue him after his forces began attacking and killing peacekeepers. Clumsy military attempts to capture Mr. Aidid in the summer of 1993 left scores of Somalis dead or wounded and destroyed property. The people of the city quickly soured on their Western saviors, and the warlord’s repeated escapes transformed him into a local hero, the sly Somali David tilting with Goliath. By the time Task Force Ranger arrived in August to apply more skillful tactics to the search for Mr. Aidid, thousands of local citizens were ready to fight in the streets to protect him. The result was the debacle that left 18 Americans dead and ended the humanitarian operation."

43

Rush’s strategy is fairly accurate, and fairly obvious in hindsight. The rationale has as much to do with Vietnam and Lebanon as Somalia, of course. And it is also a bit Sun Tzu… let your enemy fight with exposed supply lines and on ground of your choosing.

The thought that didn’t cross my mind until I read this thread and this quote from Gorsnak

is that Saddam is also setting up a nice exit strategy. His tactics are making us more like invaders and less like liberators than we want. If he can sneak out of Baghdad before it falls (and I guarantee he has a plan for that), then we are in trouble.

He probably hopes that our continued presence and perceived manipulation of whatever government follows will increase his stature. Then he can make a triumphant return a la Napoleon (presumably planning to avoid a Waterloo).

44

BTW, I should have said that Saddam seems do have decided not to do those other things (too much) so far.

45

Thank to crusoe, Latro and ** msmith537** – Hue, Seoul and Panama City are the historical suggestions mooted. Call me old-fashioned but it doesn’t seem to have been the tactic of choice for commanders of democratic forces in the 20th century. I can understand Stalin going at Berlin with the bit between his teeth, and Hitler prior to that … but democracies … nah.

The whole impetus behind ‘smart’ technology was to ensure light i.e. acceptable casualties - I’m inclined to think we give our tacit support to military action (nowadays) by our democratic leaders on the implicit understanding that ‘we’ get the job done with almost zero losses.

This is not where anyone wants to be, least of all those who will seek reelection …

46

Oh absolutely, there are a myriad of reasons against a siege of Baghdad.

a) First and foremost is the civilian population of Baghdad. They will be cut off from food, electricity and water. As indiciationas are beginning to show, the Iraqi regime has no compunctions about using humans as bait, shields and propaganda fodder. The US will not allow them to suffer just to get to Saddam.

b) it allows for Saddam suporters and war detractors to rally political and popular support. Syria and Iran are already rapped on the knuckles for providing men and equipment and if this seige goes on, many other factions that will lend that kind of support.

c) France

d) Not a minor consideration is the election year coming up. It may not affect militarily but it would boost Saddams morale into thinking the next president might be a oushover compared to Bush.

e) Saddam himself will be a big reason. If he finds this seige not to his advantage, things will fly out of baghdad that most people think do not exist or were destroyed years ago.

47

nitpick

Enemy at the Gates was about Stalingrad. Leningrad and Stalingrad were two different WW2 battles, both quite brutal.

The siege of Leningrad lasted from 1941 to 1944 and was part of the plan of initial invasion, Barbarossa. It was marked by the mass starvation of civilians within the city during the first winter, estimates are between .5 and 1.5 million casualities, depending on who you ask. Harrison Salisbury’s book on the subject was entitled “The 900 Days”, though it was really closer to 870 at the longest.

The battle of Stalingrad took place as a result of German plan Blau during the second year of the war, beginning in the summer of '42 and effectively ending with the encirclement and surrender of Paulus’s invading Sixth Army in the brutal winter of '43 (not 900 days by any stretch). Most of the city (some 90%) was taken by the Germans, some of it fought for room by room with heavy casualities on both sides (but probably many more Russian than German). This is the type of battle many believe Saddam is hoping for.

Granted, neither scenario is what American planners would call acceptable.

48

I don’t have anything substantial to add to the debate; I just wanted to point out you’ve conflated Leningrad with Stalingrad. Leningrad did endure a 900-day siege (including a resupply across a frozen Lake Ladoga), but the comparison is more apt to Stalingrad (where a sustained street battle lasted about 6 months) if the fighting turns heavy.

49

And given that mrblue92 beat me by seconds with much better information, I really have nothing to say.

50

Ah, the old Leningrad / Stalingrad simulpost. Seen it once, seen it a thousand times.

51

Sorry for the mixup; I saw the movie when it first came out and mixed-up the 'grads.

52

Still, it’s more interesting than almost anything Limbaugh has to say. The only reason I came in was because I misread the subject as “the Lindbergh hypothesis” and was therefore momentarily confused about how Lucky Lindy would apply to the current situation.

What would Lindy do?

53

http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/01/17012001123550.asp

Policis in Mogadish went from humanitarian to peacekeeping. A vietnam in microcosm. No set objectives, no escape plan, no overwhelming force.

54

A thing I hadn’t considered as being relevant any time soon just came to light. This is very worrying:

Conflict sapping forces’ morale
“Quite a few of the troops have said to me that this isn’t what they were expecting.

<snip>

They don’t want to admit they can’t deal with it, but I think there is definitely a sense that it is not the kind of fighting that they were really trained for.

One Marine told me: “I’ve had enough of being fired at from all directions, I just want to go home”.

I thought it quite a surprising thing to say. “
Elements of ‘elite’ US Marines want to come home after a week – this doesn’t seem to bode well ?

55

Limbaugh did no such thing. He didn’t mention Clinton at all, nor by any wild stretch of the imagination blame anybody for the Somalia incident.

Perhaps he did at other times while I was not listening, but not yesterday.

The context of Mogadishu came up because Bin Laden had reportedly used it as an example of our unwillingness as a country to accept blood and casualties, and therefore we were a paper tiger

56

The marines are experiencing the realities of a real war with a desperate enemy that doesnt fight fair. They are kept from doing what they need to do while the enemy is free to do what they want to do. That builds frustration and into stress. That is understandable. It may not bode well but it does not mean we can be defeated. This will just take longer than everyone expected.

What does not bode well is this false media perception that the opinion of one tired marine reflects the attitude of the entire US force.

57

What ? You fight to survive, to win. A dawn duel at 12 paces in Hyde park it ain’t

Ever shoot the messenger ? I hope you’re right about the tiredness, it seems possible/probable.

58

Saddam waits for summer like Russia waits for winter. Our team depended on factors which are proving to be fantasies: “shock and awe”, collapse of the command structure, popular uprisings. We were counting on it being over by now.

Of course, motivated people can take heat, fight in heat. All the material factors still weigh on the “allied” side, and, finally, I have little doubt they will prevail. But our fear of chemical/bio weapons is his ace in the hole. Temperatures above 110 are bearable. Fighting in such temperatures is bearable, if you have enough water. But wearing a chem/bio warfare suit?

He doesn’t even have to have the weapons. All he has to do is fake it. Lob a scud over with something that smells funny, and everyone is scurrying into portable saunas. Welcome to hell. And he can pull that bluff over and over and over because…we’ll never know. When its 110 outside, whats the temp inside one of those suits? How long will they have to be worn, before you are sure you’re safe? How long does heat stroke take?

Saddam’s strategy is the strategy of desperation, there is little chance. But if he can hold out long enough for General Summer to come into the field, his chances improve one hundred percent from none to slim.

59

Cite?

60

You’re kidding, right?