Thomas Friedman has stopped saying that (so we can stop calling it a Friedman Unit), but the torch has been taken up by Petraeus’ own senior staff.
Enough. It’s over. There’s no more fact-based argument to the contrary anymore.
The only debate now is if the delusionaries in the White House and their loyal acolytes will finally believe it, and act accordingly, after this six months - unless there’s also a debate about how many more lives will be wasted along the way.
Petraeus is of a different mold than the WH political appointees et al. AFAICT, he IS the man for the job.
As your article notes he’s promised to tell it how it is this summer if things are beyonf hope of repair.
Yes, well, remember why Petraeus was tapped for the job: He was one of the few remaining generals willing to tell W what he wanted to hear.
cite please
Slightly different meaning of the phrase this time. The sense is that if we don’t see progress by this summer, the political will in the US to continue combat operations will collapse. Get ready for a debate in that timeframe about about what constitutes “progress”. Bottom line, though, if we don’t see casualties decrease (both US and Iraqi casualties), it will be next to impossible for Bush to spin “progress” out of the facts on the ground. Still, I’d be surprised if we were completely out of Iraq by Jan 2009. I just don’t see Bush clearing out that fast.
Also, keep in mind that you’ve got a whole slew of Senators running for president who don’t want to be left with combat troops in Iraq that aren’t already at least scheduled to be headed home when and if they take over as Commander in Chief.
Have you read his counter insurgency manual yet?
You did know that he wrote The Book on CI didn’t you?
I may be biased, but I’ve been a fan of his for at least four years now (going by old MB posts [not here]).
I like him too, a lot, but it may be too late for him to affect anything at this point. He’s definitely the last hope.
Sorry, I only know that because W told me so himself, when we were hanging out – and don’t bother asking him, because he was so drunk I doubt he’d remember.
Is that the book that says you need one combat soldier for every 50 civilians - which means we’d need 140,000 combat troops to hold Baghdad alone when we have about 65,000 of them in the country?
To be fair, you’re not counting any Iraqi forces in that number. I don’t know what the right number to use is, but it isn’t zero, even if that number doesn’t add up to the total needed.
Nor, based on their performance to date, is there any reason to.
I provided a link, take a look for yourself instead of just reading the pundits.
The assertion that it would 100k+ US troops is propaganda-ish
Employing the Elements
[INDENT]1-67. The movement leaders provide the organizational and managerial skills needed to transform mobilized individuals and communities into an effective force for armed political action. The result is a contest of resource mobilization and force deployment. No force level guarantees victory for either side. During previous conflicts, planners assumed that combatants required a 10 or 15 to 1 advantage over insurgents to win. However, no predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in COIN. The conditions of the operational environment and the approaches insurgents use vary too widely.
A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents in an AO. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.
1-68. As in any conflict, the size of the force needed to defeat an insurgency depends on the situation. However, COIN is manpower intensive because counterinsurgents must maintain widespread order and security. Moreover, counterinsurgents typically have to adopt different approaches to address each element of the insurgency. For example, auxiliaries might be co-opted by economic or political reforms, while fanatic combatants will most likely have to be killed or captured.[/INDENT]
Given a population of 4.5mil in Baghdad we’re looking at 90,000 folks to meet the cookie-cutter estimates given for general informational purposes (which were provided with more than one disclaimer that each situation is different and must be analyzed for its own merits.)
Bullshit.
Cite?
He was the right guy to put in charge 4 years ago. Now it’s too late to matter.
You’ve heard of irony, right? I’d heard the number, then read and made sure it was the same report before asking my question.
But it’s also not refuted by what Petraeus wrote.
This is beyond obvious; of course there’s no way to guarantee success.
In other words, it’s generally believed to require a minimum of 1 per 25, but that might not be the case here. Has he said why that might not be the case in Iraq?
And what about the other 20 million people in Iraq?
Very Socratic of you. :rolleyes:
“Cite?”, fyi, means “Got any evidence to the contrary the time, or are you simply unable to find something to nitpick?”
Really, we’d *all * be happy to see any evidence of a real, effective Iraqi national army that can and will combat the militias, not itself made up of sectarian militia members biding their time while they get free training and arms.
Got something for us to consider? Anything at all? Or is “Bullshit” all you can come up with? :dubious:
I’m not going to cite something you both know damn well is true. If you want me to play that game, you give something up. If I can cite there have been instances where the ISFs have been effective, then you guys stop posting in GD if for one month. If you’re unwilling to take that challenge, then you know you’re wrong. And if I can’t find a cite, then I’ll stop posting for one month as well. We can pick a neutral judge-- someone like tomndebb.
All I said was the proper number is not zero.
Reviewing the bidding, you said, “To be fair, you’re not counting any Iraqi forces in that number. I don’t know what the right number to use is, but it isn’t zero, even if that number doesn’t add up to the total needed.”
Given that the ISFs are often part of the problem - a player in the ongoing civil war, rather than a neutral peacekeeping force - the number could well be negative. So promising a nonzero number is really kinda meaningless. Since zero isn’t a floor, it’s just like any other number - unlikely to be the right one.
And because there are all sorts of situations - occasional instances where the ISFs have done their job, numerous accounts where the ISFs have stood back and let US troops do the heavy lifting, and plenty of evidence that they’re out there killing Sunnis just for being Sunnis when we’re not around - your ability to produce some instances where the ISFs have been effective doesn’t mean the right number is positive.
What conditions in Iraq make it possible for roughly half of the recommended minimum soldiers to successfully combat the insurgents?