No, my logic is that if he walks in front of a speeding bus he’s an idiot. And saying “well, maybe the bus would have gone around him,” is a pretty weak argument for supporting his decision to do something reckless with a high likelihood of disaster.
Going for it was equivalent to moving out of the way of the bus. Punting, in this case, would have been akin to trying to jump over the bus.
Yes, that’s exactly what I am saying. Bu t now you (and RNATB) are acting like I’m picking some arbitrary independent variable as an index of success instead of a game decision where the potential for disaster was clear to everyone, and which had a direct, undeniable connection to the outcome.
This is poorly aligned with what actually happened.
You need to prove that the likelihood of disaster is as high as you claim. Equating not punting with drunk driving is a poor, short-sighted analogy.
Look, “It didn’t work, therefore it was a bad decision” only makes sense if we know the outcome of the decision before we make it. Since we don’t, all we can do is try to make the decision that gives us the best chance of winning. Are you honestly saying that there is no chance going for it there gave the Patriots a better chance to win than punting, given that when the decision was made, the play might succeed and might fail?
No, what we’re saying is that you can’t use information from after the decision was made to critique the decision itself.
Um, yes you can. In fact, it’s the most important factor in evaluating a decision. Wish certain ex presidents had thought of it.
It would have been a bad decision anyway.
Yes, one could argue that plausibly, and people here have. But you don’t need to go the “you’re only criticizing it because it didn’t work.” IIRC, Collinsworth was questioning it as it happened.
FWIW, I tend to think it’s 50/50 either way. I was okay with going for it, but thought it was a lame playcall.
As for Gregg Easterbrook … I have too few brain cells to lose more by smashing my head against a keyboard while reading his column.
Great! Now please explain why.
ETA: Please explain why, using only information available at the time the decision was made.
I think it’s a fair analogy given the “percentages” argument vs. a wiser risk vs. reward assessment.
Because if you don’t convert the down you give a good offense a short field and a hella lotta mo.
You’re saying that Belichick shouldn’t have gone for it with 2:08 left in the game, because the Colts scored a touchdown with 13 seconds left in the game. At the time he made the decision, Belichick didn’t know whether they’d get the first down or not, so he has to look at the probabilities, as several people have described above in the thread.
Yes, but you can’t stop there. If you only include what might go wrong in your analysis, then every course of action is incorrect.
So far, you have failed to consider (or even acknowledge) the possibility of a good outcome – this is especially egregious since the good outcome is more likely than the bad outcome, and would yield an infinitely good result (i.e., a virtually assured victory).
That’s one dimensional coaching. You can have a computer make descisions based on percentages. A smart coach (as opposed to a coach who is too smart for his own good) will look at risk vs. reward, the rhythms of the game, etc. It’s not just a short field vs. a long one (although that’s a huge part of it). It’s also about playing an away game, knowing how invincible the Colts feel if they get it inside the thirty, the crowd going crazy. How doomed your own team would feel if they can’t get two yards.
Punt the damned ball. There’s a reason that’s the “conservative” play. Trust your defense, but give them every yard you can.
Better than denying the existence of a bad outcome that actually happened.
Seriously, put your money on the Phillies. I have a good feeling about this on paper.
You’re all right. The Patriots won ten alternate history versions of that game. Billicheck is a genius. Carry on.
The circumstances (“rhyhtms of the game”) were stacked in favor of that decision. The Colts had just burned them for a long TD drive very quickly and it’s unlikely they were going to stop another one. Chances are high that the Colts are going to score even if they have 70 yards to go in 2 minutes with a timeout.
On the other hand, the Pats are the best team in the league at making a short passing play conversion.
So you have 2 great offenses, one that has a very high chance of converting the 4th down, and the other that has a very high chance of scoring a TD if you let them touch the ball again, so “letting your defense handle it” is a bad decision in regards to the rhythm of the game. The Pats’ best chance was not letting Manning touch the ball again.
I didn’t see the game, but I’m inclined to think this was set up. We’ve seen these guys at sporting events before – hell, they were in the crowd at American Idol – and it’s no coincidence they only show up when Fox is doing the broadcast.
As for Indy/NE, yes, it was four-down territory – 30 yards or 75 yards, you give Manning the final two minutes and he’ll give you a TD – and no, the Pats did not convert on 4th – even a cursory look at the tape makes it clear that he didn’t have posesssion anywhere near the marker.