No. Carriers were considered adjuncts to the battleline, not the replacement for it. In any event, Saratoga had just arrived at San Diego having completed her months long overhaul at Bremerton. Enterprise was 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor returning from ferrying 12 Marine Wildcat fighters to Wake Island. Lexington was 500 miles southeast of Midway Island, on her way there to deliver 18 Marine Vindicator (or as they were more unkindly referred to “Wind Indicators”) dive bombers. You can see the locations of the two carriers deployed in relation to Pearl Harbor on a map here. For the conspiracy minded these are rather poor locations for keeping them out of harm’s way, either one could easily have run across the return path of or been spotted by Kido Butai and found herself alone against 6 Japanese carriers. Also note the size of the carrier fleet in the Pacific when Japan attacked: a grand total of 3 carriers, one which had just completed overhaul. In comparison there were 9 battleships in the Pacific, the 8 at Pearl Harbor and the Colorado which was undergoing overhaul at Bremerton. With the thinking of the time, it would have made more sense as a conspiracy to let the 3 carriers be sacrificial lambs at Pearl while the battleships were conveniently at sea.
Too much Alfred Thayer Mahan.
Mahan was an American naval officer. He was incredibly influential as a military theorist in the first half of the twentieth century.
A big part of Mahan’s ideas were based around the strength of the fleet. Mahan emphasized having the biggest guns, the heaviest armor, and concentrating all of the ships together into the strongest possible force.
The Japanese admirals were completely sold (so were a lot of other admirals). As they saw it, the way to win a war was attack the opposing navy. They saw sinking warships as the only measure of success.
Other navies were beginning to realize Mahan’s ideas were limited. You can defeat a fleet by attacking its logistic lines. It’s a lot easier to sink a fuel tanker than a battleship but a battleship without fuel is out of the fight.
It became was useful, but my understanding is that it was part of the overall torpedo development. They Japanese did not start working on shallow water drops that early.
I figured you would like that. One of the best spies ever. A pity that Stalin didn’t use his information better.
I saw and interesting documentary on him when I lived in Tokyo. Not surprisingly, the subject matter was presented differently.
That’s an interesting subject and something which I, too had unquestioningly fallen for the standard line that the Japanese missed the boat (ouch) by not attacking either the oil or repair facilities.
Anything about the Pacific War and Pearl Harbor in specific needs to be examined in light of the IJN’s core strategy of a “decisive battle” in which the battleships of the two combatants battle it out with the victor winning the war. Sort of like Jutland on steroids. Navy commanders had grown up with the victory over the Russians in which they done exactly this.
By summer of 1941 Japan was losing the peace, war between her and the US was inevitable, the only question was when rather than if. As I said upstream, everyone knew that Japan could not win a prolonged war against the US, let alone the entire ABCD alliance. (American, British, Chinese, Dutch)
So, they rationally realigned their national policies to prevent national suicide. No, just kidding. They closed their eyes and doubled down on the decisive battle doctrine. Shock the US at Pearl Harbor, seize all the islands around the DEA to protect their newly acquired oil and deny the US bases to launch a counter attack. The US would either charge out to protect the PI, and they would sink the fleet or the US would tire itself out fighting against fanatical soldier with higher “mental/spiritual” selves who would win because they were “Yamato” warriors.
The didn’t look at prolonged wars because if they had, it was helpless. Just as it always comes up on hypotheticals about refighting the Eastern front and what if Hitler hadn’t have attacked Russia. That scenario would not have happened because Hitler would not have been Hitler if he weren’t going to attack the USSR.
Japan had figured on a short, several month war. Yamamoto’s aims on December 8th (Japan time) were more than fulfilled. Interestingly, for all of his supposed foresight in the art of war, it was the subordinate planning the attack who more targeted the carriers.
I’ve seen the claim that Yamamoto had instructed that the oil farm not be attacked in order to preserve viability. However, other historians more follow the logic that it simply wasn’t a key target.
An interesting claim is that the carriers didn’t carry enough bombs to destroy either the dry docks or the oil farm. I’ve only read a summary on a WWII board, but it seemed to make sense. One point he make was the Japanese machine guns on the planes were not AP, so the oil farm tanks had to be destroyed by bombs. The author does extensive calculations. I can look for it if anyone is interested.
For the reason that they did not make a third wave, in addition, they had some serious concerns about sticking around the scene any longer than necessary. The commander had achieved his objectives beyond his dreams. He wasn’t the best, and was curiously conservative for this type of gamble but seniority but him. Someone else may have done differently. However, I suspect they still would have only wasted planes going after more ships in the face of increased resistance.
I’ve got a zillion things to do, so I should walk about from this, but no, I’ve to waste my time doing more research on this.
Reading about the shallow water attack and Little Nemo’s claim, I ran onto a web site by Kimmel’s son trying to rehabilitate his father’s name. Not that he’s the first to claim that his old man and Gen. Short were scapegoated, as that has been debated for years, but he’s saying that his father’s excuse was that Washington was also negligent in not being more proactive about defenses against torpedoes.
Colin Powell makes the point in his book about being a peacetime commander of a military base. You really aren’t doing much. In the classic At Dawn We Slept, the point was made that General Short was spending his evenings personally confirming the figures for where the ammunition was being stored for the regular reports. The author Prauge makes the point that if the generals are doing a lieutenant’s job, who will be doing the general’s?
This is also the charge against Doug. Even if Little Nimo’s uncited (and IMHO unwarranted) claim about MacArthur’s divided loyalties were true, it would not excuse the lack of preparations. He was the commander. On the ground. It was his responsibility. Full stop.
Post deleted. Everybody else said it better.
Okay, what is “the DEA”? I mean, I know you aren’t talking about the Drug Enforcement Agency, but I got nothin’ else.
Dutch East Antilles?
Great thread by the way. Learning a lot.
I think it’s just a typo - should have been DEI (Dutch East Indies) - you know where the oil was.
Dutch East Indies (?)
The name of Indonesia, prior to independence following WWII.
It should be noted that the Japanese launched very few attacks against Curaçao and no successful ones.
On this note, post war analysis has shown that Japan seriously underestimated the amount of shipping and material that was going to be required to fight the war.
Not only that, they seriously underestimated their ability to win wars. There were generals who were thinking of going up into Siberia as well.
Let’s not only take on America and the British commonwealth, let’s go for the USSR, too!
Go big or go home!
Overestimated. :smack:
I’m not ignoring your request for a cite. Unfortunately, I read it in a book and it’s harder to locate that then it would be with an online source. Google unfortunately doesn’t seem compatible with my library. Fortunately, it’s something I read in the last couple of months. I’m checking and I’ll post it as soon as I get it.
And I’m not disputing MacArthur did a poor job. Regardless of his hesitation over launching an offensive operation there was no justification for failing to take any defensive actions such as disbursing his forces. He deserves the full responsibility for not only his own individual failure but also for having gutted his command of any officer who was willing to take initiative and do their job without waiting for MacArthur’s permission.
As far as I know, they were adequately paid… they just weren’t properly deployed! 
I’m not directing this post at anyone in particular, but a few things popped into my mind that haven’t been covered.
First, I can’t see the value in Japan trying to conquer the US, or even invading the West Coast. What could they hope to achieve? There’s no question that occupying any land conquered would stretch their resources beyond reasonable limits. While they envisioned an Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, I don’t think this included the US much; they were much more Asia-oriented.
Japan didn’t attack Pearl Harbor to soften them up for landing; they were just trying to remove military threats to their own resource supply lines. This didn’t require invasion, just decimation.
Next, if Japan tried to invade the West Coast, and US troops weren’t available, don’t you think most US citizens would take matters into their own hands a la Minutemen? People fighting for their own land have a vested interest, even to the point of defensive absurdity.
Second, and for a reverse argument, those you claim the supply line for a West Coast invasion was impossibly long and impractical, remember that the distance from Japan to the US is exactly the same as from the US to Japan, yet the US had serious plans in place to invade Japan before The Bomb was dropped, with some of the same concerns – the Japanese would be fighting for their homeland, supply lines would be long, etc.
The notion of Japanese conducting any major invasion on the U.S. mainland is much too absurd to pass any sniff test. I didn’t click the link – Is the whole scenario a concoction by gun liberals? One of their themes is that Americans need their guns to protect from foreign invasions.
In my many days of wargaming, I have found this is the one thing that can allow the Axis to win. Japan putting any kind of pressure on the USSR can cause the USSR to collapse.
In fact the one-two punch of NOT attacking the USA (but yes, taking out the Dutch East Indies and British colonies) , thus allowing a push into India and pressure on Russia is the solid win. The USA entry is delayed by a year+ which cuts a lot of aid to the USSR, thus The Soviet Union goes down, and if the USA doesn’t enter, Britain sues for peace.
Mind you, I am not talking about a serious grab for land. Just a handful of divisions putting pressure. The Russians were still scared of the Japanese.
The problem with the Japanese-German Axis is that they didn’t act much like allies. They just had common foes.