Let me add something to the discussion that might provide some additional background and useful context.
I first learned about gain-of-function research in around 2002 or 2003. My wife at the time was an epidemiologist, and got us an invite to a lecture on bioterrorism preparedness. This was in the wake of 9/11, obviously, when everyone was worried about what might be coming, so domestic security agencies were sending experts around with this presentation. The idea, apparently, was to talk to specialists, reassuring them about what was happening, educating them about the subject so they could be additional “eyes and ears” in the field, and, possibly, capture the interest of at least some people who would offer themselves for recruitment.
A lot of the details were above my head, but one of the things I was able to follow was on the challenge of rapid identification. It was assumed that terrorists wouldn’t announce the release of a biological agent ahead of time, or provide a guidebook as to its design. The defensive response would be purely reactive, recognizing an emerging crisis and figuring out how to contain it.
One of the major difficulties, they said, lay in identifying exactly what had been released, as quickly as possible. Something like anthrax is commonly found in soils, but weaponizing it takes work and transformation. This means there isn’t a single biological profile to be matched for any given agent; they can be modified in all sorts of ways, depending on the sophistication and intentions of the attacker.
So, one of the things they were doing was pre-emptively studying how these agents could be weaponized. This is, in other words, gain of function research. Their aim was to build a library of potential attack mechanisms, which could be used for rapid matching in the event of a suspected incident, thereby accelerating identification in order to launch the correct response. Some of what they described was theoretical, because the work was high risk with very bad potential outcomes, and they were trying to design changes that would test virulence and contagiousness without also ramping up lethality — or, ideally, reducing it, because the point of the research was to study efficient dispersal, as that was assumed to be a key aim in a hypothetical attack.
The point of this is that GoF research is well established and has lots of legitimate purposes in various areas of inquiry. The wild-eyed reaction of the public on the current revelations (“why would you make a virus more dangerous?!?!one?!”) comes from ignorance of how the science has worked for decades. There are good reasons to understand these mechanisms and to get out ahead of potential outbreaks. More knowledge is almost always better than less knowledge.
And the stoking of panic by irresponsible news organizations who leap directly to malevolent mad-scientist speculation in order to feed the xenophobic paranoia of their audience pisses me off.