What if Ayad Allawi became Iraq's Prime Minister in 2010?

What if Ayad Allawi, rather than Nouri Al-Maliki, became Iraq’s Prime Minsiter in 2010? (For what it’s worth, a good way to make this occur might be to make Iraqiyya’s “victory” in 2010 more impressive than it was in real life.)

How exactly would this have affected post-2010 U.S.-Iraqi relations? Likewise, how exactly would this have affected developments in Iraq, in Syria, and in other parts of the Middle East and Arab World after 2010?

Any thoughts on this?

Also, for what it’s worth, here is what I can imagine:

-Iraqi Sunnis would have been much less dissatisfied with the Iraqi government (at least until the next Iraqi elections in 2014).
-The U.S. might remain in Iraq after 2011, but I am not completely sure about this. After all, Iraqiyya wouldn’t have had a majority in the Iraqi Parliament and would have thus needed to compromise with other parties in regards to various issues (possibly including this issue).
-Less Sunni dissatisfaction in Iraq, along with a (probably) somewhat less corrupt Iraqi military means that ISIS probably wouldn’t be able to make significant gains in Iraq until at least 2014 (which is when the next Iraqi elections would have occurred). If Allawi remains Iraqi Prime Minister in 2014, then ISIS might either never get a significant foothold in Iraq or only get a significant foothold in Iraq at least several years later. However, if some sectarian Shiite politician (either Nouri Al-Maliki or someone else) replaces Ayad Allawi as Iraq’s Prime Minister in 2014, then ISIS might get some footholds in Iraq in the 2014-2018 time period. Of course, a lot depends on whether or not (and if so, exactly how many) U.S. troops remain in Iraq after 2011 in this scenario.

Anyway, any thoughts on this?

Al-Maliki significantly weakened the new Iraqi army, by acting like a tin-pot dictator and making sure that important positions went to his supporters, rather than to competent people.

From that perspective, just about anybody else probably would have been better.

it is a very americna naivete to think that their bureaucratic habits are going to be just ‘trained into’ a country.

Al Maliki acted in an Iraqi context to reinfoce his power by the paths of the Iraqi culture. It is extremely naive to think that Allaoui would be different.

But maybe he would have made better choices of his clients in placement, that is a possible diference. And it is very possible that Allaoui would have more widely engaged the non-shia factions.

You nailed it very well yourself, Ayad Allawi as prime minister would be moderate and more inclusive. He would not have played sectarian politics such as going after the Sunni Vice President on trumped up charges. He would not have alienated those who did not agree with him, including Shiites who were opposed to him.
Iraq was becoming safer after the U.S left. The oil production was going up, but Maliki screwed everything up.

Yes ISIS would not have gotten the foothold that it did later with Allawi at the helm. This despite the conflict in neighboring Syria.
It was a great move when Maliki was fired last year by the president, Fuad Masum. Prime minister Haider al-Abadi is much better.

I disagree that Maliki’s actions were in line with “Iraqi culture”. He was very divisive, and it hurt Iraq and the country could ill afford divisive politics.

So no he was not in line with “culture”, that is saying Iraq being sectarian is normal:smack:. And it is not “American naïveté”.

And?

Yes he was divisive and he focused on the well rooted channels of the identity and the loyalty in the prevalent Iraqi culture, which are the tribal and the affiliation group - sect, but even more specific than that, and the ancient traditions of patronage and reward (hardly unique to the Iraqi culture of course, in fact the normal until quite recently even in the western bureaucratic state).

No it is saying that in the Iraqi culture, with a weak tradition of the sense of the cultural identity for a national state (created by the colonial powers out of several old ottoman regions), a weak (that is no) tradition of power sharing by the dominant political group, the deep roots of old patronage habits and tribla and affiliation politics contre the shallow roots of the abstraction of the affiliation to the idea of Iraq - and the severe security instability, the Maliki government drew on the safe sources of power in the shortest term.

yes, it is actually. It shows in your response.