Does this all seem too easy? Some sources claim the retreat from Kabul was a ploy to entice American and British troops to send in ground troops ( http://msnbc.com/news/627086.asp )
So is it indeed a trap, or simply a bluff?
You don’t run if you are strong.
However, their forte is terrorism, not governing countries, so they may well hang on in that niche for years.
When we see numbers like “Northern Alliance takes 95% of territory”, we should recall that the percentages were reversed just a month ago. A 5% holding of a country the size of Texas is greater than the West Bank. Lots of room for mischief.
No.
It’s not a ‘trap’, but it is a strategic withdrawal, and a smart one. They got out of dodge before the U.S. could set up interdiction by air to destroy them as they retreat. Now they have a good chunk of their force intact and back in the mountains where they started, to wage another guerilla war. One that will fail this time, but it’s still their best shot.
From what I have read the Taliban have retreated in defeat, but they are not routed, dropping their weapons, etc. There is a big difference. George Washington spent about seven years retreating and won the revolutionary war against a superior enemy with long supply lines. Had the Taliban not retreated, their forces in the city areas probably would have been encircled and unable to retreat and regroup later. They are presumably regrouping now and forming new defenses in areas where their enemies are sparse.
Is it a trap? Yes and no. If we rush in without adequate intelligence and preparation (bombing of fixed positions) we will needlessly suffer higher losses (still less than the Taliban). Their advantage is that they are defending very mountainous terrain, which has always been difficult for attackers. However, we have distinct advantages. We can move our forces to have superior numbers very quickly, and we are better supplied, and have superior weapons and tactics (usage of our advantages). Our soldiers are highly trained (theirs presumably have seen lots of skirmish action, which is to their advantage). But our biggest advantage is battlefield intelligence. We can take a usable photograph of any surface area in Afghanistan within a few minutes using satellites and Predator aircraft (robots with real time video apparently, and the ability to shoot a couple small missiles at targets of opportunity). In short, unless the Taliban seriously change their strategy (big picture objectives), they will wither in the face of sustained attacks. Except using terror, these guys are not serious opponents. When we went to war against Iraq in 1991, we had to position troops for 4 months first. Here, U.S. forces were able to topple the Taliban from their capital in a matter of weeks without a similar huge deployment.
Throwing in another simple “no”. We already have special forces on the ground assistng the Northern Alliance. I think Bush and Blair would be hesitent to send in a major ground force when the NA already has tenative control of the area.
The last thing we need is what looks like an occupation army on the ground.
Place yourself in the tent of a Taliban/AlQaeda commander. The alternatives are:
Alternative A - die gloriously, getting bombed in your fixed positions, accomplishing very little
Alternative B - Live to fight another day, either by integrating for the time being to the new society while “keeping the faith” or by heading for the hills or going underground and making it impossible (thru guerilla and terrorism) for the new government to service the provinces. Don’t bother defending cities.
The much-feared Taliban are being decimated and their brave last stand in northern Afghanistan is going to be a rout. The statistical handful that do escape to the mountains will be picked off a few at a time. Comparisons with the Soviet paradigm are meaningless. The Soviets were clearly third-rate tacticians.
If history is a good teacher, then we should be careful not to underestimate enemies that seem like “barbarians”…
When the Chinese Nationalists went to take care of the Communists in Manchuria, it at first seemed to be a rout (heck, it was at first). But after that the victories all seemed to come too easily. Army troops would be sent to cities, where they obliterated Communist forces easily. But then they noticed they weren’t getting supplied. Mao was enveloping the Nationalists in these pockets, cutting off communications and supply. Chaing Kaichek (sp) who had counted on air power to help supply his men, found that his aircraft were in constant danger from Communist AAA.
The lesson is obvious. Is it a trap? Christian soldiers were repeatedly fooled by the Mongol tactic of faking a retreat, drawing in disordered soldier meaning to exploit the retreat, and then attacking them from all sides, inflicting massive casaulties.
Exactly my point, Eternal. The tactic that seems most favorable for the Coalition forces is to utilize the native forces of the Northern Alliance as much as possible, if for nothing else than their experience with the fighting tactics and strategies that the Taliban might use. Thus far, the Coalition forces have sustained very little casualties, and I don’t see many good reasons to send in ground troops en masse from the Coalition forces just yet. Caution, people, caution…
The modern US military is not known for making rash decisions not backed by intelligence. I wouldn’t worry there. Further, the US is not likely to unleash ground troops until there is certainty that the casualty rate is minimized. Unlike island hopping in WWII and hill hopping in Viet Nam, throwing soldiers at the “problem” will not necessarily spell victory. This is more pronounced when one considers the way press handles active duty military deaths.
One “benefit” of the retreat, and a reason the Taliban forces are not attacked in retreat, is that they seem to be heading towards caves in the hills (many enter the hills but there later seems to be no sign of them above ground) and it doesn’t take three degrees in Euclidean Geometry to determine where those caves are. US intelligence can get a fix on the location of hide-out caves by watching where the Taliban forces go.
The art of war gives good advice regarding attacking an enemy on a hill. The US is wise to take that advice.
We don’t know how will the Taliban has really prepared for all of this. They may not be out of surprises. Who knows whats in those caves? It could be that there is a vast network of caves and tunnels all over the place.
Because we can all be confident the US military doesn’t do squat without consulting intelligence, but intelligence is often wrong.
Look, the Taliban can continue as a guerilla force ONLY if they have the support of the surrounding population. If the locals support them, then they can last up in the hills and caves forever. If the local people don’t like the Taliban then the regime that holds the cities can rout them easily.
This is not a trap in the sense that the Talib leaders thought to themselves, “Hmmm…we could hold onto the cities and defeat the Northern Alliance and their American masters. However, if we retreat we will be in a better position to wipe them out”. No, they retreated because they had no choice. They are not finished as an organization yet, but a guerilla campaign requires them to be supplied by the locals. If they don’t have that they will soon be starving.
Afghanistan is going to have armed bandit groups operating out of the hills and caves for generations to come. Many of these bandit groups will be ex-Taliban. But they will never take over the country again unless they have popular support. And the evidence of the past two weeks says that they are universally despised.
When they were strong and in control of the country it didn’t matter that the people hated them. But now that they are weak and on the run they are finished…as an army and as a government. As terrorists and bandits I imagine they are going to be around for a long long time.
We know were the caves are. What do you think the CIA was doing when they were helping afgans fight russians? I think they have noted were the caves are. Also the northen allians are probably telling us were all the hide outs are anyway.
I don’t think there is really any evidence that they were despised by the majority of Afghans. And if the Taliban retreated with a lot of the country’s material wealth, they’ll be able to buy support.