Someone may have said that. However, unless there is a smoking gun, I can’t see how someone’s speculation would be all that meaningful.
Remember, all commanders in the Pacific area had been ordered to assume to be on war footing. Short and Kimmel were sacked because they had the misfortune of being peacetime commanders when the war broke out. MacArthur showed the same ineptness and IMHO, should have been sacked as well.
I don’t think it requires any further explanation.
Sort of. They were attempting to provide the US into rashly charging out with the remainder of the fleet and take them out in the “final battle.”
Also, the US fleet wasn’t decimated. We lost a bunch of WWI era battleships. The carriers, fast cruisers, and the whole rest of the fleet was saved.
It makes a good movie, but when you’re getting bombed with real bombs and blown up with tanks, a bunch of weekend warriors would not have been able to defeat a fully equipped army, had there been one.
The difference between Hollywood and guys like this is that the latter just simply kill everyone who resists him.
Read about the fighting between the Germans and the Russians if you want to see how many people can get killed in war.
It doesn’t take that careful of a read of history book to see that the US spent 3 1/2 years fighting closer and closer to Japan in order to build a supply line which reached Japan. Hence the reason for invasions of such places as Okinawa. We didn’t just go there to get a good tan.
One of the final huge debates which was ongoing when the Japanese surrendered was if they should first invade Kyushu, the southernmost of the four main islands before invading the Kanto plain. The invasion of Kyushu was so that it could serve as a staging area for the subsequent attack near Tokyo, and provide closer airbases so that land based fighters could also participate.
It was expected to be a bloody fight. Estimated casualties were in the hundreds of thousands.
And, you neglected to mention the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, which many historians believe to be an equal factor in Japan’s decision to surrender.
What link are you referring to? The original claim was from a German-language documentary shown on German television. How do you get gun liberals out of that? (And aren’t those normally considered to be conservatives, in the first place?)
True, but the amount of 5th column and guerilla activity would have been so intense that the Japanese would have been completely unable to secure their supply lines.
And only the Russophiles believe that. The same one who state the USSR won the war singlehandedly. It was obvious the Japanese needed something they could surrender to, and that was the Atomic bomb. It allow them to save face - They could think they didn’t lose the war by being outfought, they lost the war because of a technological horror weapon.
War games don’t equate reality. The scenario wouldn’t work.
Japan would have gotten her ass kicked had she decided to invade Siberia. The Battles of Khalkhyn Gol showed the folly of this to all but the diehard fools in the Kwantung army. The Russians did keep a large number of troops in Siberia just to prevent Japan from attacking.
Japan would not have invaded DEI without attacking PI. It simply would have been suicide for them. The US was rabidly rearming at, for the Japanese, an alarming rate with the Two Ocean Navy Act, was developing better planes and training more pilots.
The US was anticipating war breaking out in spring of 1942, and was already increasing its strength in the Pacific. Had Japan not invaded the Philippines, her supply route to her newly acquired oil would have been cut at moment’s notice. You cannot win a war without oil. End of story.
Any delay would have allowed the US to have build up her bases in the area and fortified them enough that Japan would never have been able to take them. The US could then build up its forces and skip several years of fighting.
The other basic problem is that a Japan which would have been rational enough to realize she couldn’t beat the US, and hence would have not gotten into a fight with the US, would have been rational enough to avoid fighting in the first place. Japan could not have won against the US in any scenario.
Did you click on the link for the guy, Prince Yasuhiko Asaka? They guy who allowed up to several hundred thousand people to get massacred in Nanking? He’s going to sit on his hands when some weekend warriors play their games?
:rolleyes:
We’ve done this fairly extensively. It’s fun though to point out that this is factually incorrect, that most, if not all of the historians who argue about the importance of the Soviet attack completely dismiss the bomb.
Also, Japan had NO domestic supply of oil. At the time of Pearl Harbor, the IJN had about a 6 week supply of bunker oil. Japan’s ability to wage war depended pon a reliable oil supply.
Your statement that "And only the Russophiles believe that. The same one who state the USSR won the war singlehandedly. "
If you read my post, I said that “And, you neglected to mention the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, which many historians believe to be an equal factor in Japan’s decision to surrender.”
Your statement is factually incorrect and illogical. Anyone who states the the USSR’s entry into the war is an *equal *factor could not possibly be arguing that it was the only factor.
Them Russian civilians did a damn good job stopping the Nazis on their doorsteps, didn’t they?
Axis & Allies? The game where it takes no extra movement to send tanks across the Himalayas into the “soft underbelly” of Russia?
Besides, I’m not persuaded India was all that vulnerable to a Japan already tied up with China…and especially the idea of attacking India to get to Russia. I mean, Japan was capable, but deliberately setting oneself up to fight China, India, and Russia at the same time? Shudder
Meh. You don’t get to decide how big your war is. A “handful of divisions putting pressure” might be met by an enormous response from, well, apparently all of Asia.
Fiddlesticks. Stalin was concerned about the Japanese in 1941. Zhukov, who had already taken Imperial Japan’s best troops to the woodshed at the aforementioned battles of Khalkhin-Gol, was not worried about the Japanese. And the Japanese were (rightly) hesitant to provoke the Soviets for the duration of the war, having learned their lesson. Remember, the Soviets of 1942 were much better-equipped and much more experienced than the ones who had beaten Japan’s best in 1939.
Although the literature on partisan and resistance movements is plentiful and romantic, they had little effect on the larger war. Historian John Keegan notes that on June 5, 1944, the last day Hitler was uncontested master of Western Europe, fewer than 20 of his 300+ divisions were engaged in any sort of activity against partisans and resistance movements, and all of those were not front-line-capable divisions. Such movements were militarily effective only when operating in close proximity to major regular military units – specifically because the regular military forces (rightly) consumed most of the attention of enemy forces. An American resistance would have been militarily effective only when operating in adjunct with large-scale regular American forces – which on their own would probably have been sufficient to crush a Japanese invasion.
Japanese supply lines from Tokyo to Cleveland would have been untenable if North America were uninhabited, assuming the American submarine force was still at sea. Sea control, followed by the sheer physical challenges of distance and terrain, were the problems, not the Red Dawn kids.
Troops were available, which makes this a moot point. Fighting for your homes isn’t an advantage; it’s a romantic notion that it is.
The US invaded Iraq in 2003. Does it follow that Iraq should therefore have been able to invade the US?
Bolding mine. You’re basing this statement on fiction, not reality. Based upon my many years playing Europa Universalis in its various incarnations the Ottoman Empire should have had no problem carving its way into China, making steady inroads in Europe and colonizing North America by 1500. Wargames are entertainment.
I liked the push into India bit, may as well go all the way when crafting a fantasy.
By the IJA General Staff? Siberia had nothing-no oil, no rubber, no food. Had the Japanese attempted this, it would have been disastrous.
And the IJA had been soundly defeated (Khalkin Gol) by the Russian army under Gen. Zhukov. What did they think they would accomplish?
Those two statements are neither factually incorrect nor illogical. Russophiles have been claiming the USSR won the war singlehandedly. Then as sort of a grudging point, they mention the Bomb, but then add “the Japs would have surrendered anyway, it was the entry of the UIRRS into the War that convinced them”. Whereas the entry of the USSR was not a significant part of the decision at all.
Yep, those well known crazy kids playing soldier , those weekend warriors known as the
“By the middle of 1943 partisan resistance to the Germans and their allies had grown from the dimensions of a mere nuisance to those of a major factor in the general situation. In many parts of occupied Europe the enemy was suffering losses at the hands of partisans that he could ill afford. Nowhere were these losses heavier than in Jugoslavia.”
The *Armia Krajowa *, and the
Nope, no rubber, no oil, nothing. Just the only method of winning the war. The Japanese were thinking short term, as you apparently are, not in terms of actually- winning the war.
Keeping Gen. Zhukov busy and out of their allies hair, for one.
If troops (using that word to mean military defense in general) were available, why did the Japanese have so little resistance at Pearl Harbor?
So apparently the fact that there were ample troops wasn’t enough to defend the territory. They have to be property deployed, supplied, and warned.
You missed the point. If the reason for a non-attack on the West Coast was for reasons of distance for the Japanese, it would be the same distance going the other direction for the Americans. Therefore, if one side considered the distance to be surmountable, perhaps the other side could handle it, too. Conversely, perhaps it was too far for either side; we’ll never know.
This is kind of a strawman. TokoBayer didn’t say “the average Russophile is right,” he made a specific claim that Soviet intervention weighed in the Japanese decision – a point that many mainstream historians agree with. Finding a Russophile claim you can show was too extreme does not refute what he said.
Uh…you’re not doing as well as you think you are in this line of argument. For one thing, I never said they did nothing. I did assert that what they did had little to no military significance.
At the risk of a hijack…
Have you read Keegan? Both The Second World War and Intelligence in War? He specifically investigates the inflated claims of the intelligence services regarding the effectiveness of irregular action in WWII, and concludes what I stated. The various guerrilla movements were good morale boosters and propaganda tools, and somewhat politically important in determining the postwar control of their regions of operation (one reason that all of them except Soviet partisans spent so much time and blood fighting their political rivals instead of the Axis), but the limited damage they did was primarily to third-string Axis forces – reserve units and combed-out military police.
Propaganda, popular sentiment for the underdogs, and the self-interest of intelligence agencies which had sponsored covert assistance all over-emphasized the contributions of irregular forces.
The three most effective examples are instructive in just how limited that “effectiveness” was.
[ul][li]Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia are generally the most heralded. Despite wasting a substantial portion of their effort assassinating internal political enemies, they managed to do some damage to the third-string German defense troops in that backwater (and German minor allies). German reprisals were so effective that the British Special Operations Executive began to dissuade the partisans from further attacks because the minor damage done to backwater units had no effect on winning the war, but brought terrible suffering on the population. Later in the war, rapidly advancing Soviet troops dominated German attention, and the Yugoslav partisans were somewhat more effective.[/li]
[li]Soviet partisans, on the other hand, were militarily effective – blowing up train tracks and telephone lines behind German lines. But this effectiveness was possible almost entirely because they were used in close proximity to actual military units. Heavy units. The Soviets did not fuck around, and by mid-war, threatened the entire German front with huge, well-armed masses of troops. The attention of German front-line forces was fixed on these heavy forces, and necessarily, they could not gallivant around behind the lines rounding up partisans. The Sovs typically used their partisans in conjunction with attacking forces; pressure on the front lines gave the vastly weaker partisans much more freedom to wreak their limited havoc on German rear areas. Even so, their casualties could be high when they did tangle with (or get caught by) first-rate German troops. The Soviet high command was willing to accept such losses – partisans were entirely expendable as long as the Great Patriotic War was won.[/li]
[li]Lastly, the French Resistance. While their spying was useful, actual engagement went heavily against them most of the time. As a result, the Allies usually tried to keep them out of combat until the D-Day landings. It is true that after D-Day, the Resistance blew up road junctions and rail lines to impede German movement toward the buildup areas. However, again, that was feasible because the presence of significant Allied ground force immediately in contact with the Germans rightly held most of the German attention. The Resistance was an irritant, not a deadly threat. One part of the Resistance took action farther from the front lines. The “Maquisards” tried an uprising on the Vercors plateau. Ordinary German soldiers and second-string Russian/Ukrainian troops pitilessly exterminated them; it was too soon after D-Day for Allied conventional forces to be able to assist.[/ul][/li]
These are the best examples of large-scale irregular warfare in WWII, and in every case above, the results were meager-to-counterproductive unless conducted in the immediate vicinity of large, active conventional armies. A putative American partisan movement would have similarly been a romantic irritant to the Japanese unless working closely with large-scale regular forces.
Not following this. The Japanese had little aerial and naval resistance at Pearl because they struck by surprise – and left in a hurry, before delivering a third attack to mop up and hit the oil storage tanks. The ground resistance was so formidable they didn’t seriously contemplate invading, and brought no ground forces to even try.
I mean, I guess I agree that early in the Japanese expansion, Allied ground forces let themselves be panicked and given the bum’s rush (see Singapore for the prime example). But that doesn’t mean the continental US would have fallen.
Uh, the two sides weren’t equal. The ability of the United States to wage intercontinental war in two separate drives across the Pacific with the leftovers from its “Germany First” policy was one of the wonders of the world; no one outside the US expected that it could be done on such a scale and so early in the war. The distance was very much more an impediment to the Japanese than it turned out to be for the well-organized, superbly-equipped, technologically superior, more numerous, wealthier Americans.
But *the distance *was. And that is entirely my point, and only my point. If it was impossible for one side to traverse the distance for reasons of distance, then the same condition existed for the other side to traverse the same distance. That is all.
Anyone who claims that the Japanese could not attack the West Coast *for reasons of distance *needs to consider that the Americans were planning on attacking in the other direction, with distance was not a factor, although many other things were.
You’re misreading the claims here and in doing so comparing apples and oranges. The U.S. did not launch a fleet from California to attack Japan. It moved in a series of steps across the island chains of the Pacific, building a solid supply capacity that provided for storage and resupply. The U.S. never moved across 5000 miles of empty ocean because that would be both insane and impossible.
The Japanese could have done so in reverse, but that would have taken years. The claim that is being refuted is that Japan could have staged a surprise invasion of the west coast without the preparatory work of controlling the Pacific Ocean. They also had the disadvantage that while there are many islands close to the Asian continent, the distance between the North American continent and the nearest island group, Hawaii, is vast. In purely logistical terms, going from California to Japan is far different from going from Japan to California. The two journeys are not comparable, even if they are the same length.
So both things can be true simultaneously. The Japanese could never have moved an invasion force secretly and in one strike across the Pacific Ocean. And the U.S. could move an invasion force publicly and over a period of years in shorter hops.
The game where it takes no extra movement to send tanks across the Himalayas into the “soft underbelly” of Russia?