What conventional weapons? As shattered as Japan’s industrial capacity was by the real end of the war, an invasion would have waited until aerial bombing rendered them unable to even make bullets; Japan would have been fighting an invasion with rocks and sticks.
Heisenberg had to argue with the Luftwaffe for uranium. It was used to make luminous aircraft instruments. There was a hell of a lot of it on the submarine, though.
No. Not at all.
The Japanese had already stockpiled an enormous amount of ammunition and supplies. These were scattered and held in caves and other places safe from Allied shelling and bombing. (I discussed this earlier in the thread.)
Likewise, fuel for the kamikaze attacks were also stored and waiting.
They would not have been able to fight endlessly, but enough to make the battles quite painful.
Japan had no method of further refining any uranium. Zero. Their atomic program had never been robust and had been discontinued before this mission.
There wasn’t that much uranium on the German Sub U-234. Uranium trioxide has a density of 5.5-8.7 g/cubic centimetre. So 550 kg would take up at most 100 litres of space. Think half a 40 gallon drum. Uranium dioxide is even denser so would take even less volume. If it could be refined with no wastage (a practical impossibility for Japan in 1945) this could have produced 3.7kg of U-235.
By comparison, by July 1942 the Manhatten project was producing a tonne of uranium dioxidea day. This then had to be further separated so that the fissile U-235 could be extracted. Three separate methods were used, each requiring the development of pretty large factories. The end result of all this production and refining was:
Thanks, lisiate.
That particular article is a piece of crap. Ward Wilson is a fantastic author but this is not one of his better pieces. Here is an expanded version (pdf) but again one which misses the point.
Here is a rebuttal which is much closer to the actual situation.
I covered this in this lengthy post as well as the follow up in this post.
The conventional thinking that it was simply the atomic bombing is wrong as is the revisionism that the Soviet entry was more important.
From the second of the posts:
The linked posts are fairly lengthy. To summarize and then slightly expand, be aware that there was a Supreme War Council (Supreme Council for the Direction of the War) which consisted of six members: the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the War Minister (Army) Navy Minister, Chief of Staff Army and Chief of Staff Navy.
The Council was divided down the middle (three to three) between the Doves (surrender if the position of the emperor is guaranteed) and the Hawks (let’s fight forever!) who wanted to end the war on terms unacceptable to the Allies. The emperor wanted the war to end, but wasn’t able to order that.
The Hawks had been stalling discussions about surrendering for months by suggesting that the Soviets may negotiate on their behalf. The Soviets were keeping the Japanese hanging by not giving clear answers while they were preparing their invasions of Japanese held territory, moving their 1.5 million men, tanks and other equipment into position and ready to go.
As long as the Soviets weren’t replying, the Hawks refused further discussions.
Japan went from not ready to surrender on August 5th to accepting the surrender within 10 days. There were four main steps involved.
First, the Doves pushed harder.
Second, the Hawks stopped evading discussions. (They didn’t agree to surrender, but they allowed the discussion to happen.)
Third, the emperor intervened (Divine intervention)
Fourth, the military acquiesced and didn’t mount a coup.
It can be demonstrated that in Step One, the Hiroshima atomic bombing had a large impact on the Peace Faction (as well as the emperor, which contributed to step three). The atomic bombing directly lead to another session of the Supreme War Council. (Point to atomic bombing)
It is known that the militarists were not able to table the discussions because of Soviet entry into the war. They were forced to agree to attend the meeting. (Point to Soviet entry into war)
It is unknown what exactly were the reasons that Hirohito elected to make an extraconstitutional move of intervening before the advisers had come to a unanimous decision. He had been pushing for the war to end since late spring. Would he have done the same if only one of the factors were in play? That’s unknown, but very possible.
It is unknown exactly why the militarists acquiesced and didn’t mount a coup. I discussed this more in the linked articles. I believe it was the “twin shocks” of the two events.
As is widely known, the fear of a coup as well founded. That the Kyujo incident failed shows how much danger there was.
TL,DR verision: I think both events were necessary for the surrender to occur at that time.
I haven’t read anything specifically addressing this, but my guess is that the part about the Soviets was really internal stuff. That only affected the negotiations between the two factions within the Supreme War Council and would not be known to outsiders.
The real target of the emperor’s radio address was not necessarily the general public but rather the colonels and majors of the Imperial Japanese Army. Make sure that the public and enlisted men knew about it to prevent officers from leading a coup.
The atomic bombing provided a face-saving reason. Yes, the IJA was still the best in the world, but the other side has technology that we can’t compete with. The entry of the Soviets would not necessarily be an immediate game changer as far as the war itself goes.
My WAG, YMMV.
And of course, the Japanese not only lacked the facilities to process the uranium, they were completely without the ability to engineer, fund, build or even power those facilities.
If the Germans could have magically delivered 1000 times as much uranium to the Japanese, they still would not have been a day closer to making an atomic bomb, dirty or not.
I know the official party line is that the military didn’t want to surrender due to concern for the emperor and to avoid dishonor, but I wonder if the top military brass were actually more concerned for their own safety. They knew that each of them would be tried, and very probably convicted, of war crimes. Any last ditch sacrifice Japan made in the hopes that the allies would decide that invasion wasn’t worth it could allow them to negotiate terms that allowed them to keep their necks out of the noose.
Certainly this would be a factor. I’ve read that conjecture explicitly made by scholars. Afterall, one of the three conditions which the militarists were holding out for was that Japan was to try its own war criminals.
However I think that it was not entirely about the top generals and admirals wanting to save their own personal skin. An unconditional surrender would eliminate the military as they knew it, which would drastically affect most everyone they have interacted with over the previous several decades of their lives.
One sticky point was the kokutai, which the military interpreted as “the Japanese way” much like we were fighting for “the American way” during the cold war. I’m not completely unsympathetic to the idea, after all there were Americans saying “better dead than Red.”
However, all of that needs to be looked at at what a horrible cost the “Japanese way” had on civilians in Asia and the cruel inhumanity manifested toward both civilians and enemy troops.
Exploiting the emperor’s position was an honored tradition throughout Japanese history. After the nation was was forced to open up to Western powers in the 19th century, people unhappy with the bakufu (“shogun” government) used the slogan of revere the emperor, expel the barbarians 尊皇攘夷 to overthrow the Tokugawa regime.
After the Meiji Restoration, the militarists started the cult of the emperor to consolidate their power.
General Anami, Minister of War and the most powerful person in the government had the most to lose. He was vacillating in the same meetings between accepting the surrender terms and insisting on a final battle to attempt to push the Americans back.
He could have easily toppled the civilian government and carried out a coup. I often wonder why he didn’t. On the second link in my previous post, I quote about how he handled subordinated who did want a coup. Yet, he knew about the impending one and didn’t attempt to stop it.
He committed suicide after the surrender so we don’t know his motives.