MLB: Can Bonds make it to 756?

In My Humble Opinion
21

Right, I know. But the Giants have Bonds, and Bonds alone. This is where I said the numbers can blind one to common sense. Bonds batting leadoff, in a best case scenario, garners you what surplus production over the course of the season? Maybe six bombs and ten walks? We can probably assume that Bonds will get more at-bats, too, so maybe he gets another five or so homers because he’s more likely to get pitched to. More Bonds PA’s and AB’s in place of Ray Durham’s PA’s is obviously an improvement in a vacuum. But don’t you think Bonds’ presence in the middle of the order, over 140 or so games, is worth those six to ten HR’s (which are more likely to be solo than not) in terms of run production out of the rest of the order?

Here’s what the protection/production stuff boils down to, in my opinion. Will the top 3 Giants hitters get pitched to differently when Bonds is behind them than they would if they were batting 2-4 and Bonds has already batted? As soon as you acknowledge that they would, you acknowledge that Bonds’ position in the lineup does matter, and damn the numbers. I’ve seen some of the studies, but I just don’t think this sort of thing translates from situation to situation. Bonds batting behind Grissom is an entirely different animal than Jose Canseco batting behind Dave Henderson.

22

I think most of Bonds’s home runs are solo anyway, since he gets pitched to differently or pitched around with runners on. He has 18 homers and only 39 RBI.

23

Right. So is putting Bonds into more situations wherein he’s likely to be up with nobody on really an improvement?

24

I think in the end it wouldn’t make that much difference, or that getting him pitched to more often would be an improvement.

25

Home Runs- Career = #1
Bases on Balls - Career = #1
Slugging %- Career = #2

:eek:

Un-Freakin’-Believable!

26

I think you’re right but I think this is wrong reason. Why would you pitch differently to those batters if they’re batting 2-4 than if they’re batting 1-3? Surely the pitcher’s intent is always to minomize the likelihood they’ll reach base? How would the pitcher’s approach differ?

There’s no evidence other players post different numbers based on whether they are in front of or behind a feared power hitter. You can keep repeating that they should behave differently, but it just does not happen.

Why I doubt the smarts of Bonds hitting leadoff is that he’s playing in the NL, so the slot ahead of him is posting a .170 OBP. You’re going to lower the value of his contributions in homers and walks by vastly reducing the likelihood that the batter ahead of him is on base. Granting that his homers are mostly solo jobs, walking him with men on is a lot better for the Giants than people think, and doing far more damage to opposing teams than they realize. You want to maximize the number of PAs Bonds posts in high leverage situations.

27

I see what you’re saying, RickJay. Obviously you’d always like to get the batter out, I just think that in the case of hitters in front of Bonds, the priorities are 1. DON’T WALK HIM, 2. don’t let him get a hit. In other words, make these guys get a hit, because free runners on base ahead of Bonds is suicide. If they were behind Bonds, obviously the pitcher would still want to get them out, but the fear of the walk is diminished. Considering that the current Giant hitters beside Bonds aren’t the most selective in the world, I don’t think that would help the team. It’s easier to get somebody out when you aren’t afraid to walk them, that’s all.

28

There is a mathematical solution that would provide Bonds more at bats and homer opportunities, and still pressure pitchers not to walk good hitters.

Suppose the regular lineup were:

  1. Mr. Leadoff (high on-base percentage)
  2. Mr. Greathitter
  3. Barry Bonds (cleanup hitter)

The new lineup could be:

  1. Barry Bonds
  2. Number 4
  3. Number 5
  4. Number 6
  5. Number 7
  6. Number 8
  7. Number 9
  8. Number 1
  9. Number 2

Problem solved.

29

In other words, get him out.

30

In that order, genius.

31

But Yookeroo’s point is sort of hidden. What matters in baseball is getting on base. If you get on base more you will score more runs; if you get on base less, you will score fewer runs. Absent a really bizarre number of home runs, getting on base and not making outs is 90% of scoring runs.

So let’s go back to Barry Bonds’s teammates. If the Giants’ opponents always pitched the way they SHOULD pitch, they would always try to pitch to keep the Giants off base. They wouldn’t be concerned about hits first and walks second, or walks first and hits second, or who was coming up next; they’d just try to minimize the chance of guys getting on base by either method, because that is what works 100% of the time. Now, I don’t understand why they would be concerned about walking people in front of Bonds more than giving up hits, as opposed to giving up hits more than walking people after Bonds. Walk or hit, a man is on base. But I’ll grant this MIGHT be true. I don’t think it is, really; no MLB pitcher is going to groove fat pitches to avoid walking you unless he’s convinced he’ll give up less in hits than he saves in walks, and if that were true, he’d do it all the time no matter who was coming up next.

From the Giants’ perspective, though, it doesn’t matter. If opposing pitchers are going to change the way they pitch and therefore disadvantage themselves, that’s good for the Giants. If they really are dumb enough to start grooving pitches in an effort to avoid walking men in front of Bonds, that’s not bad for the Giants, it’s good. You WANT them to groove easy pitches.

In any event, more recent evidence suggests that pitchers really only control three things; how many men they strike out, how many men they walk, and how many home runs they give up. The convincing evidence is that pitchers have little or no control over the batting average of balls put into play, and the ratio of hits to outs on balls to play is pretty much identical for all pitchers in the long run, assuming the same ballpark and defense. Since that is the case, it is always to the benefit of a pitcher to, in every situation no matter what, concentrate on striking guys out, not walking men and not giving up homers. (In other words, keep in down in the strike zone.) Again, it doesn’t matter if the next guy up is Barry Bonds or Barry Manilow. It’s always to your benefit to reduce BB’s and taters and increase K’s. Any deviation from that strategy by the pitcher helps the Giants.

32

Of course, good pitchers know that that when they are facing batter X and you need a double play, that if you throw X a certain pitch in a certain location X is apt to hit a ground ball to shortstop. Granted, it is out of the pitcher’s control whether or not the shortstop fields it cleanly, or makes a good toss to the second baseman for the force out, or whether the runner coming from first breaks up the double play or not, and on occasion batter X will not ground to short but will bloop a hit, but in that situation the pitcher’s proper play is to try to make batter X hit it a grounder to shortstop.

33

No, counter-intuitively, what Rick is saying is based (I’m pretty certain) on some groundbreaking work by Voros McCracken.

From the numbers it appears that other than strike outs, walks and home runs (the ‘three true outcomes’ that made Rob Deer famous) their appears to be no control on the part of the pitcher with what happens when a batter makes contact. Out, single, triple, double play, etc…the minute it touches the bat (other than HR as mentioned) it’s out of the pitchers control (there may be a very few exceptions for the all-time great pitchers).

Here’s a link to Voros article on BP. I think that’s a free link. If not you can google 'Voros McCracken and get some info.

34

I believe he will. I am also rooting for him to.

35

Again, I don’t necessarily think that the numbers are the same as the real game. Just because a bunch of people on the internet have run extensive studies to determine that you should never bunt hitters over, or never steal with X outs, or whatever, that doesn’t mean Joe Torre is sitting at his computer taking notes. Baseball people do things that the SABR people say they shouldn’t. Happens all the time. So when you say that the numbers show that pitchers can’t control what kind of hits they give up, that’s fine, but I don’t believe that the numbers are dictating what is Randy Johnson thinking when he’s pitching to Ray Durham. No pitching coach is reading Voros McCracken and saying, “OK guys, new strategy. We can’t control what they do when they hit it, so if you’re going to throw a strike, throw it right down the pipe,” right? They’re still trying to force the outcome, whether the number support that effort or not. I don’t want to come off like I’m disparaging the guys who do those studies, I’m just saying that baseball statistics and baseball aren’t the exact same universe.

Anyway, let me try to explain this again. First, I never said that it wasn’t to the Giants advantage that pitchers pitch differently in front of Bonds. I’m saying that it definitely works in their favor, and thus Bonds should be in his customary spot in the middle of the order. Second, I find it hard to believe that you don’t think pitchers consciously put the ball in play in front of Bonds. Here’s a scenario to try to illustrate what I’m talking about- 8th inning, tie game, Bonds is hitting fourth in the lineup. One out, man on second. Grissom’s at the plate with a 2-1 count. Obviously, a base hit hurts you because it scores a run. If you try to pitch away from contact, though, you risk going 3-1 and losing Grissom, bringing Bonds up with two on and no bases empty. So what do you do? Seems to me, based on what I’ve heard from post-game press conferences and the like, that Grissom’s getting a fastball. If he hits it, he hits it, and hopefully you make the out. But you can’t lose Grissom, because if you pitch to Bonds with two on, your chances of getting out of the inning alive are slim. The pitcher has to believe he has a better chance with Grissom putting the ball in play than he has with Bonds, so he has to make an effort to get the out from Grissom. Walks in front of Bonds are more dangerous than walks behind him, or walks of him, because the only way walks hurt you is when somebody makes it hurt.

That’s what I mean by priorities. If Bonds isn’t looming on deck, you can pitch to Grissom as usual- just try to get him out. With the grim specter of a three run bomb hovering over you, though, you have to make a conscious effort not to lose Grissom. Moreso than usual, because you just can’t be forced to pitch to Bonds. Obviously, you always want to get Grissom out, but you’d rather make him beat you than risk letting Bonds do it. Maybe Grissom beats you 30% of the time if he gets a fastball, but Bonds beats you even harder, and even more often. Plus, Grissom, being used to hitting in this position, should know to look for a fastball to crush, so Bonds makes him a better hitter. Maybe I’m way off base, but hopefully that at least explains where I’m coming from.

36

In regards to your first paragraph there the important point is that pitchers have been adjusting as you described for a century and it hasn’t shown up as resulting in anything more than random behavior.

I’m not trying to bring you down or attack you, Jimmy. Please understand that. But the important point to remember here is that all the sabermetric studies you see are based not on theory (some are, I suppose) but rather on what the real-world outcomes are in such situations.

Sort of like you mention about bunting and such…the reports you might have seen from James Click on BP lately about this aren’t made up. They’re real world results. Sort of like:

If a runner is on second with no outs and the batter bunts in what percentage of those situations does the runner score? And in the same situation without a bunt what is the scoring percentage? Contrast the two and it’s possible to develop some idea about what the better scoring strategy will be.

But click has even taken it farther than that. He’s taken it to the batters performance. REcent in a column he broke down such performances and determined that a batter has a better chance of bringing the runner home via the bunt (and the downstream consequences thereof) if his overall numbers are below .249/.305/.370. If they’re above that a team is more likely to score that runner if the batter does not bunt and attempts to bat normally.

And that’s a big piece of data.

37

Oh, I wasn’t trying to imply that the BP people et al are a bunch of geeks sitting around a supercomputer, wholly divorced from the diamond. I realize that when they run these studies, they know what they’re doing and they’re using real data. If they say X is correlated strongly with Y, I believe them. I think that much of what they find can be applied beneficially to the major leagues.

What I’m trying to get across is that the people in charge of major league clubs’ behavior don’t, necessarily. There are other factors at play- egos, attendance, money, the manager’s personal affinity for speed (on the basepaths, not in the locker room). So that the fact that, historically speaking, the OBP of the leadoff man has accounted for 58% of a club’s offensive performance (numbers pulled out of ass) doesn’t always translate into a team’s best OB guy batting leadoff. If I was managing the Giants, and if other teams were using data reports to optimize their chances of retiring my lineup, and doing it with success, I would use the data to counter that. However, other teams don’t do that. Like you say, the pitchers have been doing what I described. Bobby Abreu doesn’t bat leadoff for the Phillies (don’t get me started). And I don’t think that the teams who face Bonds treat the 1, 2, and 3 hitters the same no matter who bats behind them. I think that they panic, don’t want to put runners on in front of Bonds, and so adjust their strategies accordingly, and by doing so they make the Giants a better offensive ballclub. The fact that this is to the Giants’ advantage is neither unexpected nor contradictory to my argument. You have to do what’s best considering what they are going to do, not what would be best if they did what they should do.

In a perfectly efficient baseball world, every team would field the lineup that maximizes their chances of scoring runs, and every team’s strategies would be backed up by reports and analyses. I don’t think this is that world, though. I think that other teams alter their pitching based not on sound statistics, but based on fear. As long as this is so, I think it’s smart of the Giants to play off that fear, instead of putting out the best theoretical lineup based on what a smarter manager would do against them. Right now, I think that Barry Bonds has a bigger impact in the middle of the order, considering what the opposition does.

38

Oh, you’re certainly correct that the analytical side isn’t being adopted quickly…but it IS happening. Currently we have GMs with an analytical bent in Oakland, Chicago (Cubs), Boston, and Toronto and a few others are leaning. It’ll be a slow process but an almost inevitable one.

And that imparts a competitive advantage to those who DO use this research to better their teams. If one manager knows that the sacrifice bunt won’t maximize runs and another doesn’t then the smart money is on the first manager scoring more runs (all other things being equal)(ha) and therefore winning more games. (Don’t get me started on pythagorean records!)

As an extreme case of analysis a few years ago the early God of the movement, Bill James (now hired to consult with Boston) ran an experiment in which he asked ‘What if opponents just gave up on Bonds and simply walked him EVERY time?’ So he constructed a study in which all of Bonds teammates produced their real-world number and Bonds went 0-0 with 600 walks (leading, amusingly to a line of .000/1.000/.000) and set the computers loose. Turns out that NOT pitching to Bonds completely actually leads to the Giants scoring more runs because of the increased number of baserunners the Giants get with all those walks.

39

Thanks for the link to McCracken’s very interesting article, Jonathan. I don’t buy his thesis though.

I think all that McCracken proved is that there is a lot of background noise in baseball statistical analysis, which we would all agree on. While if one is studying pitchers’ quality it is beneficial to factor out things like the quality of the pitcher’s team’s defense, it doesn’t follow that the pitcher only has control over Ks, BBs and HRs. It doesn’t follow because the pitcher doesn’t wholly control those either, because it does matter whether the pitcher is facing Barry Bonds or Barry Manilow, or Joe Morgan or Joe Charboneau. The fact is that the pitcher does have some control, the degree of which I have no idea about, concerning whether the batter hits a grounder or a fly ball.

In one of Thomas Boswell’s books - I forget which one - he talks about interviewing Gaylord Perry, and Perry said that he knew how to pitch to batters based on the batters’ stance, the situation, and stuff like that. You pitch in one guys hands to get him to pop it up if he’s standing one way, etc. With all due respect to Mr. McCracken, and to Bill James, whose books I love, I trust Gaylord’s opinion over Mr. McCracken’s.

40

Nobody’s suggesting that Bonds and Morgan don’t affect the number of K’s, BB’s, and homers. However, in the case of K’s, BB’s and homers, those things are heavily affected by who the pitcher AND the hitter are. In the case of hits, it appears to be affected very little by who the pitcher is (once the ball is put into play; pitchers with more strikeouts, obviously, allow fewer hits.)

You’re welcome to doubt the thesis but thus far, all studies into it find the same thing. Do you have objective evidence to the contrary?

Which has a pretty strong impact on home runs allowed - which, again, is one of the three things we agree the pitcher exerts great control over. Actually, my understanding is that a pitcher can exert a slight amount of control over hits allowed, but it’s not much.

With all due respect to Mr. Perry, who was a great pitcher, if he could pitch THAT precisely, I am curious as to how he came to allow 399 home runs, 1,379 walks and 4,938 hits. If he could place the ball that effectively why’d he get lit up all those times?

I’m sure Gaylord knows a lot about pitching, but he still managed to give up 4,938 hits on (by my calculations) approximately 12,400 at bats. So when the ball was put into play against Perry, about 39.8% of them fell in for hits. That’s basically league average for the time and places he pitched - actually, maybe a hair below, certainly no more than four or five hits a year. That’s the point. The skills in this area really amounts to no more than a hit a month in the case of really GOOD pitchers. It’s a tiny, almost unmeasurable and basically meaningless skill. But a pitcher’s ability to avoid walks and strike guys out is a very big deal, and varies enormously from pitcher to pitcher. Home runs less so, but more important than hits.