Article here: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-trump-hotel-idUKKBN16U2S7
:smack:
It is good to be POTUS.
Correct decision.
There’s not a lot of detail in that article. Could you explain why the decision is correct? (Not for the purposes of me disagreeing)
Can you explain?
There’s one aspect of this that has me scratching my head. Trump said that any profits he gets from the hotel that comes from foreign governments (e.g., if a dignitary stays in the hotel) would be donated to the Government. (I may be slightly off in how that’s phrased, I’m going from memory.)
But this article seems to imply that it is not possible for Trump to profit from the hotel until he is no longer President, thereby satisfying the contract. However, it seems from the article that after his Presidency, he would benefit from such profits, which seems to me to be undercutting the agency’s determination.
If I have any of this right, it seems like Trump has set it up so that the benefits of his LLC, which he still owns but has his son running, will simply be deferred until after his presidency is over. How that squares with the contract – forget anyone’s basic sense of propriety – completely baffles me.
My sense is that the only argument is “The President doesn’t own the trust. Therefore he couldn’t possibly derive any benefit from its profitability. Also, because STFU.” Not even a decent whitewash. Just a pre-determined and unsupported decision.
You can read the decision and exhibits here: https://www.gsa.gov/portal/getMediaData?mediaId=157798
I would be more sour a fine Government building, in the grand manner, was sold to wretched commercial interests.
To be fair, when he won the auction in 2011 ( thanks to Obama’s haste in pushing along the sale ) I doubt if El Trumpo seriously expected to be president 6 years later — and except for an extraordinary concatenation of opportunities: a blank slate of GOP bumpkins; facing Hillary for the final countdown; a hysterical hostile media ( which garnered sympathy ); and a confused moronate, he wouldn’t have had the tiniest chance — so can be cleared of pre-planning this coup, which is just serendipity for his pocket.
A sad commentary on this administration that “President didn’t do something illegal” is now newsworthy.
Don’t worry - he’s still guilty of something. Dig harder.
Regards,
Shodan
Yes.
The provision at issue in the lease says:
The President is a shareholder in an entity called DJT Holdings Managing Menber LLC, which holds the lease for the general benefit of the LLC. His son is the official in control of that LLC.
While that LLC is held in turn by other interests, the President is not an officer, director, manager, or employee of any of them.
Therefore, he does not violate the lease.
But that however clause says “may be a shareholder or other beneficial owner of any publicly held corporation or other entity”. That LLC isn’t a publicly held corporation. (it is an “other entity” but that’s a rather broad out.)
Edited to add, the clause seemed to say that if I’m the new Secretary of [Whatever] and I have shares in the Marriott/Hilton/whatever company and that company had the contract to lease the building, I would not be in violation of the lease. But an LLC is a much more closely held corporation.
So what?
It’s an “other entity.” The clause does not say, “or other broadly-held entity.”
What exactly is your objection to the “broad out?”
The lease says that if I’m the senior senator from [whatever state], I can’t benefit from the lease. But it’s cool if I’m a shareholder of an “other entity”, presumably even if I’m the sole shareholder of an LLC or other corporation. What’s the difference?
My objection would be: why specify a publicly held corporation if it is completely subsumed in the “other entity”?
Under your reading, the clause exempts a shareholder of a publicly held corporation or any owners of any juridicial person. It’s too late on a Friday (and therefore I’m too drunk) to conjure up the correct canon of interpretation (is this rule against surplusage?), but you’re reading the statute to say: “a shareholder [etc.] of any entity.” Which makes “publicly held corporation” meaningless. The only way to give “publicly held corporation” meaning (maybe this is ejusdem generis?) is to read it as “publicly held corporation or other [publicly held] entity.” I don’t think you can have a publicly held non-corporation, but to read it otherwise renders the specific provision meaningless. Doesn’t it?
This is admittedly not my area of expertise, but no. It seems to me that the straightforward provision is unambiguous: a shareholder of an entity that’s not an officer, director, manager, or employee.
It’s certainly not my areas of expertise either. But, if your interpretation of the statute is correct, then the specific enumeration of a publicly held corporation is surplusage. Because the statute could read, as you put it, “a shareholder of an entity.”
We assume (I think) that the specification of “publicly held corporation” has some purpose. It would be odd, for example, if we had a sign that said: “No parking, except for Harley Davidson Sportsters or other model motorcycles.” You’d read the sign to say: “No parking, except motorcycles.” But, I’d wonder why we’d specified a single model. Your interpretation makes that specification meaningless. Maybe it means Harley parking only. (I’m not a motorcycle person, I don’t actually know if the hypothetical works). It’s, at least, ambiguous to me.
Then it’s lucky that the agency reached a conclusion, so we can assign due deference to its interpretation of an ambiguous provision. 
So does it matter if, say, Eric Trump regularly visited his father with business details? If so, to what extent COULD they interact on with such topics? Or is there any limit at all, as long as paperwork says Trump is not employed by the LLC?
Thanks for the information. I actually read the ruling in between the time I posted that and you answered. And is seems like a big part of the ruling was the definition of “admit” and the fact that he was already a part of the ownership and didn’t become part of it after he became elected was a big part of it. Again, not disagreeing, since from my reading it seems like it’s okay with regard to the current state of the lease and the law.
In my opinion, the lease is violated if President Trump acts constructively as a director, manager, or officer, no matter what his official title is.
So if young Trump visits Dad and says, “Hey, things are going great with third quarter revenue,” and Dad nods pleasantly, there’s no violation.
But if he says “Third quarter revenue is slumping,” and Dad says, “Write off that swimming pool refurbish cost to boost your numbers,” then the lease is violated.