Let's negotiate peace in Ukraine

Great Debates
1

In other threads, we’ve thrown around ideas about what kind of agreement would end the war in Ukraine. I thought it deserved its own thread, but if mods decide this belongs somewhere else that’s cool.

So, let’s figure out a peace deal that will actually work. (Not what we’d like to see, which for me would be Russia giving everything back including Crimea and handing Putin over for trial in the Hague.) Let’s assume all parties are negotiating in good faith and will abide by the terms. Everything is on the table:

  • Donbass
  • Crimea
  • NATO membership
  • EU membership
  • Future supply of weaponry for Ukraine
  • Reparations
  • Continuation (or not) of sanctions against Russia
  • Russia’s nukes
  • Other factors I can’t think of at the moment

Okay, Dopers, let’s solve this!

2

Russia (under Putin, at least, and probably under any likely successor) will not give up control of Crimea, and probably not Donetsk and Luhansk unless the have a complete collapse of military capability. Surrendering these would invalidate the war and undermine evena claim of moral victory.

Russia will not voluntarily accede to Ukraine being admitted to the EU and NATO and will insist on a demilitarized Ukraine but despite the realpolitik views that NATO offering Ukraine a path to membership is what spurred this invasion it is clear that Ukraine has good reason to want this, and the economic benefit of the industrialized Ukraine being in the EU rather than being a co-joined ‘client’ to a failing petrostate are evident. Ukraine, as a sovereign nation will insist on its right to choose its associations and will understandably refuse to disarm.

Reparations, denuclearization, and other concessions that further weaken Russia are a nonstarter for the same reasons as above. Indefinite sanctions are terrible for everyone involved and will be inevitably undermined anyway. The sum total is that without transformative regime change in Russia, a ‘negotiated settlement’ of this war is likely to end in a stalemate with Russia retaining control of Crimea and at least some parts of the Donbass region, Ukraine gaining stronger ties with NATO and the EU if not full membership, and some token sanctions toward Russia that don’t mean much while the West helps to rearm and militarize Ukraine. So, a largely Pyrrhic victory for Putin, a divided Ukraine, and continued instability between Russia and the Europe/US while China seeks greater advantage but no real alliance with Russia.

And no forward progress on any of the multiple existential threats facing humanity as a whole because nationalism and pseudo-idiological conflict trumps rationality and awareness. That, of course, assumes that this doesn’t escalate into something far worse, the consequences and outcomes I shudder to contemplate.

“Many were increasingly of the opinion that they’d all made a big mistake in coming down from the trees in the first place. And some said that even the trees had been a bad move, and that no one should ever have left the oceans.” – Douglas Adams

Stranger

3

I think part of the problem is that the second sentence is going to work in direct contradiction to the first. I think we have ample evidence that indicates that Putin does Realpolitik just as stated, but never negotiates in good faith - just in terms of what he feels he can manipulate short-to-medium term, but with no intention of keeping terms if situation changes in his favor.

Similarly, I don’t think Ukraine is going to negotiate in good faith - the moment Putin is out of power (by whatever means that ends up being) they’re going to (with good cause) toss any settlement out the window as it was basically forced at gunpoint and by bad faith by Russian actors.

Thus I stand with @Stranger_On_A_Train’s assessment, this is going to bog down as Russia’s needs to have a win will probably require concessions that will cross Ukraine’s requirements. I do NOT think we’ll see any sort of negotiated settlement, but we might see a negotiated, longish-term cease fire in which -

  1. Russia retains control of sections of the break-away territories (and Crimea still) even if it isn’t acknowledged internationally.

  2. Ukraine doesn’t formally enter NATO, but despite Russian desires, begins active cross training while in the territory of NATO countries, such as the training going on in Poland right now.

  3. Ukraine actively pursues EU membership, which while it won’t be fast tracked, will probably have open support.

  4. With active fighting ceased, transfers of weapons to Ukraine will slow (but not stop), especially as other former soviet bloc nations will happily transfer older soviet era weapons and vehicles.

  5. Russia will never agree to pay reparations, but Ukraine and it’s citizens can and will pursue all Russian assets and profits in various international courts, with some degree of success.

  6. Sanctions will probably be at least partially lifted on goods that are in international demand (such as wheat and petrochemicals), but the fact that Russia took control of international assets and disallowed sales will mean it’ll be a poor investment choice for the west. China will also have concerns, but as a show of support will probably consider some minimal investment, but Russia’s economy will remain substantially repressed.

  7. Russia will continue to maintain and brandish it’s nukes, especially now that their standing army has been made to look like (and may well be) a paper tiger by modern western military standards.

  8. Russia will likely cozy up (diplomatically) with other pariah nations to establish it’s own block, including Syria and NKorea, and thumb it’s nose at the rest of the world. So even less support for sanctions against NKorea as well as possible under the table technology transfers to distract.

So, in short, we’d see a semi-formal stop to hostilities, but fundamentally zero changes in solving the underlying concerns of ANY of the nations involved.

4

The following presumes Putin holds power – if he doesn’t, then Russia’s position could collapse very rapidly and they could lose everything including Crimea.

It seems clear to me that Russian ability to fight is getting worse and worse, and they won’t have the ability to do anything other than hold Crimea and the Donbass, if even that, over the next several months. If Ukraine continues to have the ability to fight (based on morale and supplies from European allies) over the next few months, I think they could push for essentially the best possible terms they could get, which I believe would be the following:

-Russian withdrawal to pre-war lines and return of all Ukrainian prisoners/deportees
-Internationally supervised referenda (possibly after a year or two delay) for the contested regions, both Crimea and the Donbass regions. The residents of those regions will have the free and fair ability to determine whether they belong to Ukraine, Russia, or become independent
-Ukraine agrees not to enter NATO for a period of time (maybe 15 years or so) but can join the EU and can make defensive alliances for security guarantees with European and American allies (to prevent another Russian invasion); Ukraine retains ability to maintain strong defensive military
-Some level of Russian reparations, but could be phrased as something like “infrastructure assistance” to save face for Putin. Russia also gets end of sanctions, and some token Ukrainian promise not to develop WMDs and remove (mostly non-existent) Nazi influences.

As weak as the Russian military has shown itself to be, I think the above is possible, if perhaps not probable.

If Ukraine judges it can’t or shouldn’t continue to fight for months or longer, then they could settle for the above minus the referenda (Russia keeps Crimea and the Donbass regions, but not a land-bridge between them) and minus the reparations.

I think the following will be non-negotiable for Ukraine, barring a complete military collapse which would go against everything we’ve seen so far:
-Ukraine retains the ability to defend itself and security guarantees (i.e. defensive alliance with Europe and the US) to prevent second Russian invasion
-no additional territory beyond Donbass and Crimea for Russia, including no land bridge to Crimea
-Ukraine retains ability to join EU

5

Russia keeps Donbass, Crimea and Luhansk.
No war crimes trials.
Ukraine gets to join NATO and EU.
No war reparations, but seized Russian assets can be used by the West to help rebuild Ukraine.
Exchange of POWs.
Sanctions lifted.

It’s a light-year away from what I would LIKE to see, but this may be good enough to get Russia to sign off on it.

6

You have a problem getting to first base on this. What happened to the Uk’s was a big terrorist strike. No one raised a complaint. Furthermore, no demands were made, no conditions set, no timetable set, and war was not declare. These are important matters, because without them, what we have is a big terrorist strike. In fact, it’s something worse than Pearl Harbor, where at least war was declared. War has not been declared by Russia.

Now, we can ask questions about the “Donetsk Oblast” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic”, specifically the politics of the residents, but I don’t know if we will ever know for sure the percentage that supports each side. When France took back Alsace & Lorraine at the end of World War I, it was assumed that most of the residents supported France. However, I read that 85% of them spoke German, which brings up the horrible matter of nationality. How shitty it would be if we found out that all these people were German. :roll_eyes:

7

Putin has mentioned security concerns. If he’s really worried about that, and if he wants to pursue a North Korea / South Korea solution, let’s try that, with a twist. Part of South Korea’s security includes having US troops on their soil. Maybe Russia can invite some of their “allies” to do the same. Have China and India build a base or two in western Russia so that those countries would have some skin in the game should Ukraine or NATO invade.

8

I think they’d find that China and India’s support (such as it is) would not extend that far. At all.

9

IMHO letting Russia retain the break-away regions could be acceptable to both sides. Note that the two regions in question, Donetsk and Luhansk, are part of the overall Donbas province (not the entire Donbas)…let Russia have it, but not Mariupol…

And, considering Crimea, I think there needs to be more discussion around that - I am not sure how parts of Ukraine became so inhabited by Russian speakers…

10

During the Soviet Era, there was a lot of forcible migration, both of ethnic Russians into Ukraine and traditional groups (Crimean Tatars, Zaporozhian Cossacks) from it. Crimea is actually a Russian annex from 1783 (as a consequence of the Russo-Turkish War) and was never traditionally a part of Ukraine until it was transferred in 1954. Donetsk and Luhansk are, of course, on the east of Ukraine bordering Russia and many ethnic Russians migrated into the Ukrainian SSR after the Holodomor to repopulate the region.

Stranger

11

I’m not sure we can really do this. Clearly Ukraine wants total withdrawal of Russian troops and freedom to associate with the EU and NATO. Russia wants to overthrow the Ukrainian government and replace it with a puppet regime. Peace negotiations can’t seriously happen until each side is convinced it can’t get all of what it wants at an acceptable cost. Exactly what each side might be pressured to agree to will depend on the military situation at that time.

I don’t think the Ukrainians will ever voluntarily accept the loss of democracy or significant restrictions on their right to trade with the West. I doubt Russia, barring dramatic regime change, will ever be willing to accept the possibility of Ukrainian membership in NATO.

12

I agree. This is sort of like if I am selling my car, book value $10k, but I love it and wouldn’t sell it for $50k, and you think it’s a piece of shit and wouldn’t take it for free.

How can we work this out to our mutual satisfaction?

13

Great analogy, and got a good laugh out of me, too.

14

I believe that’s where things sit most recently. Poutine wants nothing less than total unconditional Ukrainian surrender so anything he’d “sign off on” short of that would never be lived up to anyway. Much like Hitler in 1938. So the insanity continues and the chips fall where they may.

15

The problem with a negotiated peace is a simple little thing called “Principle”:

A hell of a comparison, eh?

There is nothing like a Pearl Harbor like surprise attack on a peaceful, benevolent neighbor.
The instigator(s) deserve Nuremberg war crime trials.
Let’s not forget the Moscow apartment bombings of 1999, with all the evidence pointing to Putin’s KGB friends, and his subsequent war in the Crimea. Shit for brains has to go.

16

And those views would be false. That is only an excuse Putin uses.

My suggestion- Putin gets acceptance of Crimea. Ukraine agrees to not join NATO (until Putin is gone). In a few years, Donblas holds a Plebiscite.

Sanctions ended, but assets can be used to rebuild.

Stalin. Stalin committed Genocide against Ukraine. i.e. the Голодомо́р, or Holodomor, Stalin starved 5-10 Million Ukrainians and moved Russians in. So, Putin claiming that he wants to protect Russian speaking people in Ukraine is like the man who murdered his parents, and then threw himself on the mercy of the court as he was a orphan.

17

Only acceptable peace in Ukraine would be total withdrawal of Russian forces back to the pre-February borders. If Russia wants to keep Crimea…o…kay. That may be acceptable. But nothing less than 2/24 borders.

And until or unless Russia does withdraw, the USA should keep funneling enough of the stuff that that $750 billion magnificent defense budget is paying for, to Ukraine, to force Russia to.

18

My understanding is that Ukraine has been trying to negotiate peace in Ukraine. They made overtures to Russia that were certainly urgent and presumably in good faith and felt were reasonable. They continued negotiating with the EU and NATO after credibly claiming no progress was made.

It is difficult to see what can be done now that would be acceptable to both Russia and The Ukraine. At this point the Russians would perhaps have to withdraw to 2014 borders, move all equipment away from the front and allow Ukraine’s overtures to Europe to continue. They might not find these terms acceptable. Ukraine would likely not accept much short of this?

Here is a current article describing the situation in some detail.

19

And that’s why everyone who thinks they can negotiate peace in Ukraine without pushing Russia out is living in fantasy-land. Ukraine has been at war since 2014, and they don’t seem to intend to stop being at war until Russia is no longer occupying their territory. I don’t think the west shutting off support would make them stop trying to achieve that goal. I can generally understand why, and I don’t see Canada or Mexico behaving any differently if the US tried to slice off portions of their territory by force, either.

20

From the above article (short excerpts, it is a very long article, unsure if paywalled as subscribe):

“Ukraine’s forces, outgunned and until recently largely outranged in artillery, have been mauled. The government says they are suffering as many as 200 casualties a day. On June 15th a Ukrainian general said that the army had lost 1,300 armoured vehicles, 400 tanks and 700 artillery systems, far more than previously thought. Many of Ukraine’s most experienced and best-trained units have been destroyed”…

Yet this does not mean Russia will sweep through Donbas. Its advance has been slow, grinding and costly, enabled only by massive, indiscriminate bombardments. New recruits are getting just a few days of training before being thrown into battle… Morale is low, [with] “armed stand-offs between officers and their troops”…

“Russia still has plenty of munitions and equipment… Russian arms factories are said to be working double or triple shifts, he notes. Russia also has large stockpiles of old tanks to draw on. Over time, shortages will bite… [Manpower is a bigger problem.]… finding enough of them is difficult: the government has had to offer lavish pay, of almost three times the median wage…. Russia’s shortage of well-trained troops is one reason its advance in Donbas has been glacial…

Indeed, some Ukrainian officials, including Volodymyr Zelensky, the president, argue that if Western help arrives on a sufficient scale, Ukraine may be able to win the war before winter sets in.…. But this optimism glosses over several yawning pitfalls. For one thing, Ukraine’s forces have used most of their munitions and, without the domestic manufacturing capacity to replenish them, are now completely reliant on foreign benefactors. The recent fighting has centred on long, heavy artillery barrages that consume vast amounts of ammunition. Russia, which has huge stocks, is thought to be blasting away… indiscriminately…

… The 7,000 Javelin anti-tank missiles America has provided, for instance, are thought to amount to about a third of its total inventory. Western armies do not want to let their own supplies run too low; in fact, many of them are hoping to add to them in light of Russia’s aggression… The worry in some Western countries is that Ukraine will try to match Russia gun for gun, and so blaze through its ammunition at a prodigious rate…

… The aim is to encourage Ukraine to use rocket launchers and other long-range systems in line with their original purpose of fighting a “deep battle”: hitting important Russian targets,…

…This offers a path, if not to outright victory, then at least to a standoff that imposes severe costs on Russia. Western officials doubt that Ukraine will be able to take back all the land it has lost since the invasion began. After all, the war has shown how much easier it is to defend than attack…

[However, money and economic change is a problem in Ukraine]… Mr Putin appears confident that time and money are on his side. Even if Russia’s forces fail to advance rapidly, they have succeeded in blockading Ukraine’s ports…. Mr Putin… [has] kept dissent to a minimum… But the lengths to which Mr Putin has gone to avoid a general mobilisation suggest that he is not confident that Russians are willing to put up with a long and bloody war…

… fully 93% of [Ukranian] respondents say Ukraine will prevail in the end, with varying degrees of confidence. “Ukraine has started to believe in itself,”…

…Ukrainians remain firmly against the idea of negotiations with Russia, with the mood against compromise shifting decisively following the reporting of Russian atrocities in the second half of March. They fear a repeat of the Minsk accords…

…