Just wanna say “thanks” to Col for the pointer to News and current affairs from Germany and around the world | DW as CNN.com was starting to sound like “The American Soldiers’ Network” to me, too. 
What does “Medh wal-mujamelat” mean?
No, I was asked, couldn’t because of scheduling but plan to soon.
My sense is that there is a somewhat similar dynamic with Iraq. Sadaam and Baath did a lot of things Iraqis consider positive in the early years, albeit bloodily, so the stew of feelings is very, very complicated.
Well…
Hard to say. If it was in the next two weeks, I would say don’t bloody go. And that is coming from me. Cairo is boiling now.
May, if the war is still on? Don’t go. If not, go.
I expect the conference will be cancelled in the end.
Praise and flatteries, or something along those lines.
I might note, that I do not want to appear to be saying people LOVE Sadaam, but that, as Izzy pointed out, and other articles point out, hatred/dislike of Sadaam does not ipso facto translate into support of the Anglo-American invasion or our plans for a post war Iraq, per se.
To explain, due to net investment/savings balance in US. US imports savings, so to speak.
I believe I can think of some ex-USA reasons, but in large part there are not economic reasons to do so, I agree. In fact makes exports more competitive, but raises domestic price pressures, given US balances. One can see scenarios where a rapid dollar fall could provoke some bad things.
Martin Wolf (FT) had some interesting comments on this back in January as I recall.
Well… yes. Medium term, a wonderful economists abstraction away from adjustment events, yes?
I can the exacerbation of an overshoot based on war-driven deficit fears. Likely, … I don’t know. Much more focused on the delicate position over here. Lord knows some of our companies would be well and trully fucked by a currency crisis.
C
I read the following list for the post-war Irak administration :
Military governor : General John Abizaid. Second in command to Gal Franks and of Lebanese descent.
Civilian administrator : Retired general Jay Garner, currently heading a company selling military equipment and friend of Mr. Rumsfeld
Deputy administrator : Ronald Adams. General, serving in the NATO headquarters and former commander of the international forces in Bosnia.
Coordinator for rebuilding : Lewis Lucke (member of the United States agency for international development)
Coordinator for civilian administration : Michael Mobbs, Ronald Rumsfeld special advisor, heading a comitee of Iraki “supervisors”, each of them being in charge of a kind of “ministery”.
Coordinator for humanitarian help : Georges Ward (I couldn’t quickly find infos about him on the web)
Coordination for Center Irak : Barbara Bodin (former ambassador)
Coordination for South Irak and North Irak : not mentionned
Collounsbury (et al),
There have been a lot of recent reports (or at least claims by the allied command) of Iraqi fedayeen forcing soldiers to fight at gunpoint, or with threats to their families (e.g. here). This is pretty brutal, but the bright side is that it suggests a possibility that if the US gains some degree of control, this type of intimidation would be considerably lessened, and the Iraqi opposition would lessen as well, replaced, perhaps, by some degree of resentment at those who perpetuated such tactics. What would your assessment be here? IOW, what percentage of the current resistance do you think is reasonable to attribute to these tactics, if any? (One big concern is that the US not get bogged down in some Chechnya-like situation).
One thing I can’t understand, BTW, is people saying that if Saddam remains alive/free the US mission will have been a failure. It would seem to me that this is confused. Saddam’s presence is only significant as long as he has a grip on the reigns of power. If he doesn’t, I don’t think he has the kind of Bin Laden following that believe in him personally. He does not stand for anything other than himself (or at least he didn’t, prior to this war). If he manages to escape somewhere and live in exile, it will be a personal triumph for him and something of an embarrassment for the US, but I don’t imagine it will mean much practically.
Super. Gotta get a listen to Abizaid speaking, heard he speaks Arabic, but wonder if it’s ‘kitchen arabic’ or the real deal.
BTW, I will be offline for the weekend, starting shortly.
Damn it lost my reply!!!
Okay, well, I will get back to this. See however links above.
to which Coll said
Slight misunderstanding. I was referring to the fiscal position - slowing economy with falling tax revenues, tax cuts, increased spending - not the current account deficit (roughly the value of exports less the value of imports).
But it’s useful to note the two sides of the current account deficit coin. Yes, in a sense the US “exports savings”, but equally, the world imports the productivity of US investment opportunities. Under a floating exchange rate, the current account deficit (trade less debt payments) must by definition equal the capital account surplus. People say a current account deficit means “we’re spending more than we earn” and/or “we’re not saving sufficient amounts to finance our investment needs and we have to borrow to make up the shortfall”. But it is - must be - the case that foreigners think the US is such an attractive place to invest due to the returns they expect to make that they’re willing to pay more than domestic residents to get hold of the assets. The former things sound like they’re a bad thing, the latter like a good thing. But under a floating exchange rate a current account deficit must be matched by a capital account surplus.
Collounsbury welcome back in your new and improved form. Thanks for starting the thread it is very informative.
Couple of quick questions before you go for the weekend.
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You keep mentioning the demonstrations in the region in terms of “Friday demonstrations” could you please clarify for me the signicance of Friday demonstrations vs Thursday demonstrations (if they even exist)
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Although I understand your position in reference to how you would like to see post Saddam Iraq governance played out, could you please indulge in what in your opinion what could be done possibly militarily to instill a sense of… how shall I say… an understanding within the “Arab street” that the U.S. is not playing games anymore in respect to our own national security.
Hey I know this is a somewhat simplistic view point but I wanted to keep this question short in order to possibly get it answered before you go offline.
Yes, I am well aware of this, however the deficit itself has to be funded out of the same universe of savings that private investment must be funded.
Given American low level of savings, we have further pressure.
Yes, true. At the same time, the attractiveness of US investment opportunities has proven to be somewhat less spectacular than one was led to believe during the recent giddiness.
Obviously this affects interpretations of the attractiveness of such investment opps, above all as foreigns have several reasons for fear information assymetries that they (and US) discounted, all that USGAAP superiority talk during the recent giddiness.
While there may be overshoot on the negative view, there are also political fears for several large pools of more or less mobile capital, including Gulf capital. Some disputable signs of redirection away from USA.
To the extent political issues dovetail with economic fears, you have added pressure.
Fine, all well and true, but insofar as the US net position may be unsustainable, the transition might be ugly.
Well, I gotta go, so I can’t clarify my thinking for the moment, but let me get back to this interesting point.
Well old boy, let’s see how long I can keep it up.
The ‘Friday Prayer’ is when people “go to Church” (to the Friday Mosque, the big ones) and often politics is discussed, especially in times like these. People get riled up – plus the Governments in question are more reluctant to repress mosque based political gatherings than elsewhere, so you get this issue of politics being squeezed into the Mosque space.
Powderkeg when people spill out in the street.
I predict Cairo is going to be bad this Friday, although perhaps Mubarek will really pull out the Blue Tin Cans.
What makes you think “The Arab Street” ever doubted this? This is a myopic view, US policy has long been “serious” in the region. But wrong headed.
Okay, I am really off now, my attache buddy has his nice armored car waiting for me! (joke, joke)
I presumed this was what you where refering to I just wanted to be sure. Thanks
We now step off in to the debating portion of my question which for the time being I would like to avoid. Worst case secnario what course of action would you concieve of working?
This is less of a question for Collounsbury and more a general question-
Who in the US Administration “gets” the Middle East? Anyone? It seems like Wolfowitz and the other advisors simply do not understand the history of the region, and are leading the president down the primrose path.
BTW, what are the Blue Tin Cans?
blanx
Yeah, what are the Blue Tin cans?
And what does “nota bene” mean?
(My plebe/prole roots are showing I know.)
nota bene- note well…
Blue Tin Cans = Riot Police?
BTW, the website yojimbo linked earlier in this thread, www.aljazeerah.info, is no longer available. While I was able to confirm that a couple of articles there were valid, I did see one that turned out to be utterly false. I question whether the site was valid at all.
I saw a web site up under the link from Wash Post, the english.aljazeera.net one, early yesterday morning. i figured that they just move their site while they worked on the other one. BUT the englsish. al… one isn’t a registered domain name according to MSN’s search.
I’ve been afraid to feel like Winston Smith about what I saw.
What made you question it? I’ve been browsing it off and on all day today.
Here’s this: http://dayton.bizjournals.com/dayton/stories/2003/03/24/daily30.html
i just found this. Hadn’t read it yet.