Generally this refers to the Budapest Memorandum which the U.S., the U.K., and Russia “assured” Ukraine of its security in return for giving up its nukes.
“Assurance” is apparently not a legal obligation.
Generally this refers to the Budapest Memorandum which the U.S., the U.K., and Russia “assured” Ukraine of its security in return for giving up its nukes.
“Assurance” is apparently not a legal obligation.
In hindsight one wonders if Ukraine should have held out for an iron-clad security treaty with the US before giving up its nukes.
Aside from everything else, this war is a setback for nuclear non-proliferation. There are probably a number of countries around the world wondering whether their long-term security is best achieved through nukes…
It doesn’t exist. The Budapest Memorandum does not impose any requirement for the US to defend Ukraine. It’s 6 short bullet points. I don’t understand the confusion here.
You should ask the Czechs about the awesomeness of iron clad security guarantees.
No, it pretty clearly doesn’t impose any requirement on the part of the US to defend it. It does state Russia will honor Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, but you can see how far that promise went in 2014, let alone today. There is no mechanism for Ukraine to request enforcement of even the rather nebulous points of the memorandum, for that matter, and it’s really not all that surprising that Russia would ignore them when it wanted too.
This is at least the second thread where this came up. All it does is require each basically to respect the sovereignty of Ukraine. It doesn’t say that Russia will defend them against US actions or vice versa. It says that Russia won’t invade, the US won’t invade, and the UK won’t invade.
I also don’t know why this keeps coming up as some sort of protection of Ukraine that the US guaranteed. We only guaranteed that we wouldn’t attack them.
I think this is realistic. Only thing I would add, tho, is Ukraine - and others in the West - trying to get SOME assurance that in 10 years or so the bear won’t take another bite out of Ukraine.
I don’t really know what a sovereign state like Ukraine can do to stave off aggressive action by a neighbor - short of aligning itself with someone else. Such as joining NATO. And, if a state like Ukraine is not willing to take proactive steps, I’m not sure how concerned other states ought to be about bailing them out again.
Maybe I’m misreading what you are saying here, but Ukraine has been practically begging to be part of NATO. In fact, they just made yet another appeal to be included in both NATO and the EU directly to the European parliament. They have been repeatedly turned down, or at least backburnered. But it’s not their choice or desire.
Trouble with this is…how could anyone trust Russian assurances? I mean, Russia assured Ukraine they would honor their territorial boundaries and sovereignty when Ukraine was asked to give up its nukes…and then turned around in 2014 and took Crimea. And now, launched an invasion. Not exactly a track record that builds trust.
I’m merely suggesting SOME assurances be added to your proposal - which I opined was reasonable. So the settlement MIGHT say the remaining Ukraine would join NATO. OR perhaps there are steps short of that. Some bilateral treaties? Possible leasing of western bases? Some western investment in border territories, such that future incursions would equate to a direct attack on western interests? Possibly some clearly set out economic implications?
Russia would never accept that, however. In fact, that is probably the one point that is a red line for them. They would not accept this as part of a settlement. Only if Ukraine, by some miracle, won this fight and pushed Russia out would it even be considered.
Like what? Seriously, short of a mutual defense treaty, I can’t see any sort of bilateral treaty doing anything to ensure this didn’t happen again.
No on a lot of different levels. Again, red line for Russia. Also, without the treaties to back them up, what good would the bases be?
I think that’s already going to happen and is in fact happening already. And, yeah, that’s about the best we can do. With a well-defined set of economic impacts if Russia violates Ukrainian territory…again.
There is not much that a country like Ukraine can do on it’s own to prevent a larger and more powerful neighbor from doing whatever it wants, whenever it wants. However, I think what you may be getting at here is something similar to Finlandization, where Ukraine could happily co-exist with it’s neighbor by agreeing to work with Russia while simultaneously aligning itself toward the west, and also not posing any perceived threats to Russia (such as joining NATO, allowing EU military presence, accepting arms from the west, etc.).
However, after this past weeks’ aggression by Russia, things may be too far gone to propose this sort of cooperation.
To date, Taiwan seems to have been able to stave of a Chinese takeover. Didn’t believe they were a member of NATO.
If the US is not willing to take similar steps WRT Ukraine, does that indicate that the US simply does not care as much about Ukraine? Does not think them as important?
No. We do care about Ukraine. It’s why we were pushing for military aid and sharing intelligence with them, etc etc. It’s why Biden et al were pushing for sanctions with real teeth to be laid out before the invasion as something to try and make Russia rethink their invasion. But the US doesn’t have any sort of formal defense treaty with Ukraine. And, pretty obviously, NATO and Europe didn’t have any taste for going to Ukraine’s aid directly. And, frankly, there wasn’t any in the US either. Nor anywhere else.
Taiwan is a whole 'nother kettle of fish wrt defending it from China. The US does have several treaties with Taiwan, as well as a long history going back over 50 years. They are also a very successful democracy (which Ukraine is just starting to become) who is also a key in the global economy…and happens to sit astride a major trade hub for global trade. There are a lot of factors that make Taiwan different than Ukraine from the US’s perspective. But none of this means we don’t care about Ukraine.
Note - I said “care as much.” The options exist. But if we chose not to exercise them…
Is there a god explanation why the west did not take more action WRT Crimea? Is that not the clearest analogy?
Also be aware that The United States might or might not respond with actual military involvement if China invaded Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act commits the U.S. to providing arms to Taiwan but leaves its getting militarily involved ambiguous.
In 2014, just prior to Crimea being annexed by Russia, Ukraine kicked their pro-Russia leader out of the country under revolutionary standards. I think the west was reluctant to get too involved other than some finger-wagging, not knowing what sort of government may take over. Putin knew that was a good moment of chaos to swoop-in to grab Crimea, under the pretext of “security”, as is being used in the current situation. Also, I believe Crimea has a large pro-Russia population to start with.
I am aware of this, yes. But we do have a treaty (which, as I’ve said repeatedly ‘of sorts’) and history, so the odds of us responding are much more than in Ukraine. Strategic ambiguity has been our go-to wrt Taiwan and China for decades now, and it doesn’t look like that will change. I personally think it’s a mistake, but they don’t generally consult with me so it’s kind of moot what I think or don’t think. ![]()
Basically, they didn’t want to push Russia too hard. It was felt that Crimea wasn’t worth pushing them to do more or into a corner. In hindsight (and really, even at the time) I think it was a mistake, but this was when Europe was really opening up trade with Russia and the Europeans weren’t in any sort of mood to hammer Russia…or detract from their own trade or hurt their own economies. Germany, especially, was wanting to get rid of their nuclear plants and coal-burning plants and make a big switch to natural gas, and their best option for that was Russia.
But mostly because there was enormous support in Crimea itself for the annexation.
I actually don’t think that was a major consideration from the west’s perspective, but I could be wrong. Mainly because of how hinky the whole thing was wrt how Russia did it and how they counted the vote. Even if a majority of people in Crimea wanted to simply leave that’s not the way it’s done.