Justify a well-known bad sports trade

Reading Rob Neyer’s Big Book of Baseball Blunders, I’m struck at how several times he shows how, at the time, a trade that has gone down in history at a terrible deal for one team really didn’t look that way when you looked at it at the time it was made, without knowing the outcome.

The classic example he deals with is the sale of Babe Ruth to the Yankees. Neyer pointed out that the purpose of the trade was to get rid of a troublemaker, and that no one at the time expected Ruth to be able to top the 29 home runs he hit the previous year, let along nearly double it (it would have been like expecting Mark Mcgwire to hit 120 home runs the year after he hit 70).

So, pretend you’re the person making the trade. You have no idea how the players will play – that one ends up having a Hall of Fame career and the other is out of the sport in two years. Why is the trade a good idea for the team that is now considered to have made a terrible deal?

I’ll talk about my favorite: the Nolan Ryan (and Leroy Stanton et.al.) to the Angels for Jim Fregosi. The justification at the time is clear:

[ul]
[li]Fregosi was perennial all-star, and possibly the best shortstop in baseball at the time.[/li][li]Nolan Ryan had a great fastball, but couldn’t find the plate with a compass. He had just come off an absolutely horrible season, and looked like he was done. That was especially notable in the second half of the season: after July 1, he was 2-10 with an ERA of 6.94 (especially high in that era), with 22 walks and on 44 strikeouts in 59.2 innings pitched. His ERA+ for the season was 86 (average is 100), and his WHIP increased every year. There isn’t a stathead today who wouldn’t say this was the sign of a pitcher who had no business being in the majors.[/li][/ul]

So, what would you choose? Any sport is fine.

The Vikings and Herschel Walker.

From Wiki: “In 1989, at the height of his NFL career, the Cowboys traded Walker to the Minnesota Vikings for a total of five players (LB Jesse Solomon, DB Issiac Holt, RB Darrin Nelson, LB David Howard, DE Alex Stewart) and six draft picks (which led to Emmitt Smith, Russell Maryland, Kevin Smith, and Darren Woodson).”

This one’s not defensible, except to say that the Vikes are in a similar situation now–they perceive themselves to be one player away from the Super Bowl. This time it’s a quarterback, and the Bret Favre siren song has clogged all their ears. Big mistake, in my book.

Not a sports issue but the other thing that’s always said about that trade was how Frazee traded Ruth away to finance a play. What often gets overlooked was that the play was the basis for the musical No, No, Nanette - a huge success that ran for several years and was made into three movies plus a 1971 revival. Even if Frazee had been able to see the future he might still have gone ahead with the deal.

That’s a misconception. Frazee wanted to get rid of Ruth because he was a troublemaker. Ruth, despite being in the middle of a multiyear contract, demanded a raise and threatened to sit out the season if he didn’t get a raise. In addition, Ruth was a hellion, breaking training rules and generally being impossible to control. Frazee got fed up, so tried to trade him.

Trouble was, there was a cold war between clubs in the AL at the time. Frazee had pissed off Ban Johnson, AL president, who was supported by five of the other seven franchises. They refused to make trades with Boston. That left the White Sox and the Yankees (who were pissed off at Johnson). The White Sox offered him Shoeless Joe Jackson and $60,000, while the Yankees offered $100,000 plus a $300,000 loan. And the Red Sox GM thought that the Yankees didn’t have any players the Red Sox wanted (remember, at this point, the Yankees had never won a pennant, while the Red Sox had won four pennants and finished second twice in the previous eight years).

Jackson for Ruth would have been interesting – Jackson had just been part of the Black Sox scandal, so it would have been considered a terrible trade, too, but probably Frazee wouldn’t have been blamed.

As for My Lady Friends – the play that became No, No Nanette – it opened on Broadway on December 3, 1919. Ruth was traded on December 26. The play ran for over 200 performances, which should have allowed it to turn a profit back then, plus any money Frazee needed to invest would have been needed before the play opened.

After the Black Sox scandal, Frazee’s other potential trading partner was removed from consideration, so he made all those deals with the Yankees because they were the only team he could deal with. The various trades of the time were considered fair by most baseball experts when they were made, but the players sent to the Yankees thrived (even those who looked pretty mediocre with the Sox), while those sent to the Sox fell apart.

I’ll admit I’ve never done an in depth study of the situation but my understanding is that the issue of timing has been generally refuted and the consensus is that Frazee did use the loan money from the trade to buy into My Lady Friends.

Are you including trades of minor-league prospects who might or might not have made it eventually, and somehow did, for veteran performers by teams trying to strengthen themselves for the stretch? There are plenty of those (:cough: Jeff Bagwell :cough:).

Another might be Dave Murphy and Kason Gabbard for Eric Gagne, in 2007. Gagne looked like a great pickup for the pennant drive, a former Cy Young winner who had performed well for Texas after surgery, for a couple of fringe-looking players. Boston nearly made Gagne the closer with Papelbon setting him up. Gagne is out of OB now, and Murphy is doing well as a Ranger.

Sparky Lyle for Danny Cater.

Red Sox fans of a certain age are still pissed about this one. Cater was at the tail end of a good but not great career. Sparky went on to help the Yankees to three pennants.

On edit: There was no justification for that trade.

The dates don’t support that (the New York Times confirms the opening date of the play). You don’t need money for a show once it opens. At that point, it’s supported by the box office. Since the box office was fairly good, I can’t see why he needed the money.

In any case, whatever he did with the money, the impetus to trade Ruth was the Babe’s threat to sit out the season if his contract wasn’t renegotiated. Ruth was a headache for Frazee and he had grown tired of him.

According to this book, Frazee did have debts associated to staging plays and sold Ruth for the money.

The assertions are contradicted by original sources and the timeline. Ladies First was a solid success on Broadway at the time of the trade, the only show Frazee produced in 1919. When it closed in June of 1920, it was the 11th longest running show at the time. It’s clear that the play was making money. (It seems like it spent a long time on the road before the opening, which would have increased costs, but not by much. The show was on the road during the days before the Actor’s Equity Strike, so Frazee didn’t have to pay the actors for rehearsing). The book clearly states that he sold Ruth after Ladies First opened, which was when the cash flow was coming in for the show. And once a show opens, if it’s running at a loss, it closes immediately.

The book also ignores an article cited by Neyer by Glenn Stout in in 2005 that actually looked at Frazee’s finances in 1919 and showed that he was not in any financial trouble.

Now Frazee could have used the money for his theatrical show; money is frangible. But he did not use it to finance Ladies First (which was a success). He may have used it for other shows and theatrical pursuits, but they were not a factor in the trade.

Frazee traded Ruth because Ruth was a pain in the ass (as your source notes). 8

Good for Neyer that he got a book deal out of it, but the fact of the matter is that most trades looked even and fair when they were made, weren’t they? Was either the Chicago Tribune or the Chicago Sun-Times outraged when Lou Brock was traded for Ernie Broglio? I doubt it.

Raiders give up Randy Moss to the Patriots in return for a fourth-round draft pick.

Looks idiotic now that Moss has returned to something top-5 WR status in the NFL. But at the time, Moss was basically DONE with the Raiders. He had started off great when he joined them in 2005, but he was suffered a huge hit halfway through the season against the Chargers and wasn’t quite the same the rest of the year. In 2006 he was obviously not trying… and yes, while the Art Shell offense was flat-out terrible, he’s still collecting a paycheck and should be putting some sort of effort in. He had to go, one way or another, and if the Raiders hadn’t traded him, they might as well have just cut him. So getting a 4th rounder was better than nothing.

The Montreal Canadiens trade Chris Chelios to the Chicago Blackhawks for Denis Savard.

Montreal needed more goals, and Savard certainly would provide that; more than a thousand points over a decade in Chicago. Chelios had a serious knee injury in 1989-90, and they had many young defenseman ready to step into more prominent roles (Eric Desjardins, Mathieu Schneider and Petr Svoboda, to name some)

Obviously, it didn’t work out that way. But, Montreal still won a Stanley Cup with Savard. Chicago did not.

No, in fact the deal was considered at the time to be a steal for the Cubs. The year before, Broglio had gone 18-8 with a 2.99 ERA. He’d gotten off to a somewhat slower start in 1964 – but then, so had the Cardinals as a team.

Brock, on the other hand, was batting .251 at the time, and had never hit higher than .263. He had not shown he could hit for power and his fielding gave rise to his nickname “Brock as in Rock.”

As for the Tribune’s reaction?

I would try to justify the Kansas City Royals trading away a young and promising David Cone for the ailing Ed Hearn, but I would have no idea how to do that. Luckily, teh intarwebs came to my rescue:

http://royalsretro.blogspot.com/2008/05/100-greatest-royals-of-all-time-52.html

Cone was in AA ball at the time, and had taken a big step backwards. It was looking like picking him in the draft was based a fair bit of homerism (he hailed from my high school alma mater Rockhurst High School, a local KC private school).

The Royals were down a catcher (Sundberg had run his course behind the plate), and Quirk hadn’t matured yet.

Cone went on to excel with the Mets, going 81-51 with a 3.13 ERA, 1.19 WHIP, 1172 K, 431 BB in 7 seasons (he finished a 17 year career with stats just under HOF consideration).

Hearn - well - he played 13 games for the Royals.

This one:

The Baltimore Orioles trade pitchers Curt Schilling, Pete Harnisch and outfielder Steve Finley to the Houston Astros for First Baseman Glen Davis.

Sure, the Orioles gave up pitching for non-great hitting – there’s a reason for the maxim never to do that – and sure, we spent a decade or so reading about Schilling’s accomplishments. But what’s not fully understood is that Davis wasn’t a better hitter than the Orioles had on staff, and Harnisch and Schilling were their absolute best pitching prospects. The team went from having a promising farm pitching crop and mediocre hitting to having nothing and mediocre hitting.

The often forgotten part is that Davis broke his jaw in a bar fight two years later and was never worth a damn again, hitting .177 in his final year.

Justifying the trade: The baseball world was tired of Orioles dominance, and particularly the Orioles’ reputation for smart management. This put an end to both, apparently permanently – a highly efficient trade.

Davis was a better hitter than anyone on the Orioles aside from Randy Milligan (including Saint Cal Ripken The Man Who Saved Baseball), with an OPS+ in the mid-130s from 1986-1990, and for whatever reason Milligan was never taken seriously by baseball insiders. Davis was a big upgrade at 1B/DH over Sam Horn, Joe Orsulak, and the other candidated Baltimore had.

Which still doesn’t say you send 3 of your top prospects for a 30-year-old who’d lost half of his most recent season to injury. But without the freak injury, the trade looks less uneven.

Well, after the trade he hit .227, and later .277, and .177, if memory serves. None of which are worth very much in trade value. I find it hard to get excited about a .227 hitter. At the time of the trade, my father (who knew a lot more about baseball than I ever will) rolled his eyes.

If we’re going to include baseball trades that involve minor leaguers you could fill five pages. It’s not easy to guess who will pan out and who won’t.

Example: the Yankees traded away Fred McGriff to get someone named Dale Murray. That sounds awful, but at the time they traded him away McGriff was in rookie league ball. He was a ninth round draft pick, hardly a Grade A prospect. Nobody would have looked at him and said, “Well, there’s 493 home runs right there.”

Steve Carlton (to Phillies) for Rick Wise (to Cardinals) in 1972.

Sure, Carlton was coming off a 20-9 season, and had turned in a phenomenal season in 1969 (ERA+ of 164). But in 1971 Wise was significantly ahead of Carlton in ERA+ (123 to 101) and WHIP (1.215 to 1.365), which made his 17-14 season with the punchless Phils look pretty good indeed.

Of course, Carlton was to turn in one of the greatest pitching seasons in modern history in '72, but his '71 stats didn’t make that look inevitable.