To answer question 1, at the beginning of the Cold War but prior to the missile era there was actual combat between US and Soviet aircraft in two different circumstances. Prior to the much, much better-known U-2 incident of 1960 where Gary Powers was shot down by a Soviet Surface to Air Missile, over 200 US aircrew were killed or captured after being shot down in or near Soviet airspace in a number of incidents. These were classified and information didn’t start to come out until after the fall of the Soviet Union. In the other circumstance, Soviet ‘volunteer’ pilots flew MiG-15s during the Korean War and both shot down and were shot down by US aircraft.
The mock and later actual fighting in Top Gun was based on the 1981 Gulf of Sidra incident and prior mock attacks by Libyan aircraft against the US Navy conducting patrols inside what Gaddafi declared was the “The Line of Death” that he considered to be Libyan territorial waters. In this (1981) incident all the missiles fired by both sides were IR seekers, Libyan AA-2 Atolls and US AIM-9L Sidewinders, so radar locking wasn’t an issue in the actual aerial combat, but radar locking appears to have occurred frequently in the earlier encounters:
Early in the morning of 18 August, when the U.S. exercise began, at least three MiG-25 ‘Foxbats’ approached the U.S. carrier groups, and were escorted away by American interceptors. The Libyans tried to establish the exact location of the U.S. naval force. Thirty-five pairs of MiG-23 ‘Floggers’, MiG-25s, Sukhoi Su-20 ‘Fitter-Cs’, Su-22M ‘Fitter-Js’ and Mirage F1s flew into the area, and were soon intercepted by seven pairs of F-14s and F-4s.[14][16] U.S. Naval Intelligence later assessed that a MiG-25 may have fired a missile from 18 miles (29 km) away at U.S. fighter aircraft that day.[17]
In a later incident in the Gulf of Sidra in 1989, so after Top Gun was released, another pair of Libyan aircraft were shot down, this time with both radar guided AIM-7 Sparrows and IR AIM-9L Sidewinders, so both radar locking and actual engagement with radar guided missiles occurred.
At 11:58, the F-14s made a left turn, away from the MiG-23s, to initiate a standard intercept.[12][1][13] Seven seconds later, the MiG-23s turned back into the American fighters for another head-on approach and were descending in altitude.[12] At this point, the F-14 aircrews began employing tactics to reduce the effectiveness of the MiG-23s’ radars and the 12-mile-range (19 km) AA-7 Apex missiles they were potentially carrying.[11][10] The American aircraft started descending from 20,000 to 3,000 feet (6,100 to 910 m) to fly lower than the Libyan fighters. The drop in altitude was meant to prevent the MiG-23s from detecting the F-14s by using ocean clutter to confuse their onboard radars.[11] The American pilots executed another left turn away from the Libyan aircraft during the descent. Moments after the F-14s created a 30-degree offset, the MiG-23s turned to place themselves back into a collision course and accelerated to 500 knots (930 km/h; 580 mph).[12]
The air warfare commander on the Kennedy gave the American aircrews the authority to fire if they believed the MiG-23s were hostile.[13][8] The F-14s turned away from the approaching MiG-23s two more times, and each time, the American aircrews saw the Libyan aircraft turn back toward them for a head-on approach. At 12:00:53, the Radar Intercept Officer (RIO) in the lead F-14, Commander Leo Enwright in Gypsy 207, ordered the arming of the AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles on the American fighters, after what he determined was the fifth time the Libyan aircraft turned back toward them.[12]
The American aircrews armed their weapons when the opposing aircraft were less than 20 miles (32 km) away, the two groups closing in on each other at a rate of 1,000 knots (1,900 km/h; 1,200 mph).[1] At a distance of about 14 nautical miles (26 km), the lead F-14 pilot, Commander Joseph Connelly, made a radio call to the carrier group’s air warfare commander to see if there was any additional information in regard to the MiG-23s.[13][8] There was no response to his call. At 12:01:20 and at a range of 12 nautical miles (22 km), Enwright fired an AIM-7, surprising Connelly, who did not expect to see a missile accelerate away from their aircraft. The missile failed to track toward its target. At a distance of about 10 nautical miles (19 kilometres), Enwright launched a second AIM-7, but it also failed to hit its target.[1]
The MiG-23s continued to fly directly toward the American fighters at 550 knots (1,020 km/h; 630 mph).[12] The F-14s executed a defensive split, where both aircraft made turns in opposite directions. Both Libyan fighters turned left to pursue the second F-14, Gypsy 202.[1] Connelly prepared Gypsy 207 for a right turn to get behind the MiG-23s as they went after the other American fighter.[8] With the MiG-23s pointed directly at them, the crew of Gypsy 202 fired a third AIM-7 from roughly five miles (8.0 km) away and downed one of the Libyan aircraft.[12]
After executing a sharp right turn, Gypsy 207 gained a position in the rear quadrant of the remaining MiG-23.[1] As the Libyan fighter was turning left and from a distance of one and a half miles (2.4 km), Connelly fired an AIM-9 missile, which downed its target.[12][8] The second MiG-23 was hit by the AIM-9 at 12:02:36. The F-14s descended to an altitude of several hundred feet and returned at high speed to the carrier group.[1] The Libyan pilots were both seen to successfully eject and parachute into the sea, but it is not known whether the Libyan Air Force was able to successfully recover them.[1][14]