While I am not an authority on the SDI program, I will venture that the technological advancements spinning out of it could well justify even the marginal military returns we are seeing so far.
In this bottom line driven, what-has-your-stock-done-for-me-lately?, ultra short-sighted economy, programs like SDI serve as an immense benefit to fundamental research. America’s corporations have increasingly cut back on pure research in ways that make me fear for our preeminence on the world’s technological stage.
While the efficacy of the SDI concept is yet to be validated, I think that directed energy weapons and advanced target acquisition technology have other applications that will all prove of great benefit to society.
When we eventually wise up and begin to orbit large solar collection arrays, high-energy beams will be the method of choice to downlink this resource to ground based users. Our doddering air traffic control system could leapfrog significant technical hurdles with the tracking and identification firmware that will spin out of SDI.
As long as we permit ourselves to be so lax about fundamental research I remain obliged to support such programs as SDI. I wish that there were better management of the funds spent and that less “blue sky” thinking dominated the program, but all in all there are few other venues for the development of such critical next generation technology.
Our lethargic exploration of space and the fabulous potential that it represents is grist for another thread. So I will open the debate with this question;
“Does SDI have the ability to eventually justify itself as either a viable weapons system or at least as a technology incubator?”
1.) I followed the SDI debate VERY closely during the Reagan years. I’m not up on the absolute latest. but nothing I’ve seen convinces me that there have been any fundamental breakthroughs or canges.
2.) I am all for funding research into possible SDI. We were doing this before Reagan’s March 1983 speech. We’ve been doing it ever since, for that matter.
3.) Nothing I’ve seen convinces me that we’re ready to deploy an SDI system. Or even tells me which system were going to deploy.
4.) Everyone says that we’re going to use this against attacks from “rogue states”. That’s a wonderful piece of propaganda. What’s a “rogue state”? The very name suggests that no one would object to our attacking hem.
The funding increase Bush and his gang want for SDI is for the explicit purpose of developing a production anti-ballistic missile system based on the less than successful tests that have been well documented in the past few years. They aren’t interested in spending another 10 years doing R&D, they’re ready for a real weapon system, no matter how the tests have gone so far. After all, it depends on what the meaning of the word “works” is.
This is akin to Boeing spending billions of R&D on a next generation aircraft that can’t get off the ground and then saying, well heck, we really need this new plane so let’s start building it anyhow. Hopefully, we will find someone smart who will figure out a way to get it to fly.
There is little evidence to say that the problems in the ABM system are solvable, no more than the problems inherent in the giant space-based lasers that Reagan promised us. ABM countermeasures are trivially easy compared to the physics involved in getting a missile to hit another missile.
Besides, if a “rogue nation” really wanted to nuke us, wouldn’t it be easier to stick a bomb in the hold of a freighter and sail it into New York Harbor, Long Beach, or up the Potomac? Probably a lot less likely that your country would be turned into a sheet of highly radioactive glass.
I don’t begrude the idea of SDI research, that would probably could be a nice technology incubator, but being that the work is by its nature highly classified, it would probably be a long while before useful work trickled out into the public domain.
In theory, yes. But I’ve heard such actions being touted as such a simple task, yet if it were so easy, you’d think more people would try it…
Oh, they have? Well, what stopped them?
Oh! Border patrols! Remember that dude trying to smuggle bombs into Canada?
(Sorry… I’m feeling a tad cynical tonight…)
Anyway, the point is that we’re ALREADY doing everything we can to prevent someone smuggling a warhead into the country via truck or boat, so it’s pointless to bring it up in a debate about SDI. We’ve already covered our asses, now it’s time to cover our heads.
No one wants to say it, so I, the Ever-Effervescent SPOOFE, will do the politically incorrect… all the SDI proponents aren’t worried about “Rogue States”, they’re worried about China.
Well, I guess one could consider China a “rogue state”…
Er… the guy going into Seattle was a terrorist on a public ferry. Nation-states, even puny ones like North Korea, usually have more resources and skilled people to put such a plan into action (e.g. their own ships). To date, I’ve never heard of anyone trying to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the U.S., and I’m not sure whether we’d be able to stop them or not. Despite the failure of some people trying to smuggle bombs into the U.S. like the guy in Seattle, there are others who have succeeded (e.g. the World Trade Center bombing).
Well… actually I’m not sure that the bomb used in the World Trade Center bombing was smuggled in; it may have been constructed inside the U.S. In theory, the same could be done with a nuclear bomb.
I disagree. Our asses are not covered, and we’re being silly if we try to cover our heads with something that won’t work. SDI will be almost completely ineffective if all it does is encourage enemies to change the delivery system for nuclear warheads. There are many other ways to deliver such a weapon besides an ICBM. We’re kidding ourselves if we ignore the alternatives our enemies will surely be examining.
I think you’re probably right. But how many ICBMs does China have? 20? (I’m not sure). What an SDI system might do is simply convince the Chinese to build hundreds of ICBMs. Wouldn’t that make the world a more dangerous place?? In fact, isn’t the PRC this year increasing its defense budget?
So far, diplomacy has destroyed many, many more ICBMs than any SDI system is likely to be capable of. I believe we should continue to fund R & D into SDI, but building an ineffective defensive system is the same mistake the French made in the 1930s. I think we should avoid that pitfall.
I think you made some excellent points wevets. Although “rougue” states like North Korea and Iran are seen as perpetual threats I hardly think that they will be stupid enough to launch an easily tracked ICBM towards the U.S… It is safe to assume they would shortly resemble a glassed over parking lot if they did. A “hand carried” device is much more likely.
There have been many studies about the ramifications of detonating a nuclear device against the U.S… It is almost impossible for such a weapon to be delivered against a military target. The resulting international furor directed towards any nation that exploded an atomic bomb in or near a large population center would be immense. Although this may not sufficiently deter terrorists from doing so, I think that it has been a mitigating factor in some thinking on the topic.
I do think that it might be in our interest to make any foreign aid to North Korea contingent upon their adoption of Thorium based reactors that would not breed fissile material, but that is grist for yet another thread. The same goes for China, except that it is for another reason entirely. We desperately need to avert China’s expansion of coal based energy production. They alone could topple all other efforts to curb greenhouse emmissions. Again though, another topic for another thread.
With our own submarine strike forces still in operation, we maintain an unassailable threat of retaliation against anyone insane enough to launch against us. There are also ways of tracing the origins of nuclear materials by their distribution of isotopes. Cold comfort I know, once we have been nuked, but still a potent deterrent to anyone who wants to detonate one within our borders. If you have read Tom Clancy’s “The Sum of All Fears”, you will know that the assembly and manufactur of a nuclear weapon is an extremely difficult task. I think that we have much more to worry about when it comes to the missing briefcase sized nukes from the defunct USSR’s arsenal.
There is a distinct possibility that we may be able to construct a missle defense system good enough to prevent a small number of launch vehicles from reaching us, but the key is how to manage the Russians’ fear of our immunity in such a situation. All of this is a diplomatic bugbear, but I think that we owe it to ourselves to investigate the feasibility even further.
The problem that I have is with the concept of interceptor missles and other obselete technologies being used. I think that directed energy weapons are far more suited to the task and, as mentioned previously, they would also have significant downstream applications. I hold absolutely no great hope that Shrub has the brains or wisdom to fully assay the merits of such an important decision gate. I am further compelled to wonder if he will be misled into another military boondoggle of outdated equipment and outmoded thinking.
Thanks for all of the input folks.
PS: wevets, are you going to make it to SD Spring Break?
Development of a working conventional ABM system will probably require significant advances in materials science, optics, computer processing power and miniaturization, and active maneuvering systems, very much like the massive technology leap that the 1960s saw as a result of NASA’s moon shot.
However, unlike NASA’s windfall, these advances in technology are not public knowledge. In fact, they are just the reverse: they’re classified, and won’t be available to the public until their usefulness as inventions becomes questionable.
Combine that with the perfectly shoddy test record of the current system, the unrest it stirs in our enemy-turned friend nuclear counterpart, the complete unpredictability of the Chinese, and the logical conclusion that the best way to counteract such a system is to fire a shitload more missiles than you now plan to fire in the short term and to actively pursue more efficient countermeasures later, and it becomes pretty clear that SDI isn’t the most effective way to counteract a nuclear strike.
The way we’ve done it so far is to let every potential enemy know that our response to a nuclear, biological, or chemical strike will be the complete destruction of the offending nation by like means. That promise–and it is a promise–got us a helluva lot more mileage than any anti-ballistic missile ever did.
While just about everyone here has made some valid points, I just want to point out that SDI is not just one system, but a collection of systems that could include technologies to detect land or ship-borne missiles, plus point defenses of strategic targets like missile silos, although these are not as necessary any more.
A component of SDI could be something as simple as the Vulcan Phalanx gun, which is used as an anti-missile defense for ships. Put on at a missile silo, and it has a decent chance of destroying or disabling an incoming ICBM.
SDI made a lot of sense back when the Soviets were a major threat, and I think part of the reasonf for continuing with it now is the threat of Russian missiles. There are still thousands of them out there, sitting in areas controlled by unstable governments.
I don’t see the point of even undertaking an expensive R&D effort for this. If SDI is targetted at Russia or China, they can respond with what I understand to be fairly simple countermeasures. Or worse, (in the case of China) they could respond with a large missle force, which could trigger a regional arms race.
Meanwhile, I question the utility of a shield that stops, say, 30-80% of the incoming missiles, except to the extent that it could potentially give the US first strike capability.
Hadn’t considered this, Sam. Interesting point. Here we have an scenerio of our potential adversaries basically stumbling upon a set of limited set of ICBMs, without a lot of advanced planning. Thus, their scope for countermeasures, even straigtforward ones, might be limited. What’s the extent of this problem? i.e. How many former Soviet missiles are based in states such as Kadzikhastan, etc.?
SDI a varied system: Hm. I had understood that the Patriot system was wholly outside of the SDI program. I don’t believe I have a problem with defensive systems not associated with ICBMs. And, as I stated in my previous post, systems that target ICBMs before they reach orbit also have at least some plausibility. But, setting aside the Russian Caucaus problem (which requires further examination) I can’t see a basis for an expensive R&D effort to counter ICBMs in the orbital/post-orbital stage.
Let’s not forget a final point. Judging from press reports of GW’s “skeptical” attitude towards North Korea, it appears that the US administration is planning on using SDI as a (piss-poor) substitute for missile diplomacy. Still, all is speculation: Powell, for one, is rumoured to have a more critical stance towards SDI.
The Vulcan Phalanx Close-in Weapon System has a maximum range of 5,500 meters, with a maximum effective range of 1,490 meters. An ICBM has a re-entry speed of 7,000 meters/second. That means a Vulcan Phalanx would have less than 0.21 seconds to acquire and destroy an incoming ICBM; less than 0.78 seconds even if we’re very generous about the range. Is that really within the capabilities of this weapon system? I think it’s really pretty much an anti-aircraft gun (which would include cruise missiles).
This was in direct reference to China and Russia’s relative small arsenals. I am obliged to recognize the fact that more missle building might be the response. However, right now, neither China or Russia can really afford to build much of anything. I freely admit this is a tough call, which is precisely why I started this thread.
And, yes, I have to second that the Vulcan Gun is completely useless against ICBM’s. It might have limited use against cruise missles, which after all are the technology of choice for cracking missle silos, but only in American style silo site scenarios does it pay. Our open prarie launch sites might find some defensive value in them.
One EMP blast in the upper atmosphere will probably wipe out the micrwave guided radar system such guns use though.
As stated earlier, I have always thought that the space program was an inefficient method for inventing Tang, Teflon and the microchip. (Aside: NASA invented the microchip?!? Sounds like an urban myth to me, or rather an exaggeration. http://www.ox.compsoc.net/~swhite/history.html )
When big bucks are allocated to anything (like SDI), something has to get squeezed out. Among those nonfavored items in W’s budget is -you guessed it!- basic research.
I agree with Mr. Ullman that the Clinton administration liked public support of basic research. I differ on the question of whether this was a bad thing.
Question to SDI proponents: We’ve been researching this for 15+ years. Where are the spinoffs? Easier question: where are the advances in basic science? (Those must exist. Somewhere. Any examples?)
If you have ever seen a Phalanx system in live fire, you would be more than impressed. Regrettably, its record of shooting down even subsonic cruise missiles is spotty at best, and the speed of an incoming ICBM is several times faster yet. Also, IIRC, ICBM’s are generally detonated about 1,000-2,000 feet above the target for maximum blast radius, though this varies from objective to objective. Hence, Phalanx would be useless.
There are a 100 holes in our present defense. SDI might plug 10. Anyone versed in Sun Tzu already realizes this and thus laughs at the concept. Commercial spinoffs from the most closely guarded national secrets seem unlikely.
I’m pretty sure I saw the Phalanx as a potential point defense weapon. Remember, even though the range of the gun is short, the range at which it can track a missile is much, much farther, which means the missile can be encountering a wall of lead the second it comes into range.
Also, they were only proposed for point defense of hardened silos. For a successful deployment, all it has to do is cause the missile to move off course by a few hundred yards. I don’t know if it would ultimately be feasible.
Erm…what if the target isn’t a missile silo? I can’t see anyone paying for Vulcan CIWS to be installed on every tall building in the US.
Going back to SPOOFE’s post earlier, I disagree that we don’t need to worry about non-missile attacks. Just because there hasn’t been on yet, that doesn’t mean that it couldn’t happen.
Besides, if a “rogue nation” really wanted to nuke us, wouldn’t it be easier to stick a bomb in the hold of a freighter and sail it into New York Harbor, Long Beach, or up the Potomac?
In theory, yes. But I’ve heard such actions being touted as such a simple task, yet if it were so easy, you’d think more people would try it…
Oh, they have? Well, what stopped them?
Oh! Border patrols! Remember that dude trying to smuggle bombs into Canada?
Oh, so how does a border patrol stop what appears to be a legitimate freighter going about its business? If the bomb was built into what seemed to be part of the ship no one would question the absence of a particularly large shipping container on the shipping manifest, and I doubt if anyone is going around looking for excess radiation as a giveaway (and shielding will eliminate THAT risk).
Face it, no one has tried this yet because thus far no one has both had the resources AND been sufficiently pissed off at us. This can change. To me this seems a much more plausible way for Saddam and his friends to try for a spite attack on New York, say, than to try and launch a nuclear-tipped SCUD.
First, why bother with a nuke when all you need is a Cessna, a misting device, and a vial of anthrax or small pox agent?
Second, yes there have been plenty of groups outraged/nutty enough to nuke us. All they lack is the means. The desire has never gone away.
Last, I’ve seen video footage of the Phalanx against a sea-surface-skimming (SLCM) cruise missile. Despite putting up a dense wall of lead, most times the missile could penetrate the defense and score a direct hit. And if the attacker’s doctrine is not based on counterforce, then it’s all moot anyway.