Seems like there are some in-touch folks here. Given that, I’d like to get some informed comment on as aspect of this system I haven’t see discussed here.
As I understand it, the goal (achievable or not) of this system is to be able to intercept something of the order of 10 incomings at the same time.
China is estimated to have around 20 nuclear-armed ICBMs capable of reaching the US, meaning it accounts for half of their capability. If and when this system is deployed, they have no option but to assume it will work as advertised and so increase their ICBMs to more like 40 or 50 to overwhelm this system and retain their MAD crediblity.
India, seeing this (and having fought wars with China) has no option but to follow suit. Pakistan, seeing India do this, likewise has no option but to increase their nuclear capability. Iran will then also feel pressure to increase their nukes, and so then so will Israel.
IOW this system if deployed will trigger a nuclear arms race in a very unstable part of the world, and the more successful and credible this system the worse the proliferation.
Is there a flaw with this chain of events? If not it’s very very frightening, and makes it look like the US is protecting itself at the expense of the rest of the world’s safety.
No, there is no flaw in your reasoning. This is the very line of reasoning that SecDef Robert McNamara used in opposing the full-on installation of what was then Nike, later to become the downsized Safeguard and Sentinel. (See one of my posts above for the relevent cite.)
We have, or rather will have, ten “birds in the hole” up in Fort Greeley, Alaska, with ten more out of Fort Vandenberg, California. (This is AFAIK…I’m not directly involved with the ongoing program and the deployment schedule may have changed.) The notion, as far as I know, is that there will be a 1:1 kill ratio, which is hopelessly optimistic. (Since none of the testing has really gone right and/or been against a realistic threat, it is impossible at this point to assess the functionaly accuracy of the system.)
The nominal reason for the system, at least at this point, is to protect against ICBMs from North Korea. (There was a recent thread on this but I’ve unsubscribed and am too lazy to search for it.) This is kind of silly, because North Korea, IMHO, doesn’t have the resources to engage in a development program to build a reliable and accurate ICBM capable of reaching the US. It would be a couple of decades or more before they might have that capability.
The system, in my opinion, is or was nothing more than political grandstanding and pork-barrel support for the major defense contractors, all of whom have had a thumb in the pie. The result, as you’ve noted, is that it may well encourage other countries to proliferate with negative political and economic reprocussions.
Furthermore, if they are trying to develop it they should be encouraged at all costs, as making ICBMs able to hit the US would be a huge waste if their resources and success would be very problematic. Whereas if the shield is seen to be successful, they will abaondon any efforts at that and do something easier, cheaper, and more likely to be successful - such as the aforementioned shipboard nuke.