Well, I’m trying to set forth the logical consequences of what you yourself have agreed in order to understand your position. I can see no way to escape the consequence that I have ‘dead’ consciousness now, as well as 'live consciousness. That would lead inexorably to the conclusion that dead people are less conscious than living ones, since living ones have the ‘dead’ arrangement and the live activity as well. Is there anything in this you object to? I’m trying not to do anything you consider underhand here.
Again, instead of positing such a baffling enigma, surely the simpler explanation is that cadavers have not plural consciousnesses (since I, a cadaver with additional brain activity, can’t detect anyone else in here but me!) but lesser or none?
And I am exploring the consequences of the latter. What might my memory be retained in, do you think - what does birth wipe, exactly? Surely it is, again, far simpler to guess that there was no memory apparatus?
And what I interpreted as the ghost at the end of the bed? Some interpretations and experiential observations are illusions.
I appreciate your open-mindedness here, Gyan. Like I said, I’m uncertain that cognitive science yet provides the explanation of consciousness in terms of computational entities, and the boundary between consciousness and non-consciousness will inevitably be as fuzzy as that between life and non-life.
But the step you have made, considering cadavers, elementary particles and yourself in the 13.7 billion years before your birth as conscious, is as enormous a leap as calling atoms “alive”: it’s rather cutting off your nose to spite your face, philosophically speaking (and I won’t repeat the adjectives which even respected ‘awkward’ philosophers of mind like John Searle or Colin McGuinn use on the Stanford page). Adhere to it as you will, but it is a poor substitute for mere skepticism regarding the physicalist view, which I appreciate entirely.