The Great Ongoing Aviation Thread (general and other)

I now see the same on CBC News with the caveat that this information is still preliminary.

For those that didn’t scroll down in the Reddit link:

I have 1,500 hours in Challenger 650s. They have a very “sensitive” laminar wing that doesn’t handle contamination well. I feel confident the crew would have used type 1/4 fluid. I wouldn’t be surprised if there are new holdover timetables published assuming the crew followed their holdover tables. Cold weather training we receive in annual recurrent always mentions accidents over the years. The CRJ uses a similar wing and experienced a wing stall on flare to lading but the aircraft was low enough it didn’t cause a catastrophic accident. On that occasion, the crew was able to land and likely had to clean out their underwear. Challengers also have a problem with “over rotation”. No more than 3 degrees of pitch change per second on rotation. The CL650 is a great jet, but can be a handful if you don’t mind its limitations.

I’m not sure that this credible-sounding statement about the aircraft characteristics is consistent with this first statement from the article sourced from an AP report about “a history of problems”:

The business jet that crashed Sunday evening while trying to take off in a snowstorm in Maine and killed at least a half dozen people is a plane model that has a history of problems with crashes caused by ice buildup on the wings.

A problem in the bizjet community is safety corners being cut in the name of cost, expediency, or can’t-wait customers.

IMO the pilot guy on Reddit said “If you follow all the procedures carefully, you’ll be fine. If you don’t, that airplane will bite you harder than most.” What AP said was “Bizjet operators have a history of not bothering to follow all the procedures. Which habit is especially dangerous in Challengers.”

I sorta agree with you, but what I object to is the implication in the AP source that the Challengers were designed wrong. It’s just typical media hype, and it’s certainly the implication of a statement like “a history of problems.” Challengers of various models have been flying safely for 40 years.

I’m guessing that the cause of this accident may have had a lot of similarities with Air Florida flight 90 out of Washington in 1982. In the former case, the bizjet and pilots were based in Houston. In the latter, based in Florida. Neither, coming from warmer climes, were as attuned to the risks of icing as they should have been. Also, in the Bangor incident, it was a stopover for fuel and they were heading to Paris, so in addition to everying else, there were well weighted down with fuel while taking off in snowy icing conditions with shitty visibility.

Regarding the King Air that did an emergency autoland using the Garmin system back in December, Mentour Pilot weighs in and explains what really happened.

TL;DW: No, there was an unexpected cabin decompression, the pilots put on their oxygen masks, and while they did, the Garmin system began an emergency descent, as programmed. It then went into autoland mode while the pilots tried to figure out what had caused the decompression.

They weren’t sure exactly what the system would do if they turned it off, e.g., whether the autopilot would continue to land the plane as the Garmin had programmed to to do. Rather than take any chances, they allowed it to continue on its own.

I’m way out of my wheelhouse regarding the Challenger 650 crash but I thought it was a dry snow event. Do you need need to de-ice again in heavy snow once it’s knocked off?

I’d be leery of flying if snow or freezing rain was sticking to a laminar wing. Can pilots just extend out the rotation to compensate or is the lift profile just going out the window?

I agree w your contention. It’s accusation by innuendo, and lazy innuendo at that. I suppose I’m just past the point of expecting better, so sort of read past it.

A bit like the argument about the 737’s ancient cockpit design, you can argue the airplane is fine and the modern 3rd world pilots are weak, or you can argue that the plane must be designed for the operators as they are, not as they once were or as you wish they were. There’s an element of truth in both approaches to the problem. The regulatory answer is (mostly) clear cut, but the regulations aren’t a perfect reflection of the current or near-future world either.

There are several issues here.

If there is any snow or ice on the airplane it must be de- iced. Typically with hot Type I fluid applied with a giant pressure sprayer to not only melt, but also blast off, any adhering ice or snow. Type 1 fluid runs off the plane like water, carrying the melted and dislodged contamination with it. Assuming it’s not actively precipping or blowing fallen snow while this process is being done, at the end of the process the airplane is 100% clean & ready to fly.

BUT … if any frozen precip, or even very cold liquid rain is falling, the airplane must immediately be anti- iced. This is generally done using Type IV fluid which is very different stuff from Type I. Type IV is hot, is thick and goopy, and is gently sprayed to form a solid layer over over the wings and tail. It sticks to the airplane. This protective layer absorbs what fell on the plane during the de-icing process and will absorb what falls on the plane during start, taxi, and takeoff.

Depending on the temp, the type of precip, the wind, and the intensity of precip, the protective coating may last anywhere from 5 minutes to a couple hours. Measured from when the coating starts being applied. If it takes 4 minutes to spray the whole plane, you have 1 minute (!) to get airborne after they finish. Good luck with that! If you time out, you need to once again use Type I to blast off all the accumulated gunk and sodden used-up Type 4, then reapply a fresh coat of Type IV to keep you safe through liftoff.

More realistically, once the so-called “hold-over time” of effective protection gets to be much less than 10 minutes for a bizjet or 20 for an airliner, the effort is futile. Even with de-ice facilities next to the takeoff end of the runway you can’t get the airplane clean fast enough to get it airborne before the weather overwhelms your protection and you have to start over. So instead you cancel or delay the flight.


The “laminar” bit is a bit of a red herring. All wings are designed to have as laminar a flow as is reasonable. Some take pursuit of laminarity a little farther than others. But yes, extra good laminarity implies extra sensitivity to contamination, be that insects or ice.

For any wing, extra-laminar or typically laminar, even very minor ice can utterly destroy the lift. A common cliché is “surface roughness equal to 80 grit sandpaper will cut lift by 80%”. There’s no speed at which you could compensate for that degree of loss of lift. Now consider that in an anti-iced plus precip takeoff, the degree of contamination along each wing is random and may not be the same. Percentagewise, it takes very little difference between the two wings’ lift to exceed your max roll control authority.


Bottom line: If you have crap on your jet’s wings, you crash. Pretty much for sure. So don’t do that. Lots of airliners crashed in the 1960-80s and a few into the 90s learning this lesson. But the regulators and the industry get it now. And have the tools to cope with heavy freezing precip. But not for insane blizzards, nor for freezing rain. And now they have the discipline to say “These conditions are untenable. We’re staying here until / unless it improves.” And the tools with which to pretty reliably determine “untenable.” There’s always some gray area, but that’s where the attitude difference between “Safety first” and “Let’s go; it’ll be fine” comes in.

I don’t know the exact weather at Bangor that day. Nor those guy’s decision processes. Nor their degree of training or icing mindset. But this crash didn’t have to happen.

Glad I wasn’t on this flight.

I don’t have references and n front of me, but there have been a few icing related crashes of CL-600-2B19 (CRJ 100/200) aircraft. I seem to recall one event involving a CL-600-2B16 which is what a Challenger 650 is. Their wings and performance are similar.

The crashes were events where the aircraft was either not deiced, inadequately deiced, or failed to repeat or further remove snow/ice after waiting too long for take off (I don’t remember the specifics). The wing design is sensitive to this contamination, and what happens is one wing generated lift and the other stalls, and the aircraft tilts and flips over. There’s pretty much nothing to be done at that point. Post crash fire happened in the cases I remember, and all or most occupants died.

There was a transport Canada airworthiness directive to retrofit an upgraded on-ground anti-ice system to detect and warn about this type of icing. I believe EASA adopted the AD. The FAA did not.

The system is installed at delivery on Challenger 650 aircraft. I’m afraid I don’t know the particulars of how it works.

All of this is what the CBC article was very lazily alluding to.

Gear up landing in Houston. Crew was okay.

On my phone and links would be to PDF so googling CF-2016-R19R2 will get you the CRJ airworthiness directive, and the one applicable to Challengers is CF-2017-07. I was mistaken; the system was introduced in the 650 but the crash aircraft would have had it.

There’s a couple of other related mandated actions I can’t be bothered to read right now.

The AD description reads:

Accumulation of snow, slush or ice on the wing leading edges and upper wing surfaces caused by prolonged ground operations can severely reduce the controllability of the aeroplane during take-off. This accumulation could cause a premature stall with an uncontrollable wing drop at low altitude, which in turn could result in the loss of the aeroplane.

To prevent take-off with contaminated wings, Bombardier implemented a design change that enables activation of the low temperature ground wing anti-ice system for ground operation when the crew activates the cowl anti-ice system. The modification mandated by this AD, along with actions mandated by the AD CF-2005-03 and AD CF-2008-16R1, completes the actions undertaken by Transport Canada to improve safety of the Challenger fleet when operated in adverse weather conditions

Not anymore.

Maybe it just got some scratches from that gear-up belly landing. They’ll probably just buff right out!

From the comments and database. There are 11 more airframes in the desert. Funding or need will be the hold up.

Like a lot of NASA jets, those things are ancient oddballs that have to be quite difficult to maintain. Stuff just gets old.

They probably need a major recapitalization of their “air force”. And their computer systems. And …

Not much money for science coming from DC these days.

That particular airframe came from there.

In 2011 it was determined that a third aircraft was needed to satisfy mission requirements and an additional WB-57 was removed from the 309th AMARG after over 40 years at Davis-Monthan AFB and returned to flight status in August 2013 as NASA 927… On January 27, 2026 NASA 927 had a landing gear malfunction and made a belly landing Ellington Field [sic] in Houston.

Amazing to me that a flying machine, mothballed and sitting in the desert for four decades, can be brought back to flying condition. And not just for airshow nostalgia, but to carry out research.

I wonder if we’ll be able to do that in the future. A plane of the WB-57’s vintage would be mostly mechanical, if it had any computers at all. Decades from now, will we be able to resurrect an Airbus, Boeing or F-16? Or will that effort be doomed for lack of a 13 cent computer part that no longer exists and can’t be easily replicated?

UPS announces it is retiring it’s fleet of MD-11’s.
ABC

CEO Carol Tome said during a fourth-quarter earnings call that UPS decided to “accelerate our plans and retire all MD-11 aircraft in our fleet."

And good riddance. It’s long been my feeling that DC-10s should have been permanently grounded and the MD-11 never built.

At the time the DC-10 was introduced, Air Canada had a large fleet of DC-8s and DC-9s. The DC-10 would have been a natural fit. After extensive research, they went nope, nope, not gonna touch it. But they needed a wide-body trijet, and opted for the Lockheed Tristar L-1011. They operated a fleet of them from 1973 to the early 1990s. None of the engines ever flew off, and none of the cargo doors ever blew open. Lockheed, in a bit of marketing self-praise, issued a press release complimenting Air Canada on the thoroughness of their investigations.

They’re also laying off 30,000 due to contract with Amazon ending so it sounds like those planes won’t be needed anyway with their package count reductions.