If the connection of the consciousness to the memory is broken, and also the connection from the senses to the consciousness is also broken, then this would be expected behaviour.
But are they cognative modules, or are they the connection lines between consciousness and memory?
(P.S. Do you have any link to studies of mental activity and scans during REM)
(P.P.S. I’m mostly just devil’s advocating here, but until we can show complete processes congruent to consciesness occuring within brain neurons, it is hard to dismiss the possibility that we are only seeing the activity within brain material that contacts or interfaces with a metaphysical consciousness. )
That’s pretty much where I was going, but, as Gyan pointed out, I’m not sure you understood what I meant. As a physicalist, I (and I would guess SentientMeat would agree) think it’s possible to describe all of reality purely through physical description.
To get to the heart of this thread–which, if I’m not mistaken, is “What is the difference between SentientMeat’s (and my) supervenience physicalism, Gyan’s panpsychism, and Aeschines’s pantheism”–this is what I’m seeing. Please correct me if I’m wrong.
[ul]
[li]Supervenience physicalists (like SentientMeat and myself, I think) believe it’s likely that all of reality can be described purely through physical description (ie, using physics).[/li][li]Panpsychists (or at least Gyan) think it’s likely that it takes more than just physics to describe all of reality, although Gyan isn’t certain.[/li][li]Pantheists like Aeschines haven’t had time to way in on this thread yet :)[/li][/ul]
Am I wrong about anything in that list?
A more specific question for Gyan: Do you believe photons have consciousness, do you think it’s likely that photons have consciousness, do you think it’s not likely that photons have consciousness, or would you characterize your position on photonic consciousness in some other way (if so, please explain). I think SentientMeat and I fall into the “not likely” camp, with a strong not likely, but not absolute certainty.
To put it another way, I think the difference between at least supervenience physicalism and panpsychism, at least the versions accepted by those on this board, is a degree of openness to the idea of consciousness of things that do not specifically exhibit evidence of consciousness. As I said in my first reply, I don’t know that cyanobacteria lack consciousness, but I see no reason to believe that they do.
It seems a bit similar to an agnostic/weak atheist/strong atheist discussion. I don’t personally think there’s much difference between agnosticism (as the term is normally used, if not the strict literal definition of “a belief that it is impossible to answer the question of the existance of a deity”) and weak atheism; either you believe in something or you don’t. But I know that many people who describe themselves as “agnostic” likely don’t share the exact belief as me; I have no belief in a deity, because I’ve seen no evidence of a deity; they think it’s entirely possible that a deity exists, and often wonder if maybe one does, but they just don’t have the complete faith in a deity’s existance that they think someone who believes in a deity should.
Depends on whether photons really exist. They are the physical interpretations given to mathematical models. Are the entities at quantum levels “distinct particles”?
My position is if other consciousnesses exist, consciousness is universal.
This is the logical error in physicalism. Let C = consciousness, B = behaviour, H - humans, A =amoebas, R = rocks and L - life, S = self
I am conscious and alive [S -> LC].
I exhibit behaviour [S -> B].
Other alive humans exhibit similar behaviour [LH -> B]. Assume behaviour is indicative of consciousness [B -> C].
Hence, other humans are conscious [LH -> C].
Amoebas exhibit simple and unsimilar behaviour [LA -> B]
So do rocks, but not lively behaviour [(~L)R -> ~B]
The physicalists claim that [C -> B], which does not follow from the above.
And [~C -> ~B] is valid but unsound (atleast unknown), since [B -> C] is an assumption dependent on [C -> B] being true. [B -> C] is an assumption since consciousness is not observable.
What are “other consciousnesses”? Consciousnesses other than your own?
I’m not sure I can parse your logic argument (why didn’t Logic count toward my biology degree, and why didn’t I take it anyway???), so I won’t reply to that just yet.
It’s not necessary. Consciousness may ultimately be an emergent phenomenon exclusive to a list of entities coincident with our intuitions.
But given that fact that consciousness itself is not physical (what physical attributes does it possess?), it is less arbitrary to assume that consciousness is a distinct phenomenon. Hence, if I make the further (pragmatic) assumption that other minds exist, less arbitrary to assume consciousness is a non-privileged universal aspect of matter rather than pick some cutoff threshold like primates or rats, mainly based on some intuition. Intuition, which is primarily grounded on the [B -> C] assumption, where similarity of behaviour required is some fuzzy notion of “humanlike” behaviour.
What?? You surely don’t think that ‘unmathematically moving’ things like kites or coupled pendulums or robots are alive?
No, it isn’t at all. Motion is just an observed activity of living things, just as synapse fire or witty conversation is an observed activity of waking humans. Why do you say that observing motion=observing life but observing synapse fire or witty conversation** != **observing consciousness? To borrow from a later post of yours, why do you Assume behaviour is indicative of life [B -> L]?
Neither do I. Why do you assertively believe that rocks and corpses have consciousness?
Because working memory requires access to past states: only certain processes and arrangements of certain complexity can remember things, just as only certain arrangements and processes of certain complexity can live, be alive. Why don’t you ask the same question about life, or computation, or any number of other processes which can only occur in certain arrangements of a given complexity?
I gave a physical mechanism of memory and memory formation, which I suggested was the basis of consciousness. What is the non-Pythonesque flaw in this science?
And physicalism is, as you agreed regarding the ‘perfect’ detector finding no physical change in the brain upon formation of a new memory. This would falsify the physicalist position (unfortunately, we haven’t got perfect detectors yet and so this test cannot yet be carried out - we can only point to the physical changes we do observe when new memories are formed).
But it can, just as well as other phenomena such as “life” and “computation”. We agree that you cannot experience the consciousness of someone or something else. But neither can you live the life of another organism. You cannot process the processing of another computer. Does this relegate biology and computer science to philosophy?
Then in what way could that person be “fully conscious” at all? Would a rock not be just as “fully conscious”, merely having its “connections broken”?
Well, if you’re asking me, their activity is what consciousness is. You sound like you want to remove all of the different levels of memory, sensory processing, emotional moderation and every other function in the brain and be left with this “consciousness” (perhaps even in a dead brain!). To me, that sounds like you want to disconnect all of the chips, RAM, ROM and other modules in your Playstation and still play Doom.
Depends on what you consider life is. Besides, life is motion doesn’t mean all motion is life. After all, you, the physicalist, should agree. If all is physical, then a human being, is ultimately entirely a product of the same physical laws as the kite. Or am I in the company of a closet vitalist?
Behaviour is the defining characteristic of life, i.e. patterns of motion. Unless you couple life with consciousness, life is entirely a third-party observable event, even if we don’t agree what the threshold is.
[quote]
Why do you say that observing motion=observing life but observing synapse fire or witty conversation** != **observing consciousness? To borrow from a later post of yours, why do you Assume behaviour is indicative of life [B -> L]?
What other phenomenon would life include? If consciousness is a requirement, then yes, the same restrictions apply to life as well.
Less arbitrary belief, given my belief of the nature of consciousness.
A retread. Begs the question. Reread earlier post
Life and non-life are both visible to the same observer. Agreed? So the demarcation line is among phenomenon of the same type, in the same realm. The only reason I know about consciousness is because I am conscious, and yet I can’t observe other consciousnesses and others can’t observe mine (if they can, everyone’s done an excellent job of hiding it). Now, if you believe that life involves some extra hidden elements, then the same objections apply as with consciousness.
You gave the description of what happens in the brain that corresponds to memory formation, given that consciousness already is present. You haven’t shown why and how sodium and serotonin zipping around neurons and glia should give rise to any experience in the first place. I can’t put this any simpler. If you can’t see the point here, this is a lost cause.
The object of inquiry in that sentence is ‘consciousness’, not physicalism. If all aspects of consciousness are amenable to scientific method, then the burden should be shouldered by the scientific method, else it’s masturbation material for philosophers.
That’s a stretch of the term ‘life’. I cannot assume the identity of any other object other than me. That’s ownership. But consciousness is also private. Life is observable, only a putative proxy is visible for consciousness.
Do you consider that kites and pendulums constitute life?
I do, which is why I am asking what your position is regarding what is alive and what merely displays some observed characteristics of living things. Kites aren’t alive, agreed?
I’ll give you the reasons why I don’t call kites “alive” upon request, just as I have given you reasons I don’t think kites are “conscious”. What do you say about the life and consciousness of kites, and why?
And yet, when I suggest that behaviour is the defining characteristic of consciousness, ie. patterns of computational activity, I am told that I am making unsound assumptions. What is the difference between your assumption and mine?
Again, in what way are the observable events of consciousness (by which you, a third party, demarcate my living consciousness from my dead consciousness) different from the observable events we use to demarcate my life from my death?
All kinds of observable activity: growth, replication, stimulus response *etc.[/i.] But this is just observable activity, not the life itself if we follow your approach, agreed?
I am keepin life and consciousness separate for now, since we agree (so far) that some things are not alive but disagree that some things are not conscious. I am asking you why you say that some things are not alive, since we could simply call kites, rocks and photons alive, thus neatly requiring no scientific explanation of how life emerges from complex arrangements of physical matter.
No it isn’t. Python Sketch. Hum Sousa’s “Liberty Bell” march.
Not if they call kites alive, no. The observers can only agree on observable criteria by which to determine whether the particular arrangement is alive rather than non-alive. If one of them refuses on the basis that all things are alive and that life cannot emerge from specific complex arrangements of matter, the visible characteristics become irrelevant.
Is the only reason you know about life because you are alive?
I could show how activity in cells “should” give rise to life, yes? I could show how activity in chips and RAM “should” give rise to computation, yes? I can show how activity in neurons and glia “should” give rise to memory, yes? I’m using the word “should” in these sentences correctly, am I not? If so, are you not suddenly switching the use of the word “should” when I ask “Could I show how sensory input processed in working memory should be the basis of consciousness?”
But all aspects of life or even silicon computation are not necessarily amenable to scientific method, agreed?
And that still does not fundamentally impugn the thesis that life emerges from a complex arrangement of matter, agreed?
In what way is a putative proxy not all we can observe of ilfe?
Did you say this specifically to avoid dealing with the so-called 'hard problem"? If so, you’ve failed. Perhaps you and Gyan should face up to the fact that you are talking about what Chalmers calls awareness and he is talking about what Chalmers calls consciousness. You are definitely talking past one another.
I don’t care. The untied floating kite is on the fuzzy threshold for ‘life’.
Not agreed. There’s no objective boundary to life/nonlife, so I won’t answer that one.
Behaviour is externally manifested phenomena, consciousness is a privately-accessible owned phenomena.
There are no observable events of consciousness. If there were, we wouldn’t be having this discussion. Re: life, read below.
No. Life is just motion. I don’t see any aspect that needs extra elements to be posited.
It’s an arbitrary distinction, not an objective one. But generally, we regard life as that which exhibits certain characteristics, similar to ours, such as growth, seemingly unmathematical motion …etc.
Now, it’s your assertion. I said earlier, " Putting the cart before the horse. You have already assumed that gases can’t encode memory, hence the a priori defining of criteria for memory, in terms that processes, non-analogous to life, don’t satisfy. "
I’m not a vitalist, nor are you, seemingly. Not sure why ‘they’ are brought into the picture. I’ve noticed that your entire (or most of) interrogation is based on analogy . I suggest starting with first principles.
If I could be conscious without being “alive”, then No.
The result and the process are contained in the same realm. Emergence is not problematic there. The analogy does NOT extend.
Only if consciousness is already present.
Like which?
But the emergence of life does not give arise to any non-physical phenomena, unless you assume that something alive must be conscious.
Gyan, many thanks for your patience and input thus far, but I won’t respond to your last post just yet. I’d like, if I may, to back up a step. I’m still not sure what kind of answers you, a panpsychic, want from consciousness-emergentist me in order to address the questions you ask. You invited me to defend cognitive scientific models of consciousness, and I’m trying to do so in a way you might find convincing, but we don’t seem to be discussing the scientific results and models at all.
So, I’d briefly like to play the role of a panvitalist asking you, a life-emergentist, those same questions, OK? If you could (briefly) defend the biological scientific models of life (as vaguely as you like - we needn’t get technical), I might see a more useful approach. Here goes:[ul][li]It seems like you are assuming that observable behaviour is indicative of life. Of course I can see all this observable activity in these furry or leafy things, like motion and replication and whatever, but are you going further and saying that this observable activity is the life, ie. the cause of the life?[/li][li]Why should these seemingly arbitrary complex arrangements give rise to something so enigmatic as life, this mysterious energy force which we cannot touch or see?[/li][li]Surely it is less arbitrary to consider that those things we think of as “dead” simply have a different life, perhaps a kind of life having no observable characteristics -why not simply ascribe life to particles, rocks, or indeed anything in the universe?[/li]Even biologists and life scientists agree the emergence of life from physical matter is full of gaps. How can you cling to life-emergentism in the face of such glaringly insufficient explanations?[/ul]Again, I’m not trying to mess you about here and I promise I won’t continue in this role any longer than absolutely necessary (and, again, I’m extremely grateful for your contributions here). I’m only trying to work out how I might explain those elements of cognitive science to you most effectively.
Life doesn’t have a separate cause. Life is the umbrella term used for agglomerations of matter that exhibit certain types of behaviours. There’s no privilieged phenomena at which we have to guess. Assuming that life and consciousness aren’t necessarily copaired, there’s nothing extra to explain about life. All we observe is all there is.
I don’t associate a mysterious “elan vital” with life, so no issues for me.
I say the same of computation and, ultimately, consciousness: we observe the consciousness of conscious things only by their behaviour just as we observe the life of living things only by their behaviour.
Why not? I don’t associate a mysterious disembodied soul with consciousness, since cognitive science sets forth an explanation based on sensory processing in working memory, so there are no issues for me in that case either.
Why don’t you, since you for some reason do for consciousness?
(And could you give the final question a shot, if possible?)
Consciousness is a real, private & owned phenomenon, unlike life, barring a posited life “force”. I assume consciousness of other humans, because, within my consciousness, I observe my owned physical embodiment and notice that other humans are similar. Hence I “complete the picture” and assume that other human apparitions must be like me. From this assumption [B --> C], you have derived another assumption [C → B] via some bizarre, and unknown to me, logic. In order for you to assume that consciousness does translate to behaviour, you have a sample size of 1, just you. At least, we can agree, that’s bad science.
Umm, the “some reason” being, I (a mental concept of consciousness) experience (the primary predicate of consciousness) consciousness (the phenomenon). Within your consciousness, You experience the vision, smell, sound…etc of me, not my consciousness. No offence, but this should be clear as sky. Maybe, someone lurking, can put this in better words than me.
If life does require a ‘force’, then there’s a problem. If not, the “gap” is just the result of the “wonder” with the phenomena of life. The “wonder” exists because we are of such a state (‘alive’), lot of the environment around us, isn’t. That discrepancy and the failure of deliberate human action to completely manufacture it in a lab, leads to that “awe”, which will relegate life to be a “precious mysterious gift”, with no actual theoretical deficiency in physical explanation.
But the life of an organism (or the computations of a computer) are also private to that organism (or computer), yes? I cannot live the life (or compute the computations) of those things, I can only observe those things.
Exactly the same logic as you derive the assumption that Life–>Behaviour, surely?
And I (a computer) process (what computers do) sensory input in working memory (the phenomenon). If you are simply asserting what your position is, I may surely do the same? I had hoped we could talk about cognitive science just as I had hoped you might at least allude to biological science in your answers.
The sensory input to my working memory is not of lifeor consciousness, but of the behaviour of you, a living, conscious entity.
Again, if we can get into the science (be it biological or cognitive), things might become clearer. At the moment I am merely mirroring your assertions.
A beautiful answer, and thanks for putting in the extra time to provide a paragraph rather than a single line - such effort really helps these debates along.
Could it not be that consciousness is such a wondrous process, despite having a physical computational explanation, that our “awe” elevates it to the level of a “precious mystery”? We are conscious, but so much of the rest of our environment seems not to be, nor can we manufacture it in a lab (at least, not anything like what humans have). You say that life has no theoretical deficiency in physical explanation, despite biologists and life scientists pointing out the blatantly obvious real, practical deficiencies in reducing life to matter. Could a cognitive scientist not similarly dismiss you “theoretical” deficienceis just as you do those of the vitalist?