jjimm, that’s a remarkably facile list of excuses from Benzamin.
"…the Palestinian mutiny cannot be suppressed with force;" He starts off fairly accurately, although characterizing the Palestinian conflict as a “mutiny” seems rather awkward.
"…Israel must not cave in to terror;" Does “cave in” mean “completely capitulate to all Palestinian demands”? If so, this is a bit of a strawman in an apologia for status quo, as this is far from the only alternative (and in fact is the least likely).
"…there is no partner for peace talks on the other side;" This is self-serving. Although it’s nice to see Benzamin recognize that Palestinians aren’t a monolithic ideology, it’s also disingenuous to claim, after Israel has been such a large party (along with Palestinian extremists) to the marginization of Arafat and actual moderate Palestinian elements, that there’s no “partner” available.
"…Israeli concessions are perceived as signs of weakness;" Most likely they are, by many. So? False perceptions are only dangerous when they’re unknown. Israel is not weak, either militarily or economically; any mere perception of political weakness can be dispelled by showing committment to a process of resolution which includes a strong Israel as its goal.
"…the core issues - the Temple Mount and the Palestinian right of return - cannot be resolved and a permanent agreement can therefore not be sought;" This supposed intractability, at least as far as right of return is concerned, is a false claim, and the insinuation that these two are the only “core issues” is deceptive as well. All Benzamin is saying here is “but the issues are really hard ones”. Well, yeah. That’s why the situation is not a self-resolving one.
"…unilateral withdrawal would not end the conflict but only boost the motivation of the Palestinians and the Arab world to crush Israel;" A conclusion unsupported by argument, and not valid axiomatically. Also a strawman, as complete and sudden withdrawal is not the only option available to Israel.
"…because of coalition problems and the ideological rift in Israeli society, no government has the power to make unequivocal moves either way;" Wrong. No Israeli government will ever make unequivocal moves which will be universally accepted by Israeli society. This reality is why leadership is difficult, but it is no valid excuse for paralysis.
"…if Israel reoccupies the territories and destroys the Palestinian Authority or, alternatively, if it agrees to withdraw to the borders of 1967, the relationship between Israel and the Arab minority living in Israel would change dramatically, to the extent of an existential threat;" Again Benzamin not only presents two acontextual extremes as the only possible alternatives, he presents a conclusion (dramatic and threatening changes to Israel’s relationship with the Arab minority) without supporting argument.
"…resuming direct negotiations where we left off in Camp David would only give the Palestinians an incentive to keep up their terror campaign;" As opposed to the incentives offered by continued occupation? If true, this assertion amounts to a “damned if we do, damned if we don’t” analysis which ignores other costs and benefits of resuming negotiations. But the truth of the assertion has not been demonstrated, and in fact, even if true the assertion cannot be applied a priori to any possible agreement produced by negotiations.
"…if the international community is allowed to sponsor negotiations, dictates would be handed down to Israel that it cannot accept;" Israel, like any other party to any other negotiation, would have to go to the table with both bargaining points and “non-negotiable” items. This is a truism, and is no valid excuse for avoiding the table.
I think the OP is valid to a large extent. ISTM that Sharon’s purpose is to deny and delay Palestinian autonomy, and that he believes the only long-term security for Israel lies in maintaining control over Palestinian territory, which Israel cannot do if the peace process is resumed. NOTE that this is an arguable position, in support of which much historical and tactical data can be presented.
IMO and in the OP’s opinion, this policy may be shortsighted, but I don’t think it’s fair to characterize it as absolutely wrong, any more than it’s plausible to deny the policy’s implicit existence.